Authors: Adam Zamoyski
36.
Napoleon,
Lettres Inédites
(1897), II/202; Napoleon, Corr.
Inédite
(1925), V/611.
37.
Caulaincourt, II/158, 160, 162; Rapp. 210; Bausset, II/159.
38.
Breton, 112–13.
39.
Wilson,
Invasion
, 279; Castellane, I/189; Buturlin, II/227–8; Breton, 114; W.H. Löwenstern, I/345–7.
40.
Fezensac,
Journal
, 106.
41.
Freytag, 169. His description of the events has to be taken with caution, as he mixes up the sequence of events and spreads the action over too many days.
42.
Fezensac, J
ournal
, 112; Planat de la Faye, 103.
43.
Pelleport, II/45, 48; Bonnet, 106; Pelet, 39, 44 (where he claims that he was the one to come up with the idea to cross the Dnieper), 47–52; Podczaski, 110; Chuquet,
Lettres de 1812, 1
85ff; Fezensac,
Journal
, 104–18; Chlapowski, 134. There is some doubt about how many made it: Pelet (50) says some 8–10,000 set off, of whom most made it; Materre, who was on Ney’s staff, claims (77) that 6,000 crossed the Dnieper; Berthézène (II/157) writes that only 4–500, mostly officers and NCOs, got through; Fezensac
(Journal, 118)
puts the figure at 8–900; Pelleport (II/52), probably the most reliable, says that 1500 reached Orsha.
1.
Kutuzov,
Dokumenty
, 256, 252.
2.
Voronovskii, 228–9.
3.
Marchenko, 500.
4.
Maistre, I/220.
5.
Ibid., 230.
6.
Dubrovin, 303; Kutuzov,
Dokumenty
, 249.
7.
Marchenko, 503; Palmer,
Alexander
, 254.
8.
Radozhitskii, 238; Muravev-Apostol, 36–7.
9.
Mitarevskii, 141, 142, 148–9, 153, 154.
10.
Bennigsen, Zapiski, 369.
11.
Uxküll, 100; Radozhitskii, 259.
12.
Shvedov,
Komplektovanie, 136
; Mitarevskii, 154; Radozhitskii, 258, 272.
13.
Aglaimov, 77.
14.
Mitarevskii, 146, 157; Württemberg, 33, 35–6; Kutuzov,
Dokumenty
, 250; Wilson,
Invasion
, 234.
15.
Shcherbinin
(Zapiski)
, W.H. Löwenstern (I/317), Ermolov (128–9) and Maevskii (161) are among those who believed Kutuzov was afraid of confronting Napoleon. See also Garin (130) and Pokrovskii (III/188).
16.
Ermolov, 118; Beskrovny,
Polkovodets
, 311.
17.
Davidov, 142–3; W.H. Löwenstern, I/338, 343; Kutuzov,
Dokumenty
, 250.
18.
Rapp, 210; Caulaincourt, II/163.
19.
Denniée, 141; Napoleon,
Correspondance
, XXIV/310, 311; Caulaincourt, II/166; Voenskii,
Sviashchennoi Pamiati
, 192.
20.
Caulaincourt, II/163.
21.
Fabry,
Campagne de 1812
,191; Napoleon,
Correspondance
, XXIV/312; Caulaincourt, II/166; Fain,
Manuscrit, II
/325.
22.
Planat de la Faye, 107.
23.
Shishov (302) gives the number of prisoners as 422 officers and 21, 170 other ranks, along with 213 guns; Bezkrovny (
Polkovodets
, 320) lists 26,000 prisoners and 116 guns, effectively repeating the figures given by Buturlin (II/231); see also Troitskii, 1812
Velikii god
, 279. In a letter to Maret (
Lettres Inédites
(1897), II/202) Napoleon himself writes that he had lost 30,000 men and been obliged to leave 300 guns behind.
24.
Griois, II/131–2.
25.
Laugier, Récits, 154.
26.
Mailly, 86–7; Duverger, 15.
27.
Roos, 180.
28.
Bourgoing, Souvenirs, 161.
29.
Roguet, III/539; La Flise, LXXIII/55; see also Thirion, 229–31.
30.
Holzhausen, 209,
31.
Bourgogne, 137–45.
32.
Mayer, 342–3; Olenin, 1996.
33.
Auvray, 82.
34.
Everts, 151, 157–8; Mayer, 347; Wilson,
Invasion
, 256; Placzkowski, 225.
35.
Breton, 114, 126; Chevalier, 249; Holzhausen, 347–8; Kochechouart, 198, 200; Puybusque, 324–5; Pouget, 220; Comeau de Charry, 465.
36.
Le Roy, 265.
37.
Beauharnais, VIII/112.
38.
François, II/813.
39.
Thirion, 238–9; Dembinski, I/199–200; Bonneval, 76; Sanguszko, 104; Bourgogne, 68.
40.
Roos, 186; Castellane, I/192.
41.
Griois, II/129.
42.
Krasinski, 98.
43.
Combe, 152; Chevalier, 248.
44.
Griois, II/174–6.
45.
Planat de la Faye, 111.
46.
Boulart, 269.
47.
Suckow, 206; Griois, II/173.
48.
Lejeune,
Mémoires
, II/255.
49.
Ricome, 48; Boulart, 267.
50.
Labaume, 394; François, II/826; Lejeune,
Mémoires, II
/266–7.
51.
Lejeune,
Mémoires, II
/271–2.
52.
François, II/826; Lagneau, 237.
53.
Constant, V/147–8, 154; Rapp, 210.
54.
Caulaincourt, II/189; Bourgeois, 139; Radozhitskii, 263; Bourgogne, 213; Denniée, 143.
55.
Caulaincourt, II/189; Roos, 149; Dedem, 275; Labaume, 376; Bourgeois, 139; Duverger, 16; François, II/827; Caulaincourt, II/172; Chambray (II/385) states that there was much grumbling, and Pion des Loches (310) that soldiers openly heckled Napoleon.
56.
Faber du Faur, 249.
57.
Ségur, V/309; Wilson,
Invasion
, 254; Maistre, I/247.
58.
Falkowski, V/85; Hochberg, 106–7; Brandt, 314; Beulay, 67; Oudinot, 214.
1.
Jomini (Précis, I/184) writes that Napoleon heard the news on the evening of 19 November, but this is clearly wrong: see Caulaincourt, II/168; Napoleon,
Correspondance
, XXIV/311
(’rien de nouveau’)
, 312, 313.
2.
Kutuzov,
Pisma
, 411; Langeron, 55; Czaplic, 515; Chichagov,
Pisma
, 61; Martos, 498; Rochechouart, 182.
3.
Chambray, III/15, 25–6; Caulaincourt, II/168–70.
4.
Rochechouart, 182; Chichagov,
Mémoires
, 59; Voenskii,
Sviashchennoi Pamiati, 111
ff, 121ff; Chichagov,
Mémoires
, 53; Rochechouart, 188–9; Marbot, III/185–6.
5.
Caulaincourt, II/173, Napoleon
(Lettres Inédites
(1935), 102–3) bears this out.
6.
Jomini,
Précis
, I/186–8, says that he discussed this plan in Tolochin on 22 November, but at that stage Napoleon still believed he held the crossing at Borisov, so he must have been mistaken; Caulaincourt, II/173, mentions the
plan as having been discussed after he had heard of the fall of Borisov. See also Voenskii,
Sviashchennoi Pamiati
, 191–9.
7.
Constant, V/121; Bourgoing (
Souvenirs
, 154) paints a somewhat different picutre.
8.
Brandys, II/136.
9.
Jomini,
Précis
, I/188–90; Fabry,
Campagne de 1812
, 206–7, 208–9, 210, 219, 220, 221, 222, 233–4; Napoleon,
Correspondance
, XXIV/316, 317, 318; see also the (unreliable) account by Korkozevich, 114–17.
10.
Voenskii,
Sviashchennoi Pamiati
, 191–9; Langeron, 60; Rochechouart, 192; Volkonskii, 215; Clausewitz, 208–9, 211.
11.
Corbineau (48–9) claims that he built the first bridge with the help of some of Oudinot’s artillerymen, on 24 November, and Gourgaud (434) also maintains that there was a bridge built by Oudinot’s gunners on the 24th, which was swept away by the current. But in their authoritative account, Colonel A. Chapelle, chief of staff to the bridging train, and Chef de Bataillon Chapuis, who commanded one of the battalions of pontoneers, explain that Oudinot’s artillerymen and sappers had begun making trestles, but these were inexpertly made, and proved of no use. See Fabry,
Campagne de 1812
, 288.
12.
Voenskii,
Sviashchennoi Pamiati
, 103–4; Czaplic, 508–9.
13.
Pils, 141.
14.
Rapp, 213; Constant, V/127.
15.
Voenskii,
Sviashchennoi Pamiati
, 104; Czaplic, 509.
16.
Vlijmen, 322; Pils, 143.
17.
Baudus, II/274; Boulart, 276; Fusil, 277; Rossetti, 168; Gourgaud, 429; Rosselet, 178; Constant (V/122) maintains there was an eagle-burning; Castellane (I/192) reports that the eagles of most of the cavalry regiments were burned at Bobr.
18.
Suckow, 250.
19.
Fabry,
Campagne de 1812, 2
27–9;Chapelle, 3; Vlijmen, 322; Brandt, 319.
20.
Pils, 144.
21.
For the bridges and the first day’s crossing, Fabry,
Campagne de 1812
, 227–31; Pils, 143–5; Vlijmen, 322–4; Chapelle, 3–6; Fain,
Manuscrit, II
/378–9.
22.
Bertand, 152.
23.
Bussy, 290; Begos, 191.
24.
Napoleon,
Lettres Inédites
(1935), 103.
25.
Beulay, 57, 63; Castellane, I/198.
26.
Czaplic, 510–12; Rochechouart, 193–4; Chichagov,
Mémoires
, 77.
27.
Pils, 146–7. The question of numbers at the Berezina is a vexed one. Most French sources put the total at Napoleon’s disposal at 25–27,000, while Russians consistently inflated his strength – according to Clausewitz (208–9)
Wittgenstein thought he had as many as 100,000 men. Russian strengths are not easy to determine either. Chichagov’s whole army numbered up to 60,000, but much of this had been left behind to garrison Minsk, to patrol south of Borisov and to keep an eye on potential threats from Schwarzenberg. According to Chichagov (
Pisma
, 54), he only had 18–19,000 infantry at his disposal in the Borisov – Studzienka area; Czaplic (514) affirms that Chichagov had 15,000 infantry and 9,000 cavalry, but my reading of the sources suggests that he had at least 10,000 more than that. See also Tarle,
Nashestvie
, 271; Berthézène, II/160; Faber du Faur, 273.
28.
Bourgoing, Souvenirs, 160.
29.
Bussy, 291; Begos, 192; Chapuisat, 87; Braquehay, 184; Vlijmen, 325–6; Legler, 194.
30.
Legler, 198; Bussy, 292; Vlijmen, 325, 326.
31.
Hochberg, 113–14, 139.
32.
Kurz, 184; Holzhausen, 259; Brandys, II/141.
33.
Thirion, 250.
34.
Suckow, 256–7.
35.
Holzhausen, 180.
36.
Griois, II/156; Pontier, 15. On the question of the bridges being free at night: Planat de la Faye, 105 (he was one of those trying to persuade stragglers to cross); Chambray, II/70; Bourgogne, 210, 214; Seruzier, 255; Rossetti, 175 (he did cross with his
fourgon
on the night of the 27th); Turno, 114; Gourgaud, 459; Chevalier, 233; Soltyk, 452; Marbot, III/199 (he actually went back to look for a lost wagon); Larrey, IV/101 (he went back to pick up some surgical instruments that had been left behind), and many others; only Auvray, 79–80, a less than reliable witness in other respects, claims that there was a terrible jam on the bridges on the night of 27 November.
37.
Bourgogne, 215. For the subsequent day’s crossings and the burning of the bridges: Fabry,
Campagne de 1812
,230–2; Chapelle, 7–13; Vlijmen, 326–7; Hochberg, 141–4; 1812
god v Vospominaniakh sovremennikov
, 139–44; Kurz, 177–85; Corbineau, 43–51; Curely, 311–24; Rapp, 213–14; Castellane, I/196–8. Ségur and others who did not witness the worst moments have overpainted the picture of horror, which led others, such as Gourgaud, to belittle it and dismiss much of the writing on the subject as melodramatic.
38.
Martos, 502.
39.
Rochechouart, 195.
40.
Gourgaud, 461; Fabry,
Campagne
de 1812, 234–5; Chapelle, 9; Labaume, 405; Bennigsen,
Mémoires
, III/165; Buturlin, II/386; Langeron, 75; Shishov, 306.
41.
Clausewitz, 211.
1.
Griois, II/164.
2.
Caulaincourt, II/192; Bourgogne, 216.