Decoding the IRA (39 page)

De Valera's support organisation in America was the AARIR. However, like all the Irish-American political organisations it went into a decline following the Anglo-Irish Treaty – only it had further to fall than the others. In 1921 its membership was 700,000 and by 1925 this had dropped to 13,870, of whom approximately a quarter were in New York.
¹⁵⁰
This was still, however, a larger membership than that of the Clan. Some republicans remained members of both organisations, although overall the AARIR's membership was more affluent and influential than that of the Clan.

In January 1926 Frank Aiken set out on a lecture tour of the US, sponsored by the AARIR.
¹⁵¹
Although no longer chief of staff, he remained an officer attached to the GHQ staff and officially the IRA pronounced that ‘he was granted leave of absence to perform work for the Republic abroad.'
¹⁵²
In reality though de Valera had sent him to raise support and funds for the soon-to-be-founded Fianna Fáil.

On Aiken's arrival the newspapers, including
The New York Times
, inaccurately referred to him as the IRA chief of staff.
¹⁵³
Aiken didn't correct this error for some time and news of his ouster wasn't commonly known in America. Even Joe McGarrity assumed he was still chief of staff and he was furious when he found out.
¹⁵⁴
McGarrity felt that he and the Clan had earned the right to be kept fully informed of developments in Ireland and angrily wrote to Aiken: ‘I have failed to learn up to the present time, just what the platform or policy of the party is.'
¹⁵⁵
Aiken (and de Valera) were trying to maintain the Clan's support, or at least prevent their condemnation, as they stealthily developed their political policy, and Aiken wrote to McGarrity that ‘the Clan na Gael organisation should confine its
activities to supporting the Army [IRA] whilst leaving the members free to support their favourite political Republican organisation.'
¹⁵⁶

In the autumn Aiken was suspected of suffering from TB and was sent to recuperate in the dry climate out west. ‘Jones' reported: ‘He is in California at present under doctor's orders. He was becoming TB [
sic
].'
¹⁵⁷
As instructed by the Army Council, ‘Jones' sent him on a copy of General Order 28, which forbade a member of the IRA from standing as a candidate in an election.
¹⁵⁸
Aiken continued to be watched by the IRA until his return to Ireland in mid 1927 – still technically a member of the organisation.
¹⁵⁹

Members of the Clan were concerned about what appeared to be another impending split in its ranks; between those who favoured de Valera and those who supported GHQ. In New York the Clan had already been badly affected by the 1920 break with Devoy (when only a minority of the original Clan members aligned themselves with McGarrity's section) and in 1927 members there proposed that Sinn Féin and Fianna Fáil reunite under a ‘neutral' leadership. As Neenan reported:
‘In the near future, the idea of both republican wings of political organisations [Sinn Féin and Fianna Fáil] becoming united is to be suggested. A convention of each party is to be called when ‘Scelig' [J. J. O'Kelly, a Sinn Féin leader] will offer to resign and call on de Valera to do likewise, leaving both conventions to elect a neutral leader. [It is] said [that the] united party will get [the] full support of Devoy's Clan. This is the report, as I got it, and though I see no possibility of it materialising, the New York Clan are very keen on you [Twomey] having this information.'
¹⁶⁰
Twomey more realistically replied: ‘There is no hope of success for the suggestion … It would not be entertained I think by any section. They [Sinn Féin and Fianna Fáil] are getting more apart every day.'
¹⁶¹

A major cause of the dissension within the Clan was a rule passed at the organisation's convention in September 1926, that stipulated that its membership couldn't participate in any political party that was involved in elections in Ireland.
¹⁶²
The rule was clearly aimed at Fianna Fáil. At the convention Cooney (who was in attendance) had
‘advised against passing the rule … [as he] knew it would lead to friction'
and the IRA's leadership in Dublin regarded it as ‘unwise'.
¹⁶³
In February 1927 Neenan reported that the rule had
‘driven a lot of old members away, as the
latter believe they should be entitled to do as they please. All such members are joining Fianna Fáil. This … is doing a lot of harm.'
¹⁶⁴

Most republicans in the United States (and Ireland) continued to be unaware of any significant policy differences between Fianna Fáil and the IRA, and were disappointed with Neenan and McGarrity for distancing themselves from de Valera. This was all the more reason for de Valera to remain deliberately ambiguous or misleading in his pronouncements on his plans.

Whatever difficulty the Clan had from Aiken's visit, it was to be nothing compared with the arrival of de Valera himself in March 1927. Ostensibly the purpose of his trip was to give evidence in a court case brought by the Free State to secure possession of the $2.5 million remaining from the $6 million raised for the Irish Republic Bonds. The court's decision in May was a defeat for the Free State and a victory for de Valera's strategy as the judge ruled that the money should be returned to the original subscribers. De Valera hoped that the subscribers would then voluntarily hand over the money to him and Fianna Fáil.
¹⁶⁵

Twomey warned Connie Neenan:
‘De Valera is sailing for America tomorrow in connection with [the] Dáil loan litigation and chiefly it is believed to get [a] portion for his party from [the bond] subscribers, in case amounts [
sic
] are returned [by the court to the] subscribers. You must be active too on this matter. Keep in touch with [the] bond holders' association, and be ready to collect if [the] time comes to do so. You must take it, de Valera will do his utmost to influence and win over influential members of [the] Clan to his party, so be prepared for this … He must be left in no doubt as to [the] attitude of Clan [na Gael] and no receptions or encouragement to his activities must be given.'
¹⁶⁶
A week later Twomey followed this up:
‘Keep us informed of de Valera's activities. You will act if he attempts to gain [control] over [the] Clan or prominent members of it. It may be necessary for you and “Jones” to visit various centres [to thwart him].'
¹⁶⁷

De Valera arrived at a difficult time for Neenan, as Joe McGarrity, one of the few people who could have helped him rally the Clan, had left the country. In December 1926 McGarrity resigned as chairman and headed to Colombia in search of needed business opportunities.
¹⁶⁸
He was armed with a letter of introduction to the archbishop of Bogota from
Cardinal Dougherty of Philadelphia, who described him as ‘an excellent Irish Catholic'.
¹⁶⁹
Neenan put the reason for his trip delicately:
‘It was not a case of financial difficulties, but he had some idea of improving his accounts.'
¹⁷⁰
As it was, McGarrity retuned to the United States in May 1927 and quickly resumed his leadership of the Clan.

Within a month of de Valera's arrival, Neenan reported to Twomey:
‘De Valera has done us a lot of damage since his arrival. Through his influence many good members of [the] Clan are actively engaged with Fianna Fáil. His presence had its desired effect as … certain members [of the Clan] showed their real sympathies. It was the Army [IRA] men that surprises [
sic
] me. I warned [the] New York [Clan na Gael] Officer Board of the possibilities two months ago, and those who believed I was wrong actually went to meet de Valera … To avoid [the] Dub. [GHQ] position being misrepresented, I consulted with Art [O'Connor, president of Sinn Féin] and ‘Jones'. Later going to meet de Valera and explaining our position and also the good work which the young men had done here, but which could easily be destroyed by his agents. I also told him I disagreed with his policy, so as to avoid a discussion of it.'
171
‘Events at home and de Valera's visit created misunderstanding and apathy [among IRA veterans in the US]. [A] number of Army men who arrived in this country are of no use, some [are] harmful.'
¹⁷²

All de Valera had to do was avoid, as far as possible, a confrontation with the IRA and the Clan while steadily winning over their members. And his response to Neenan showed that he was now the master of the situation – a politician who could run rings around the IRA.
‘He [de Valera] practically advised us to go on as we were going and stated his desire to bring back the people here to [the] republican idea [
sic
]. So far he has avoided a full explanation of his policy, so that people cannot locate the weak spots. In personal talk with some individuals he refused to give the important guarantees [such as whether he'd enter the Free State Dáil] which convinced them his policy was wrong.


‘He is very well received and getting large sums for elections, even certain Clan members subscribed liberally, who had given insignificant sums to [the] Army [fundraising] appeal. The sooner he returns [to Ireland] the better for us.


‘The situation has got so tense that the clause [rule] about [Clan members supporting] outside organisations, [passed] at [the] last [Clan] convention cannot be enforced. As a matter of fact in some districts it has been stated [that Clan] members were free to [do] as they liked. Even some of the Clan executive, favoured the latter course openly in their own areas. At a largely attended reunion in New York, some members wanted the rule enforced: [that] all [Clan] members [who were also members] of constitutional movements be expelled. A very unhealthy discussion arose which lasted a few hours. It did not help the organization in any way. It surprised me the number of Army men who opposed the motion, but their idea was to prevent a split. A certain bunch of old timers would be better out than in.'
¹⁷³

Neenan saw the disagreement within the Clan as a threat to its very survival.
‘I took up the attitude of preventing a split as it would reduce our numbers to a very small amount. Furthermore it would kill any hope of assisting the Army [IRA]. All our schemes and progress … would receive a deathblow. Not that members support Fianna Fáil, but they would drop off disheartened and disgusted. It would drive men to become interested elsewhere. My idea is to save the Army men, as in time de Valera's policy will prove its futility. We must retain the Army men united.'
¹⁷⁴

Neenan realised that the Clan rule would be hotly debated at the next convention in the autumn, and he asked Twomey:
‘Let me have your views on the matter and what do you suggest as a course of action. We can have it discussed – pros and cons – before [the] Clan convention.'
175
He felt that ‘unless [an] amicable arrangement [is] reached trouble will ensue.'
176
‘De Valera's presence has caused all this [
sic
] question to reappear. If he goes so will all [the] anxiety … Joe McGarrity is expected back in a month from now. His presence will be helpful.'
¹⁷⁷

The news from around the country was similar to that in New York.
‘Boston suffered [the] most from de Valera's visit. Some members wanted to meet him officially, but my [Neenan's] advice was sought [and] I refused to agree. [The] trouble ceased on [my] explanation but still several [men] support Fianna Fáil … Some members are definitely lost in Boston but we will get on without them.'
Neenan also noted support
for Fianna Fáil among Clan members in Philadelphia and Chicago.
¹⁷⁸

On 1 May de Valera left Boston to return to Ireland, his visit a success. He had managed to consolidate support in America, while side-stepping any disagreements he had with the IRA. The influential
Irish World
continued to support both de Valera and the Clan. Even
An Phoblacht
in Ireland continued favourable coverage of Fianna Fáil.

Twomey wanted Neenan to keep an eye on the AARIR and report back on their work
‘supporting Fianna Fáil' as well as the organisation's ‘strength, money raised, activities, nature of [their] propaganda and speeches'
. He harboured a hope that IRA supporters within the AARIR would help to split the organisation (just as appeared to be happening to the Clan) and rather wistfully asked Neenan:
‘Any organisation being formed by [the] republican [
sic
] minority at [the] AARIR convention?'
¹⁷⁹
While Neenan was unable to detect any sign of dissension, he noted that joint branches of the AARIR and Fianna Fáil were being formed and
‘It won't be easy to get that lot to work in harmony. The vast majority [of them] are no good.'
¹⁸⁰

While the activities of de Valera threatened the very existence of the Clan, the breach with Devoy was overall of less significance but far more bitter. Neenan made occasional reports back to Ireland on the activities of Devoy, his paper the
Gaelic American
and the FOIF. The
Gaelic American
managed to excel when it came to gutter journalism and its columns reflected Devoy's spite in his old age; de Valera was called a ‘dead jew' and the editor of the
Irish World
was accused of having overdosed with a ‘chink' in New York's Mott Street. However, the paper was closer to the truth when it accused the AARIR of having more initials in its name than actual members.
¹⁸¹