Decoding the IRA (20 page)

The insurmountable obstacle was that Sinn Féin wanted an assurance
that Fianna Fáil wouldn't enter the Dáil in the event that only a minority of republican deputies were returned, while Fianna Fáil were prepared to take their seats provided there was a way to avoid taking the oath of allegiance.
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Twomey implied that the members of Fianna Fáil with whom he had met (including Seán T Ó Ceallaigh, P. J. Ruttledge and Tom Derrig) had agreed in principle to the plan – which amounted to a form of quasi-legitimate
coup d'etat
– but that the sticking point was what to do if the republican bloc didn't gain a majority:
‘The proposals for setting up of [the] machinery for coordination during [the] election, the creation of a panel [of candidates] and the line of policy to be pursued if majority were got were acceptable The difficulty, of course, arose on the question if only a [republican] minority being secured. Sinn Féin would not cooperate with Fianna Fáil, while they [Fianna Fáil] [were] prepared to enter parliament on conditions. Fianna Fáil would not forgo this portion of their policy. The effort failed on this point.'
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By late April the National Executive of Fianna Fáil replied to the Army Council that ‘it was unanimously decided that the proposals were not acceptable' and the Council accepted that ‘the efforts of the Council had failed, and that no fresh attempt in the same direction should be undertaken'.
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Twomey wrote:
‘We tried our utmost to secure coordination between both political organisations for the election. We failed up to this and I can see no hope now … we feel [that] with coordination, enthusiasm could be aroused [among the electorate] and a majority got and that to get it was worth taking big risks … We found Fianna Fáil would be afraid to do anything in the way of meeting the situation in de Valera's absence.'
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He added: ‘We found Sinn Féin very difficult to deal with and at times insulting.'
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But in fact one last attempt was made to secure agreement. On de Valera's return to Ireland the Army Council sent a letter directly to him, which was most likely written by O'Donnell, in which he explained that he was writing to him as ‘the [Fianna Fáil] Executive may have felt reluctant to take such steps in your absence', adding ‘Trusting you are very well after your tour abroad'.
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De Valera in a terse note rebuffed O'Donnell: ‘I am in complete agreement with the view expressed by the Executive.'
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And so ended O'Donnell and Twomey's plan. The IRA moved quickly
to remind volunteers of General Order 28 (GO 28) which forbade members from accepting nomination as a candidate for election to the Dáil.
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Twomey reported:
‘We are insisting on the rigid enforcement of GO 28 forbidding Volunteers from being [Dáil] candidates since [there are] no hopes of [a republican] majority with [the present] disunion.'
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However, the order hastened the resignation of many Fianna Fáil supporters.

The results of the June election largely vindicated de Valera's strategy. Fianna Fáil won an impressive 26 per cent of the vote and forty-four seats, as against 27.4 per cent and forty-seven seats for Cumann na nGaedheal, while Sinn Féin imploded and only managed to win five seats. Among those elected was Frank Aiken.
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De Valera then led his deputies to the Dáil but had to withdraw when the clerk of the Dáil blocked their way – unless they complied with the ‘little formality' of the oath.
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Over the summer de Valera tried to devise a manoeuvre to enter the Dáil without taking the oath, while Cosgrave for his part was determined to prevent him. Then on Sunday 10 July a shooting occurred which was to have a profound impact on Irish politics.

The killing of Kevin O'Higgins

Kevin O'Higgins was the most able parliamentarian in the Dáil and as vice-president of the Executive Council, Minister for Justice and Minister for External Affairs one of the most powerful members of Cumann na nGaedheal. Seán MacBride described him at the time as ‘the brains of the government'.
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Though he dealt firmly with the IRA, he was committed to a civil society based on law and order and had been instrumental in bringing the army under effective civilian control and was strongly critical of garda abuse of IRA prisoners. Seán MacBride later wrote: ‘I was not aware of any particular antagonism to Kevin O'Higgins on the republican side at that period … it was generally felt that he was trying to restore law and that he disapproved of … acts of violence undertaken by the CID or the military. The CID had become a little law unto its own at the time.'
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However, by the time MacBride wrote this in his memoir, his opinion had likely mellowed. But to some republicans O'Higgins was a much hated figure who (as Minister for Home Affairs) was held responsible
for the execution of IRA prisoners during the Civil War, including that of Rory O'Connor, who had been the best man at his wedding. In 1923 Éamon de Valera had referred to him as a ‘scoundrel'.
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On that Sunday in July, as O'Higgins was walking to church in the south Dublin suburb of Booterstown, a hijacked car happened to pass by with three IRA volunteers on their way to a football match in Wexford. Recognising O'Higgins they jumped out of the car and, firing at him with their revolvers, mortally wounded him. He died five hours later at home.
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The three IRA men – Bill Gannon, Archie Doyle and Tim Coughlan – were never caught and their involvement only became known to the public in the 1980s.
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GHQ immediately denied responsibility for the attack and it's unclear when it became aware of the identity of the perpetrators. Not surprisingly, the gardaí launched the most intensive investigation in the history of the Free State, which, however, produced nothing. Senior IRA leaders and associates were arrested, including Michael Fitzpatrick, George Plunkett and Frank Kerlin.
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Tom Merrigan was arrested but freed after priests at the Capuchin friary in Church Street stated that they had been talking to him at the time of the shooting. Merrigan was an IRA company captain, who in 1925 had helped place the bomb in the Masterpiece cinema and went on to become a member of the Dublin brigade staff.
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Jimmie Brennan, a Dublin quartermaster, was questioned by ‘about a dozen CID men [who] were around him all throwing questions & using filthy language. When he said he believed the IRA did not shoot O'Higgins he was told that is what the rank and file are told. They informed him to tell his intelligence [officer] there will be shooting over it.'
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As part of their investigation the Special Branch ordered IRA captain Michael Clark to put on ‘the clothes he wears on Sundays' after they arrested him.
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Detectives also took away Tom Merrigan's Sunday clothes.
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The gardaí, along with members of the IRA, also suspected ex-members of the Free State army – bitter about their treatment following the failed 1924 army mutiny.
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As late as September 1927 GHQ must still not have known who killed O'Higgins, for the director of intelligence told the OC in Waterford that it was ‘most important' that he should investigate a report that
‘a doctor named McGuinness was in Waterford
and was entertained by Dr Coughlin. McGuinness is reported as stating he attended O'Higgins after being shot [and] that O'Higgins recognised one of those who shot him and that they were Free Staters.'
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In late August Seán MacBride was arrested, even though he had a watertight alibi of being on the continent at the time and had bumped into a Cumann na nGaedheal TD with whom he was on friendly terms.
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He was ‘charged with conspiracy to murder' but was eventually released in October.
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On his release, Andy Cooney warned the IRA that MacBride was likely being followed by police agents trying to capture other IRA leaders or discover safe houses:
‘Smith [Cooney] has an idea that they had a reason for letting Seán out and thinks that he will be closely watched for some time. [He] suggests that he remain very quiet.'
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In December the gardaí unsuccessfully tried to link Mick Price to the killing.
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Meanwhile the government's immediate reaction was to pass an emergency Public Safety Act, but more importantly they enacted a law requiring every candidate for election to the Dáil on nomination to swear to take the oath. This forced de Valera's hand, and on 11 August he led his deputies into Leinster House. There he pushed the bible to the side, covered the words of the oath and signed his name to the ledger. He later said he took no oath but merely put his name down on the ledger to gain admittance to the Dáil.
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Whatever the semantics, the significance of this occasion was that it marked the beginning of the ‘untreatying' of the Free State, and it was de Valera and Fianna Fáil, not Moss Twomey and the IRA, who were to achieve this.

The entry of Fianna Fáil into the Dáil resulted in a vote of no confidence in the government which the government barely survived – forcing Cosgrave to dissolve the Dáil and call for an election in September. In the year's second general election Fianna Fáil increased its share of the vote to 35 per cent and won fifty-seven seats. However, Cumann na nGaedheal also improved its position – winning 39 per cent and sixty-two seats – at the expense of the smaller parties.
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Fianna Fáil, in the words of Seán Lemass ‘a slightly constitutional party', now entered a period of spirited opposition in the Dáil. Outwardly their rhetoric continued to be strongly republican but de Valera was firmly in control and committed to the ‘constitutional' path. Though he was interested in subsuming the IRA's membership into the ranks of Fianna Fáil, he wasn't going to share power with them.

For the IRA, 1927 ended on a relatively quiet note. In November eighty delegates attended an army convention in Dublin and passed a motion pledging support for Russia in the event of war with Britain.

W
HILE
, 1926
AND
1927 have been described as a time of reorganisation and stabilisation for the IRA, they were, in reality, a period of decline and marginalisation. The initiative had clearly passed to de Valera and Fianna Fáil. Though the IRA's newly installed leadership – with the likes of Moss Twomey, Peadar O'Donnell and Seán MacBride – contained ample talent, it failed to show any real aptitude in guiding and developing the paramilitary organisation. At no time did it develop a coherent strategy or achievable goal, instead rushing from one dream to another.

The failure of the barrack raids should have alerted Twomey to the critical weaknesses of the IRA. Command authority – which is essential to the functioning of every army – had collapsed. Officers and men ran little risk of punishment for failure to obey orders (aside from the offence of informing) and most units lacked cohesion, being divided between supporters of GHQ and de Valera. Few volunteers had shown themselves prepared to kill (or be killed by the) gardaí or Free State soldiers. In short this was a force no longer capable of overthrowing the Free State or of fighting the British.
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Twomey was unable to reconstitute the IRA as a smaller, more disciplined and better trained clandestine organisation. The organisation failed to develop effective social and economic politics attuned to the Irish electorate and to the IRA's own membership. Time was to vindicate Frank Aiken's warning in the autumn of 1925 that ‘faith alone is no good for national salvation [the leadership] must use foresight and common sense'.
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CHAPTER 4

The IRA's local units

There are ten men in this area – who come under the category of spies, bailiffs, sheriff and judiciary – to be shot here.

IRA officer in County Offaly

Are you able to carry out the annihilation of all known spies? If so, is your brigade in a position to look after the men, who may have to go on the run

IRA chief of staff

During the period 1926–7, the country at times resembled the ‘wild west'. Gangs of armed men staged raids and robberies and threatened their opponents. In Dublin young men went around with loaded revolvers in their pockets, and were accustomed to hijacking a car when the need arose, while in court, witnesses were too frightened to identify accused IRA men. GHQ was not in full control of the IRA arsenal and it was often difficult to distinguish official IRA actions from those of criminals.

However, following the turmoil of the Civil War, Ireland was returning to a state of relative normalcy. The only killings publicly attributed to the IRA were those of the two gardaí shot during the barrack raids and that of Kevin O'Higgins, while no IRA volunteer was killed.
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Overall the organisation was badly split between supporters of GHQ and Fianna Fáil, with the result that many local units were inactive.

In November 1926, the IRA had an estimated membership of only 5,042, compared with 112,650 at the end of the Anglo-Irish War in July 1921.
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With the exception of Dublin, some of the areas where the IRA had been most active during the Anglo-Irish War and the Civil War saw the greatest decline in membership and organisation. This paralleled the defection of the most capable commanders to Fianna Fáil, who frequently took with them many of their men. In addition, members left the IRA due to disillusionment and disagreement with its policies (or lack or policies) while many other volunteers emigrated. Of the 5,042 documented members, 583 (12 per cent) were from Dublin, whereas only 280 (6 per cent)
were from Cork and a mere 80 (2 per cent) from Tipperary. On the other hand, localities which had seen much less fighting were becoming relatively more important. Mayo had 747 (15 per cent) members and even in Kilkenny there were 235 (5 per cent). At the most only half of these volunteers actively participated in the organisation.
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