For all these reasons the War Cabinet and Parliament approved the policy of leasing the bases to obtain the destroyers, provided we could persuade the West Indian island Governments concerned to make what was to them a serious sacrifice and disturbance of their life for the sake of the Empire. On August 6, Lothian cabled that the President was anxious for an immediate reply about the future of the Fleet. He wished to be assured that if Britain were overrun, the Fleet would continue to fight for the Empire overseas and would not either be surrendered or sunk. This was, it was said, the argument which would have the most effect on Congress in the question of destroyers. The prospects of legislative action, he thought, were steadily improving.
I expressed my own feelings to the Foreign Secretary:
7.VIII.40.
The position is, I think, quite clear. We have no intention of surrendering the British Fleet, or of sinking it voluntarily. Indeed, such a fate is more likely to overtake the German Fleet – or what is left of it. The nation would not tolerate any discussion of what we should do if our island were overrun. Such a discussion, perhaps on the eve of an invasion, would be injurious to public morale, now so high. Moreover, we must never get into a position where the United States Government might say: “We think the time has come for you to send your Fleet across the Atlantic in accordance with our understanding or agreement when we gave you the destroyers.”
We must refuse any declaration such as is suggested, and confine the deal solely to the colonial leases.
I now cabled to Lothian:
7.VIII.40.
We need the fifty or sixty destroyers very much, and hope we shall obtain them. In no other way could the United States assist us so effectively in the next three or four months. We were, as you know, very ready to offer the United States indefinite lease facilities for naval and air bases in West Indian islands, and to do this freely on grounds of inevitable common association of naval and military interests of Great Britain and the United States. It was, therefore, most agreeable to us that Colonel Knox should be inclined to suggest action on these or similar lines as an accompaniment to the immediate sending of the said destroyers. But all this has nothing to do with any bargaining or declaration about the future disposition of the British Fleet. It would obviously be impossible for us to make or agree to any declaration being made on such a subject. I have repeatedly warned you in my secret telegrams and those to the President of the dangers United States would run if Great Britain were successfully invaded and a British Quisling Government came into office to make the best terms possible for the surviving inhabitants. I am very glad to find that these dangers are regarded as serious, and you should in no wise minimise them. We have no intention of relieving United States from any well-grounded anxieties on this point. Moreover, our position is not such as to bring the collapse of Britain into the arena of practical discussion. I have already several weeks ago told you that there is no warrant for discussing any question of the transference of the Fleet to American or Canadian shores. I should refuse to allow the subject even to be mentioned in any Staff conversations, still less that any technical preparations should be made or even planned. Above all, it is essential you should realise that no such declaration could ever be assented to by us for the purpose of obtaining destroyers or anything like that. Pray make it clear at once that we could never agree to the slightest compromising of our full liberty of action, nor tolerate any such defeatist announcement, the effect of which would be disastrous.
Although in my speech of June 4 I thought it well to open up to German eyes the prospects of indefinite oceanic war, this was a suggestion in the making of which we could admit no neutral partner. Of course, if the United States entered the war and became an ally, we should conduct the war with them in common, and make of our own initiative and in agreement with them whatever were the best dispositions at any period in the struggle for the final effectual defeat of the enemy. You foresaw this yourself in your first conversation with the President, when you said you were quite sure that we should never send any part of our Fleet across the Atlantic except in the case of an actual war alliance.
To the President I telegraphed:
15.VIII.40.
I need not tell you how cheered I am by your message or how grateful I feel for your untiring efforts to give us all possible help. You will, I am sure, send us everything you can, for you know well that the worth of every destroyer that you can spare to us is measured in rubies. But we also need the motor torpedo-boats which you mentioned, and as many flying-boats and rifles as you can let us have. We have a million men waiting for rifles.
The moral value of this fresh aid from your Government and people at this critical time will be very great and widely felt.
We can meet both the points you consider necessary to help you with Congress and with others concerned, but I am sure that you will not misunderstand me if I say that our willingness to do so must be conditional on our being assured that there will be no delay in letting us have the ships and flying-boats. As regards an assurance about the British Fleet, I am, of course, ready to reiterate to you what I told Parliament on June 4. We intend to fight this out here to the end, and none of us would ever buy peace by surrendering or scuttling the Fleet. But in any use you may make of this repeated assurance you will please bear in mind the disastrous effect from our point of view, and perhaps also from yours, of allowing any impression to grow that we regard the conquest of the British Islands and its naval bases as any other than an impossible contingency. The spirit of our people is splendid. Never have they been so determined. Their confidence in the issue has been enormously and legitimately strengthened by the severe air fighting in the past week. As regards naval and air bases, I readily agree to your proposals for ninety-nine-year leases, which are far easier for us than the method of purchase. I have no doubt that once the principle is agreed between us the details can be adjusted and we can discuss them at leisure. It will be necessary for us to consult the Governments of Newfoundland and Canada about the Newfoundland base, in which Canada has an interest. We are at once proceeding to seek their consent.
Once again, Mr. President, let me thank you for your help and encouragement, which mean so much to us.
Lothian thought this reply admirable, and said there was a real chance now that the President would be able to get the fifty destroyers without legislation. This was still uncertain, but he thought we should send some British destroyer crews to Halifax and Bermuda without any delay. It would create the worst impression in America if destroyers were made available and no British crews were ready to transport them across the Atlantic. Moreover, the fact that our crews were already waiting on the spot would help to impress the urgency of the case on Congress.
At his press conference on August 16, the President made the following statement:
‘The United States Government is holding conversations with the Government of the British Empire with regard to acquisition of naval and air bases for the defence of the Western Hemisphere and especially the Panama Canal. The United States Government is carrying on conversations with the Canadian Government on the defence of the Western hemisphere.
According to the newspapers, the President stated that the United States would give Great Britain something in return, but that he did not know what this would be. He emphasised more than once that the negotiations for the air bases were in no way connected with the question of destroyers. Destroyers were, he said, not involved in the prospective arrangements.
The President, having always to consider Congress and also the Navy authorities in the United States, was of course increasingly drawn to present the transaction to his fellow-countrymen as a highly advantageous bargain whereby immense securities were gained in these dangerous times by the United States in return for a few flotillas of obsolete destroyers. This was indeed true; but not exactly a convenient statement for me. Deep feelings were aroused in Parliament and the Government at the idea of leasing any part of these historic territories, and if the issue were presented to the British as a naked trading-away of British possessions for the sake of the fifty destroyers it would certainly encounter vehement opposition. I sought, therefore, to place the transaction on the highest level, where indeed it had a right to stand, because it expressed and conserved the enduring common interests of the English-speaking world.
With the consent of the President I presented the question to Parliament on August 20, in words which have not perhaps lost their meaning with time:
Presently we learned that anxiety was also felt in the United States about the air and naval defence of their Atlantic seaboard, and President Roosevelt has recently made it clear that he would like to discuss with us, and with the Dominion of Canada and with Newfoundland, the development of American naval and air facilities in Newfoundland and in the West Indies. There is, of course, no question of any transference of sovereignty – that has never been suggested – or of any action being taken without the consent or against the wishes of the various Colonies concerned, but for our part His Majesty’s Government are entirely willing to accord defence facilities to the United States on a ninety-nine years’ leasehold basis, and we feel sure that our interests no less than theirs, and the interests of the Colonies themselves and of Canada and Newfoundland, will be served thereby. These are important steps. Undoubtedly this process means that these two great organisations of the English-speaking democracies, the British Empire and the United States, will have to be somewhat mixed up together in some of their affairs for mutual and general advantage. For my own part, looking out upon the future, I do not view the process with any misgivings. I could not stop it if I wished; no one can stop it. Like the Mississippi, it just keeps rolling along. Let it roll. Let it roll on – full Hood, inexorable, irresistible, benignant, to broader lands and better days.
Former Naval Person to President.
22.VIII.40.
I am most grateful for all you are doing on our behalf. I had not contemplated anything in the nature of a contract, bargain, or sale between us. It is the fact that we had decided in Cabinet to offer you naval and air facilities off the Atlantic Coast quite independently of destroyers or any other aid. Our view is that we are two friends in danger helping each other as far as we can. We should, therefore, like to give you the facilities mentioned without stipulating for any return, and even if tomorrow you found it too difficult to transfer the destroyers, etc., our offer still remains open because we think it is in the general good.
2. I see difficulties, and even risks, in the exchange of letters now suggested or in admitting in any way that the munitions which you send us are a payment for the facilities. Once this idea is accepted, people will contrast on each side what is given and received. The money value of the armaments would be computed and set against the facilities, and some would think one thing about it and some another.
3. Moreover, Mr. President, as you well know, each island or location is a case by itself. If, for instance, there were only one harbour or site, how is it to be divided and its advantages shared? In such a case we should like to make you an offer of what we think is best for both, rather than to embark upon a close-cut argument as to what ought to be delivered in return for value received.
4. What we want is that you shall feel safe on your Atlantic seaboard so far as any facilities in possessions of ours can make you safe, and naturally, if you put in money and make large developments, you must have the effective security of a long lease. Therefore, I would rather rest at this moment upon the general declaration made by me in the House of Commons yesterday, both on this point and as regards the future of the Fleet. Then, if you will set out in greater detail what you want, we will at once tell you what we can do, and thereafter the necessary arrangements, technical and legal, can be worked out by our experts. Meanwhile, we are quite content to trust entirely to your judgment and the sentiments of the people of the United States about any aid in munitions, etc., you feel able to give us. But this would be entirely a separate spontaneous act on the part of the United States, arising out of their view of the world struggle and how their own interests stand in relation to it and the causes it involves.
5. Although the air attack has slackened in the last few days and our strength is growing in many ways, I do not think that bad man has yet struck his full blow. We are having considerable losses in merchant ships on the northwestern approaches, now our only channel of regular communication with the oceans, and your fifty destroyers, if they came along at once, would be a precious help.
Lothian now cabled that Mr. Sumner Welles had told him that the constitutional position made it “utterly impossible” for the President to send the destroyers as a spontaneous gift; they could come only as a
quid pro quo.
Under the existing legislation neither the Chief of the Staff nor the General Board of the Navy were able to give the certificate that the ships were not essential to national defence, without which the transfer could not be legally made, except in return for a definite consideration which they would certify added to the security of the United States. The President had tried to find another way out, but there was none.
Former Naval Person to President.
25.VIII.40.
I fully understand the legal and constitutional difficulties which make you wish for a formal contract embodied in letters, but I venture to put before you the difficulties, and even dangers, which I foresee in this procedure. For the sake of the precise list of instrumentalities mentioned, which in our sore need we greatly desire, we are asked to pay undefined concessions in all the islands and places mentioned, from Newfoundland to British Guiana, “as may be required in the judgment of the United States.” Suppose we could not agree to all your experts asked for, should we not be exposed to a charge of breaking our contract, for which we had already received value? Your commitment is definite, ours unlimited. Much though we need the destroyers, we should not wish to have them at the risk of a misunderstanding with the United States, or, indeed, any serious argument. If the matter is to be represented as a contract, both sides must be defined, with far more precision on our side than has hitherto been possible. But this might easily take some time.
As I have several times pointed out, we need the destroyers chiefly to bridge the gap between now and the arrival of our new construction, which I set on foot on the outbreak of war. This construction is very considerable. For instance, we shall receive by the end of February new destroyers and new medium destroyers, 20; corvettes, which are a handy type of submarine-hunter adapted to ocean work, 60; motor torpedo-boats, 37; motor anti-submarine boats, 25; Fairmiles, a wooden anti-submarine patrol boat, 104; seventy-two-foot launches, 29. An even greater inflow will arrive in the following six months. It is just in the gap from September to February inclusive, while this new crop is coming in and working up, that your fifty destroyers would be invaluable. With them we could minimise shipping losses in the northwestern approaches and also take a stronger line against Mussolini in the Mediterranean. Therefore, time is all-important. We should not, however, be justified, in the circumstances, if we gave a blank cheque on the whole of our transatlantic possessions merely to bridge this gap, through which, anyhow, we hope to make our way, though with added risk and suffering. This, I am sure you will see, sets forth our difficulties plainly.
2. Would not the following procedure be acceptable? I would offer at once certain fairly well-defined facilities which will show you the kind of gift we have in mind, and your experts could then discuss these, or any variants of them, with ours – we remaining the final judge of what we can give. All this we will do freely, trusting entirely to the generosity and good will of the American people as to whether they on their part would like to do something for us. But anyhow, it is the settled policy of His Majesty’s Government to offer you, and make available to you when desired, solid and effective means of protecting your Atlantic seaboard. I have already asked the Admiralty and the Air Ministry to draw up in outline what we are prepared to offer, leaving your experts to suggest alternatives. I propose to send you this outline in two or three days and to publish it in due course. In this way there can be no possible dispute, and the American people will feel more warmly towards us, because they will see we are playing the game by the world’s cause and that their safety and interests are dear to us.
3. If your law or your Admiral requires that any help you may choose to give us must be presented as a
quid pro quo,
I do not see why the British Government have to come into that at all. Could you not say that you did not feel able to accept this fine offer which we make, unless the United States matched it in some way, and that therefore the Admiral would be able to link the one with the other?4. I am so grateful to you for all the trouble you have been taking, and I am sorry to add to your burdens, knowing what a good friend you have been to us.