The Third World War - The Untold Story (43 page)

That, in essence, was the Soviet naval plan. It was a good one, and it very nearly worked.

Admiral Maybury then continued his talk on the basis of the Soviet naval objectives and dispositions already described, with brief accounts of some selected actions, all of which it must be emphasized were taking place at about the same time. He began with the heavy cruiser
Kirov.

It was known in CINCUSNAVEUR on 1 August that this ship had sailed from the Kola inlet a day or so before and headed south-west towards the middle of the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap at moderate speed. From time to time, in the past, the
Kirov
had proceeded into the Atlantic, west of Iceland, and appeared to be acting as target for
Backfire
strikes from airfields in the Murmansk area; it was good training, also, for the Soviet maritime reconnaissance aircraft and for satellite surveillance. What was not known, on this occasion, was that the
Kirov
was accompanied by an Oscar-class nuclear attack submarine, keeping station beneath her, so that her noise signature could not be distinguished from that of the surface ship.

By 3 August the
Kirov
was about 350 miles south of Cape Farewell. Suddenly the US Navy
Orion
that had been trailing the cruiser detected another echo close to her. The echoes then merged, and after a short while separated. The
Orion
continued to trail what she felt sure was the cruiser, while the other echo headed south at 20 knots; both echoes were now observing radar and radio silence. It was the
Kirov,
however, that was heading south. Early on the 4th the cruiser intercepted the British container ship
Leeds United,
the exact position, course and speed of which had been transmitted to the
Kirov
by Moscow. The
Leeds United
never knew what hit her - two SS-N-19 conventionally-armed tactical missiles fired from over the horizon. During the next three days the
Kirov
destroyed, in the same way, no less than seven Allied ships, all valuable. As none of them managed to transmit an SOS, let alone a raider report, these losses went unnoticed.
Kirov’s
orders were to continue south towards the Cape Verde Islands where she could replenish with missiles at the Soviet base at Porte Grande. Having already used up all her surface-to-surface missiles (SSM), her capable Captain Fokin decided instead to make all speed back to Murmansk, passing through the Denmark Strait. He knew that the US airfield at Keflavik had been put temporarily out of action by bombardment with submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) specially developed for the purpose, fitted into the old but still operational
Golf
-class boats. In the event, the
Kirov
was located by a Canadian
Orion,
which managed to keep just out of range of the cruiser’s SAM. On 9 August the
Kirov
was severely damaged by
Harpoon
attack from the US submarine
Dallas,
and later sunk by torpedoes from the submarine’s squadron mate, the
Groton.

In the Mediterranean, on 2 August, the Soviet Fifth
Eskadra
came to its regular anchorage in the Gulf of Hammamet, off the coast of Tunisia; that is to say, the surface ships and their auxiliaries did. The submarines - two
Charlie
II SSGN (submarine, guided missile, nuclear powered), and two
Victor
SSN - remained in deep water, a pair consisting of one of each type patrolling to the east and to the west of Malta. On 2 August the Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH) and the Commander, Sixth Fleet, agreed that it would be advisable for the carrier battle group, which was already at short notice for sea, to sail from Naples and proceed to exercise south-east of Malta. The Soviet
Eskadra
was, of course, kept under surveillance. However, the electronic deception of the Soviet force was successful, in so far as the guided-missile cruisers
Admiral Drozd, Sevastopol
and
Admiral Golovko
with their accompanying missile destroyers were able to weigh anchor after dark on 3 August and proceed eastwards at high speed without immediately being trailed.

The force was located at about 0300 on 4 August by one of CINCSOUTH’s reconnaissance aircraft about 150 miles to the westward of the
Forrestal
and her battle group. Admiral Lorimer, commanding the Sixth Fleet, immediately ordered reconnaissance to be flown off and a strike readied. At this time both the Soviet submarines of the eastern group were in contact with
Forrestal’s
battle group and had received orders to commence hostilities at 0400. Sonar conditions, with the warmer surface water typical of the Mediterranean in summer, greatly assisted the submarines to remain undetected. A few minutes after 0400, and before the American admiral had received the order to open hostilities, his flagship was struck by two guided missiles which started fires in the hangar and among the aircraft ranged and armed for the strike. The AWACS aircraft, which had been airborne since 0300, was able to report the incoming missiles as submarine launched, and shortly afterwards

detected a stream of missiles approaching from the Soviet force to the westward. This time the counter-measures had some effect. No more missiles hit the
Forrestal,
but two of her accompanying destroyers were hit. The fires in the
Forrestal
herself were being brought under control, damaged aircraft ditched and those which were intact prepared to fly off. A surface striking group was forming up, and the carrier altered round to the north-westward, into wind, to fly off the strike aircraft. This new course, as it happened, took the carrier within torpedo range of the second Soviet submarine, and at 0437 hours she was struck by two torpedoes, one of which damaged her port rudder and propellers.

In the surface-ship action that followed, the entire Soviet force was sunk, but the
Forrestal
had to seek permission to enter Maltese territorial waters, and was with difficulty brought into Marsaxlokk and anchored. That evening one of the western group of Soviet submarines was sunk by the USS
Arthur W. Radford
while attempting to get within torpedo range of the carrier.

The US battle group in the Indian Ocean was centred on the nuclear-powered carrier
Nimitz.
Sailing from Diego Garcia on 2 August, this force set course north-westwards towards the Arabian Sea. The Soviet Indian Ocean Squadron was known to be at Socotra, and it was the intention to get within airstriking range of it as soon as possible. The battle group’s movements were, of course, impossible to conceal from satellite reconnaissance. Using their exceptionally high speed, two torpedo-armed submarines, Soviet
Alpha
-class SSN, took up an intercepting position which would enable contact to be made with the US battle group at about 0100 on 4 August. Because the US force was steaming at 25 knots, it was unable to utilize its ASW helicopters for screening, and its fixed-wing anti-submarine aircraft, relying upon sonobuoys for submarine detection, were in the circumstances of little value. Once again, therefore, a successful submarine attack was carried out shortly after the opening of hostilities. Fortunately, however, only one torpedo hit the
Nimitz,
and although it was fairly far aft, the carrier’s speed was reduced by only 4 knots; more importantly, her reactors remained safely in operation. A subsequent air strike on the Soviet squadron was not very successful. Casualties from SAM were heavy, mainly because the one electronic counter-measure (ECM) aircraft accompanying the strike lost power shortly after take-off and ditched. The carrier’s fighters were able to counter, fairly effectively, an attack on the battle group by Soviet
Backfires
from South Yemen. Honours, one might say, in the Indian Ocean were fairly even during the first few days of the war, although the lack of a dock anywhere nearer than San Diego large enough to take the damaged
Nimitz
was a serious matter.

The
Kirov-class
heavy cruiser in the Pacific had followed a rather similar pattern of operation to that of the
Kirov
herself in the Atlantic. That is to say, she would from time to time sortie from Petropavlovsk and proceed south-eastwards into the Pacific for some days, apparently in order to provide a reconnaissance and strike target for the Soviet Naval Air Force. On 1 August the cruiser followed the usual course into the Pacific. Fortunately, the US submarine
La Jolla
was on surveillance patrol in the vicinity of Petropavlovsk and the Soviet cruiser had a ‘tail’ as she went on her way. Shortly after hostilities were opened, the Soviet ship was attacked. The stricken cruiser, hit by three torpedoes, sank within twenty minutes.

In the meantime, the carrier
Kitty Hawk -
one of two in the US Seventh Fleet at that period - which was exercising to the eastward of Yokosuka with her
Aegis
-equipped cruiser consorts and some units of the Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Force, had been ordered to intercept the Soviet heavy cruiser as back-up for the
La Jolla.
But before this group had come within striking range of the Soviet warship the submarine report of its sinking was received in the
Kitty Hawk,
which then set course with her group to return to Yokosuka.

The American carrier
John F. Kennedy,
with her battle group, was in Subic Bay in the Philippines on 4 August. Admiral Carlsberg, the Commander, US Seventh Fleet, reckoned that his first duty, if the state of tension should be followed by war, was to take his force to sea and seek out and destroy the Soviet carrier
Minsk,
sister ship of the
Kiev,
which was currently using Cam Ranh Bay as an operational base. Accordingly he sailed his battle group from Subic at 1800 on 4 August after having conducted energetic ASW operations along the sortie route. What he did not know was that a Soviet submarine had that morning laid a minefield precisely where the
John F. Kennedy
would have to go when leaving Subic. The carrier duly detonated one of those mines and had to return to harbour, having first managed to fly off her aircraft. The
Minsk’s Forger
V/STOL fighters were no match for the strike carried out at dawn next day by the
John F. Kennedy’s
own air group, flying from the airfield in Manila. The Soviet carrier and two of her group were sunk. Two guided missile cruisers and two destroyers survived, however, and sank several merchant ships in the South China Sea before being interned in Surabaya, Java.

By this time the
Kitty Hawk
had been redeployed to Subic as flagship for Admiral Carlsberg in place of the damaged
John F. Kennedy.

The Soviet submarines stationed off Cape de Sao Roque, to the west of the Straits of Gibraltar, and off the Cape of Good Hope, all sank several important merchant ships during the first few days of hostilities, and all round the world ships were kept in harbour or back from danger zones pending developments. Several vessels struck mines laid a few days previously by Soviet merchant ships. There can be no doubt that the ‘instantaneous threat’ had been successfully put into effect.

The final operation now to be mentioned is the launching by the Soviet armies in the south, together with Romanian and Bulgarian assistance, of a seaborne assault upon the Dardanelles. Rather than make a direct attack in the immediate vicinity of the Bosporus, the Soviet forces advanced by land from Bulgaria - strongly opposed by a combined Greek-Turkish force already deployed against just that contingency - while simultaneously launching a sea and airborne assault on the port of Zonguldak. From there it was intended to proceed westwards along the coast, supported by the Black Sea Fleet, while at the same time threatening Ankara. As is now evident from Soviet records, it was expected that this campaign would induce the Turks to come to terms following the Soviet success in West Germany: These intentions were frustrated owing to the failure to reach their objectives on the Central Front.

One general point should be made before giving an outline - and it will have to be just that - of the naval operations that followed the first two days of hostilities, which is all that we have dealt with in the war at sea so far.