Hannibal: A Hellenistic Life (13 page)

The rebels swore an oath committing them to torture and kill every Carthaginian they came across and to cut the hands off every ally of Carthage. Seven hundred hostages were executed. The rebel commanders must have known they would receive no clemency from Carthage after these acts and
that the war would not be settled by negotiation. The extreme treatment of their prisoners may have been designed to deter the rebel soldiers from deserting to Carthage now that Hamilcar, popular and charismatic, was in charge and had the upper hand.
⁴⁴
Hamilcar responded in kind to the violent treatment of prisoners: shifting from his initial policy of leniency towards his captives, he began retaliatory executions. Those prisoners he had taken in the field and those brought to him as captives were ‘put to the sword … or thrown to the elephants’ (Polyb. 1.82.2). There would be no mercy on either side.

Hamilcar and Hanno who had been commanding two separate armies came together to avenge Gisgo and the other victims of the executions (1.81.1–2). Polybius makes much of the two generals joining forces, uniting their armies and then quarrelling ‘so seriously that the Carthaginians ordered one of the two to leave his post’ (1.82.3–6). The choice of which commander they preferred was left with the troops. When the preference of the soldiers was Hamilcar, Hanno retired from the battleground but not from the political landscape. He would remain an implacable enemy of the Barcid clan through the next decades of their supremacy.
⁴⁵
The citizens of Carthage sent out another general to work under Hamilcar, who now commanded one unified army (Polyb. 1.82.12).

This disagreement in the field would have serious repercussions for Hannibal in future years. The figures of Hamilcar and Hanno may well have represented two sides in an internal political struggle at Carthage.
⁴⁶
Both Polybius and Livy mention divisions between political factions at Carthage throughout the history of the Punic Wars but little specific detail is given. The theory of factions based on populist versus traditionalist elements in the Carthaginian government has developed in modern scholarship based on the ancient writers, but equally these factions may simply represent different extended familial groups vying for power. The long-standing animosity between the Barcids and the faction led by Hanno would result in a disjointed policy that was to have a direct impact on Hannibal’s ability to sustain his efforts in the subsequent war.

As the fighting continued, both good and bad ‘fortune’ plagued the Carthaginians. A storm destroyed a supply fleet coming to Carthage’s aid from allied cities along the coastal stretch south and east of Carthage (Polyb. 1.82.6 – called the
Emporia
: see
Map 2
).
⁴⁷
Then another blow fell when Hippo Acra and Utica defected to the enemy. These cities had been the only centres to remain loyal to Carthage in their northern coastal region. After long being under pressure from the rebels, the citizens slaughtered their garrison of soldiers and threw the bodies from the city walls. Mathos and Spendius, the
leaders of the rebellion, emboldened by the events at Utica, moved on to lay siege to Carthage.

Just how close Carthage came to defeat is perhaps best seen in the reactions of Carthage’s enemies, Syracuse and Rome. Cut off by land from all its resources, supplies had to arrive by sea. Carthage was forced to ‘resort to an appeal to the states in alliance …’ (Polyb. 1.83.1). It is telling that in this moment of need Syracuse came to the aid of Carthage but Rome’s reaction was more ambiguous. The Syracusan king Hiero was most helpful and ‘prompt in meeting requests’. Polybius reasoned that it was very much in his own interest to do so, for Hiero understood that the demise of Carthage would only favour Roman hegemony and Syracuse would be the loser if Rome were to become supreme (1.83.3–5).

The Roman reaction to the plight of Carthage is more equivocal. When the Carthaginians ‘captured at sea, traders coming from Italy to Libya with supplies for the enemy’ it implies that Rome was providing for the rebels (Polyb. 1.83.7). Up to 500 prisoners were taken to Carthage and in the negotiations that followed the Romans agreed to return to Carthage all the remaining captives from the Sicilian war, numbering some 2,743, according to the Roman tradition.
⁴⁸
After this, Rome’s merchant ships began to supply Carthage in accordance with the treaty that ended the First Punic War. It is clear that Rome’s first instinct was to help the rebellious mercenaries, an action that betrays Roman intentions towards Carthage. Despite the terms of the treaty they would take any opportunity to damage their enemy.

By 238
BCE
the war seemed to be drawing to a close but hostilities rumbled on. Hamilcar had besieged the besiegers, trapping them between Carthage and his army (Polyb. 1.84.1). The fighting continued, with the Libyan soldiers shadowing Hamilcar’s army, not engaging in battle but laying ambushes and traps by anticipating the movement of his troops. This was a tactic the Roman general Fabius Maximus Cunctator (the delayer) would use against Hannibal in the Second Punic War. Polybius’ hero Hamilcar was able to overcome these tactics by cutting off and isolating groups of the Libyans. When he finally confronted Spendius and his army, they were trapped and ‘did not dare risk a battle nor were they able to escape’ (1.84.11). Hamilcar surrounded and then starved the rebels. The gruesome violence of the war continued with the Libyans forced to cannibalize their captives and their slaves before finally giving themselves up to the enemy. Yet this capitulation did not end the war.

The Libyan leaders including Spendius, the Gaul Autaritus and eight others surrendered to Hamilcar ‘to discuss terms … near the place called the Saw’ (Polyb.1.85.7).
⁴⁹
Modern historians have identified the location as near
Zaghouan, about 40 kilometres south of Tunis and 20 kilometres west of modern Hammamet (perhaps at Djebel Djedidi) near a ridge of hills called Djebel es Serra. The agreement was that the Carthaginians could choose any ten of the rebels as prisoners and the rest of their army would go free. Hamilcar then chose the ten envoys he was negotiating with as his prisoners. To the soldiers in the camp it seemed as if their own leaders had betrayed them by coming to terms with Hamilcar. As news of the deal reached the soldiers they refused to accept the conditions, fearing a trap. They once more took up their arms. Hamilcar surrounded and destroyed them.
⁵⁰

With Mathos’ army still at Tunes the war was not quite over. Hamilcar first secured the countryside then re-established control over lost regions and finally laid siege to the remaining rebel forces. The city of Tunes was surrounded, with Hamilcar to the south and a general named Hannibal to the north, the side that faced Carthage. The ten Libyan leaders whom Hamilcar had taken prisoner at the ‘Saw’ were crucified just outside the walls of the town. Despite these public executions Mathos was not persuaded to surrender, surely seeing his own fate below him along the city walls. In desperation he turned and attacked Hannibal’s army to the north. Mathos managed to capture the commander Hannibal and drive the Carthaginians out of their own camp. In revenge Mathos then took his newly captured prisoners to the location of his comrades’ execution. He removed Spendius from his cross and there crucified the Carthaginian commander Hannibal in retaliation (Polyb. 1.86.4–6).
⁵¹

The rebellion continued through the year 238
BCE
. A complete mobilization occurred at Carthage with all citizens of military age conscripted into the fight and the previously dismissed commander Hanno returned to the field. When the army of Carthage was finally victorious the entire force of rebel Libyans had either been killed in battle or re-engaged as allies. It had been an exhausting struggle, but Hamilcar is given credit both for the victory and for expanding Carthaginian territory in Africa in the aftermath. He ‘extended the Carthaginian frontiers, and brought about such a state of peace all over Africa as to make it seem that there had been no war there for many years’ (Cornelius Nepos,
Ham.
2.5). The scars left on the countryside and at Carthage must have run deep but history has preserved the reputation of Hamilcar and not the suffering of the Libyans. Thus Carthage moved from the brink of disaster to a position of strength in Africa over the ‘three years and four months’ of the rebellion (Polyb. 1.88.7).
⁵²

The relief of final victory must have been immense for the Carthaginians but there was a bitter note at the very end of the war. Just as Carthage was
preparing to finish off the rebellion by reinstating its military presence in Sardinia, the Romans seized the island. At first Rome had refused to get involved in the rebellion in Sardinia as it was legally recognized as Carthaginian territory. Subsequently, the Romans changed their policy and at the end of the Mercenary War (238/237
BCE
) accepted an invitation from the rebels on the island. Carthage voiced objections to the Romans, stating that its sovereignty over Sardinia had been agreed in the Peace of Lutatius. The Romans decided to challenge Carthage on this matter and, as Livy says, ‘the Romans tricked the Carthaginians into the loss of Sardinia’ (21.1.5).
⁵³

Rome used the pretext of Carthaginian preparations against Sardinia to declare war, claiming falsely that Carthage was gathering an army together to attack Rome and not to reclaim Sardinia. The Carthaginians were deeply embittered by this betrayal but were not yet able to embark on another war with Rome. They were left with no choice but to yield to the new demands. The Romans must have anticipated this and Sardinia was ceded to them. Carthage even agreed to pay an additional indemnity of 1,200 talents to Rome to avoid a conflict.
⁵⁴

The Romans justified their actions by arguing that Sardinia lay in close proximity to the Italian coast, which meant that the island could be used as a launching pad for any future attack on Rome. It seems that in the Roman view the hostilities between the two states were far from over. To the Carthaginians the Roman seizure of Sardinia was a great betrayal, a humiliation and a cynical move at a time of great hardship. Even Polybius’ assessment is critical of the Romans at this juncture. He claims the taking of Sardinia as one of the chief causes of the Second Punic War and referred to it as ‘theft’ (Polyb. 3.30.4).

The descriptive account of the Mercenary War in Polybius is unprecedented in its detail of violence, torture and barbarity. It was a war that ‘far excelled all wars we know of in cruelty and defiance of principle’. The last scene of the war was ‘a triumphal procession of young men leading Mathos through the town and inflicting all kinds of torture on him’ (Polyb. 1.88.6–7). The cruelty of the Carthaginians and the Libyans emphasizes the bloody and uncivilized aspects of the conflict. Hamilcar is the main protagonist in a story with many antagonists – the Libyan rebels, the hostile Carthaginian opposition and the Romans. This tale above all paints a picture of the Libyan and mercenary soldiers as dangerous, lawless, extremely cruel and violent. They are portrayed as barbarians wanting to overthrow a civilized power. Any legitimate concerns that the Libyans had against Carthaginian hegemony in Africa are swept away by Polybius in the narrative of Hamilcar’s supremacy.
⁵⁵

The story of the Mercenary War is more than just a tale by Polybius to warn his readers about mercenary soldiers. It portrays the rise of Hamilcar and the powerful impact that Carthage’s neighbours would have on its history. The crucial mistakes that Carthage made during the years of this civil war are laid bare (1.88.8–12). Polybius’ historical interest in cause and effect has given us a close view of an ancient civil conflict and important insights into Carthaginian struggles against the Libyan uprising.
⁵⁶
The tales of the war illuminate the proximity of Carthage and her neighbours. From the time of the foundation of Carthage, the Tyrians had intermarried with the indigenous peoples of North Africa.
⁵⁷
Hamilcar learned key lessons about sustaining an army of loyal Libyan, Libyphoenician and Numidian troops. For the Barcid family military success would be connected to personal alliances with the neighbouring peoples in North Africa.
⁵⁸
The period of Hamilcar’s rise to power sees a corresponding rise of important political and military figures in the Numidian kingdoms.
⁵⁹

The events of these years shaped Hannibal’s approach to military conquest, cooperation and alliance. With violence and the threat of destruction close at hand, equally dangerous had been the treachery of the Romans. Hannibal learned the lessons of these crucial events; especially the importance of the personal loyalties of soldiers, of never trusting the Romans, the fickle nature of the politics of the Carthaginian Republic, and how politicians could betray a general in the field.
⁶⁰
Once the dust had settled at Carthage the loss of Sardinia sent the Carthaginians in search of further territory in the Mediterranean. Hamilcar, hero of Carthage, subdued great swathes of land in Africa before he went off to Iberia and took his young son Hannibal with him (Polyb. 2.1.5). From there arose the next conflict with Rome.

CHAPTER 4

BARCID IBERIA FROM GADES
TO SAGUNTUM

My father Hamilcar, when I was a small boy not more than nine years old, just as he was setting out from Carthage to Spain as commander-in-chief, offered up victims to Jupiter, Greatest and Best of gods. (
Cornelius Nepos,
Hannibal
2.3–4
)
¹

I
N THE SUMMER OF
237
BCE
Hannibal left Carthage with his father. He was nine years old and would not return to the city until 202
BCE
as a forty-five-year-old man.
²
Hamilcar’s departure to Iberia (modern Spain and Portugal) was celebrated with rituals and offerings to the gods. After the disasters of the previous decades, the renewal of prosperity at Carthage relied on the acquisition of new territory, new ports, and Hamilcar sought divine backing for his expedition. Among the citizens of Carthage there may have been a renewed sense of continuity and stability as people looked to the future. Hannibal recalled the sombre moment when his father stood and offered a sacrifice to the god Ba’al before he set off on this new endeavour. ‘Hamilcar poured a libation to the gods and performed all the customary rites’ and then, since ‘the omens were favourable’, he beckoned to his nine-year-old son Hannibal to approach. The scene was set in front of an altar covered with the bloodied remains of the sacrifice, which in the Punic tradition meant the head of a cow.
³
Hamilcar turned to his eldest son and asked if he wanted to join him on the expedition. The boy Hannibal ‘accepted with delight’ and at that moment Hamilcar took him ‘by the hand, led him up to the altar and bade him to lay his hand upon the sacrificial victim’. In front of the gods Hannibal had to
swear an oath ‘never to be a friend of the Romans’ (Polyb. 3.11.5–7).
⁴
For Livy the story of the Second Punic War began here at the moment of departure, with the oath of enmity that Hannibal swore against Rome (21.1.4–5). In reality the nine-year-old Hannibal was more likely to have been enthralled by the idea of accompanying his father than bothered about an oath. Hamilcar, celebrated as the saviour of Carthage, was taking his son on a great adventure.