Decoding the IRA (45 page)

 

Krivitsky said that when he renewed contact with IRA personnel, he worked with them until they presented him with ‘definite suggestions for collaboration in a terrorist plan', and, judging the risk too great, he again terminated the contacts.
⁹⁶
He also said that when Soviet intelligence wanted to recruit an agent ‘their first recruiting ground is the Communist Party: if that fails they invariably try and seek out an Irishman.'
⁹⁷

Was Walter Krivitsky ‘James'? Krivitsky was a senior RU agent stationed in Berlin and from his own admission (following defection to the west) had contacts with the IRA over a period of time. ‘Mr X' we know was stationed in Berlin, and this was probably another name for ‘James'. While ‘James' usually met with George in London he did not
have to be based there, and could have regularly travelled from Berlin under the guise of a Soviet diplomat or trade representative.

Another RU agent, Ignace Poretsky, alias ‘Ludwik', was stationed in Holland from 1928 to 1929 and had contacts with the IRA but found them ‘to be of little use' as ‘they were convinced that their own problems were the world's most important'. After he was observed by British intelligence meeting with IRA representatives, sketches of him were published in English newspapers, forcing his reassignment.
⁹⁸

The IRA and Russians in America

It was ‘Mr Jones' in New York who provided the Russians with the most important intelligence. ‘Jones' was a highly colourful character: aggressive and arrogant, outrageous and confident. In a typical exchange with Twomey, after an IRA officer from Clare complained that he couldn't make contact with ‘Jones' in New York, ‘Jones' told Moss Twomey: ‘When I see him he won't write home any more.'
⁹⁹

Initially ‘Jones' was both An Timthire (the IRA's chief representative in the US) and the IRA's intelligence agent assigned to work with ‘Stephen' of Red Army intelligence. In the autumn of 1926 ‘Stephen' asked him to devote himself full time to intelligence work and that this would ‘necessitate very long journeys'. ‘Jones' therefore wrote to Andy Cooney in October, stating in his own inimitable way: ‘If you don't send over a man at once [to take over An Timthire's duties], I will appoint one myself, as it will be impossible to carry on the two jobs after next week.'
¹⁰⁰
By the end of the year, Cooney and Twomey had appointed Connie Neenan to replace him as An Timthire. ‘Jones' and Neenan worked well together and Neenan appears to have been the only other person in the US fully aware of what ‘Jones' was up to.

In November, ‘Jones' was working flat out for ‘Stephen', spending up to five days a week outside of New York. ‘My job is getting very hard …
wine and women. I am onto the right people now and can produce material of a high order but I have to bring good whiskey along and stay up all night drinking with whores and the people who give me the stuff. ‘Stephen' is satisfied and offered me a raise in pay. I refused, as I don't want him to think I am doing it for the money. I may not last
long at this pace. If you hear of me being mixed up in a scandal, you will understand.'
¹⁰¹
He added:
‘I may have to put up in swank hotels in future [and] to do this I must have good clothes. I intend to ask him to furnish these if necessary as I couldn't afford to buy them.'
102
Twomey reasonably replied: ‘Expenses of clothes and extra hotel expenses should be borne by Stephen.'
¹⁰³

I
N THE
us
THE
Russians were principally interested in information on the armed forces and the defence industries – intelligence on chemical weapons being a particular priority.
¹⁰⁴
The United States army's Chemical Warfare Service, under the command of General Amos Fries, had responsibility for all aspects of chemical warfare including research and development. The service had extensive experience in the refinement and production of mustard gas, which was regarded as the most effective gas used in the First World War. In addition, towards the end of the war an American officer, Captain Lewis, had developed the highly toxic Lewisite, which like mustard gas was potentially fatal when absorbed either through the skin or inhaled. In the 1920s and 1930s the Russians devoted considerable resources to the production and deployment of these two gases. The US had also developed advanced gas masks borrowing on British and French designs.

‘Jones' provided ‘Stephen' with a wide array of information, covering areas such as chemical warfare, official reports from the army, navy and air service and airplane engine testing. In the field of chemical warfare he supplied copies of the journal,
Chemical Warfare
for the years 1922, 1923 and 1924. This was a journal produced by the Chemical Warfare Service, which Connie Neenan described as of
‘wonderful value'
to the Russians. There was also
‘a complete book of various army gases'
, which probably refers to the book,
Chemical Warfare
written by General Fries as a ‘labor of patriotism'. This was published by McGraw Hill in 1921 and though available in bookshops at the time was a most macabre production, containing detailed information and formulae of the poison gases of the First World War. In addition ‘Jones' handed over the 1926 annual report of the Chemical Weapons Service and two gas masks, one of which was developed for army officers
so as to allow the wearer to use a field telephone or wireless.
¹⁰⁵

Figure 27. The IRA's agent in New York, ‘Mr Jones', reported to Moss Twomey on the success of his espionage activities for ‘Stephen', the Soviet intelligence officer.

In paragraph 9 ‘Jones' wrote: ‘My job is getting very hard I was asked to concenterate
[sic]
and give results. I have, but it means:-
wine and women. I am on to the right people now, and can produce material of a high order, but I have to bring good whiskey along, and stay up all night drinking with whores and the people who give me the stuff. “Stephen” is satisfied and offered me a raise in pay. I refused as I don't want him to think I am doing it for money. I may not last long at this pace. If you hear of me being mixed up in a scandal, you will understand.'


 

Other items supplied included: a technical drawing of the Browning .50 calibre anti-aircraft machine gun, the 1926 annual reports of the chief officers
commanding the artillery and the infantry,
‘important technical notes [from the] Navy Construction Yard'
and information on a naval torpedo.
¹⁰⁶

Regarding airplane technology and the air service, ‘Jones' gave the Russians documents on tests of two Packard airplane engines – one the 520 horsepower 1500 engine, the other the 2500 engine. Neenan claimed that:
‘This saved Stephen's people $250,000 as they intend[ed] to buy one prior to getting [the] test [results].'
There were also Air Service
‘tests, photos and drawings', ‘Specifications issued by [the] Officer in Charge [of the United States Army] Air Service' and ‘[flight] manuals [from the Air Service's flight training school at] Kelly Flying Field [in Texas]'
. In addition there were ‘aero technical bulletins', and ‘technical notes' and memoranda for the years 1924 through to 1927.
¹⁰⁷

In 1926 ‘Jones' engaged in negotiations for items that cost up to $500,000. He hoped that ‘Stephen' would purchase them through him and so preserve a connection that could be later exploited by the IRA for their own purposes, as well as landing him a hefty ‘commission'.
‘I [‘Jones'] built my connection thru [
sic
] people who were helping me in the hope that I would buy stuff, the price of which might run up to $500,000. I discovered that our friend [‘Stephen'] was buying the stuff. I asked him to give me the buying of some of it and I would be in a position to give very valuable information. He refused. This puts me in a hole and I may lose good connections. He knows this and it's his lookout. It will mean hard work to work it up again. There is a big commission going with this.'
It is intriguing to wonder what this highly expensive equipment was. ‘Jones' refers to it as ‘stuff' and this was a term used by the IRA for munitions, specifically explosives.
¹⁰⁸

‘Jones' didn't specify who his sources were, though he mentioned one particularly valuable ‘connection' who was not Irish. He also clarified that he had multiple sources and additional potential informants whom he hadn't ‘tapped', due to the refusal of the Soviets to adequately fund the IRA.
¹⁰⁹
Given that much of the intelligence consisted of up-to-date military reports, it is reasonable to assume that at least some of his informants were serving military personnel. Why did they spy for the Russians? American communists could have informed out of a sense of idealism. But it was unlikely that ‘Jones' had much contact with communists,
aside from possible contacts among Irish-American socialists and trade unionists sympathetic to the IRA. Some Irish-Americans would have been open to supplying information to the IRA if they felt it was in support of the ‘struggle' against Britain, and it is highly unlikely that ‘Jones' would have explained that the information was being passed on to the Soviets. Money was also a likely motivating force for informants, particularly those with alcohol or other problems. I've found no evidence to suggest that the FBI or other US agencies were aware that the IRA was spying for the Soviet Union. In 1940 the FBI director, J. Edgar Hoover, wrote: ‘The Bureau has not been greatly concerned in the past with the activities of the Irish Republican Army except on specific occasions.' The words ‘specific occasions' are most likely a reference to IRA contacts with Germany during the First World War, which the federal authorities investigated at the time.
¹¹⁰

Towards the end of 1926 ‘Stephen' brought up the issue of the Soviet ‘war scare' with ‘Jones' and proposed that when Britain and the Soviet Union went to war, the IRA would help sink British merchant ships sailing from ports on the east coast. ‘Jones' reported:
‘They [the Soviets] are going to go to war with our friends [Britain]. Not at once, probably next Fall
[
sic
].
When that time came I would go home so I would have to train a man to take my place [in America], as we will have to work for him during [the] war period. We would have to destroy all our friend's shipping. He will supply all the necessary material. I would have to organise the men etc.'
¹¹¹
Twomey replied:
‘Regarding destruction of shipping, it is a most delicate matter. Doing so may involve [the] United States in war; not by England in declaring war on [the] USA, but by [the] USA against others.'
He was probably inferring that the US would declare war on the USSR if it found out about the Soviet involvement. Twomey, however, was not dismissing the idea of sabotage:
‘Destruction may be feasible, if it could be done secretly and without capture of our agents. Could you ensure this?'
¹¹²
However, ‘Jones' cautioned:
‘Under the excitement of war conditions, we would get almost all our men to do anything, but could not give any guarantee that we could avoid casualties in killed and captures [
sic
] … I am sure if war broke out, ‘Stephen' would try to use us in every way possible.'
¹¹³
By March, ‘Stephen' reported that
‘there was no immediate
danger of war from their [the Soviet] end'
.
¹¹⁴
In early May 1927, a week before the British raid on the Arcos offices, Twomey noted ominous signs:
‘Word from Glasgow that there is great activity in Nobel's factory making bomb plates and fuses. Working overtime, aeroplanes being constructed by Beardmores on the Clyde'. ‘Our friend [‘James'] in London has left and his successor is absent at the moment. We have a feeling [that] big international events and probably war on Russia are impending'
and added
‘lately a French newspaper published what purported to be plans for a joint attack by England and Japan on Russia.'
Twomey asked Connie Nennan to update him on ‘possible happenings in such [a] direction'.
¹¹⁵
In November at the IRA army convention the delegates passed a motion pledging IRA support for the Soviets in the event of war.
¹¹⁶

Contrary to actual Soviet policy at the time, ‘Stephen' professed that the Russians should be glad to have the IRA as allies:
‘Owing to the strained relations with England he was of the opinion that they [the Soviets] would make friends with anyone under the circumstances.'
¹¹⁷