The Senate Intelligence Committee Report on Torture: Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program (70 page)

346.
As described, the “Renditions and Interrogations Group,” is also referred to as the “Renditions Group,” the “Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation Group,” “RDI,” and “RDG” in CIA records.

347.
Interview Report, 2003-7123-JG, Review of Interrogations for Counterterrorism Purposes, █████████████, February 23, 2003.

348.
█████████ 10140 (031727Z JAN 03).

349.
See email from: █████████; to: █████████; subject: EYES ONLY - [████████████] ONLY – MEMORANDUM FOR ADDO/DDO; date: January 22, 2003. In an April 12, 2007, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence hearing, Senator Carl Levin asked the CIA Director if the CIA disputed allegations in an International Committee of the Red Cross report that suggested CIA detainees were placed in “[p]rolonged stress standing position, naked, arm[s] chained above the head . . . .” The CIA Director responded, “Not above the head. Stress positions are part of the EITs, and nakedness were part of the EITs, Senator.” See Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Hearing Transcript, dated April 12, 2007 (DTS #2007-3158).

350.
See, for example, CIA Office of Inspector General, Report of Investigation: Unauthorized Interrogation Techniques at [DETENTION SITE BLUE], (2003-7123-IG), October 29, 2003; email from: [DETENTION SITE BLUE] COB ██████████████; to: █████████████████; subject: EYES ONLY - [███████████l ONLY -- MEMO FOR ADDO/DDO; date: January 22, 2003.

351.
For additional details, see Volume III.

352.
CIA Office of Inspector General, Report of Investigation: Unauthorized Interrogation Techniques at [DETENTION SITE BLUE], (2003-7123-IG), October 29, 2003.

353.
CIA Office of Inspector General, Special Review – Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program, (2003-7123-IG), May 2004.

354.
CIA Office of Inspector General, Report of Investigation: Unauthorized Interrogation Techniques at [DETENTION SITE BLUE], (2003-7123-IG), October 29, 2003.

355.
CIA Office of Inspector General, Report of Investigation: Unauthorized
Interrogation Techniques at [DETENTION SITE BLUE], (2003-7123-IG), October 29,
2003.

356.
████████ [CIA OFFICER 2] received a one-year Letter of Reprimand, was suspended for five days without pay, and was prohibited from promotions, within-grade step increases, quality step increases, or permanent salary increases during that one-year period. The decision did not affect ██████████ [CIA OFFICER 2’s] eligibility to receive Exceptional Performance Awards, bonuses, or non-monetary forms of recognition. See █████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████. ████████ [CIA OFFICER 2] retired from the CIA on ████████, 2004. (See ██████████████████████████████████████████.
) On June
20, 2005, the CIA director of transnational issues, aware of ██████████ [CIA OFFICER 2’s] problematic background, approved ███████████ [CIA OFFICER 2’s] employment on a CIA contract because the project was “mission critical” and “no other contractor with the needed skills was available.” (See ███████████████████████████████████████
.
) The chief of Base received a two-year Letter of Reprimand and a ten-day suspension without pay, and was prohibited from receiving any bonus awards from the CIA during the period of reprimand. On ███████████, 2003, prior to the implementation of the prohibitions, this individual retired from the CIA. See ███████████████████.

357.
████████ 10267 ████████████.

358.
According to a December 12, 2002, CIA cable, al-Nashiri “visibly and markedly trembles with fear every time he sees [███████].” See ████████ 10038 (122119Z DEC 02).

359.
Email from: █████████; to: █████████████; cc: [REDACTED]; subject: Re: date: January 22, 2003. Despite this notification █████████ did not immediately resign from the interrogation program.

360.
Email from: █████████; to: ██████████, [REDACTED], ██████████████, ███████████, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: CONCERNS OVER REVISED INTERROGATION PLAN FOR NASHIRI; date: January 22, 2003. █████████, referenced in the passage as a “HVT Interrogator,” was the chief of interrogations.

361.
Email from: ████████; to: ████████, [REDACTED], ████████, ████████, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: CONCERNS OVER REVISED INTERROGATION PLAN FOR NASHIRI; date: January 22, 2003. As noted above, personnel from CIA’s Office of Medical Services raised the same concerns about medical and psychological personnel serving both to assess the health of a detainee and to participate in the interrogation process.

362.
DIRECTOR █████ (201659Z JAN 03); DIRECTOR █████ (230008Z JAN 03).

363.
██████ 10289 (241203Z JAN 03); ████ 10296 (251113Z JAN 03), ███████ 10306 (261403Z JAN 03).

364.
██████ 10309 (261403Z JAN 03).

365.
██████ 10312 (270854Z JAN 03).

366.
HEADQUARTERS █████ (031945Z SEP 06); ██████ 1242 (050744Z SEP 06); HEADQUARTERS ████ (051613Z SEP 06).

367.
See, for example, ███████ 11247 (141321Z APR 03); █████████ 1959 (111700Z DEC 04); █████████ 2038 (211558Z JAN 05); ███████ 2169 (251133Z MAR 05); █████ 11701 (191640Z MAY 03); ████████████████ 1756 (190800Z SEP 03).

368.
█████████ 1502 (021841Z AUG 04); ██████ 2709 (271517Z APR 06); ████ 3910 (241852Z JAN 06); █████ 2709 (271517Z APR 06).

369.
See, for example, █████ 1029 (291750Z JUN 06); ████ 1142 (041358Z AUG 06); ██████ 1543 (111600Z AUG 04); ████████ 1716 (180742Z SEP 04); █████ 3051 (301235Z SEP 05); █████ 1029 (291750Z JUN 06); ██████ 2474 (251622Z JUN 05); ██████ 2673 (021451Z AUG 05); ███████ 1716 (180742Z SEP 04).

370.
See, for example, ███████ 1356 (011644Z JUL 04); ██████ 1880 (140917Z NOV 04); ██████ 1959 (111700Z DEC 04); ██████ 1962 (121029Z DEC 04); ██████ 1959 (111700Z DEC 04); ██████ 2038 (211558Z JAN 05); █████████ 1091 (031835Z NOV 03); ████████████ 1266 (052309Z JAN 04); ██████████████ 1630 (271440Z MAR 04).

371.
█████████ 1203 (231709Z MAY 04); ██████████ 1202 (231644Z MAY 04).

372.
█████████ 1843 (271356Z OCT 04). In the final years of al-Nashiri’s detention, most of the intelligence requirements for al-Nashiri involved showing al-Nashiri photographs. In June 2005, the DETENTION SITE BLACK chief of Base suspended even these debriefings because it was “the very, very rare moment” that al-Nashiri would recognize a photograph, and because the debriefings often were the “catalyst” for his outbursts. See ██████████ 2474 (251622Z JUN 05).

373.
While still in the custody of a foreign government, prior to his rendition to CIA custody, al-Nashiri provided details on multiple terrorist plots in which he was involved prior to his detention, including the attacks against the
USS Cole
and the
MV Limburg
, plans to sink oil tankers in the Strait of Hormuz, plans to attack warships docked at ports in Dubai and Jeddah, and his casing of a Dubai amusement park. This information was disseminated in intelligence reports: ███████ 36595 ██████████████; █████ 36726 ██████████████████; ALEC ███████. For disseminated intelligence, see ██████████ CIA ████ █████████; ██████████████████ CIA █████ ████████; ██████████████████ CIA █████ ████████; ██████████████████ CIA █████ ████████. For other reporting from al-Nashiri while he was in the custody of a foreign government, see ██████ 70879 ███████████████; █████ 70866 █████████; ████████████ 70868 █████████; ███████ 70870 ███████. For disseminated intelligence, see ███████████; ███████; ███████.

374.
ALEC █████ ██████████.

375.
[REDACTED] 84200 █████████.

376.
DIRECTOR ████ ███████.

377.
███████ 10640 ████████.

378.
The CIA insisted █████████████ be redacted in the Committee Study prior to the Study being relocated to the U.S. Senate from the off-site research facility.

379.
████████ 78275 █████ DEC 02).

380.
[REDACTED] 1888 ███████.

381.
[REDACTED] 2666 ████████.

382.
HEADQUARTERS ████ ██████.

383.
[REDACTED] 3280 ███████. According to the cable, the CIA Station speculated that the change of position was “at least somewhat attributable . . . to our gift of $█ million . . . .”

384.
See Volume I for additional details.

385.
[REDACTED] 7526 ([REDACTED] [REDACTED]).

386.
[REDACTED] 7849 ([REDACTED] [REDACTED]).

387.
[REDACTED] 9210 (231043Z SEP 06).

388.
[REDACTED] 7839 ([REDACTED]). Email from: [REDACTED]; to [REDACTED]; subject: BOMBSHELL; date: [REDACTED]. Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: CIA Prisons in [Country █]; date: [REDACTED]. Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: I think [████████████] had to react [REDACTED]. ████████; date: [REDACTED].

389.
ALEC █████ (222334Z SEP 01); █████ 92557 (15SEP 01).

390.
ALEC █████ (292345Z AUG 02); ALEC ██████ (111551Z SEP 02). The CIA represented to policymakers and others—inaccurately—that “as a result of the use of EITs” Abu Zubaydah provided information on Ramzi bin al-Shibh that played a “key role in the ultimate capture of Ramzi Bin al-Shibh.” See section of this summary on the “Capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh” and Volume II for additional details.

391.
See ████████ 22507 █████████████; █████ 22508 ████████████; █████ 20744 █████████.

392.
██████ 10406 █████████
See also
████ 22694 ██████████████████████ 22695 ████████████████████████████ 10407 ███████████████████████████████████████████████████████.

393.
ALEC ████ (130206Z SEP 02); ALEC ████ (222334Z SEP 01); █████ 92557 (15 SEP 01); ALEC ████ (270132Z JUL 02); █████ 97470 (281317Z MAR 02).

394.
ALEC ████ (302240Z JUN 05).

395.
ALEC ████ (131444Z FEB 03).

396.
ALEC ████ (111551Z SEP 02).

397.
DIRECTOR ████ █████ DEC 02).

398.
█████ 22888 (240845Z FEB 03).

399.
█████ 22888 (240845Z FEB 03).

400.
According to a 2005 CIA assessment, the “most significant” reporting from Ramzi bin al-Shibh on potential future attacks was background information related to al-Qa’ida’s plans to attack Heathrow Airport. According to the CIA, Ramzi bin al-Shibh provided “useful intelligence,” including an “overview of the plot” that was then used in the interrogation of other detainees. (See ALEC ████ (302240Z JUN 05).) Ramzi bin al-Shibh provided the majority of this information in mid-October 2002, while in foreign government custody. See CIA ████ █████████.

401.
█████ 10406 █████████.
See also
████ 22694 ███████████████████████████ 22695 ███████████████████████████████10407 ████████████████████████████████████████████████████████.

402.
█████ 10361 ███████.

403.
This included Khaled Shaykh Mohammed (█████ 10654 (030904Z MAR 03)); Hambali ████████████ 1310 (101825Z SEP 03)); Abu Yasir al-Jaza’iri (█████ 10990 ████████); Abd al-Latif al-Barq ██████ 12348 ████████); Hambali and Lillie (█████████ 1243 (152049Z AUG 03)); Hassan Ghul (██████ 1267 (████ JAN 04)); Adnan al-Libi ██████████ 1758 ███████; and AL-TURKI ██████████ 2179 ████████.

404.
█████ 10361 ███████.

405.
█████ 10361 ███████.

406.
█████ 10361 ████████. See Volume II for detailed information on CIA representations to Congress.

407.
█████ 10361 ███████.

408.
█████ 10361 ███████.

409.
This included Asadullah (DIRECTOR ████ (████ FEB 03)); Abu Yasir al-Jaza’iri ██████████ 35558 (████ MAR 03)); Suleiman Abdullah ███████████ 35787 (████ MAR 03); ██████████ 36023 (████ APR 03)); Abu Hudhaifa ██████████ 38576 (████ MAY 03)); Hambali ██████████ 1241 (151912Z AUG 03)); and Majid Khan (███████ 46471 (241242Z MAY 03); ████████ 39077 (27179Z MAY 03)).

410.
For additional information, see Volume III. In an April 12, 2007, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence hearing, Senator Levin asked the CIA Director if the CIA disputed allegations in an International Committee of the Red Cross report that suggested CIA detainees were placed in “[p]rolonged stress standing position, naked, arm[s] chained above the head . . .” The CIA Director responded, “Not above the head. Stress positions are part of the EITs, and nakedness were part of the EITs, Senator.” Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Hearing Transcript, dated April 12, 2007 (DTS #2007-3158).

411.
See Volume III for additional information.

412.
█████ 10452 (121723Z FEB 03).

413.
ALEC ████ (131444Z FEB 03).

414.
█████ 10446 (111754Z FEB 03). The Committee was informed that the CIA’s standard practice during coercive interrogations was to ask questions to which interrogators already knew the answers in order to assess the detainee’s level of cooperation. The Committee was further informed that only after detainees were assessed to be cooperative did interrogators ask questions whose answers were unknown to the CIA. See, for example, Transcript of SSCI Hearing, April 12, 2007 (testimony of CIA Director Michael Hayden) (DTS #2007-3158).

415.
█████ 10452 (121723Z FEB 03). In June 2002, Ramzi bin al-Shibh participated with KSM in an interview with the al-Jazeera television network on the 9/11 attacks. DIRECTOR ████ (112136Z SEP 02).