Decoding the IRA (42 page)

Meanwhile, the Communist International or Comintern was founded in 1920 as the controlling body of all communist parties around the world. The Comintern was based in Moscow under the control of the Russian Communist Party. Local communist parties were expected to subordinate themselves to Moscow's policies and dictates. But in countries not ripe for communism, strategic alliances between communists and nationalists were approved. Ireland and the IRA fell into this category. To further its cause the Comintern set up front organisations such as International Red Aid (in support of ‘political' prisoners) and the League Against Imperialism.
⁴

After a series of intelligence disasters, responsibility for foreign espionage was taken from the Comintern in 1924 and handed over to Red Army
intelligence or
Razvedupr
(RU).
⁵
Little is known about the RU and yet it was the ‘most important intelligence agency of the Soviet Union', reporting directly to the ruling Politiburo of the Communist Party. Compared with the thugs who ran the
Cheka
or secret police, its members were often highly educated and sophisticated, and frequently non-communist. This facilitated their covert activities and ability to penetrate foreign governments and society.
⁶

RU operatives, who were identified by a false first name, ran clandestine networks of agents in the west, often on a massive scale. They frequently operated under the cover of Soviet trade missions, such as Arcos in London and Amtorg in New York. The RU gathered information about military, scientific and industrial developments, in addition to political intelligence. Informants were handed a document, known as a questionnaire, which listed the precise technical information required.
⁷

The items on the questionnaire were tailored to the priorities of the Soviet Union, such as technical information on chemical warfare. In the First World War the Russian army had been unable to adequately respond to German poison gas attacks, and Russian fatalities of 56,000 accounted for over half the total number of deaths from gas on all fronts throughout the war.
⁸
During the Civil War the British reportedly used mustard gas against Soviet troops in Siberia.
⁹
In the inter-war years many in the west as well as Russia continued to believe that poison gas would play a decisive role in future wars, and the Soviets devoted considerable energy to developing chemical warfare capability. Mustard gas was regarded as one of the most promising agents.

The Soviets were also interested in acquiring data on mechanised warfare (particularly tanks), airplane engines and military communications equipment.

The Soviet Union and Ireland, 1917 to 1925

The overthrow of the Russian Tsar was greeted by many in Ireland with great enthusiasm. People were able to relate to the toppling of a monarchy that was perceived by many to be foreign and that exploited an impoverished people. They were delighted when the communists called for an end to the First World War and for national self-determination. In February 1918
some 10,000 people attended a rally at Dublin's Mansion House in support of the revolution.
¹⁰
Later, in the Ireland of the 1920s, while only a small number of people were enthusiasts for the Soviet Union, there remained a tolerance of communism in many sections of society. This acceptance disappeared in 1930 when the Catholic Church took a strong stance against the USSR and its militant atheism.
¹¹

The Comintern's attempts to build a mass Irish communist party were failures and the first Communist Party of Ireland was dissolved in 1924 with fewer than fifty members.
¹²
Jim Larkin (the hero of the 1913 Dublin Lockout) was the only Marxist in Ireland with a large base of popular support. However, Larkin refused to be subservient to Moscow or anyone else; he proved extremely difficult to work with, and can be described as unpredictable, egocentric, paranoid, litigious, intolerant and with a history of misappropriating funds. By 1927 the Russians were beginning to look elsewhere, until he finally broke with them in 1929.
¹³

For a period of time in the mid and late 1920s the IRA was to be the most promising ally for the Soviets in Ireland – combining, as it did, popular support together with communists in leadership positions. IRA members actively participated in Comintern front organisations – Mick Fitzpatrick was on the presidium of the International Friends of Soviet Russia, Donal O'Donoghue and Frank Ryan attended the Congress of Oppressed Nationalities and Peadar O'Donnell, as editor of
An Phoblacht
, provided the Soviets with a public outlet for their propaganda. In 1926 the paper enthusiastically reported that, in Russia, ‘miners have a 6 hour [work day] … which seems wonderful'. So good that the miners themselves didn't know it! When the republican and socialist activist Charlotte Despard visited the Soviet Union she observed: ‘There were no locked doors in the prisons, the prisoners managing their own affairs.'
¹⁴
Communist cadres were recruited from amongst the IRA's ranks and O'Donnell's close friend Seán Murray was to become general secretary of the second Communist Party of Ireland in 1933.
¹⁵
However, despite their disproportionate representation on the Army Council, the vast majority of IRA members had little sympathy or interest in communism.

Irish republicans had a long history of attempting to negotiate an alliance with the Soviet Union. Beginning in 1919, an IRA emissary, Harry
Boland, made contact with Soviet representatives in America. In 1921 de Valera sent a representative to Moscow to conclude a recognition treaty and secure arms and ammunition, but the Soviets, having just signed an Anglo-Russian trade agreement, backed out.
¹⁶
In August 1922 the British Communist Party sent two representatives to Dublin who met with leaders of the IRA (possibly including Ernie O'Malley) and an agreement was reached that the Soviets would supply weapons to the republicans.
¹⁷
However, there is no evidence for any substantial transfer of weapons to the IRA during the Irish Civil War period. In January 1923, the Free State's representative in Geneva reported that de Valera had sent a message to the Soviet foreign commissar asking for money.
¹⁸

However, contacts of some sort must have continued, since Frank Aiken wrote to Liam Pedlar, the republican ‘Military Attaché' in America, in April 1925:
‘Touch with Russians
[
sic
]. We have definitely decided to drop this – hopeless bunglers, in any case as far as we can see, and not very eager to help.'
¹⁹

In the summer of 1925 the IRA sent a small delegation to Moscow, led by P. A. Murray of the headquarters staff. Murray had had contacts with the Soviets in 1923 when he was IRA OC in Britain. Also included were Seán Russell, Mick Fitzpatrick a leading IRA communist, and the Sinn Féin TD Gerry Boland. Boland was a close confidant of de Valera's and was probably sent by him to keep an eye on the other three.

Stalin met privately with Murray, with just an interpreter present, and told the Irishman ‘your revolution has not gone far enough' – which I suppose could be taken as a compliment. He wanted to find out from Murray to what extent the IRA with their widespread contacts throughout the Irish diaspora could assist Moscow. Murray later claimed that no agreement was reached, as Stalin was concerned that any weapons supplied might be traced back to the Soviets by the British, and that Ireland was too remote to be of interest to the Russians.
²⁰
This version is supported by comments later made by General Krivitsky of Red Army Intelligence to MI5 (British secret service) following his defection to the West: ‘The Polit Bureau [
sic
] refused assistance because of their anxiety not to offend the British Government as well as the impossibility of supporting the nationalistic aspirations of the
IRA at the same time as the international activities of the Irish Communist Party.'
²¹

But in fact some sort of an agreement was reached, either at this time or shortly afterwards, and Russell returned to Dublin via Berlin, where he met a Soviet agent, ‘Mr X', to formalise the arrangements for lines of communications with the Soviets. ‘Mr X' then came to London where Russell introduced him to the IRA OC in Britain.
²²
Two later statements confirm that an agreement was reached around this time. In 1926 Andy Cooney said that there was
‘a definite agreement made [by the Soviets] with [the] late C.S. [chief of staff, Frank Aiken]'
. This had to be before Aiken was deposed as chief of staff in November 1925.
²³
And in March 1927 Moss Twomey referred to an
‘agreement made in Lond. [London]'
before May 1926 with the Soviets.
²⁴

The apparent contradiction between the statements of General Krivitsky and Moss Twomey and Andy Cooney may be one of semantics. Krivitsky states that there was no agreement with the IRA ‘as a political body' but he states that ‘individual members [of the IRA] may have been recruited as intelligence agents for special purposes'.
²⁵
Thus what the IRA took to be an ‘agreement', the Soviets may have regarded more as an arrangement with individual IRA members. As far as P. A. Murray's denial is concerned (it's reasonable to expect that), just like the remainder of the IRA leadership, he would continue to deny any agreement with the Soviets. When he and other veterans gave interviews and reminisced about their IRA years in later life, their narrative was one of heroic ambushes in the Anglo-Irish War and not cloak-and-dagger with the Russians.

The IRA agreed to spy for the Russians in Britain.
²⁶
In turn the Soviets promised to pay for the information, though they were evasive about whether they'd supply weapons.

Thanks to the success of the IRA in the Anglo-Irish War and its resultant sterling revolutionary credentials, the Soviets likely over-estimated its capability and didn't fully comprehend the extent to which the organisation had declined. There were many ways in which the IRA could be of value to the Soviets: 1. Conduct military espionage in Britain and America. 2. Assist Soviet agents by providing false passports and other forms of cover. 3. In the event of war between Russia and Britain, attack
British merchant shipping and launch diversionary attacks in England. 4. Promote Comintern fronts and Soviet propaganda in Ireland. 5. Enable the Soviets to recruit among IRA members, to build a communist base in Ireland. 6. Provide the Soviets with contacts throughout the Irish diaspora in America and Europe. 7. Provide propaganda and material help to nationalists in China, who were a key Soviet ally. 8. In the unlikely event of the IRA seizing power in the Free State and the subsequent Irish withdrawal from the British Commonwealth, the integrity of the British empire could be threatened. On all but the last of these key points the IRA either delivered or planned to do so.

The risk for the Russians was that discovery of the relationship would bring down on them the wrath of Britain, an important trading partner and their most feared military threat.

The IRA had little to lose from an alliance with the Soviets. They stood to gain money, arms and military training. Furthermore, just as the First World War had provided the IRA in the past with a crucial advantage, an Anglo-Soviet war could provide the IRA with the opportunity to attempt to seize power in Ireland and encourage the Soviets to provide them with significant military aid. The only risks were that the Russians wouldn't deliver the money and arms, and that communist efforts and propaganda would encourage IRA members to prioritise social revolution over the national revolution. Indeed the latter was to happen in the 1930s as many leading republicans left the IRA for radical or communist politics.

The Soviet–IRA agreement

By 1926 the IRA and Red Army intelligence had a fully operational and clandestine relationship. The cornerstone of this was the supply of information on military technology (much of it gained by espionage) in return for Russian money. The IRA was in contact with the Russians in London, Paris, Amsterdam and New York. The Soviets had a history of dealing with subservient communist parties, but this was a relationship of mutual distrust with both parties trying to exploit the other.

From November 1925 on, Moss Twomey and Andy Cooney oversaw the agreement on the Irish side, and along with Seán Russell they were intensely suspicious of the Russians, to whom they had no ideological
commitment. For their part, the Soviets handed over as little money as possible, and did their best to avoid providing weapons. General Walter Krivitsky, was later to admit ‘he worked with them [the IRA] purely as intelligence agents and for a time got quite useful information out of them, at the same time experiencing difficulty in evading attempts to interest him in the terrorist activities of their organisation.'
²⁷
Twomey wrote:
‘These people [the Russians] are so shifty…they are out to exploit us and use for their ends' and ‘except for our urgent need of cash, I would not be so keen on this [agreement], but am very much so [enthusiastic] on this account'
,
²⁸
while Cooney called them
‘people in whom we cannot place much confidence'
.
²⁹
Somewhat ironically, ‘Jones' in New York referred to the Soviets as
‘absolutely unscrupulous'
.
³⁰

Right from the start the IRA tried to prevent the Soviets from using their men as paid agents rather than representatives of the ‘Irish Republic'. Russell in September 1925 was concerned that ‘Mr X' was trying to use the OC. Britain as an individual agent.
³¹
Seán Lemass, the republican ‘Minister for Defence', replied: ‘We must be on terms of absolute equality with X's Government or there can be no liaison.' Later Connie Neenan echoed this concern when he wrote to Twomey:
‘At the moment we are just paid servants.'
³²