Decoding the IRA (18 page)

The raids were a disaster. Aside from the killings, which elicited a swift response from the gardaí – and met with disapproval from the public and even from within the IRA's own ranks – little information or weapons were acquired, while many IRA units were either unable or unwilling to participate.
²¹⁹

Cooney confided to a colleague:
‘From reports to hand many areas refused to carry out the raids.'
²²⁰
Even the diehard republican, Tom Maguire of Mayo, disobeyed orders:
‘Tom McGuire [
sic
] conveyed [the] order to [his] adj. [adjutant] but cancelled it at the last moment.'
²²¹
The Offaly brigade's excuse for its inactivity was that a supervising staff officer hadn't arrived from GHQ as promised:
‘[The chief of staff] was to send down a staff officer to this area, to make final arrangements for the executions [
sic
] of the operations, which were to be brought off in this area on Sunday last. I and [the] staff here, very closely scrutinised the details necessary for the bringing off of the well planned raids on the Tullamore and Birr barracks, but were badly disappointed by no staff officer turning up. What a pity it was, that this area was not included in the lists of last Sunday's activities. I presume the arrest of Moss would account for the mix-up.'
²²²
Cooney (rather magnanimously) replied to this lack of initiative:
‘I regret very much that final instructions were not sent [to] you. Everyone at GHQ were convinced that your area was already informed of the date. Arrest of [the] C.S. [chief of staff] was responsible for the hitch.'
²²³

There was also dissent in Tipperary, and GHQ wrote to the brigade OC:
‘Re. refusal of units to carry out raids, it is advisable that no undue haste be shown in dealing with those units. Our main efforts should be devoted to keeping the organisation intact against the present enemy offensive. That areas were not prepared for immediate operations is evident, but for future work I am convinced that these areas will not be caught napping. The moral to be impressed on all officers, is that they should be prepared and ready for all eventualities in a military organisation such as ours.'
²²⁴

Within days the government proclaimed a state of emergency and the police rounded up over 110 republicans across the country.
²²⁵
‘Flying squads of armed detectives carried out numerous raids.'
²²⁶
In Dublin Special Branch officers searched well-known IRA haunts such as the Clarence and Exchange hotels looking for Cooney and other GHQ officers.
²²⁷
An Phoblacht
's offices were raided and the printing press was smashed, preventing the production of the 3 December issue.
²²⁸
Cooney reported:
‘Men and women are being arrested daily. Raiding is as intensive as in the old days.'
²²⁹
He even managed to strike a note of defiance:
‘Most leaders arrested and will be interned. [There is a] big offensive by the enemy to crush the army. They will not succeed, but our task will be tremendous.'
²³⁰

In pre-dawn raids Frank Kerlin and George Plunkett were among twelve leading IRA members arrested in Dublin. They were remanded in custody for a week and though discharged on 24 November, the court had them immediately re-arrested under the Public Safety Act.
²³¹
Others arrested included John Joe Sheehy, OC of the Kerry 1 brigade, and Michael Kilroy and Dr J. A. Madden, both of the North Mayo brigade.
²³²

However, it was the arrests in Cork city that proved the most problematic for the IRA's leadership. Initially forty republicans were arrested there, but the majority were released and just ten were remanded in custody for a week. This latter group comprised some of the city's leading IRA gunmen from the time of the Anglo-Irish War, many of whom were either in the process of resigning or had already left the IRA and were supporters of Fianna Fáil. They included P. A. Murray, who was on the Army Executive and had recently been adjutant general, Mick Murphy, who was also a member of the Army Executive, and Tom Crofts, who had been OC of the 1st Southern division during the Civil War. Disappointed with the pointless killing of Garda Sergeant Fitzsimons and wishing to distance themselves from the organisation, they recognised the court, obtained legal representation and were granted bail. All of this was against the IRA's General Order 24, which barred recognition of Free State courts. The lawyer for Tom Crofts and one of the other defendants stated that ‘he wished to say that his clients had not hand, act or part in the occurrences of that Sunday night, which they all so deplored and regretted',
²³³
while Mick Murphy referred to the raids as ‘regrettable happenings' and that he had ‘severed my connection with all political military organisations over twelve months ago'.
²³⁴

Figure 16. In the aftermath of the barrack raids Andy Cooney wrote to a colleague, warning him not to return to Ireland for the time being. He addressed his comrade as ‘A Chara dhil' or ‘dear friend' and may have been writing to Seán Russell.

 

So public a break with the IRA – by men who had fought a hard battle against the British – provoked an angry response from within the organisation. In particular Mick Murphy's comments were singled out for criticism. Cooney reported:
‘Mick Murphy, Moss Donegan, and four or five others, arrested in Cork have written [to] the press, denying all connection with [a] military organisation. They deplored the murders and have done much harm amongst the rank and file. Cork No. 1 [brigade] is working normally, notwithstanding [the] arrest of all its late officers.'
²³⁵
He accused them of having
‘done much harm by surrendering completely to enemy aggression'
.
²³⁶
Interestingly, Cooney himself was likely disturbed by the killing of the two gardaí and used the term
‘murder'
.

As Murphy planned to emigrate to America, Cooney sent word across to the IRA's agent there, ‘Mr Jones':
‘Mick Murphy's attitude is [by] far the most serious, as his statements are untrue and every[body] knows so. He is a member of the Executive and of Cork 1 Bde [brigade]. He never resigned from either. As he is reported to be going to America, I consider it essential that ye have these facts.'
²³⁷
‘Jones' who was a fellow Corkonian, replied:
‘[I] am aware of [the] action of [the] Cork people. If any one of them come to this country they will
be treated as they deserve.'
²³⁸
Connie Neenan, who was also from Cork and based in New York, wrote:
‘The action of [the] Cork officers who surrendered was condemned by all. It was a deplorable step by men who should at least remain loyal [even] if [they're] otherwise inactive.'
²³⁹
He added that, embarrassed by their ex-comrades' betrayal, the Liam Lynch IRA Club in New York, which was composed of veterans from Cork, contributed to a special IRA emergency appeal:
‘[The] Liam Lynch Club [of] New York contributed [the] largest sum, as proof of their repudiation of [the] Cork officers.'
²⁴⁰

The arrest of Twomey and other senior officers thrust Cooney into the centre of the action. To add to his worries, a financial crisis occurred on 17 November when the Soviets abruptly announced that they would drastically decrease their funding of the IRA (see Chapter 8). This forced Cooney to travel to London the following week to meet ‘James', the Soviet intelligence officer there – but to no avail.
²⁴¹
The only other potential source of significant revenue was Clan na Gael in America and he wrote asking for an urgent fund drive. Cooney was so desperate that he even threatened to disband the IRA unless adequate support was forthcoming from the Clan (see Chapter 7).
²⁴²
And to save money GHQ sent a letter to the OC in Britain telling him to close up his operation there.
²⁴³

The Free State government, having made its point, soon relaxed the pressure. On 17 December
An Phoblacht
reported that the charges against Moss Twomey were dropped by the Circuit Criminal Court in Dublin, though the paper was indignant that the president of the government, William Cosgrave, had attempted ‘to prejudice his case, while he was on remand, by describing him as Chief of Staff of the IRA'. On his discharge Twomey was immediately rearrested and interned again in Mountjoy, only to be finally released very soon afterwards, along with the other internees.
²⁴⁴

On 17 December Frank Kerlin wrote to one of the IRA's convicted prisoners, Mick Price, in Mountjoy:
‘[The] internees are all released.'
²⁴⁵
Moss Twomey also wrote to Price on the same day: ‘You must have been as surprised as ourselves to hear that we had been released. We were sure when called out that we were to be sent to some other prison. We were only hoping that all political prisoners in the place would be cleared
out as well. It would not in the least surprise me if yourself and Donal [O'Donoghue] were released before Xmas. I am not saying this in any way to cheer you up
… [I] got [a] note in prison from yourself and Donal. [I] had [a] reply written and smokes ready when [I was] released … [I] cannot yet form [a] judgement on [the] situation [following the raids]. Things are not so upset as I expected.'
²⁴⁶

Within the IRA the verdict on the raids was decidedly mixed. The 4th battalion of the Dublin brigade wrote that the battalion council ‘was unanimous in their demand that an explanation is due from H.Q. re. the above [barrack raids]. Isolated Raids as in our opinion shuch [
sic
] activities have been instrumental in creating an atmosphere that facilitated the Free State Government in declaring a State of War, resulting in the Safety of the Army [IRA] in general been [
sic
] seriously jeopardised … [the raids have] proven detrimental to the [republican] movement in general.'
²⁴⁷
At the other end of the spectrum, Connie Neenan reported:
‘The recent attacks at home by the army gave rise to great enthusiasm and admiration here amongst all our fellows. We should gain considerably in membership and finance', though he did admit that ‘the army has an enormous task [ahead of it]'
.
²⁴⁸
Also in New York, the
Irish World
led with a triumphant front-page headline: ‘Spy lists seized by Irish Republicans'.
²⁴⁹

Moss Twomey alluded to these differences of opinion when he wrote:
‘There appears to be a very emphatic demand that the army decide what the policy is to be, as regards the question of armed activity.'
²⁵⁰
Andy Cooney expressed a somewhat similar concern:
‘We are going to have a difficult time to pull through. The army, as a whole, was not prepared for the operation, and there will be much local dissension.'
²⁵¹
The failure of officers and men to carry out orders and the inability of the leadership to discipline them are ominous signs in any military organisation. Without discipline and cohesion the IRA was incapable of carrying on any sustained or determined campaign. The organisation was now split into at least two major camps: one supporting Twomey and GHQ and the other supporting de Valera and Fianna Fáil. One solution that Twomey suggested, and if it had been implemented would have greatly strengthened the IRA, was of forming a smaller, more clandestine and
better-trained army:
‘[The] feeling is growing in favour of a smaller and more secret active organisation and for organising other volunteers and ex-volunteers in an open organisation.'
²⁵²