Decoding the IRA (46 page)

Unlike ‘James' in London, ‘Stephen' seemed to have been genuinely very concerned about the possibility of a break with the IRA. In February 1927 Twomey wrote to ‘Jones' that:
‘we may have to break off, even temporarily, to let them see they cannot dupe us or treat us as they wish'
and when ‘Jones' told ‘Stephen' that the connection was to be broken, the latter was
‘mad'
. He summoned ‘Jones' to a meeting where they talked about this for three hours. ‘Stephen' was
‘wildly excited over the matter, and will do anything to keep us on his hands'
. Jones had already slacked off on his work for ‘Stephen', reporting:
‘I notified my connections that I would not see them for a few weeks. I also had told Stephen during argument that I had not tapped certain sources, which would give results, because I felt they had no intention of being straight with us. He said that he believed this. Of course there is a certain amount of truth and bull in it, as I did not work hard on the job for some time past, but I gave satisfactory results just the same. It will take ten weeks to get an answer from his HQ and he thinks I am treating him bad in not supplying him with stuff in the meantime. From his attitude I think everything will be alright, as he is more or less helpless without us, all you have to do is use the strong hand.
The chief cause of the trouble is his HQ have no idea who supplies the material. He [is] getting all the credit. As far as I can gather, he never reports in detail how or where he gets the stuff etc.'
‘Stephen' offered to pay the expenses for an IRA delegation to go to Moscow to try and get the Soviets to resume funding, provided that ‘Jones' would either continue working for him or hand over control of a particularly valuable informant. ‘Jones' refused. ‘Stephen' claimed to be making this offer on his own bat, without sanction from Moscow, and he told ‘Jones'
‘not to report the matter to his HQ'
. The two
‘parted very good friends'
.
¹¹⁸

‘Jones' was not a person overburdened with modesty and believed he was the main intelligence source for the Soviets in America:
‘They almost depend on us solely to do their work here.'
¹¹⁹
This was unlikely, however, given the presence of RU networks among American communists. He added:
‘I have been very successful in my work. When the last man [Soviet agent] was leaving, he was lavish in his praise of my work. They
[sic]
told me that when I got time for a vacation that they would send me to their capital and that they would teach me their language etc. This of course is all bull, which I pretended to swallow. I am of [the] opinion it is with a view to getting me to work for them independently. Later on this morning, I told him I was expecting a cable ordering me to cease working [for the Russians]. He was very much upset [and] he asked me what I would do. I only laughed thinking he would ask me to work direct[ly for him] and compromise himself, [but] he is too wise.'
¹²⁰
‘Jones' continued to put pressure on ‘Stephen', who was said to be in a ‘state of despair'.
¹²¹
He felt that the IRA had been exploited by the Soviets, and in an interesting choice of words wrote:
‘Believe me these people [the Russians] are getting away with murder, but they will not do so [for] much longer as I am going to resign next month.'
¹²²

‘Jones' was
‘determined to get back to civilian employment'
.
¹²³
In March Twomey wrote to Neenan:
‘Prevent ‘Jones' [from] resigning … he may need cash which you can give him. He is too hasty and almost unreasonable.'
¹²⁴
But ‘Jones' was adamant:
‘I will not work whole time again. Not even for one day.'
¹²⁵
By early May ‘Jones' had
‘definitely given up'
. Twomey felt let
‘down badly'
and wrote him a final letter asking him to reconsider:
‘You appreciate I am sure the delicate nature of this work, how very few suitable persons there are to do it. A person
who may be capable may not be close or reliable enough. We can have nobody who does not fulfil the last conditions.'
¹²⁶

Twomey wrote to Neenan recommending that he should take Jones' position and get someone else to perform the administrative and organisational duties of An Timthire:
‘The work is so delicate and needs such secrecy it may be advisable [that] you take it on yourself and get someone else as An Timthire.'
In the meantime, to maintain the relationship ‘Jones' introduced Neenan to ‘Stephen'.
¹²⁷

Since the agreement with the Soviets dated from 1925 it was to be expected that a number of Irish republicans in America would have known about it, though not in detail. Neenan contradicted himself somewhat when he said that: no one
‘is aware of his [Jones'] work, but all believe he is working for [the] Army [IRA]'
, and then he suggested that the IRA take advantage of Jones' resignation to discretely get the word out that the agreement had been terminated:
‘We could tell those who know that [the] connection with ‘Stephen' [has been] broken off.'
¹²⁸
Twomey added that Neenan should officially retain the title An Timthire so as not to arouse suspicion.
¹²⁹

Twomey advised Neenan:
‘You should be free to devote a good deal of your time to “Stephen”. This work may cease at any time, and if it does you will be able to resume [your duties as] An Timthire … Pretend to “Stephen” you must travel on his work, charge expenses to him and in this way keep in touch with [the] distant camps [IRA-Clan na Gael clubs] of ours.'
¹³⁰

Who was ‘Mr Jones'?

‘Mr Jones' is one of the most colourful and intriguing characters of these encrypted documents, a maverick with a blend of toughness, bluster and intelligence. Piecing together clues from the documents, we can get evidence as to his probable identity.

Firstly, ‘Mr Jones' signed his name either ‘Jones' or ‘JB'. What did the ‘B' stand for? In May 1927 Twomey wrote a letter to an IRA officer travelling to America: ‘I am anxious to hear from An Timthire if Mr Byrne has given up wholetime
[sic]
work?'
¹³¹
As this was at the time when ‘Jones' resigned and given that there would have been very few full-time IRA officers in America, it is reasonable to assume that ‘Mr Byrne' was the
name by which ‘Mr Jones' was known in public. Then what was Byrne's first name? Twomey wrote to Neenan, telling him that a courier would call looking for
‘you or Dan Byrne'
and that he was to be given explosives or samples of tear gas.
¹³²
Given the sensitivity of this matter, it's clear that ‘Dan Byrne' was working closely with Neenan. In addition, throughout Neenan's despatches in cipher there's only one other IRA man whom he names as being in his confidence and that was ‘Dan'. For example, when Neenan sent $5,000 to the IRA in Ireland he remarked that the method for transferring the money was so secret that he hadn't told the Clan but
‘Dan and myself [apart from the couriers] … were the only persons who knew the means by which the money was sent.'
¹³³
As the name ‘Dan' is frequently written in cipher it's reasonable to assume that this is really Byrne's and hence Jones' first name. ‘Dan' was also probably from Cork – as was Connie Neenan and Moss Twomey. This is suggested in Neenan's letter to Twomey when he recommended that the newly appointed An Timthire
‘must not be from Cork. Note this. I feel others thought Cork were running [the] whole outfit.'
¹³⁴

I'm unaware of any senior IRA officer of the time in either America or Ireland called Dan Byrne, never mind one who would have been entrusted with such an important mission. It's therefore likely that the last name ‘Byrne' was a false name, particularly if ‘Jones' was in America illegally or on the run from the gardaí in Ireland. Interestingly, Connie Neenan himself said he travelled to Boston in 1930 under an assumed name.
¹³⁵

Connie Neenan had an older brother, Dan, in America, but by the time Neenan arrived in 1926 he was already seriously ill and was soon to pass away.
¹³⁶
A dying Dan Neenan, who was not a prominent IRA figure (even if he had been an IRA volunteer) doesn't fit the description of ‘Jones'.

There were a number of senior IRA officers in America at the time, such as Con Lehane from Cork who had led the IRA's attacks from Donegal into Northern Ireland in 1922. But there's only one whose first name is ‘Dan' – Dan ‘Sandow' Donovan.

Sandow was one of the toughest IRA gunmen, not just in Cork, but in Ireland – a hard man.
¹³⁷
During the Anglo-Irish War he fought in Cork city alongside Connie Neenan. In 1920 he personally shot police divisional commissioner Smyth at the County Club in Cork.
¹³⁸
Smyth was the most
senior police officer killed in the conflict. In the lead-up to the Civil War in 1922 Sandow masterminded the capture at sea of the British arms ship the
Upnor
. The IRA operatives seized so much arms and ammunition that they're reported to have needed 200 lorries to cart it all away.
¹³⁹
A small incident that occurred during the Anglo-Irish War serves as a colourful illustration of Sandow's personality and ingenuity. At that time in Cork, much to the annoyance of the IRA, there was a priest who regularly spoke out against the organisation during sermons at mass. This presented it with the dilemma: how to stop him but without harming him – as it was inconceivable to shoot or rough up a priest. Therefore Sandow walked up to the priest in the street, drew his gun and pointed it at him: ‘I was ordered to do it Father, but I can't. But there are others who are not as particular as I am.' It's reported that the priest kept quiet after that.
¹⁴⁰

In March 1924 Sandow took part in an attack on British soldiers and civilians as they were leaving the British base at Spike Island in Cork harbour. Spike Island was one of the naval bases allotted to the royal navy under the terms of the Anglo-Irish Treaty. The IRA men were disguised as Free State soldiers and the operation was a failed attempt to destabilise the government. The gardaí immediately suspected Sandow and the IRA had to whisk him off to America.
¹⁴¹
As a wanted man, Sandow couldn't have entered the US legally and so must have been there under an assumed name. He did eventually return to Cork, the date of which I'm uncertain, though it may have been during the Depression when many IRA exiles returned home.

Therefore when one looks at factors such as name, personality and stature within the IRA there's very strong circumstantial evidence to suggest that ‘Mr Jones' was Dan ‘Sandow' Donovan. A true Irish James Bond!

The IRA and China

One of the more bizarre plans of the IRA was to provide political and military support to Chinese nationalists under Chiang Kai-shek.

By 1926 China was divided into fiefdoms controlled by warlords, while many of the key ports and cities were controlled by foreign powers. Within these treaty ports and their ‘concessions' foreigners could trade
and engage in economic activity protected by unfair treaties forced upon the Chinese. The foreigners thrived on the absence of a strong central Chinese government and were protected by a large army and naval presence. Warships of many nations, including the royal navy, patrolled the seas around China and the great Yangtze river. Britain, followed by Japan, was the largest foreign investor in China and together these two countries accounted for over 50 per cent of foreign investment.
¹⁴²
To protect her interest Britain supported the powerful northern warlord Marshal Wu Peifu.
¹⁴³
America, with a smaller stake in China, adopted a more neutral stance.
¹⁴⁴

The city of Canton in the south of the country was the Chinese nationalists' stronghold. Chiang Kai-shek was the leader of the nationalist party, the Kuomintang, which was allied to the tiny Chinese Communist Party. The Russians believed that a nationalist victory resulting in the defeat of the foreign ‘imperialists' and their Chinese allies would trigger similar uprisings throughout Asia, including India, and ultimately lead to the collapse of the British empire.
¹⁴⁵
In addition, victory by the communist–nationalist alliance would help secure the border with Russia and displace the more threatening Japanese. To build up Chiang's National Revolutionary Army the Soviets provided massive resources and a host of military advisors. The fate of China also played an important role in the struggle for power in Russia, with Stalin supporting the communist alliance with the Kuomintang, while Trotsky called for Soviet support of the communists exclusively.
¹⁴⁶

In July 1926 the National Revolutionary Army launched a major campaign to reunify China, called the Northern Expedition. Following a string of military victories by the nationalists, in late 1926 the British began to consider recognising the Kuomintang government.
¹⁴⁷
The following March the nationalists took the key city of Shanghai, and around the same time the already-strained relations between the communists and nationalists disintegrated into fighting, leading ultimately to the rout of the communists and the Russians by December.
¹⁴⁸

So where does the IRA fit into this? There are a number of reasons (none of them very good) why the IRA should have considered supporting the Kuomintang and Chiang Kai-shek. First, any war that threatened Britain and her empire was in the IRA's interests. Second, it was an opportunity
to stir up anti-British propaganda by labelling Britain's involvement as imperialist. Third, and perhaps most importantly, this was a further service it could perform for the Soviets and particularly Stalin. IRA support consisted of a combination of propaganda and military assistance. However, the Russians may have overestimated the degree of assistance the IRA could have provided the Chinese. In particular the IRA and their partners, Clan na Gael, retained little ability to mobilise American public support – as by 1927 they represented only a small minority within the Irish-American community. This was in stark contrast to Daniel Cohalan's and the Friends of Irish Freedom's successful campaign against US senate ratification of the Treaty of Versailles only eight years previously.