In reply he asked that both the
Valiant
and the
Barham
should join him. This would give him four battleships with the best available gun-range and speed. He could then dispense with the
Royal Sovereign
as with her poor deck protection and inferior speed she was a constant source of anxiety. Furthermore, he required two carriers, including the
Illustrious,
and two eight-inch cruisers. He agreed with the First Sea Lord that in the Western Mediterranean a force comprising the
Hood
and the
Ark Royal
with either one or two “R” class battleships would meet requirements. With these forces he considered that the Mediterranean could be dominated and the Eastern basin held indefinitely, provided that Malta was adequately protected by fighters and that his resources at Alexandria were built-up. In conclusion he said: “By carrying out a concerted movement it should be possible to pass reinforcements through the Mediterranean, but it would probably be desirable to do it all in one operation.”
We thus reached a considerable measure of agreement in our talks at the Admiralty. It was common ground between us that Admiral Cunningham’s fleet should be reinforced by a battleship, an aircraft carrier and two cruisers, and at the same time the opportunity should be taken to run a convoy of store ships to Malta
from Alexandria.
Thereafter on July 23 the First Sea Lord in the course of a Minute to the First Lord and me said:
Full consideration has been given as to whether it is possible to pass through the Mediterranean, not only the additional fighting ships which are being added to the Eastern Mediterranean force, but also merchant vessels containing spare ammunition for the Fleet; high-angle guns for Malta: and aircraft for Malta and the Middle East. The Commander-in-Chief is definitely of the opinion that under existing conditions it will be unsound to attempt to pass through the Central Mediterranean merchant vessels containing valuable cargoes, as if one or more ships were damaged in such a way as to reduce their speed, it would be necessary to scuttle them. I am entirely in agreement with the Commander-in-Chief.
Thus it came about that the plan for the important operation which followed under the code name “Hats” did not include provision for the passage of merchant ships. None the less with the full support of Admiral Cunningham it challenged the Italian Fleet and Air Force in the Central Mediterranean. I was now well content with the main decisions which the Admiralty were taking, and hoped that they might lead to a trial of strength. All preparations therefore went forward.
A few weeks later the bold and far-reaching step of the War Cabinet, with the full agreement of the Chiefs of Staff, to send nearly half our best available tanks to Egypt in spite of the invasion menace raised the question of the Mediterranean passage again and in a sharper way. I was of course in full accord with sending the tanks, but I feared that if they went round the Cape they might arrive too late for the battle on which the fate of Egypt depended. The First Sea Lord was at first inclined to run the risk, but on further study he thought it would complicate operation “Hats,” which now held the centre of the Admiralty stage. It involved sending at least two fast mechanical transport ships (16 knots) from Gibraltar to Malta, and this was regarded as more dangerous than sending them by the route from Alexandria. This led to further discussion.
Prime Minister to General Ismay, for C.O.S. Committee.
11.VIII.40.
I cannot accept this proposal [i.e., to use the Cape route for sending the tanks to Egypt], which deprives us of invaluable resources [fifty Infantry tanks or “I” tanks] during a most critical period, without making them available for the Middle East at the moment when they are most needed there. I must ask the Admiralty to make further proposals and overcome the difficulties. If necessary, could not the personnel be distributed among the destroyers, a larger force of destroyers being sent through from Force “H” to the Eastern Mediterranean, and returned thereafter in the same way as the six destroyers are now being sent westward by Admiral Cunningham?
There is no objection to the 3d Hussars (the personnel of a tank regiment) going by the Cape, as General Wavell can make temporary arrangements for manning [the tanks] in the meanwhile, so long as he gets their light tanks. I am prepared to risk the fifty Infantry tanks in the Mediterranean, provided their personnel is distributed among H.M. ships; but there can be no question of them or their personnel going by the Cape, thus making sure they are out of everything for two months. The personnel sent through the Mediterranean must be cut down to essentials, the balance going round.
Pray let me have further proposals by tomorrow (Monday).
Prime Minister to First Lord and First Sea Lord.
13.VIII.40.
1. Just before the French went out of the war, Admiral Darlan bombarded Genoa in full daylight without any Asdic destroyer protection, or any aircraft protection, and returned to Toulon unscathed. The Eastern Mediterranean Fleet has three times advanced to the centre of the Mediterranean and returned to Alexandria with only one ship –
Gloucester
– hit by one bomb. A few weeks ago a fast and a slow convoy were conducted uninjured from Malta to Alexandria – two days of their voyage being beset by Italian aircraft.2. The Admiralty now propose to send six destroyers from Alexandria to meet Force “H.” These destroyers, which will certainly be detected from the air, will be within air-attacking distance of the very numerous, fast Italian cruiser forces in their home bases. This movement should be rightly condemned as hazardous in the extreme but for the just estimation in which Italian naval enterprise is held by C.-in-C. Mediterranean and the Admiralty.
3. We are now told that it is too dangerous for the powerful forces we shall have in motion in the near future to carry through to the Eastern Mediterranean two M.T. [mechanical transport] ships steaming in company at only fifteen knots. Yet at the same time we are asked to spend vast sums fortifying a large part of the western coasts of Britain against what the Admiralty declare is a possible invasion by twelve thousand men embarked and shipped [from the River] Gironde [or from] St. Nazaire, who are to be sent to their destination without any warship protection of any kind. If it is held to be a feasible operation to move twelve thousand men unescorted onto the Irish or British western coasts in the face of the full British sea-power, can this be reconciled with the standard of danger-values now adopted in the Mediterranean?
4. No one can see where or when the main attack on Egypt will develop. It seems, however, extremely likely that if the Germans are frustrated in an invasion of Great Britain or do not choose to attempt it, they will have great need to press and aid the Italians to the attack of Egypt. The month of September must be regarded as critical in the extreme.
5. In these circumstances it is very wrong that we should attempt to send our armoured brigade round the Cape, thus making sure that during September it can play no part either in the defence of England or Egypt.
6. I request that the operation of passing at least two M.T. ships through with the Eastern reinforcements may be re-examined. The personnel can be distributed in the warships, and it is a lesser risk, from the point of view of the general war, to pass the M.T. ships through the Mediterranean than to have the whole armoured brigade certainly out of action going round the Cape. So long as the personnel are properly distributed among the warships, I am prepared to take the full responsibility for the possible loss of the armoured vehicles.
I was not able to induce the Admiralty to send the armoured brigade, or at least their vehicles, through the Mediterranean. I was both grieved and vexed at this. Though my friendship for Admiral Pound and confidence in his judgment were never affected, sharp argument was maintained. The professional responsibility was his, and no naval officer with whom I ever worked would run more risks than he. We had gone through a lot together. If he would not do it, no one else would. If I could not make him, no one else could. I knew the Admiralty too well to press them or my great friend and comrade, Pound, or the First Lord, for whom I had high esteem, beyond a certain point. My relations with the Admiralty were too good to be imperilled by a formal appeal to the Cabinet against them.
When on August 15, I brought the question before the Cabinet finally I said that I had hoped to persuade the Admiralty to fit the two armoured regiments into “Operation Hats.” If the tank-units proceeded through the Mediterranean they would arrive in Alexandria about September 5; if by the Cape about three weeks later. However the Chief of the Imperial General Staff did not consider that an attack in force by the Italians was imminent, and this was also General Wavell’s view. Having done my utmost in favour of the short cut, I thought that the War Cabinet ought not to take the responsibility of overruling the judgment of the commanders, and I acquiesced in the longer voyage round the Cape with regret. The Chiefs of Staff however prepared an alternative plan for the short cut should the position in the Middle East suddenly worsen before “Operation Hats” was actually launched. Two fast M.T. ships carrying Cruiser and “I” tanks would accompany the naval forces through the Mediterranean. The decision was to be taken before the reinforcements passed Gibraltar. In the event reports received from the Middle East were not considered to justify putting the alternative plan into force, and the whole convoy continued on its way round the Cape.
“Operation Hats” was carried out successfully and without loss between August 30 and September 5. Admiral Cunningham left Alexandria on August 30, and on the evening of the 31st his aircraft reported the approach of an enemy force of two battleships and seven cruisers. Hopes of an engagement were raised, but evidently the Italians were not seeking trouble and nothing happened. The following evening our aircraft again made contact with the enemy, who were now retiring to Taranto. Thereafter Admiral Cunningham’s ships moved about with complete freedom to the east and south of Malta and were not seriously molested from the air. The convoy reached Malta safely, only one ship being damaged by air attack. Meanwhile the reinforcements, consisting of the
Valiant
but not her unreconstructed sister-ship the
Barham,
the aircraft-carrier
Illustrious
and two anti-aircraft cruisers, accompanied by Admiral Somerville with Force “H,” were approaching from Gibraltar. The
Valiant
and the cruisers had no difficulty in landing much-needed guns and ammunition in Malta, and then joined Admiral Cunningham to the eastward on September 3. During the return passage to Alexandria the fleet attacked Rhodes and Scarpanto and easily repulsed an E-boat attack. Admiral Somerville’s force returned to Gibraltar without being molested in any way.
All this convinced me that it would have been a fair risk, especially compared with those we were resolutely running in seriously depleting our armour at home in the teeth of the enemy’s invasion preparations, to transport the armoured brigade through the Malta channel, and that it would now be in Egypt, instead of more than three weeks away. No serious disaster did in fact occur in Egypt during those three weeks. Nevertheless, an exaggerated fear of Italian aircraft had been allowed to hamper naval operations. I thought, and think, the event proved my case. Towards the end of November Admiral Somerville with Force “H” did in fact successfully escort a convoy to Malta from the westward, and on the way fought a partial action near Sardinia with that part of the Italian Fleet which had escaped damage at Taranto. One ship of this convoy passed on to Alexandria, together with three more store ships from Malta, escorted by further Fleet reinforcements for the Eastern Mediterranean. This was the first time that a merchant ship made the complete passage of the Mediterranean after the Italian entry into the war. The reader will see in the next volume how a still more hazardous exploit was performed by the Navy in sending tanks to Egypt in 1941,
when the German Air Force was fully established in Sicily.
Prime Minister to First Lord.
7.IX.40.
1. The course of “Operation Hats” makes me quite sure that it was wrong to recede from the idea of passing the armoured vehicles through the Mediterranean. If you will read my Minute reciting all the reasons why this course should be adopted you will see that they are reinforced by new facts now….
Prime Minister to First Lord.
7.IX.40.
I should be glad if you would let me have a short resume of the different occasions when I pressed, as First Lord, for the preparation of the
Ramillies
class ships to withstand air bombardment by thick deck armour and larger bulges. If those ships had been put in hand when I repeatedly pressed for them to be, we should now have the means of attacking the Italian shores, which might be productive of the highest political and military results. Even now there is a disposition to delay taking this most necessary step, and no substitute is offered.I have not yet heard from you in reply to the Minute I sent you renewing this project of reconstruction in the hope that we may not be equally destitute of bombarding vessels next year. I shall be glad to have a talk with you on this subject when I have refreshed my mind with the papers.
This issue could never at any moment be decided without balancing other bitter needs in new construction. It was on this rock, and not on differences of principle that my wishes finally foundered.
Prime Minister to General Ismay.
8.IX.40.
Following for Sir Andrew Cunningham, C.-in-C. Eastern Mediterranean, from Prime Minister and Minister of Defence:
I congratulate you on the success of the recent operation in the Eastern and Central Mediterranean, and upon the accession to your Fleet of two of our finest units, with other valuable vessels. I am sorry, however, that the armoured brigade which is so necessary to the defence of Egypt and Alexandria is still separated by more than three weeks from its scene of action. I hope you will find it possible to review the naval situation in the light of the experience gained during “Hats” and the arrival of
Illustrious
and
Valiant.
Not only the paper strength of the Italian Navy, but also the degree of resistance which they may be inclined to offer, should be measured. It is of high importance to strike at the Italians this autumn, because as time passes the Germans will be more likely to lay strong hands upon the Italian war machine, and then the picture will be very different. We intend to strengthen the anti-aircraft defences of Malta by every possible means, and some novel weapons of which I have high hopes will shortly be sent there for experiment. I trust that Malta may become safe for temporary visits of the Fleet at an earlier date than April, 1941. If in the meanwhile you have any proposals for offensive action to make, they should be transmitted to the Admiralty. I shall be glad if you will also concert with the Army and Air Force plans for an operation against the Italian communications in Libya, which at the right time could be used to hamper any large-scale offensive against Egypt. The advantages of gaining the initiative are obviously very great. I hope the Fulmars [the fast fighter planes which had at last reached our aircraft-carriers] have made a good impression. The battle here for air mastery continues to be severe, but firm confidence is felt in its eventual outcome.