One of the subtlest and most destructive failures of the probability mechanism produces the personality first identified in the 1940s by Hervey Cleckley: the psychopath. The psychopath suffers no failure of rational intelligence; he (it is usually he) is logical, often clever, charming. He knows what you want to hear. In situations where there are formal rules (school, the law, medicine) he knows how to work them to his advantage. His impulsiveness gets him into trouble, but his intelligence gets him out; he is often arrested, rarely convicted. He could tell you in the abstract what would be the likely consequences of his behaviorâsay, stealing money from neighbors, falsifying employment records, groping dance partners, or running naked through town carrying a jug of corn liquor; he can even criticize his having done so in the past. Yet he is bound to repeat his mistakes, to “launch himself” (as the elderly uncle of one of Cleckley's subjects put it) “into another pot-valiant and fatuous rigadoon.” The psychopath's defect is a specific loss of insight: an inability to connect theoretical probability with actual probability and thus give actions and consequences a value. His version of cause and effect is like a syllogism with false premises: It works as a system; it just doesn't
mean
anything.
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We have pursued truth through a labyrinth and come up against a mirror. It turns out that things seem uncertain to us because certainty is a quality not of things but of ideas. Things seem to have particular ways of being or happening because that is how we see and sort experience: we are random-blind; we seek the pattern in the weft, the voice on the wind, the hand in the dark. The formal calculation of probabilities will always feel artificial to us because it slows and makes conscious our leap from perception to conclusion. It forces us to acknowledge the gulf of uncertainty and randomness that gapes belowâand leaps are never easy if you look down.
Such a long story should have a moral. Another bishop (this time, in fact, the Archbishop of York), musing aloud on the radio, once asked: “Has it occurred to you that the lust for certainty may be a sin?” His point was that, by asserting as true what we know is only probable, we repudiate our humanity. When we disguise our reasoning about the world as deductive, logical factâor, worse, hire the bully Authority to enforce our conclusions for usâwe claim powers reserved, by definition, to the superhuman. The lesson of Eve's apple is the world's fundamental uncertainty: nothing outside Eden is more than probable.
Is this bad news? Hardly. Just as probability shows there are infinite degrees of belief between the impossible and the certain, there are degrees of fulfillment in this task of being human. If you want a trustworthy distinction between body and soul, it might be this: our bodies, like all life forms, are essentially entropy machines. We exist by flattening out energy gradients, absorbing concentrations of value, and dissipating them in motion, heat, noise, and waste. Our souls, though, swim upstream, struggling against entropy's current. Every neuron, every cell, contains an equivalent of Maxwell's demonâthe ion channelsâwhich sort and separate, increasing local useful structure. We use that structure for more than simply assessing and acting, like mindless automata. We remember and anticipate, speculate and explain. We tell stories and jokesâthe best of which could be described as tickling our sense of probabilities.
This is our fate and our duty: to search for, devise, and create the less probable, the lower-entropy stateâto connect, build, describe, preserve, extend . . . to strive and not to yield. We reason, and examine our reasoning, not because we will ever achieve certainty, but because some forms of uncertainty are better than others. Better explanations have more meaning, wider use, less entropy.
And in doing all this, we must be braveâbecause, in a world of probability, there are no universal rules to hide behind. Because fortune favors the brave: the prepared mind robs fate of half its terrors. And because each judgment, each decision we make, if made well, is part of the broader, essential human quest: the endless struggle against randomness.
Index
A1 standard
Abraham
Adams, Henry
aerodynamics
aerospace industry
African Americans
Agathon
agronomy
AIDS
Albuera, battle of
Alembert, Jean Le Rond d,'
Alfonso X, King of Castile and Leon
algebra
algorithms
Allen, Woody
Alpha Arietis
al-Qaeda
altruism
amygdala
annuities
antidepressants
appellation contrôlée
Aratus
Aristotle
Ars Conjectandi
(Bernoulli)
artificial intelligence
artillery
Art of War, The
(Sun)
Asad, Muhammad
ascending sequences
Asclepius
Astor, John Jacob
astrology
astronomy
Astruc, Jean
atmospheric pressure
atomic bomb
Auden, W. H.
Augustus, Emperor of Rome
authorship
autism
average individual
Aviatik DD 1 bomber
Avicenna
Aviva
Axelrod, Kenneth
axioms
Azo of Bologna
Â
Â
Bach, Johann Sebastian
Bacon, Francis
Ball, Patrick
balloon flights
Balzac, Honoré de
Banque Royale
Barbon, Nicholas
barometers
barratry
base-rate effect
Bass, John
Bayes, Thomas
Bayes' theorem
Beagle
Belgium
belief systems
bell curve (normal curve)
Bentham, Jeremy
Berchtold, Count
Bernard, Claude
Bernoulli, Daniel
Bernoulli, Jakob
Bernoulli, Johann
Bernoulli, Nicholas
Bertrand, Joseph
Bethmann Hollweg, Theobald von
Bible
billiard balls
Bills of Mortality
bingo
Biometrika
Bird, Alex
Bird, John
birth defects
birth rate
bivariate distribution
Bjerknes, Vilhelm
Black, Joseph
blackjack
blicket detectors
bloodletting
Body Mass Index
Boethius
Boltzmann, Ludwig
bookies
Booth, Charles
Borel, Ãmile
Born, Max
Bortkiewicz, Ladislaus
bottomry
Boyle, Robert
Brahe, Tycho
brain function
“breaking the line” maneuver
breast cancer
Breslau
bridge
British Medical Journal
Brooke, Rupert
Brooks, Juanita
Brothers Karamazov, The
(Dostoyevsky)
Browning, Elizabeth Barrett
Buckle, Henry Thomas
Buckminsterfullerene
Buffett, Warren
Bull, Phil
bumper pool
Bundy, McGeorge
Byron, George Gordon, Lord
Calculated Risks
(Gigerenzer)
calculus
Caligula, Emperor of Rome
cancer
Cantor, Georg
capital investment
carbon
Cardano, Girolamo
card games:
cheating in
probabilities in
shuffling in
strategy in
see also
specific card games
Cassel, Ernest
Cassiopeia supernova (1572)
Castro, Fidel
casus fortuitus
cataracts
Cathars
Catholic Church
census data
Chadwick, Edwin
Challenger
disaster (1986)
chance:
calculation of
distribution of
in experimental results
fate and
mythology of
randomness as
time as
see also
probability
chaos theory
Charles I, King of England
Charles II, King of England
chartists
Chaucer, Geoffrey
chemotherapy
chess
children
cholera
Christianity
Church of England
Cicero
circles, chords of
Civil War, U.S.
Clark, Christopher
Clark, Harry
Clark, Sally
Claudius, Emperor of Rome
Clausewitz, Carl von
Cleckley, Hervey
Clerk of Eldin, John
climate change
Cochran, William
Code
(Justinian)
coefficients, binomial
cognitive function
coincidence
coin-tossing:
probabilities in
Saint Petersburg Paradox in
sequence of
Cold Harbor, battle of
Cold War
Colenso, Bishop John
Collins, Janet
Collins, Malcolm Ricardo
colorectal cancer
combinatorics
common sense
communications systems
communism
computers
Comte, Auguste
“Concerning Hope” (Laplace)
“conditioning your priors,”
Condorcet, Marie-Jean-Antoine-Nicolas de Caritat, Marquis de
confounded variables
contingent decisions
contradiction
control groups
Copernicus, Nicolaus
Cornish Man Engine
correlation
Cortéz, Hernán
counting
Course of Experimental Agriculture
(Young)
Coxwell, Henry
crabs, Neapolitan
craps
credibility
credit
crime
Crimean War
Croesus, King of Lydia
Cromwell, Oliver
Crusades
curves:
approximation of
concave vs. convex
distribution
error
of functions
normal (bell)
sine-
cyclical calculation
Â
Â
Darkness
(Byron)
Darnborough, William Nelson
Darrow, Clarence
Darwin, Charles
data:
accuracy of
clusters of
comparative
scientific
statistical
weather
Daubert ruling
D-Day landings
Decisions
(Justinian)
definitions
“degree of enlightenment,”
Delphic oracle
de Méré, Antoine Gombauld, Chevalier
demon
Demosthenes
De nova stella
(Brahe)
depression
Descartes, René
determinism
Deuteronomy
De vetula
Diaconis, Persi
“diagnosis-related group” reimbursement
dice
cheating in
for divination
historical importance of
numerical combinations of (permutations)
odds calculated in
probabilities in
randomness in
throws of
Dicing with Death
(Senn)
Dickens, Charles
Diderot, Denis
Dieppe raid (1942)
Digest
(Justinian)
dilemmas
divine revelation
DNA
Doctrine of Chances
(de Moivre)
Domesday Book
Don Juan
(Byron)
Doob, Joseph
Doomsday machine
Dostoyevsky, Fyodor
double-entry bookkeeping
Dow Jones Industrial Average
Dreyfus, Alfred
“DRG creep,”
Dunkirk evacuation (1940)
Â
Â
earth, rotation of
Ecclesiastes
eclipses
economics
Edinburgh Medical Journal
education
Eggleston, Richard
Einstein, Albert
Eisenhower, Dwight D.
Ekholm, Nils
electrons
Eliot, T.S.
Ellsberg, Daniel
El Salvador
Employers' Liability Act (1880)
energy demand
Enlightenment
ensemble prediction
entropy
Epigrams
(Martial)
equations:
algebraic
binomial
differential
geometric forms as
non-linear
odds expressed by
squaring of
variables in
equilibrium
Essay on Man
(Pope)
Essay Towards Solving a Problem in the Doctrine of Chances, An
(Bayes)
Euclid
Eudaemonic Pie
eugenics
European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts
Evelyn, John
events:
collective
events (
cont.
)
independent
mutually exclusive
occurrence of
random
excess-of-loss reinsurance