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I found it necessary in October to add a further note about Priorities, which were a source of fierce contention between the different Departments, each striving to do its utmost.
P
RIORITIESNOTE BY THE PRIME MINISTER
October
15, 1940.The very highest priority in personnel and material should be assigned to what may be called the Radio sphere. This demands scientists, wireless experts, and many classes of highly skilled labour and high-grade material. On the progress made, much of the winning of the war and our future strategy, especially Naval, depends. We must impart a far greater accuracy to the A.A. guns, and a far better protection to our warships and harbours. Not only research and experiments, but production, must be pushed hopefully forward from many directions, and after repeated disappointments we shall achieve success.
2. The IA priority must remain with aircraft production, for the purpose of executing approved target programmes. It must be an obligation upon them to contrive by every conceivable means not to let this priority be abused and needlessly hamper other vital departments. For this purpose they should specify their requirements in labour and material beforehand quarter by quarter, or, if practicable, month by month, and make all surplus available for others immediately. The priority is not to be exercised in the sense that aircraft production is completely to monopolise the supplies of any limited commodity. Where the condition prevails that the approved M.A.P. demands absorb the total supply, a special allocation must be made, even at prejudice to aircraft production, to provide the minimum essential needs of other departments or branches. This allocation, if not agreed, will be decided on the Cabinet level.
3. At present we are aiming at five armoured divisions, and armoured brigades equivalent to three more. This is not enough. We cannot hope to compete with the enemy in numbers of men, and must therefore rely upon an exceptional proportion of armoured fighting vehicles. Ten armoured divisions is the target to aim for to the end of 1941. For this purpose the Army must searchingly review their demands for mechanised transport, and large purchases of M.T. must be made in the United States. The home Army, working in this small island with highly developed communications of all kinds, cannot enjoy the same scale of transport which divisions on foreign service require. Improvisation and makeshift must be their guides. A staff officer renders no service to the country who aims at ideal standards, and thereafter simply adds and multiplies until impossible totals are reached. A report should be furnished of mechanical transport, first, second, and third line of British divisions –
(1) For foreign service,
(2) For home service,
(3) For troops on the beaches.
Any attempt to make heavy weather out of this problem is a failure to aid us in our need.
Wherever possible in England, horse transport should be used to supplement M.T. We improvidently sold a great many of our horses to the Germans, but there are still a good many in Ireland.
4. Special aid and occasional temporary priorities must be given to the laggard elements. Among these stand out the following:
(1) Rifles.
(2) Small-arms ammunition – above all the special types.
Intense efforts must be made to bring the new factories into production. The fact that scarcely any improvement is now expected until the end of the year – i.e., sixteen months after the outbreak of war – is grave. Twelve months should suffice for a cartridge factory. We have been mercifully spared from the worst consequences of this failure through the armies not being in action as was anticipated.
Trench mortar ammunition and A. T. gun ammunition are also in a shocking plight, and must be helped.
All these laggards must be the subject of weekly reports to the Production Council and to me.
5. The Navy must exercise its existing priorities in respect of small craft and anti-U-boat building. This applies also to merchant shipbuilding, and to craft for landing operations. Delay must be accepted upon all larger vessels that cannot finish in 1941. Plans must be made to go forward with all processes and parts which do not clash with prior needs. The utmost possible steel and armour-plate must be ordered in America.
By the middle of September the invasion menace seemed sufficiently glaring to arrest further movement of vital units to the East, especially as they had to go round the Cape. After a visit to the Dover sector, where the electric atmosphere was compulsive, I suspended for a few weeks the despatch of the New Zealanders and the remaining two tank battalions to the Middle East. At the same time I kept our three fast transports, “the Glen [Line] ships” as they were called, in hand for an emergency dash through the Mediterranean.
Prime Minister to General Ismay, for the Chiefs of Staff Committee.
17.IX.40
In all the circumstances it would be impossible to withdraw the New Zealand Brigade from their forward position on the Dover promontory. The two cruiser-tank battalions cannot go. Would it not be better to keep the Australians back and delay the whole convoy until the third week in October? After all, none of these forces going round the Cape can possibly arrive in time to influence the impending battle in Egypt. But they may play a big part here. Perhaps by the third week in October the Admiralty will be prepared to run greater risks. Anyhow, we cannot afford to make sure that the New Zealanders and the tank battalions are out of action throughout October in either theatre.
Prime Minister to General Ismay.
19.IX.40.
Be careful that the Glen ships are not got out of the way so that it will be impossible to take the armoured reinforcements through the Mediterranean if the need is sufficient to justify the risk. I don’t want to be told there are no suitable vessels available.
Let me know what other ships would be available if we should decide to run a convoy from west to east through the Mediterranean about the third week in October.
Although it was a fine September, I was frightened of fog.
Prime Minister to Colonel Jacob.
16.IX.40.
Pray send a copy of this report by First Sea Lord [about invasion in fog] to the Chiefs of the Staff for C.-in-C. Home Forces, adding: “I consider that fog is the gravest danger, as it throws both air forces out of action, baffles our artillery, prevents organised naval attack, and specially favours the infiltration tactics by which the enemy will most probably seek to secure his lodgments. Should conditions of fog prevail, the strongest possible air barrage must be put down upon the invasion ports during the night and early morning. I should be glad to be advised of the proposed naval action by our flotillas, both in darkness and at dawn:
(a)
if the fog lies more on the English than the French side of the Channel;
(b)
if it is uniform on both sides.“Are we proposing to use radio aids to navigation?
“Prolonged conditions of stand-by under frequent air bombardment will be exhausting to the enemy. Nonetheless, fog is our foe.”
In spite of all the danger it was important not to wear the men out.
Prime Minister to General Ismay.
18.IX.40.
Inquire from the C.O.S. Committee whether in view of the rough weather Alert Number 1 might not be discreetly relaxed to the next grade.
Report to me.
Prime Minister to General Ismay.
18.IX.40.
Make inquiries whether there is no way in which a sheet of flaming oil can be spread over one or more of the invasion harbours. This is no more than the old fire-ship story, with modern improvements, that was tried at Dunkirk in the days of the Armada. The Admiralty can surely think of something.
Prime Minister to Minister of Supply.
18.IX.40.
The De Wilde ammunition is of extreme importance. At Number 11 Group the bombing of its factory was evidently considered a great blow. I can quite understand the output dropping to 38,000 rounds in the week while you are moving from Woolwich and getting reinstated, but I trust it will revive again. Pray let me know your future forecast for the next four weeks. If there is revival in prospect, we might perhaps draw a little upon our reserve.
Prime Minister to Minister of Supply.
25.IX.40.
I must show you the comments made upon the latest returns of small-arms ammunition by my Statistical Department. They cause me the greatest anxiety. In particular the De Wilde ammunition, which is the most valuable, is the most smitten. It seems to me that a most tremendous effort must be made, not only on the whole field of Marks 7 and 8, but on De Wilde and armour-piercing. I am well aware of your difficulties. Will you let me know if there is any way in which I can help you to overcome them?
The reader must pardon this next Minute.
Prime Minister to First Lord.
18.IX.40.
Surely you can run to a new Admiralty flag. It grieves me to see the present dingy object every morning.
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I was relieved by the results produced by the new Ministry of Aircraft Production.
Prime Minister to Lord Beaverbrook.
21.IX.40.
The figures you gave me of the improvement in operational types between May 10 and August 30 are magnificent. If similar figures could be prepared down to September 30, which is not far off, I should prefer to read them to the Cabinet rather than circulate them. If, however, the September figures cannot be got until late in October, I will read [what I now have] to the Cabinet.
The country is your debtor, and of your Ministry.
Prime Minister to Lord Beaverbrook.
25.IX.40.
These wonderful results, achieved under circumstances of increasing difficulty, make it necessary for me to ask you to convey to your Department the warmest thanks and congratulations from His Majesty’s Government.
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Throughout the summer and autumn I wished to help the Secretary of State for War in his conflict with War Office and Army prejudices about the commandos, or storm troops.
Prime Minister to Secretary of State for War.
25.VIII.40.
I have been thinking over our very informal talk the other night, and am moved to write to you because I hear that the whole position of the commandos is being questioned. They have been told “no more recruiting” and that their future is in the melting-pot. I thought, therefore, I might write to let you know how strongly I feel that the Germans have been right, both in the last war and in this, in the use they have made of storm troops. In 1918, the infiltrations which were so deadly to us were by storm troops, and the final defence of Germany in the last four months of 1918 rested mainly upon brilliantly posted and valiantly fought machine-gun nests. In this war all these factors are multiplied. The defeat of France was accomplished by an incredibly small number of highly equipped élite, while the dull mass of the German Army came on behind, made good the conquest and occupied it. If we are to have any campaign in 1941, it must be amphibious in its character, and there will certainly be many opportunities for minor operations, all of which will depend on surprise landings of lightly equipped, nimble forces accustomed to work like packs of hounds instead of being moved about in the ponderous manner which is appropriate to the regular formations. These have become so elaborate, so complicated in their equipment, so vast in their transport, that it is very difficult to use them in any operations in which time is vital.
For every reason, therefore, we must develop the storm troop or commando idea. I have asked for five thousand parachutists, and we must also have at least ten thousand of these small “bands of brothers” who will be capable of lightning action. In this way alone will those positions be secured which afterwards will give the opportunity for highly trained Regular troops to operate on a larger scale.
I hope, therefore, that you will let me have an opportunity of discussing this with you before any action is taken to reverse the policy hitherto adopted or to throw into uncertainty all the volunteers who have been gathered together.
The resistances of the War Office were obstinate, and increased as the professional ladder was descended. The idea that large bands of favoured “irregulars,” with their unconventional attire and free-and-easy bearing, should throw an implied slur on the efficiency and courage of the Regular battalions was odious to men who had given all their lives to the organised discipline of permanent units. The colonels of many of our finest regiments were aggrieved. “What is there they can do that my battalion cannot? This plan robs the whole Army of its prestige and of its finest men. We never had it in 1918. Why now?” It was easy to understand these feelings without sharing them. The War Office responded to their complaints. But I pressed hard.
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Prime Minister to Secretary of State for War.
8.IX.40.
You told me that you were in entire agreement with the views I put forward about the special companies, and ending the uncertainty in which they were placed. Unhappily, nothing has happened so far of which the troops are aware. They do not know they are not under sentence of disbandment. All recruiting has been stopped, although there is a waiting list, and they are not even allowed to call up the men who want to join and have been vetted and approved. Although these companies comprise many of the best and most highly trained of our personnel, they are at present only armed with rifles, which seems a shocking waste should they be thrown into the invasion melee. I hope that you will make sure that when you give an order it is obeyed with promptness. Perhaps you could explain to me what has happened to prevent your decision from being made effective. In my experience of Service Departments, which is a long one, there is always a danger that anything contrary to Service prejudices will be obstructed and delayed by officers of the second grade in the machine. The way to deal with this is to make signal examples of one or two. When this becomes known you get a better service afterwards.
Perhaps you will tell me about this if you can dine with me tonight.