Decoding the IRA (17 page)

There remained a significant republican constituency in the country, which de Valera could endeavour to harness – unless the IRA beat him to it. In the August 1923 general election, despite formidable challenges, Sinn Féin won a respectable 28 per cent of the vote against 39 per cent for the ruling Cumann na nGaedheal, while a low turnout of 59 per cent reflected considerable lack of enthusiasm among the electorate for the existing parties.
¹⁹¹

In March 1926, at a special Sinn Féin árd fheis, de Valera put forward a motion that, in the absence of the oath of allegiance, abstention from the (Free State) Dáil was a matter of policy, not principle. With his proposal narrowly rejected, he resigned as president of both the party and the republican ‘government'.
¹⁹²
On 16 May at the La Scala theatre in Dublin he and his supporters launched a new political party, Fianna Fáil.
¹⁹³

Fianna Fáil planned to put forward candidates to run for election, and (unlike the Sinn Féin TDs who refused to take their seat) on being elected they would enter the Dáil and assert their right to represent their
constituents without taking the oath.
¹⁹⁴
De Valera contended that this didn't imply recognition of the Dáil as a legitimate parliament, but that participation was the only way to ‘untreaty' the state and ultimately bring about an Irish republic.
¹⁹⁵

From its inception Fianna Fáil emphasised its economic policies which, though decidedly capitalist, were committed to a multi-class harmony. There was something in it for everybody – economic development to appeal to the bourgeoisie, social welfare for the working-class and policies to protect the small farmers. The goals included the development of ‘a social system in which, as far as possible, equal opportunity will be afforded to every Irish citizen to live a noble and useful Christian life', ‘to get the greatest number possible of Irish families rooted in the soil of Ireland' and to make the country ‘an economic unit, as self-contained and self-suffcient as possible – with a proper balance between agriculture and the other essential industries'.
¹⁹⁶
This approach was decidedly different from the social and economic policies adopted by the IRA, which were largely based on Peadar O'Donnell's socialist theories of ‘class conflict' and included the nationalisation of the state's resources, though Fianna Fáil successfully borrowed (and modified) the anti-annuity campaign from O'Donnell.
¹⁹⁷

Many members of the IRA and the electorate had great difficulty discerning where de Valera's approach was in conflict with the aims of the IRA. Fianna Fáil politicians continued to use strong republican rhetoric and they shared platforms with the IRA, particularly on issues related to the republican prisoners. By 1927 Fianna Fáil TDs were lobbying the Free State ministers and the prison authorities on behalf of the prisoners and reporting back to the IRA. The IRA's director of intelligence reported that on one occasion a Fianna Fáil deputation received a surprise when they pleaded the case of a prisoner at Portlaoise prison with the Minister for Justice: ‘One of the deputation told the C.S. [chief of staff, Moss Twomey] that when he was making a great case on Cavanagh's [
sic
] case, the Minister produced two letters from Cavanagh offering if released to join the Free State army, and twitted them with fighting about such a man.'
¹⁹⁸

Indeed a significant number, if not most, of the IRA's members supported Fianna Fáil and it was only over a number of years that de Valera's supporters left the organisation. The Army Executive elected in November
1925 was referred to as a ‘composite executive' as it contained a number of his supporters, including Frank Aiken and Tom Derrig (who were both later Fianna Fáil cabinet ministers).
¹⁹⁹
Up until mid 1927 many officers (including Aiken) held joint membership of both organisations, while a number of volunteers held joint membership into the 1930s.
²⁰⁰
The Fianna Fáil organisation was frequently based on existing IRA units, with IRA companies simply transformed into Fianna Fáil cumainn (branches).
²⁰¹
As late as 1932 the IRA commander in east Clare was also secretary of the local Fianna Fáil cumann.
²⁰²
Members of the leadership of the IRA and Fianna Fáil remained firm friends until the 1930s. Seán MacBride said: ‘There was this kind of bond of friendship which existed, for those who were working in the republican movement.'
²⁰³
Twomey said he remained ‘very friendly' with Frank Aiken until the 1930s.
²⁰⁴

Not surprisingly, the gardaí were unsure as to who was a member of what organisation, and Fianna Fáil members were frequently arrested for the crimes of an organisation they no longer gave allegiance to. According to Moss Twomey, even by 1928 ‘[the Special Branch] did not rightly know who was FF and who was still IRA'.
²⁰⁵
In November 1927 the IRA intelligence officer in Armagh reported that the police in Britain were making enquires about a member of Fianna Fáil:
‘Enquiries have been sent to Armagh police barracks re. Tommy Donnelly, who is working in Fianna Fáil interests in Glasgow.'
²⁰⁶

Peadar O'Donnell later argued that the republican socialists should have joined with de Valera, saying that ‘[Fianna Fáil] took all the radical and worthwhile elements from Sinn Féin … there was more radical content in Fianna Fáil than there was in any other organisation.'
²⁰⁷
Throughout 1926
An Phoblacht
ran a column titled ‘Fianna Fáil (Republican Party) Organisation Notes', which listed Fianna Fáil activities and meetings, while in the US the
Irish World
supported both Fianna Fáil and the IRA. George Gilmore said that by 1932 he ‘considered that at that time the broad policies of the two organisations hardly differed'.
²⁰⁸
Indeed for many years Aiken and de Valera consistently tried to absorb as much of the IRA into Fianna Fáil as possible, thereby garnering support for Fianna Fáil and at the same time undermining the IRA.

However, the IRA's senior leadership (who after all had ejected Frank
Aiken) were aware that Fianna Fáil was diverging from the IRA's path. In February 1927 Moss Twomey wrote:
‘Recently [the] Fianna Fáil party in public speeches, and by their general policy, have been getting away more and more from [a] revolutionary attitude, and in fact have pronounced it a constitutional party, which will use only constitutional methods.'
²⁰⁹
De Valera's ability to win over members from the IRA was dramatically brought home to Twomey during the former's tour of America in 1927 (see Chapter 7).

While the IRA was able to survive the birth of Fianna Fáil, Sinn Féin was effectively annihilated by the loss of its more talented and certainly more pragmatic members, and ceased to be a credible political opposition. The dynamism of Fianna Fáil stood in marked contrast to the intellectual bankruptcy of Sinn Féin. Many members of Sinn Féin were furious with de Valera for having ‘compromised his principles'. A leading member, Brian O'Higgins, was reported to have been so bitter towards de Valera that he left his own wife's funeral when de Valera arrived to attend.
²¹⁰
Though the leadership of the IRA and Sinn Féin continued to maintain contact with one another, the relationship became acrimonious, and the IRA tended to be dismissive of the party. In 1927
An Phoblacht
stated ‘not much can come out of Sinn Féin'.
²¹¹

The case of Patrick Garland

While all of these developments were taking place, a relatively minor incident occurred in Cork in April 1926 which illustrates some of the IRA's abilities and attitudes. An IRA courier, Patrick Garland, having disembarked from a transatlantic liner, was arrested in Cobh.

Garland, aged forty-four, was originally from Dundalk and had emigrated to New York in 1914, where he worked as a boiler operator at a hotel on Fifth Avenue. Aside from having contributed to the Friends of Irish Freedom before the founding of the Free State, he wasn't known to have any involvement in Irish politics. In April 1926, he received a telegram telling him that his mother in Ireland had ‘double pneumonia and was not expected to live'. His sister, with whom he lived, helped him pack his two suitcases, and she ‘was sure he did not have any papers in his possession to warrant his detention on the other side'.

Garland sailed from New York on the
Adriatic
, and on his arrival at Cobh was allegedly found by customs to be attempting to smuggle in a gold watch. The officer then searched him and found a concealed package suspended by string under his shirt. Inside the package were IRA despatches, which contained the names of several well-known republicans. One letter appeared to refer to IRA attempts to sell some of their cache of Thompson submachine guns in New York, though the Free State authorities misinterpreted this as an attempt by the IRA to purchase the weapons. Garland was also found to be in possession of £800 in bank drafts, which was meant for the IRA.

On his arrest, he said that wrongdoing ‘was the furthest thing from his mind' and that if he had known what was in the documents he would have burned them. He gave the improbable story that a man, whom he didn't know, had asked him to deliver the letters to another person at a railway station in Dublin. As for the money, he claimed this was his own, and even produced evidence that he had a bank account containing the very considerable sum of $35,000 (£7,000).

The capture of the documents and money along with the possibility that Garland might speak freely to the gardaí was of serious concern to the IRA, and the chief of staff contacted Seán MacSwiney in Cork (who held the interesting title of assistant adjutant Cork 1 brigade). The chief of staff at this time was probably Moss Twomey, though there's a possibility it remained Andy Cooney. He wrote: ‘I presume [Garland] is in Cork Prison. It is very important that he be visited and treated well whilst there by our friends. See to this.
Is there any possible chance of rescuing him?
I would be very keen on this and meant to send an Officer specially [
sic
] about it were it not that I was expecting the O/C. [of Cork 1 brigade] up. I was hoping this would have been done immediately after his capture. You will recognise it
would have a great effect
… Action against [the] Customs Officer [who searched him] depends on yourselves locally. What can you do? I would suggest
kidnapping and giving him a good hammering, tarring and feathering, or heaving him over the quay
. If anything is to be done it should be done immediately.'

Garland was held without bail before his trial in Dublin. Though a naturalised American citizen, he was charged under the Treasonable Offences
Act of ‘conspiring for the overthrow' of the government and of ‘conspiracy to spread sedition throughout the Free State'. He pleaded guilty to having the documents but maintained he was an ‘innocent messenger'. As often happened with IRA men convicted around this time, he got off rather lightly, with the judge appearing to accept his explanation. He was fined £50 and ordered to post bail to be on good behaviour for the remainder of his time in the country.

From the chief of staff's remarks it doesn't appear that the customs service was held in great fear by the IRA. It is ironic that, while the majority of IRA couriers were women, one of the few to be caught with money and incriminating documents should be a man.
²¹²

The barrack raids

In November 1926 the IRA raided garda barracks throughout the country, the nearest the organisation came in the second half of the 1920s to a coordinated military action. What was the purpose of these attacks? Did they mark a resurgent IRA?

In
The Secret Army
Bowyer Bell wrote that Twomey, having been impressed by the ‘growing confidence and efficiency' of the IRA, came up with the idea and told Andy Cooney the objectives were to gather intelligence and capture weapons. GHQ devised a general outline of the campaign, but individual units were to draw up specific plans for their own area.
²¹³

However, in early November the planning was disrupted with the arrest of Twomey. On his way to a staff meeting he travelled to Mullingar and then took a taxi to the venue at the remote townland of Crookedwood (seven miles away). There he was arrested by waiting Special Branch officers.
²¹⁴
An Phoblacht
reported: ‘A young man named Maurice Twomey of Fermoy Co. Cork was charged' under the Treason Act with ‘taking part in the organisation and maintenance of a military force not established by law'. He made no reply to the charges and was remanded in custody to Mountjoy prison.
²¹⁵

The IRA immediately suspected treachery. Twomey later said that Seán Harling, who was a garda informer, had handled a despatch concerning the meeting and that the letter had been tampered with.
²¹⁶
But initially the main suspect was the OC of the IRA's Midland battalion. Following
an internal investigation the IRA's director of intelligence wrote in December:
‘[I] have since found out [the] OC [of the] Midland [battalion] to be all right
[
sic
]
and I now know who gave Moss away.'
²¹⁷

Despite Twomey's arrest the raids went ahead, with most attacks occurring on Sunday 14 November. Groups of up to thirty men, armed with rifles and handguns, attacked twelve barracks in Cork, Kerry and Meath; in Waterford twenty-four were attacked and raids were also carried out in Tipperary. Garda documents were destroyed or taken away. Two gardaí were killed during the operation: Sergeant Fitzsimons in Cork city and Garda Hugh Ward in Tipperary, fatally shot in the neck. In addition to the barrack raids, two yacht clubs in (the Anglo-Irish bastion of) Dun Laoghaire were broken into and searched for poppies.
²¹⁸