Decoding the IRA (23 page)

The predicament of the nationalists in the north however remained of peripheral concern to the IRA's leadership in Dublin. Moss Twomey and his colleagues were more focused on dealing with the Free State and minimising the threat posed by Fianna Fáil.

The despatches show that the IRA was relatively powerless, isolated and weak in the north. The twenty-three volunteers in Antrim (outside of Belfast) were so cut off that the chief of staff wondered how he could remain in contact with them.
⁴⁹
The IRA didn't appear to have any significant intelligence sources in the state. The only exception was some low-level information obtained on the police in Armagh, which suggested that the IRA had an informant either in the barracks or one who had access to the post sent to the barracks.
⁵⁰

GHQ sent an organiser, Staff Captain Wilson, to work in the north.
⁵¹
There he set up a joint IRA–Sinn Féin committee to organise commemorations for the anniversary of the eighteenth-century United Irishman, Wolfe Tone. Wilson, however, found the committee ‘very slow' and had ‘to quicken them up'.
⁵²

Wilson also appointed
‘Dan Turley'
as OC of the Belfast battalion. He regarded Turley as ‘the only member of the [battalion's] staff one could consider' for the position.
⁵³
The chief of staff, however, wrote: ‘I am not quite sure that the appointment you have will work out satisfactorily as I think he is an officer who is rather hard to get on with, though I have no doubt he is one of the best otherwise.'
⁵⁴
Unfortunately for Turley's sake he was to find a place in the history of the IRA. He was a longstanding Belfast republican, having acted as an election agent for Sinn Féin in the city in 1918 and since then had served numerous terms of imprisonment. In the 1930s he was the battalion's intelligence officer; however, following a number of successful police raids and arrests, he came under suspicion of being an informer. The
IRA brought him across the border to a house, where he was beaten and tortured with a pliers and a poker. A subsequent court martial in Dublin found him guilty of spying and sentenced him to death, though this was commuted to banishment from Ireland. He agreed to the sentence and went to live in Britain. However, lonely and unable to support his family, he returned to Belfast after six months. There he spent most of his time in a secret room in his house, only venturing out at night. Friends warned him that the IRA would kill him, but he stayed and continued to protest his innocence. Finally in December 1937 he was shot dead on his way to mass. Twomey later refused to comment directly on the killing, merely saying: ‘He would not have been shot had he followed my advice which was to remain in Scotland.' Turley's family remained staunch republicans (with both of his sons members of the IRA) and they put considerable effort into trying to prove his innocence.
⁵⁵

Aside from sending despatches by courier, GHQ had difficulty communicating with its northern units. Wilson noted that: ‘The post is not safe for any length of time as the censorship is still pretty active here.'
⁵⁶
At least two addresses were used for sending letters –
‘John Rafferty, The Stores, Katesbridge, Belfast'
(the cover name for Rafferty was ‘Mr Johnson')
⁵⁷
and
‘Miss May Watters, 117 Butler Street, Belfast'
.
⁵⁸
Miss Watters was presumably related to Tommy Watters who later became general secretary of the Communist Party of Ireland in 1941.
⁵⁹
The officers of the Belfast battalion could be contacted by calling on
‘Mrs Cooley, 74 Cavendish Street, Clonard, Belfast'
.
⁶⁰

Attempts were also made to smuggle in copies of
An Phoblacht
and the chief of staff wrote to Wilson:
‘You never reported how you would suggest
An Phoblacht
can be got over the border. Would you get it in at a few places? Hegarty's of Derry have a place just outside the border and run a car across every day – without much searching.'
⁶¹
In 1930 a man from Tyrone was reported to have received a month in prison for possessing a single copy of the paper.
⁶²

Two volunteers from the village of Leitrim, in County Down,
‘Eddie Toman and Barney Cunningham'
, were reported as anxious to become involved again with the IRA following their release from prison in 1924.
⁶³

The IRA's representative in New York reported to Twomey that a
number of veterans there were critical of GHQ's efforts in the north:
‘There is a group of Six County men, very active here, [and] they think you are neglecting their area. They say there is no [IRA] organization in the north, and it is only [a] waste of time to send a man from the FS [Free State] area to reorganize them. He will not be listened to. One of them have [
sic
] volunteered to go over and reorganize that area, if you give him the necessary authorization. His name is Frank Donnelly, of County Tyrone. He is an exceptionally good man, and is willing to report at once. In doing this, he is making a great sacrifice, as he has a good business [here].'
⁶⁴
Andy Cooney sent a rather indignant reply denying that the IRA were ‘neglecting the place' and defended Captain Wilson.
‘I have only to say that a GHQ Officer has been permanently stationed in the Six Counties, since December last, on organisation work. They also have a representative on the [Army] Executive and on the Army Council.'
⁶⁵
Jones further pressed his case and finally Twomey sent a more diplomatic reply than Cooney's rebuttal.
‘Personally I consider it unnecessary at this stage for [the] Six Counties man [Frank Donnelly] to come over. He will not be able to do much and may only become a financial responsibility.
Of course if he is anxious it would be wrong to prevent him. It is really the spirit, as you state, that we should encourage and we should not do anything which might give the impression that this is not the spirit we wish to prevail.' This exchange highlights the difference in personality between Moss Twomey and Andy Cooney, and is a reminder of the skills that made Twomey such a popular leader.

While these reports and despatches don't constitute a comprehensive overview of all the IRA's units, they all support the same conclusion. The IRA was disorganised, unprepared, split and disintegrating.

CHAPTER 5

Intelligence

Seán Hogan has offered his services to [Chief Superintendent] Neligan for money.

IRA chief of staff

Warder Bailey … is always prepared to work for money.

IRA Department of Intelligence

Frank Kerlin, the IRA's director of intelligence, oversaw a clandestine network that extended throughout the country. He received reports and tips from sympathisers and IRA men, along with a small number of key informants. This chapter provides a rare glimpse into that network.

Historical background

The Anglo-Irish War has been called ‘overwhelmingly an intelligence war' and on the intelligence front the IRA was the clear victor.
¹
It was Michael Collins, the IRA's director of intelligence at the time, who established a highly effective intelligence system throughout the country. Intelligence officers were appointed to local IRA units and oversaw the gathering of information on the British police and army, as well as suspected sympathisers. Countless men and women were prepared to pass information to the IRA. Especially valuable were those employed in transport and communications, such as railway porters and post office clerks, along with hotel staff. This information was supplemented by frequent raiding of the mail by the IRA. A number of members of the police also communicated with the organisation, either out of a sense of nationalist sympathy or fear of the IRA. In Dublin, Collins controlled a group of high-value agents within the police and the British administration at Dublin Castle. One of the most important of his sources was David Neligan, a Dublin Metropolitan Police (DMP) detective.
²

With the aid of a small group of gunmen, known as the ‘Squad', Collins
used targeted assassination to eliminate British intelligence capability in Dublin. These efforts culminated in November 1920 in the ‘Bloody Sunday' killing of fourteen British officers and ended British covert intelligence for the remainder of the struggle.
³

Soon after the Treaty of 1922 Collins set up an armed ‘police' force based in Oriel House, Dublin, which became know as the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) or simply ‘Oriel House'. It was staffed largely by ex-IRA men, including intelligence officers and members of the ‘Squad'. The CID protected the government in Dublin and assisted the army in the Civil War fight against the IRA.
⁴
Members lacked discipline and organisation and the force became notorious for the brutal treatment and killing of prisoners.
⁵
In November 1923, with the ending of the Civil War, the CID was disbanded.
⁶

Meanwhile, in February 1922, an unarmed Civic Guard was formed, which was soon renamed the Garda Síochána (Guardians of the Peace). In 1925 the Garda Special Branch, under the command of David Neligan, took over responsibility from the army for combating the IRA. The Special Branch was the only armed section of the Garda Síochána. While the gardaí became well accepted by the community, the Special Branch, though considerably less brutal than the CID, was unpopular and known for its rough treatment of republicans.
⁷
As a mark of its disdain the IRA continued to refer to the Special Branch as the ‘CID'.

In July 1925 the Special Branch raided a house in Adelaide Road, Dublin and captured the IRA's director of intelligence, Michael Carolan, along with a considerable file of intelligence papers. Carolan was sentenced to a year in jail and his assistant, Frank Kerlin, succeeded him.
⁸

The Special Branch

Special Branch detectives, being frequently ex-IRA men, were at a considerable advantage in tackling the IRA, having intimate knowledge of the organisation's members, their haunts and hiding places. They engaged in a policy of continued harassment, arrest and interrogation of suspects, along with inducements to inform or reveal the location of arms dumps. Their task was made easier by the desperate economic straits of republicans and by the drift of many men away from the IRA. As one volunteer
remembered: ‘We were continuously being lifted by the Special Branch and being released again.'
⁹

In August 1927 the Dundalk IRA reported that:
‘A volunteer was approached by [the] “CID”, who offered him £2 per week for any information he could give them concerning [arms] dumps, [they] also [offered him] £1 for each rifle got.'
¹⁰
John Kelly, a Dublin IRA officer, was interviewed by Detective Hughes of the Special Branch and offered ‘many inducements hinting at the restocking of his shop … if he would give information as to the personel [
sic
] of the 3
^rd
Batt. [battalion] staff, and the whereabouts of the [arms] dumps'.
¹¹
Hughes had earlier questioned IRA quartermaster Jimmie Brennan and offered him £25 for information on arms dumps in Dublin.
¹²

Seán O'Grady of Cork went to his local garda station to apply for a passport and was told by ‘Guard Maguire, since promoted to CID … that unless he handed up a dump for which he would be well paid, a passport could not be granted'. When he refused, the garda suggested that he ‘leave a few rusty shotguns on his land … for which payment would also be made'.
¹³
At a time when economic necessity was forcing many to emigrate and start a new life in America, this was a particularly persuasive form of coercion.

Mollie Hyland of Cumann na mBan was trailed by a man (possibly Detective Kenny of the Special Branch) who loitered outside her office all day. He told her he knew Frank Kerlin when he was ‘in the game' [i.e. before Kerlin's resignation from the IRA in 1927] and that he was trying to ‘get in touch' with the IRA again.
¹⁴

One of those suspected of informing was the legendary IRA figure, Seán Hogan of Tipperary, who had been with Dan Breen at Soloheadbeg in January 1919 when two police constables transporting gelignite were ambushed and shot dead. This attack is generally regarded as marking the opening of the Anglo-Irish War. He then went on the run from the police, but came out of hiding to attend a local dance. Arrested at the dance, he was dramatically rescued from police custody on a train by Breen, which resulted in two more dead RIC men. He went on to further distinguish himself by leading a flying column that failed to participate in a single ambush.
¹⁵
In December 1926 the IRA chief of staff warned
the OC in Tipperary that:
‘We have information that Seán Hogan has offered his services to Nelligan [
sic
] for money. He may, therefore, be used in Tipp. Do not broadcast this. At present all [IRA members] should be told to be discreet, even with people who were prominent in the past.'
¹⁶

Seán Harling, a minor player in the Dublin IRA, was to become its best known informer of the period. Harling was a long-serving republican who had been a courier for the First Dáil and for Éamon de Valera and ‘claimed to have worked for Collins'.
¹⁷
Though he later referred to himself as an ‘ambivalent republican' during the Civil War, he spent most of the war imprisoned by the Free State in the internment camp at the Curragh. After his release he lived with his wife and children in a small gate lodge on the Dartry Road, Dublin. Though he received a small grant of £30 from the IRA, he remained impoverished with no prospect of a job.
¹⁸
He eventually approached the gardaí and offered to inform. In the words of David Neligan: ‘It was poverty drove Harling into working with us. I felt sorry for the poor wretch.'
¹⁹