Hannibal: A Hellenistic Life (17 page)

The Saguntines were forced back to their citadel when their city walls were undermined by the Carthaginians’ determined assault. Hannibal, as was usual for him, engaged in the fighting from the very beginning and at one point, ‘approaching the wall with insufficient caution, collapsed with a serious spear-wound to the front of his thigh’ (Livy 21.7.10). The wound was bad enough for him to retreat temporarily from the field of battle to recover but throughout most of the siege he was ‘on hand in person to give encouragement’ and promise great spoils of victory when the town was taken (Livy 21.11.3–5).

Hannibal left the siege only one other time. He had to march off with part of his army to deal with an uprising among the Oretani and Carpetani in the area of the city of Castulo. The fact that his wife Imilce originated from this region made him want to deal with it personally (Livy 21.11.13 and 24.41.7). In his absence he left his lieutenant Maharbal son of Himilco, who carried on the attack and fought with equal vigour.
⁷¹
In the end though, late in 219
BCE
, after eight long months Saguntum could hold out no longer. With no help
from Rome or other allies, the city fell and was sacked. The population was dispersed, slaughtered or sold into slavery.

Brave infant of Saguntum, cleare

Thy coming forth in that great yeare,

When the Prodigious Hannibal did crowne

His rage, with razing your immortall Towne.

(
Ben Jonson
c
. 1572–1637
)
⁷²

The sack of the city of Saguntum became an event of mythic proportions that resonated through Roman history. Seen as parallel to the sack of Troy in Roman epic it has been graphically portrayed in Livy’s history and beyond as a great Carthaginian outrage. For Livy it was the reason why the war against Hannibal had to be fought.
⁷³
The telling of the sack of Saguntum begins an epic tale of war that placed the deeds of the Romans among those of the heroes of the ancient Greeks. The story echoed down the ages so that in seventeenth-century England Ben Jonson’s poem captured the Roman perspective of a ‘Prodigious Hannibal’ whose ‘rage’ drove the Carthaginians to sack Saguntum and to provoke war with Rome. Jonson leaves no doubt whom posterity thought responsible and who was on the side of ‘right’.
⁷⁴

There are practical questions to be raised over the lack of Roman support for Saguntum. If it was such a great outrage, why did Rome not come to the aid of its ally? Livy’s confused chronology has been blamed on the fact that he (or his sources) tried to cover up Roman indecision and compress the events of 220–219
BCE
. In fact Livy admits that the chronology does not make sense and that he was having trouble piecing it together himself (21.15.3–6). In 219
BCE
the Romans were distracted in Illyria where Demetrius of Pharos, once an ally, had made a pact against Rome with the new king of Macedon, Philip V. In late spring 219
BCE
we know that the Romans sent their consul Lucius Aemilius Paullus to Illyria with ‘a force’ (Polyb. 3.16.7). Perhaps Hannibal took his chance against Saguntum while the Romans were looking east (Polyb. 3.16.5–7).
⁷⁵
Polybius also expresses his frustration with the sources, calling them ‘the common gossip of a barber’s shop’ (2.20.5), especially Sosylus and another named Chaereas, otherwise unknown, who claimed that the Romans had dithered over the situation at Saguntum.
⁷⁶
The lack of clarity in our sources should make the tale as it stands suspect. There seems little doubt that events have been adapted to fit a particular narrative and to place the blame on Hannibal’s shoulders.

When the news of the sack of Saguntum finally reached Rome, probably in February/March 218
BCE
, the Roman Senate debated their next course of
action. The record indicates that even though ‘the Punics were their enemy of old …’ the path to war was not unanimous (Livy 21.16.5). Some in the Senate wanted an aggressive reaction, like L. Cornelius Lentulus who demanded immediate war. Lentulus, ‘in his address declared that they must not delay but must vote for war against the Carthaginians and must divide the consuls and armies, sending one force to Iberia and the other to Africa’ (Zonaras 8.22.2–3). Others in the Senate were less eager to leap into a war. A faction of doves was led by Q. Fabius Maximus who ‘replied that it was not so absolutely necessary to vote for war, but that they ought first to send an embassy, and then if the Carthaginians persuaded them that they were guilty of no wrong, the Romans should remain quiet, but if they were proved to be in the wrong, the Romans should wage war against them in order, he added, that we may cast the responsibility for war against them’ (Zonaras 8.22.2–3).
⁷⁷
The Romans were eager to cast the blame entirely on Hannibal and willing to absolve Carthage of responsibility for the hostilities. Fabius Maximus’ intentions were to release the Romans from any charge of culpability in declaring war. Such is the confusion around the reasons for the start of the war that Polybius denies that there was any debate about the declaration of war at all and insists that ‘an embassy was immediately dispatched to Carthage’ (3.20.1–7).
⁷⁸

In the Carthaginian Senate during this same period debate must have raged as well but the details are even less clear than at Rome. It is certain that the Carthaginian elites were, like the Romans, divided over the issue of another war. Some of the Roman and Carthaginian leaders may even have joined together in their efforts to avert war.
⁷⁹
Hanno, the old enemy of the Barcids, led the criticism in the Senate at Carthage when Livy tells us (with the clarity of hindsight) that he warned of the destruction that another war with Rome would bring. Hanno ties the fate of Saguntum in a narrative circle to the eventual fate of Carthage (Livy 21.10.4–13).
⁸⁰
The majority in the Carthaginian Senate, however, were firmly behind Hannibal and deeply suspicious of the Romans, who had been consistently unwilling to back down from any opportunity to undermine Carthage. The huge successes of the Barcid leaders meant it was virtually impossible for the Carthaginians to turn their back on their own commander at this moment. Therefore, both Carthage and Rome were firmly committed to their unassailable right to continued conquest and expansion. Neither side could or would retreat from the conflict.

The remit of the Roman embassy sent to Carthage in 218
BCE
seems to have been to force Carthage into declaring war. This was a very senior embassy of five men which included the two outgoing consuls. The meeting took place
in the Senate at Carthage and focused on the technical aspects of the treaties between the two cities and their claim and counterclaim about who had broken the terms of which agreement.
⁸¹
Each side blamed the other. The Romans certainly saw Iberia as a rich prize to be won from Carthage.
⁸²
The Roman embassy issued an ultimatum demanding that Hannibal and his advisors be handed over to Rome. They must have known that handing over Hannibal would be equivalent to handing over Iberia and it was an impossible demand. The territory Hannibal controlled across the Mediterranean was larger than Carthage’s own African territory.
⁸³
The Romans made it impossible for the Carthaginians to avoid war. In the Carthaginian Senate there was a dramatic scene as the senior member of the Roman embassy, wrapped in his toga, spoke. He declared that ‘he held both war and peace for them’ and he would let fall from his toga whichever of the two they chose. The Carthaginian
sufet
(chief magistrate) answered defiantly that the ambassador should let fall whichever result the Romans wanted. The Roman envoy chose war and many of the Carthaginian senators cried out at once ‘and we accept it’ (Polyb. 3.33.1–4). The result of this encounter was that in 218
BCE
Carthage was again at war with Rome. The sack of Saguntum gave the Romans the perfect opportunity to fight a war they were already preparing for. What they had never envisioned, however, was that this war would be fought in Italy and would challenge their power at its very roots.

Polybius and Livy both argue unequivocally that Hannibal’s immediate plan, as soon as he came to power, was to make war against Rome and that everything he did was contrived to bring about that end. He was ‘a young man with a burning desire for power and seeing only one way to it’ in Livy (21.10.4). Polybius believed the Carthaginians to be at fault, and Hannibal especially, so that ‘everything that befell both peoples, the Roman and the Carthaginian, originated from one effective cause – one man and one mind – by which I mean Hannibal’ (9.22.1). For Livy, ‘from the day Hannibal was declared commander it was as if Italy had been decreed his area of responsibility and war with Rome his assignment’ (21.5.1). And elsewhere Polybius states: ‘as soon as he took up his command it became clear … that his purpose was to declare war on Rome …’ (2.36.3–4).

So the sources we have are explicit, yet it is worth considering whether this carefully constructed argument of pro-Roman authors is consistent with what we know. The whole responsibility for the Second Punic War has been placed squarely on Hannibal’s shoulders. After the fighting both the Carthaginians and the Romans unreservedly blamed Hannibal. It suited both sides to find a scapegoat. Following Livy, later historians portrayed the war as a personal
battle between the Barcid family and the Romans. In other passages, however, Polybius is more circumspect in assessing the role of the Romans in the lead-up to war. He reflects on Rome’s duplicity over Sardinia and mentions the increased indemnity imposed on the Carthaginians at the end of the Mercenary War as disingenuous. Polybius concludes, however, that the ‘hatred of Hamilcar’ was passed on to his sons and became the catalyst for war. Polybius differentiated between the beginning of the Second Punic War and the causes. He discussed the siege of Saguntum and Hannibal’s subsequent crossing of the Ebro in these terms: ‘I should agree in stating that these were the beginnings of the war, but I can by no means allow that they were its causes’ (3.6.3). The cause was not the same as the action that started the conflict. In Polybius’ assessment the larger geopolitical considerations needed to be taken into account.
⁸⁴

Hannibal’s actions after coming to command the Carthaginian forces were a continuation of the policies of Hamilcar and Hasdrubal before him. Was there a premeditated plan, as Polybius suggests when he claims that Hannibal was following his father’s advice or did Hannibal react to the events that unfolded on the ground (3.14.10)? Livy states that ‘had he [Hamilcar] lived longer the Carthaginians would clearly have launched under Hamilcar the invasion that they actually launched under the command of Hannibal’ (21.2.1). In Livy’s view the consolidation of Carthaginian control over much of the Iberian peninsula was only a precursor to a grand invasion of Italy.
⁸⁵
The Romans had spent the years since the First Punic War expanding their influence and power to the north and east. Resurgent Carthaginian power in Iberia now caught the attention of Rome. Foreign policy at both Carthage and Rome was expansive and ‘ad hoc’.
⁸⁶
There was little chance that another war could have been avoided unless one or the other state capitulated completely. We can never know the full story but a healthy scepticism over the Roman version of the origins of the war makes sense. The story has been adapted to fit the final outcome and the two sides were equally willing to engage in another war. One aspect is clear: in 218
BCE
there does not seem to have been any real chance of a peaceful settlement. The fall back position for settling disputes in the third century was war.
⁸⁷

CHAPTER 5

LEGEND

HANNIBAL INTO ITALY

he who should strike the enemy, shall be a Carthaginian in my eyes, whoever he shall be. Wherever he hails from … (
Hannibal in Ennius,
Ann.
234–235
)

H
ANNIBAL’S LEGEND WAS SHAPED
in Iberia where the destruction of Saguntum brought him face to face with the power of Rome. Silius Italicus’
Punica
captures the romantic sense of the dynamic young leader: ‘the Carthaginians looked on and the Asturians trembled for fear, when he [Hannibal] rode his startled horse through bolts hurled by Jupiter’ (1.252–255). The myth of Hannibal grew out of these early campaigns. His philosophy of leadership gained him great loyalty from his troops, whilst his victories among the Iberians and the sack of Saguntum made him famous. By 218
BCE
, as Hannibal prepared to leave Carthaginian Iberia and fight the Romans, he was backed by an army that would follow him anywhere and the reputation of being able to outmanoeuvre the gods themselves.

As the later Roman historian Dio commented, Hannibal believed it ‘better to be the first to act than the first to suffer’ (Cassius Dio 13.54.5). War was now inevitable, and Rome was preparing to send its armies to Iberia and to Africa. Hannibal made his own plans, backed by Carthage and almost certainly informed of the Roman preparations. Instead of waiting for a Roman attack he planned to take the fight to the Romans in Italy. Hannibal’s strategy relied on the receipt of accurate information and in these months there would have been a constant flow of people travelling from Rome through Sicily, to Carthage and
Iberia.
¹
There were merchant ships that plied the seaways of the Mediterranean and linked the cities with their trade. Merchants in the ancient world were often accused of spying and, indeed, were often used as spies.
²
Later in the story, Livy mentions the presence of Carthaginian agents in Rome, and we assume that Hannibal was kept abreast of Roman plans throughout much of the war (22.33.1). His network of informants and spies was extensive and he may well have employed specific groups of his followers as intelligence-gatherers. Evidence from later Roman armies notes the existence of detachments of soldiers whose specific purpose was to gather intelligence; the Latin term was
speculatores
.
³
Hannibal may even have had agents embedded in the Roman armies among the auxiliary troops. These may have been men who posed as deserters and were in reality acting as spies. One of Hannibal’s great skills, his ability consistently to surprise his enemy, is perhaps illustrative of the scope of his intelligence network, certainly at the beginning of the war.
⁴