Authors: Tom Mahon,James J. Gillogly
Tags: #Ireland, #General, #Politics: General & Reference, #Terrorism, #Cryptography - Ireland - History, #Political violence, #Europe, #Cryptography, #Ireland - History - 1922, #Europe - Ireland, #Guerrilla warfare - Ireland - History - 20th century, #History - General History, #Irish Republican Army - History, #Internal security, #Political violence - Ireland - History - 20th century, #Diaries; letters & journals, #History, #Ireland - History; Military, #20th century, #Ireland - History - 1922-, #History: World, #Northern Ireland, #Guerrilla warfare, #Revolutionary groups & movements
At one stage Neenan felt that Devoy might be turning away from supporting the Free State:âI have it from [a] reliable source that Devoy's Clan and [his] paper are going to constitutionally oppose [the] Free State government at a date not very distant. Latterly they have openly attacked [the] Free State in a series of leading articles. I will report any further news but it is best to leave them carefully to themselves, even though they are most anxious to get a grip on the young [IRA] men [who have recently immigrated].'
182
Twomey told him:â[It's] advisable
183
[that] touch be kept with Devoy's Clan. You should be careful not to get mixed up with them yourself. Perhaps if [the eighty-five-year-old] Devoy died many [members] would come over to us.'
Neenan also reported on the activities of Michael Ryan. Ten years earlier Ryan had been the leader of the United League, the American organisation which supported Irish home rule and John Redmond, but after the collapse of the home rule movement (following the 1916 Rising) he joined Devoy's FOIF.
184
Ryan was aânotorious bluffer'
, who even after the war remained strongly pro-German. In February 1927 he attended a function in New York in honour of the visiting retired Admiral Paul Behncke of the German navy at whichâspeeches were delivered advocating closer co-operation between Ireland and Germany'
.
185
As it happened there was to be no further split in the Clan, just inexorable decline. It is a remarkable testament to the depth of devotion and admiration Joe McGarrity had for de Valera that their friendship lasted for almost another ten years. The break finally occurred in 1936 with de Valera and Fianna Fáil in government, when an IRA prisoner died in jail â allegedly murdered. De Valera refused an inquest, leading McGarrity to accuse him of âselling out his former friends and repressing all freedom of thought and action in Ireland with the ruthlessness of a dictator'.
186
Money
During the Anglo-Irish War, America had been the source of considerable financial support for the IRA and Sinn Féin, and Moss Twomey expected the Clan to continue to provide significant funding for the organisation.
Throughout the Anglo-Irish War (1919â21) the FOIF had raised over a million dollars for the Irish Victory Fund and de Valera's Republican Bonds brought in over six million.
187
Impressive amounts, though admittedly only a fraction ended up in the hands of the IRA. American financial support never again reached such levels, although there were significant amounts raised during and immediately following the Civil War (1922â3).
In early 1923 Joe McGarrity provided $42,000 for Liam Lynch's abortive plan to purchase mountain artillery in Germany.
188
In August of the same year he helped the Clan raise $200,000 to support the Sinn Féin general election campaign, and this effort left the Clan largely broke.
189
Following this there was a significant drop off in the ability of the Clan to provide money. A 1924 drive to raise $100,000 for by-elections in Ireland was a âmiserable failure'.
190
Altogether between 1923 and September 1926 the Clan alone raised a total of $500,000 for Irish independence.
191
In January 1925 Liam Pedlar reported to Seán Russell that the Clan had raised â[$]25,000
since July-August last. All efforts in this direction have been made for theelection fund.'
192
Russell wanted Pedlar to go to the Clan executive and have the money raised by the Clan directly âearmarked' for the IRA instead of going through the ârepublican government'. In Pedlar's opinion âthere are a great many in the Clan who would rathersubscribe
andraise money for the Army than for any political purpose'
, but he recommended that any changes in the arrangement should be made by the IRA leadership in Dublin in communication with the republican âgovernment' rather than by him in the US.
193
Frank Aiken angrily wrote to Pedlar complaining about his communicating with âevery conceivable person here [at GHQ]' and to henceforth direct all his correspondence to Seán Lemass, Aiken's partner and the newly appointed âMinister for Defence'.
194
Aiken was obviously hoping to put an end to this unwanted discussion and keep the Clan on board with de Valera.
However, in August 1925 McGarrity finally declared that henceforth the Clan's money was to be provided for military activities only and not for electioneering.
195
That he didn't pull the plug on the arrangement with the republican âgovernment' earlier was due to his admiration for de Valera than any abiding faith in the democratic process. This new arrangement with the IRA was cemented by the agreement of September 1926 negotiated by Andy Cooney. When Cooney returned to Ireland in October he brought with him $2,000 from the Clan.
196
In November 1926 the Soviets cut back on their monthly payments to the IRA, making the IRA almost entirely dependent on funding from the Clan. As a result Andy Cooney wrote to âMr Jones' in New York:âThis is intended as an urgent appeal for immediate financial support [from the Clan]. Spare no effort to ensure that money is sent [to] us without delay ⦠America is our only financial source at present. It is therefore essential that support be sent without delay.'
197
Cooney was so desperate that he even threatened to disband the IRA unless the Clan provided adequate support:âOwing to [the] non-fulfilment of [the] agreement [by the Soviets] we are absolutely without any money whatever and this at a time when we never needed it more urgently. I have already written [to] you to send on money immediately. If this is not done, we will have no alternative but to close down. Point out to [the] Clann [
198
sic
] that with them rests the decision as to whether we can maintain our organisation or not.'
An Timthire replied:âA special appeal for financial help was issued by Clan Headquarters two weeks ago and returns should be completed in another two [weeks]. I attended [a] meeting of [the Clan na Gael] Board of Officers [for] New York and quoted your appeal. As a result each club increased their contribution to [the] appeal by nearly 100%. The Officer Board sanctioned giving at least $300, which should bring [the] total of [the] New York District to $1,000. The Liam Lynch Club [of] New York contributed [the] largest sum, as proof of their repudiation of [the] Cork [IRA] officers [who recently condemned the IRA's killing of a garda officer in the barrack raids].'
199
In addition the Clan na Gael clubs in San Francisco had already in October 1926 promised to provide $500 monthly â but only a portion of this was ever sent.
200
Some of the IRA leadership in Dublin suggested that Cooney and Russell visit the US to spearhead an appeal for funds.âIt is suggested here that Seán Russell and myself [Cooney] should go over for a special drive. I am totally against it, particularly at [the] present time when our place is right here. At the same time I would like to know if a special drive would justify itself.'
201
Given the strong support for de Valera among Clan members such a trip would have been potentially divisive, and furthermore, it could have been seen as interfering with the Clan's own authority. Not surprisingly,â[the] executive body of [the] Clan are totally against the proposal of yourself and Seán Russell coming out here. They contend it would not achieve any success, as [the] time and circumstances are unsuitable.'
202
In mid December Cooney again wrote to âJones':âThe situation here is impossible because of lack of finance. We must now have £1,000 immediately. We have kept going by borrowing and our credit is now at zero.'
Cooney wanted âJones' to give a bank draft for the £1,000 ($5,000)
to the IRA courier, Miss O'Connor, who had just brought this despatch to him. So that Cooney could know what boat she was taking on her return to Ireland and when she was leaving, he told âJones' to send a cryptic telegram giving the name of the boat and the date the ship set sail from New York. The telegram was to open with the wordsâDorothy sails on the ⦠[âJones' was to insert the boat name and date here]'
.
203
The Clan had difficulty raising the money andâmost districts are slow to furnish returns'
, but finally in January 1927 Connie Neenan (who had recently replaced âJones' as An Timthire) sent £1,025 by courier. This was equivalent to $5,000 â $4,000 from the Clan and $1,000 which Neenan had received from supporters in California. He took a number of precautions. The money was sent as cash and not as a bank draftâas I considered large drafts were suspicious, especially when we had no suitable names for [the] sender or to whom [it was] payable'
. Neenan also didn't send a telegram ahead of the courier, as suggested by Cooney:âI did not cable as to [the] date [the] cash was going over, as I did not want to attract suspicion in any way.'
204
Neenan expected that when all the returns from the Clan's appeal were in, he'd be able to send on a similar amount again. But even this hoped-for $10,000 (or £2,000) left Twomeyâdisappointed that [the] anticipated response will not be higher'
.
205
Twomey explained that while the money from America might be adequate to keep the IRA intact, it was insufficient to carry out the overthrow of the Free State and therefore the IRA was reluctantly forced to continue to work for the Soviets:â[I] am sure you realise how absolutely essential cash is and this necessity alone ⦠[is the reason for] our anxiety for keeping in with these people [the Soviets]. America will not supply sufficient [finance] for [our] needs except [to keep the] organisation ⦠this [is] not enough to finance preparations for revolution.'
206
Twomey was again desperate for cash in April and having toâexercise rigid economy': âWe have none whatever. We are borrowing against your remittance.'
207
Two weeks later he wrote:âWe are in a deplorable way for lack of cash. Such a state of things never existed ⦠before. We must know what we can count on from you.'
208
In May Neenan sent over another $1,250 ($1,000 of which was from
the Clan) to Ireland. The cash was sent in an envelope along with other despatches and addressed to the original courier, Miss O'Connor of Leitrim. The sender was given as her father who lived in the US.
209
Later that month the pressure on the IRA eased somewhat when the Russians finally gave them £1,000.
Neenan calculated that the $6,000 raised by the Clan between October 1926 and January 1927 worked out at $1.25 per head, and wasâhopeless, and I have told them so'
. He continued:âToo much money is used for expenses by [the] Clan. This is confidential but as far as I see, it costs too much to run such a small organization. It should be more self-contained.'
210
Twomey wasâkeenly disappointed'
and added:âUnless there are hopes of much more support, I doubt if the Clan organisation is worth all the worry, trouble and energy expended by you and some others as well as ourselves on it. Explain to [the Clan] executive [that] we must have £1,000 at once and at least £250 ($1,250) each month.'
211
Neenan agreed that theâClan can do a lot more'
and that he would discuss theâexceptionally small'
amounts raised with the executive and report back to Twomey.
212
Twomey wanted Neenan toâput it up to [the Clan] executive that administrative expenses in [the] Clan should be cut down to [a] minimum. Surely a couple of whole-time paid officers should be sufficient, taking [the] strength of [the] organisation into account.'
213
For all of 1927 the Clan sent over a total of about $20,000 (£4,000), of which $10,000 was sent by McGarrity in November.
214
In 1928 the Clan reported giving $16,000 to Neenan.
215
Overall, small change compared to what had been raised a few years previously.
The amount of money raised by the Clan was limited by the wavering support for the IRA among many of its members, the IRA's lack of military activity, and the socialist rhetoric of some of the leadership at GHQ. The Clan feared that the IRA planned to involve itself with political initiatives, and many members of the Clan were disappointed over its promotion of a republican election pact, all of which diverted attention away from military preparation. Responding to this Twomey took the precaution of writing to Neenan, regarding the pact, that:âAny proposals we make will specify for the safeguarding of the republican position'
.
216
An additional factor was the limited financial resources of many of its members, including Joe
McGarrity, while the difficulty in raising money was compounded by McGarrity's absence in Colombia during the first half of 1927.
Despite the desperate appeals from the IRA, the Clan didn't holdâmass [public] meetings'
to raise money.
217
The barrack raids were the only significant IRA activity of this period and An Timthire reported:âThe recent attacks at home by the Army gave rise to great enthusiasm and admiration amongst all our fellows. We should gain considerably in membership and finance.'
218