Disinformation Book of Lists (18 page)

During the incident, overlapping radars that should have confirmed or disagreed were not in operation. The radar post had not received routine information of satellite passage because the facility carrying out that task had been given other work for the duration of the crisis.

13

Cuban Missile Crisis: False warning due to satellite

October 28, 1962.
At 5:26 p.m. on October 28, the Laredo radar warning site had just become operational. Operators misidentified a satellite in orbit as two possible missiles over Georgia and reported by voice line to NORAD HQ. NORAD was unable to identify that the warning came from the new station at Laredo and believed it to be from Moorestown, and therefore more reliable. Moorestown failed to intervene and contradict the false warning. By the time the Commander of NORAD had been informed, no impact had been reported and the warning was “given low credence.”

14

The Penkovsky false warning

November 2, 1962.
In the fall of 1962, Colonel Oleg Penkovsky was working with the Soviets as a double agent for the CIA. He had been given a code by which to warn the CIA if he was convinced that a Soviet attack on the United States was imminent. He was to call twice, one minute apart, and only blow into the receiver. Further information was then to be left at a “dead drop” in Moscow.

The pre-arranged code message was received by the CIA on November 2, 1962.

It was known at the CIA that Penkovsky had been arrested on October 22. Penkovsky knew he was going to be executed. It is not known whether he had told the KGB the meaning of the code signal or only how it would be given, nor is it known exactly why or with what authorization the KGB staff used it. When another CIA agent checked the dead drop, he was arrested.

15

Power failure and faulty bomb alarms

November 1965.
Special bomb alarms were installed near military facilities and near cities in the US, so that the locations of nuclear bursts would be transmitted before the expected communication failure. The alarm circuits were set up to display a red signal at command posts the instant that the flash of a nuclear detonation reached the sensor and before the blast put it out of action. Normally the display would show a green signal, or yellow if the sensor was not operating or was out of communication for any other reason.

During the commercial power failure in the Northeastern United States in November 1965, displays from all the bomb alarms for the area should have shown yellow. In fact, two of them from different cities showed red because of circuit errors. The effect was consistent with the power failure being due to nuclear weapons explosions, and the Command Center of the Office of Emergency Planning went on full alert. Apparently the military did not.

16

B-52 crash near Thule

January 21, 1968.
Communication between NORAD HQ and the BMEWS station at Thule, Greenland, had 3 elements:

 

1. direct radio communication;

2. a “bomb alarm,” as described above;

3. radio communication relayed by a B-52 bomber on airborne alert.

On January 21, 1968, a fire broke out in the B-52 bomber on airborne alert near Thule. The pilot prepared for an emergency landing at the base. However, the situation deteriorated rapidly, and the crew had to bale out. There had been no time to communicate with SAC HQ, and the pilotless plane flew over the Thule base before crashing into the ice seven miles offshore. Its fuel and the high explosive component of its nuclear weapons exploded, but there was no nuclear detonation.

At that time, the “one point safe” condition of the nuclear weapons could not be guaranteed, and it is believed that a nuclear explosion could have resulted from accidental detonation of the high explosive trigger. Had there been a nuclear detonation even at seven miles distant, and certainly much nearer the base, all three communication methods would have given an indication consistent with a successful nuclear attack on both the base and the B-52 bomber. The bomb alarm would have shown red, and the other two communication paths would have gone dead. It would hardly have been anticipated that the combination could have been caused by accident, particularly as the map of the routes for B-52 airborne flights approved by the President showed no flight near Thule. The route had been apparently changed without informing the White House.

17

False alarm during Middle East crisis

October 24-25, 1973.
On October 24, 1973, when the UN-sponsored cease-fire intended to end the Arab-Israeli war was in force, further fighting stared between Egyptian and Israeli troops in the Sinai desert. US intelligence reports and other sources suggested that the USSR was planning to intervene to protect the Egyptians. President Nixon was in the throes of Watergate and not available for a conference, so Kissinger and other US officials ordered DEFCON 3. The consequent movements of aircraft and troops were of course observed by Soviet intelligence. The purpose of the alert was not to prepare for war but to warn the USSR not to intervene in the Sinai. However, if the following accident had not been promptly corrected, the Soviet command might have had a more dangerous interpretation.

On October 25, while DEFCON 3 was in force, mechanics were repairing one of the Klaxons at Kinchole Air Force Base, Michigan, and accidentally activated the whole base alarm system. B-52 crews rushed to their aircraft and started the engines. The duty officer recognized the alarm as false and recalled the crews before any took off.

18

Computer exercise tape

November 9, 1979.
At 8:50 a.m. on November 9, 1979, duty officers at four command centers (NORAD HQ, SAC Command Post, the Pentagon National Military Command Center, and the Alternate National Military Command Center) all saw on their displays a pattern showing a large number of Soviet missiles in a full-scale attack on the US. During the next six minutes, emergency preparations for retaliation were made. A number of Air Force planes were launched, including the President's National Emergency Airborne Command Post, though without the President! President Carter had not been informed, perhaps because he could not be found.

No attempt was made to use the hotline either to ascertain the Soviet intentions or to tell the Soviets the reasons for US actions. This seems to me to have been culpable negligence. The whole purpose of the hotline was to prevent exactly the type of disaster that was threatening at that moment.

With commendable speed, NORAD was able to contact the Air Force's PAVE PAWS early warning radar and learn that no missiles had been reported. Also, the sensors on the satellites were functioning that day and had detected no missiles. In only six minutes the threat assessment conference was terminated.

The reason for the false alarm was an exercise tape running on the computer system. US Senator Charles Percy happened to be in NORAD HQ at the time and is reported to have said there was absolute panic. A question was asked in Congress, and the General Accounting Office conducted an investigation. An off-site testing facility was constructed so that test tapes did not in the future have to be run on a system that could be in military operation.

19

Faulty computer chip

June 1980.
The warning displays at the Command Centers mentioned in the last episode included windows that normally showed:

0000 ICBMs detected 0000 SLBMs detected

At 2:25 a.m. on June 3, 1980, these displays started showing various numbers of missiles detected, represented by 2's in place of one or more 0's. Preparations for retaliation were instituted, including nuclear bomber crews starting their engines, the launching of Pacific Command's Airborne Command Post, and the readying of Minuteman missiles for launch. It was not difficult to assess that this was a false alarm because the numbers displayed were not rational.

While the cause of that false alarm was still being investigated three days later, the same thing happened, and again preparations were made for retaliation. The cause was a single faulty chip that was failing in a random fashion. The basic design of the system was flawed, allowing this single failure to cause a deceptive display at several command posts. The following incident is added to illustrate that even now, after the Cold War, errors can still cause for concern. This particular one could have hardly brought nuclear retaliation, but there are still 30,000 nuclear weapons deployed, and two nuclear weapon states could get into a hostile adversarial status again.

20

Russian false alarm

January 1995.
On January 25, 1995, the Russian early warning radar detected an unexpected missile launch near Spitzbergen. The estimated flight time to Moscow was five minutes. The Russian President, the Defense Minister, and the Chief of Staff were informed. The early warning and the control and command center switched to combat mode. Within five minutes, radar determined that the missile's impact would be outside the Russian borders.

The missile was Norwegian, and was launched for scientific measurements. On January 16, Norway had notified 35 countries, including Russia, that the launch was planned. Information had apparently reached the Russian Defense Ministry, but failed to reach the on-duty personnel of the early warning system.

Comment and Note on Probability

The probability of actual progression to nuclear war on any one of the occasions listed may have been small, due to planned “failsafe” features. However, the accumulation of small probabilities of disaster from a long sequence of risks add up to serious danger.

There is no way of telling what the actual level of risk was in these mishaps, but if the chance of disaster in every one of the 20 incidents had been only one in 100, it is a mathematical fact that the chance of surviving all 20 would have been 82% (i.e., about the same as the chance of surviving a single pull of the trigger at Russian roulette played with a six-shooter). With a similar series of mishaps on the Soviet side: another pull of the trigger. If the risk in some of the events had been as high as one in ten, then the chance of surviving just seven such events would have been less than 50-50.

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From September 1961 to September 1992, the United States military conducted 824 nuclear tests. Of these, 433 released radioactive material into the area surrounding the immediate detonation site. In 52 such incidents, the atomic particles drifted outside of the entire testing area (usually the Nevada Test Range) and into civilian areas.

1

Antler

Date
: September 15, 1961 (first known test in which radiation leaked offsite)
Location
: Nevada Test Site
Bomb yield
: 2.6 kilotons
Length of release
: unknown
Farthest location radiation detected
: “21.1 miles northeast of the junction of Highway 6 and Highway 25 (Nevada)”
Most radiation detected
: 28 picocuries @ Diablo, Nevada

2

Gnome

Date
: December 10, 1961
Location
: Carlsbad, New Mexico
Bomb yield
: 3.0 kilotons
Length of release
: “Large flow” for 30 minutes; “small flow” until the following day
Farthest location radiation detected
: Roswell, New Mexico
Most radiation detected
: 160 picocuries @ IMCC Mine, New Mexico

3

Pampas

Date
: March 1, 1962
Location
: Nevada Test Site
Bomb yield
: 9.5 kilotons
Length of release
: 20 minutes
Farthest location radiation detected
: Sand Springs Valley, Nevada
Most radiation detected
: 1,700 picocuries @ Penoyer, Nevada

4

Platte

Date
: April 14, 1962
Location
: Nevada Test Site
Bomb yield
: 1.85 kilotons
Length of release
: not specified
Farthest location radiation detected
: “28.1 miles northeast of Currant, Nevada”
Most radiation detected
: 34,000 picocuries @ Queen City Summit, Nevada

5

Sedan

Date
: July 6, 1962
Location
: Nevada Test Site
Bomb yield
: 104 kilotons
Length of release
: not specified
Farthest location radiation detected
: near McGill, Nevada
Most radiation detected
: 13,000 picocuries @ Diablo, Nevada

6

Johnnie Boy

Date
: July 11, 1962
Location
: Nevada Test Site
Bomb yield
: 500 tons
Length of release
: not specified
Farthest location radiation detected
: 11 miles northeast of Lockes, Nevada
Most radiation detected
: 23,000 picocuries @ Twin Springs Ranch, Nevada

7

Small Boy

Date
: July 14, 1962
Location
: Nevada Test Site
Bomb yield
: “low”
Length of release
: not specified
Farthest location radiation detected
: “seven miles south of Parowan, Utah, on Highway 143”
Most radiation detected
: 140,000 picocuries @ Elko, Nevada

8

Bandicoot

Date
: October 19, 1962
Location
: Nevada Test Site
Bomb yield
: 12.5 kilotons
Length of release
: five minutes
Farthest location radiation detected
: 14.5 miles south of Shoshone, California
Most radiation detected
: 52,000 picocuries @ Death Valley Junction, California

9

Double Tracks

This test was not technically a nuclear explosion. Rather, it was more along the lines of what we now call a “dirty bomb.” The US and British militaries wanted to study dispersal of radioactive particles, so they did the logical thing: Out in the open, they used conventional explosives to scatter plutonium to the four winds.

Date: May 15, 1963
Location
: Nellis Air Force Range (adjacent to Las Vegas)
Bomb yield
: N/A
Length of release
: N/A
Farthest location radiation detected
: not specified
Most radiation detected
: “Alpha activity detected on air samplers at Beatty, Nevada and Scotty's Junction, Nevada”

10

Baneberry

Date
: December 18, 1970
Location
: Nevada Test Site
Bomb yield
: 10 kilotons
Length of release
: 24 hours
Farthest location radiation detected
: Austin, Nevada, although, in a seeming contradiction, the military reported: “parts of the [nuclear] cloud moved over Nevada, Utah, and Wyoming; another fraction moved towards California.”
Most radiation detected
: 3,400 picocuries @ Stone Cabin Ranch, Nevada

11

Misty Rain

Date
: April 6, 1985
Location
: Nevada Test Site
Bomb yield
: under 20 kilotons
Length of release
: “controlled ventilation” occurred from two and a half to four days later
Farthest location radiation detected
: Reed Ranch Road, Nevada; Rachel, Nevada
Most radiation detected
: “No radiation intensities above background levels were detected.” (Then how was the radiation detected in Reed Ranch Road and Rachel?)

12

Glencoe

Date
: March 22, 1986
Location
: Nevada Test Site
Bomb yield
: 29 kilotons
Length of release
: unspecified length on March 27
Farthest location radiation detected
: Lathrop Wells, Nevada.
Most radiation detected
: not specified

13

Mighty Oak

Date
: April 10, 1986 (last known test in which radiation leaked offsite)
Location
: Nevada Test Site
Bomb yield
: under 20 kilotons
Length of release
: From April 22 to May 19, eight “controlled ventilations” were performed
Farthest location radiation detected
: “No radiation intensities above background were detected.”
Most radiation detected
: 430±15 picocuries @ Medlins Ranch, Nevada