Decoding the IRA (19 page)

In contrast to Twomey and Cooney, Seán Russell felt that the raids presented an opportunity for republican unity. He wrote to Twomey in May 1927: ‘You will remember, following the barrack raids last November, how Dev, believing that a National crisis had arisen, requested a meeting of SF, FF and army representatives (as nominated by the army). The Free Staters by their action in arresting army Officers of both sides made such a meeting possible. The army at that time, I believe, failed to take advantage of a favourable opportunity to bring about the unity we work so hard to make today. The Staters, realising that the arrests had the opposite effect to that which they desired, ordered the release of all the internees.' This spurred on Russell to propose a joint anti-imperialist platform with Fianna Fáil and Sinn Féin – with the IRA blowing up statues and symbols of British imperialism.
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While GHQ had learned its lesson and the raids weren't repeated, it was important to propagate the notion that they had achieved some degree of success. Twomey wrote in early February 1927 to Connie Neenan:
‘Explain barrack attacks were for intelligence purposes. [I] heard there was disappointment [over] there, when [they were] not followed up.'
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As for the Cork officers, in April 1927 the Army Executive urged that the Army Council take steps to see that both Mick Murphy and P. A. Murray were brought before a court martial ‘without further delay'.
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Overall the raids had a detrimental effect on the organisation and likely precipitated the resignation of many members. In 1970 Bowyer Bell wrote about ‘practically everyone's desire for a second round' of raids.
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From the information now available, this statement is clearly inaccurate. Bowyer Bell doesn't reference this statement but it's likely that he got it from Andy Cooney whom he interviewed in the 1960s. This and the other comments by Bowyer Bell on the raids appear to be Cooney's later explanation and justification for the raids, rather than an accurate representation of the events.

It's also noteworthy that despite the killing of two unarmed gardaí the
IRA internees were all soon released. This was part of a pattern of largely lenient treatment by the authorities at the time. Though the Special Branch could still badly mistreat prisoners and regularly harassed known IRA operatives, under the circumstances the Free State was rather benign in its treatment of the IRA. This policy was probably as successful at undermining the organisation as repression would have been. The gardaí and courts were often successful in persuading defendants to recognise the courts, apply for bail, etc. – all of which was against IRA rules (and specifcally General Order 24). And a frustrated Twomey reported: ‘The enemy do not want to have political prisoners, if he can get them to leave the Organisation or trick them into doing something for which he knows he will be dismissed.'
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Even senior officers laid themselves open to the accusation of cooperating with the enemy, and in December 1926 the director of intelligence, Frank Kerlin, had to send a letter to Donal O'Donoghue in Mountjoy:
‘Re. [your] attitude towards [the] appeal tribunal. It is to be considered as [a] Free State court and no appeal [is to be made]. [I] am sending [you a] copy of GO [General Order] 24 for reference.'
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The republican election pact

By 1927 many in the Free State looked forward to the possibility of a change of government in the upcoming summer's general election. The ruling Cumann na nGaedheal party was unpopular among many sections of the public and in particular the Intoxicating Liquor Bill was badly received. In addition, those republicans who had reluctantly supported the Anglo-Irish Treaty and the Free State were very dissatisfied with the outcome of the Boundary Commission and the resultant accommodation the government reached with Britain and the Northern Ireland state.
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Far from emasculating Northern Ireland (as many in southern Ireland had hoped it would), the commission had the opposite effect of helping to bolster the new state. This disquiet began to express itself in calls for the IRA to broker an alliance of Fianna Fáil and Sinn Féin to contest the election. In the words of Moss Twomey:
‘Efforts [for an alliance] are chiefly by Treatyite opponents of [the] present government.'
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Many felt a unified republican platform could win a majority at the election, enabling the republican deputies to form a government, renege
on the Treaty and establish a republic. Such a plan was doubly attractive to the IRA in that it would both help to maintain the unity of the organisation and allow it to seize power.
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After the dismal performance of the IRA during the barrack raids it should have been clear to GHQ that it was incapable of a conventional fight against the Free State army and needed the assistance of some such stratagem. Twomey wrote:
‘We felt justified in making the effort for several reasons; chiefly because of hope we entertained of getting [a] majority [in the Dáil] and if we did not, to prevent an acute division in the Army over [the] elections.'
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Peadar O'Donnell, Moss Twomey and Seán MacBride worked together to draw up a detailed proposal to be put before representatives of the three key republican groups: the IRA, Sinn Féin and Fianna Fáil.
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The plan called for events to unfold in the following sequence: representatives of Fianna Fáil, Sinn Féin and the Army Council would meet and constitute themselves as a National Board. The board would approve a panel of republican candidates for the election and would also approve the campaign and election literature of the candidates. Before the election it would select the members of the future republican cabinet. On winning the election, the republican TDs were to refuse to attend the (Free State) Dáil, and to instead form an Assembly, which included representatives from the six counties of Northern Ireland. The Assembly would declare itself the ‘sovereign Assembly of the country' and annul the Free State Constitution and the Anglo-Irish Treaty or ‘all Imperial commitments'. This Assembly and its cabinet now became the ‘lawful' legislature and government of the Irish Republic, with the ‘ Second Dáil' and its ‘Republican Government' transferring over its ‘powers and functions'. So as not to alarm Britain, the actual declaration of an Irish Republic could be delayed! Then, moving carefully, the new government would disband the Free State army and replace it with the IRA.

This plan contains so many improbabilities and assumptions that one would be forgiven for thinking that it had been drawn up by Hans Christian Andersen. What on earth drove O'Donnell (who was, most likely, the principal author) to think that the Free State army could be somehow peacefully disbanded? And why would de Valera submit again to the vagaries of the IRA? What would be the reaction of the unionists of Northern Ireland? How would the IRA defend itself against a British attack?

Though Twomey promoted the plan in public, in private he was less sanguine. He admitted he was prepared to back down in the face of opposition within the IRA:
‘If [there is] any opposition [within the IRA] we will not pursue the matter.'
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And even before formal meetings were held with representatives of Sinn Féin and Fianna Fáil he wrote:
‘We are doubtful if either political party as such will accept our basis [for the discussions]. Sinn Féin may absolutely refuse to cooperate with Fianna Fáil on any basis and Fianna Fáil [are] likely to regard [the] proposals as too revolutionary … We believe coordination [is] most difficult, but intend that a decision shall be arrived at without delay.' His hope was that infuential ‘Individuals in each party may force acceptance'
on their more reluctant colleagues.
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On 5 April the Army Council formally gave its backing to the proposal, provided it was also approved by a specially convened meeting of the senior officers along with representatives of the local units.
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This meeting was held on 9 April. Following the administration of an ‘oath of secrecy', Moss Twomey made an opening speech in which he stated that the proposal ‘was an effort to keep the Army [IRA] together' and that ‘an opportunity exists for overthrowing the present Colonial administration'. He was concerned that ‘if the present Government is re-elected it would be difficult to maintain the Organisation [IRA] for another six years.' But to reach an agreement the parties would have to make concessions: ‘Sinn Féin [must] agree not to insist on an immediate proclamation of the Republic should a [republican] majority be secured and Fianna Fáil [must] agree not to enter the Free State legislature as a minority party.'

In particular, Twomey and the delegates discussed the thorny problem of what to do with the Free State army. Officially the proposals called for ‘the abolition of a standing army and the organisation of the defence forces on a territorial basis', the ‘territorial basis' meaning, in effect, the IRA. The process would begin with ‘the removal from Dublin and vicinity of all enemy military forces, and this being done, that they be disarmed and demobilised. All armament be placed under the control of Oglaigh na h-Éireann [IRA]'. Finally, the Army Council would act as an advisory body to the new Minister for Defence.

Peadar O'Donnell suggested that: ‘The Free State Army might fight
against disbandment but we could meet and beat them on the grounds of economic necessity.' If successful, this would have been an event unparalleled in history! An army defeated by a discussion of economic theory. Twomey and Russell were, however, more realistic. Twomey ‘believed a military situation would ensue in which the Army [IRA] could use a strong hand', and to meet this threat the Dublin brigade would need to be strengthened. After the Free State army was neutralised, the IRA would be ‘in a position to meet the English'. Russell, though against the proposals, concurred with Twomey that ‘a military situation would probably arise from which the Army would benefit.'

As Twomey and Russell envisaged fighting in Dublin, how would the IRA have had a realistic chance of defeating the army? Either by using a masterly surprise attack or with the use of weapons which the army couldn't defend against. Twomey didn't answer the question. But it may be more than coincidence that around this time he was writing to the IRA representatives in America inquiring about both tear gas weapons and poisonous mustard gas (see Chapter 7). ‘Mr Jones' wrote to Twomey in late April that the IRA could capture Dublin by using tear gas weapons and at the same time avoid civilian casualties.
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While an overwhelming majority of delegates supported the proposals, a number of the more militant members voted against them on the basis that they would end up merely ensnaring the organisation in party politics. This was Russell's position, though he said he wouldn't work against the proposals if they were approved. The OC of Cork 1 brigade said that the IRA ‘should have nothing to do with present day politics' and George Plunkett ‘was against anything that savoured of going near Leinster House'.

Before the meeting ended, Peadar O'Donnell was able to come up with another idea – that in the newly declared republic the role of the gardaí might become superfluous: ‘If you have the high moral Volunteer spirit there would be no need for the police.'
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The Army Council next moved quickly to get the approval of both Sinn Féin and Fianna Fáil, by meeting with senior members from each party – many of whom were also IRA members.
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These meetings were held while de Valera was in America. Given that Twomey regarded him as
the
‘chief obstacle in Fianna Fáil'
, this was at the very least a fortunate coincidence.
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However, Twomey greatly under-estimated de Valera if he thought the other members of Fianna Fáil could (or would try to) force him to accept an agreement. Twomey wrote:
‘De Valera we believe [is] an obstacle to such an agreement [that would be] satisfactory to Sinn Féin and us. Many of his followers [are] anxious to get [an] agreement in his absence and force it on him. Seán T [Ó Ceallaigh, vice-president of Fianna Fáil] is most anxious for this.'
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Twomey also used the possibility of the pact to try and get desperately needed funding for the IRA, from both the Russians and Irish-Americans. In these attempts he pretended to be far more optimistic of the chances of success. Knowing that the Soviets dearly wanted to see the collapse of the British empire, he asked them for £5,000 and suggested that a republican victory would result in the newly declared Irish Republic withdrawing from the British Commonwealth, which would ultimately undermine the empire through a domino effect (see Chapter 8). In a letter marked ‘secret and urgent' he wrote to Connie Neenan discussing a possible fund-raising trip to Moscow with Seán Russell:
‘I am keen on this trip … [to Moscow] in view of [the] great probability of coordination between Sinn Féin and Fianna Fáil, and their winning of the election.'
The upbeat tone of this letter is in marked contrast to his more realistic assessment in other correspondence. In May when it was clear that there was to be no agreement, Twomey wrote to the OC in Britain telling him not to inform the Soviet intelligence officer ‘James', in case it would dissuade the Soviets from providing money:
‘Our effort to secure coordination between [the] republican bodies for the election failed. Do not mention anything about this to ‘James' should you see him.'
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Twomey urged Neenan to raise as much money as possible in the US:
‘We must have all [the] cash possible from you. Do your utmost, even borrow if you possibly can. If we secure coordination, in addition to military expenditure, we may under certain conditions expend money on [the] election.'
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It's also evident from this statement that Twomey felt that if the plan succeeded there would likely be fghting in Dublin.