Hannibal: A Hellenistic Life (16 page)

In 222/221
BCE
, four years after the Ebro agreement, Hasdrubal was assassinated by a disgruntled Iberian ally. ‘To succeed him the Carthaginians appointed Hannibal as supreme commander in Iberia; they chose him, notwithstanding his youth, because he had already shown that he combined a daring spirit with a quick and fertile brain’ (Polyb. 2.36.3). The mantle of Carthaginian power in Iberia thus passed to twenty-five-year-old Hannibal, son of Hamilcar. He was first chosen as leader by the Carthaginian troops in Iberia, then the Senate and the people at Carthage ‘unanimously confirmed the soldiers’ choice’ and ratified the appointment (Polyb. 3.13.3–5). At twenty-five he was a young man but his appointment was the army’s sentimental choice. He had certainly been fully prepared for the challenges that faced him. Hannibal had been brought up to command, to lead the Carthaginian army and to rule after his father and brother-in-law. The seven years of Hasdrubal’s leadership had continued Hannibal’s role as the apprentice to power.
⁵¹

Hannibal was ready to take on full control of Carthaginian political and military power in Iberia. When Hannibal succeeded Hasdrubal in 221
BCE
he immediately began to campaign, just as his father and brother-in-law had done before him. The soldiers had unanimously chosen Hannibal as their commander and he set out to subdue the important Olcades tribe (
Map 2
). Camped in front of their most important city Althaea with his army, Hannibal ‘terrified’ the inhabitants after a series of attacks and rather quickly captured the town. The result was that the remaining towns of that tribal group were ‘overawed and submitted to the Carthaginians’ without any further resistance. Hannibal pressed farther and deeper into the Iberian peninsula that season with great success. He imposed ‘a tribute upon the towns and taking possession of a large sum of money, he withdrew into winter quarters at New Carthage’ (Polyb. 3.13.4–7).

A key to Hannibal’s success as a general lay in the loyalty of his troops, whom he treated with ‘great generosity, distributing a bounty to them at once and promising further payments later’. Hannibal was able to engender ‘great goodwill … and inspired high hopes for the future’ through these means (Polyb. 3.13.8). The ability to nurture and sustain the loyalty and belief of his soldiers was integral to Hannibal’s military achievements. The allegiance of his soldiers created an aura of invincibility that accompanied Hannibal: his forces believed and trusted in him, and he rewarded them for this trust and devotion. Hannibal was a natural risk-taker and in order to succeed in his plans he needed an army that would follow him anywhere and believe in his ability to pull off what seemed impossible. He reached his triumphs by being bold, taking the initiative, outwitting his opponents and gambling on his own skills. The ability to inspire deep loyalty in his soldiers gave him the greatest possible chance of success.

Hannibal spent the winter of 221/220
BCE
in New Carthage perhaps in the company of his wife Imilce. The couple represented a crucial alliance at the core of Carthaginian power in Iberia, the Barcid family and local royalty. Hannibal may have been married for a few years by this point as the alliance with Imilce’s home Castulo had been in place since early in Hasdrubal’s tenure (Livy 21.11.13 and 24.41.7). It is even possible that the couple had children by 220 although there is only one, not very credible, mention of ‘a first-born and only son’ in the Roman sources (Silius Italicus 4.770–790).
⁵²
The winter in the city would have seen a court of sorts develop around Hannibal and his wife. The young Carthaginian colleagues of Hannibal and commanders from allied Iberian troops spent their time preparing for the next campaigning season. Hannibal would have received envoys from
Carthage, spies and ambassadors as well as dispensing justice in the Carthaginian territory.

The spring of 220
BCE
brought new campaigns as Hannibal again ‘took the offensive’, this time against the Vaccaei tribe (Polyb. 3.14.1). Hannibal captured the important town of Hermandica that lies deep inland in the region of modern Salamanca.
⁵³
These quick successes were an early indication of the military genius of Hannibal, whose reputation as a commander strengthened with each encounter. The legend that grew up around Hannibal was founded in these early years of conquest and campaigning against the fierce Iberian warriors.
⁵⁴
His ability as a soldier and reputation as a leader and commander made him virtually unassailable for more than a decade.

An incident during the campaign of 220
BCE
perfectly illustrates Hannibal’s genius and adaptability. On his way back to New Carthage at the end of the campaigning season, he found himself vastly outnumbered and surprised by an army of the Carpetani tribe (a mountain tribe from north of the Tagus river). Hannibal quickly reacted and immediately retreated to the far side of the Tagus, pursued by the Carpetani. He used the water as a buffer and positioned his forty elephants to challenge the enemy as they crossed. Polybius describes how ‘the barbarians tried to force a crossing at various points, [and] the greater number of them were killed as they left the water by the elephants’.
⁵⁵
On the far bank of the river the remainder of the enemy army could only watch as Hannibal then ‘moved over to the offensive, crossed the river, attacked the barbarians and put to flight a force of more than one hundred thousand’ (Polyb. 3.14.2–10).
⁵⁶

After a year in command Hannibal had moved farther into the Iberian interior than his father or brother-in-law and conquered new territory. The power of the Carthaginians had proven impossible to resist and ‘none of the other tribes south of the Ebro [river] ventured lightly to face them, with the exception of the people of Saguntum’ (Polyb. 3.14.9). Saguntum was an important town dramatically located on a high ridge near the sea 250 kilometres north of New Carthage and 135 kilometres south of the Ebro (
Map 2
). It would be events around this city in the first years of Hannibal’s command that provoked Carthage and Rome again into war.
⁵⁷

The first recorded moment when Hannibal encountered his future adversaries was in late 220.
⁵⁸
He returned to New Carthage after his highly successful season of campaign and found an embassy waiting for him from Rome made up of high-level delegates from the Senate. The city would have been busy with the return of its dynamic commander and his victorious troops. The bustling ports and multicultural population surely impressed the Roman
legates. They were also perhaps concerned at the confidence they met in the town. Hannibal granted an audience to the Romans. These important men of the Senate were used to carrying a great deal of authority and expected to be treated with respect. The Romans included the ex-consul P. Valerius Flaccus and ex-praetor Q. Baebius Tamphilus.
⁵⁹
The meeting between the young confident Hannibal, just back from campaign, and the mature, experienced Roman senators did not go smoothly. The ambassadors reproached Hannibal for involving himself in the internal affairs of Saguntum. Their mission was ‘to issue a formal caution to Hannibal to leave the people of Saguntum in peace as allies of the Roman people’ (Livy 21.6.3–6). Hannibal dismissed the embassy with some scorn. He called them hypocrites and accused them in turn of meddling in internal Saguntine politics. He claimed that Roman involvement had resulted in the death of leading pro-Carthaginian citizens in Saguntum.
⁶⁰
History has judged Hannibal’s behaviour as rash, hot-headed and full of the impetuousness of youth. Polybius believed that he could still have negotiated with the Roman envoys at this moment but failed (or chose not) to take the opportunity.
⁶¹
Hannibal defended his actions as being based on ‘an old principle of Carthage never to neglect the cause of the victims of injustice’. The Romans warned Hannibal again not to interfere with Saguntum and then sailed to Carthage to convey the same message. Hannibal also sent to Carthage, ‘asking for instructions’ and reporting that the Romans were interfering with Carthaginian allies in the region (Polyb. 3.15.8).
⁶²
Polybius claims that from this moment on the Romans believed that war was inevitable and that they would fight the Carthaginians in the Iberian peninsula.
⁶³

The argument between the two sides rests on the existence of a formal Romano-Saguntine
amicitia
(friendship). The Romans alleged that Hannibal had interfered with their ally, the Saguntines, and therefore the Carthaginians were the aggressors. The Carthaginian argument rested on the fact that Saguntum lay well south of the Ebro river and was thus not protected in the treaty with Rome. Carthage claimed that Saguntum had acted aggressively towards Carthaginian allies, both within the city and among neighbouring tribes. The details of the Ebro agreement reached in 226
BCE
are key to these arguments. As far as we know there was no mention of the city of Saguntum in the Ebro treaty but in the period between 226
BCE
and 219
BCE
there seems to have been a relationship formed between Rome and the city, even though it lay within the agreed sphere of Carthaginian influence. A plausible scenario is that the Saguntines were wary of growing Carthaginian influence and reached out to the Romans as a counterbalance, or perhaps reached out to the
Roman allies, the Massalians. The question as to when the Romans and the Saguntines formed their alliance is at the heart of the issue. Polybius’ statement that it was ‘an acknowledged fact that the Saguntines placed themselves in Rome’s protecting grasp a good many years before the time of Hannibal’ does little to resolve the issue (3.30.1).
⁶⁴

The events leading up to the conflict saw the Saguntines and a neighbouring tribe allied to Carthage involved in an incident (in
c
. 220
BCE
or earlier).
⁶⁵
There is no information on the nature of the disagreement but as Carthaginian hegemony in Iberia expanded, the local cities and states would naturally have become polarized. Some of the Saguntines, feeling the threat of the growing Carthaginian involvement in their immediate vicinity, may have applied to the Romans for support. The Roman alliance with Saguntum perhaps dated from no later than
c
. 223
BCE
.
⁶⁶
There were Saguntines who saw Rome as a counterbalance to the growing power of Carthage but within the city there were also pro-Carthaginian factions. At some point (anywhere between 223
BCE
and 220
BCE
) the Romans became involved in an internal dispute and some of the leading men at Saguntum, apparently members of the pro-Carthaginian group, were put to death. So there were two events – one internal and one involving a neighbouring tribe – that interconnected and brought Hannibal face to face with Rome. Settling a regional dispute by calling in larger powers was not an unusual event in the third century but the details are obscured by other narrative agenda in our sources.
⁶⁷

Hannibal wintered in New Carthage and moved to lay siege to Saguntum in the spring of 219
BCE
(Polyb. 3.17.9; Livy 21.15.3). Set high up on a ridge surrounded by a fertile plain, Saguntum was well fortified and supplied to resist an army. So secure was its position that the only other successful siege of Saguntum in its entire history took place during the Peninsular War in 1811 when an army of Napoleon Bonaparte captured the town. Hannibal’s siege lasted about eight months. It was a long and arduous assault on a town built to repell such an attack. At the walls of Saguntum Hannibal learned harsh lessons about being tied up in a long siege and he would later avoid doing the same thing in Italy. Although the exact dates are unclear, the campaign may have begun any time between late March and early May so the siege may have lasted until some time in December/January 219/218
BCE
.
⁶⁸

Curiously, the Romans did nothing to help their allies throughout the whole period of the siege. This may be indicative of some indecision or disagreement at Rome as to the course of action needed. In January 219
BCE
the Romans chose their consuls for the year, and they took up office in March. It may be that the debate on the course of Roman policy and the indecision were
caused by the ambiguous relationship between Saguntum and Rome and whether interference was truly justified based on a pre-existing alliance or not.
⁶⁹
A more circumspect view of these events sees the Romans as having provoked Hannibal into war using Saguntum as the bait.

Hannibal’s approach to Saguntum was consistent with the methods used by Hamilcar and Hasdrubal, and by most generals operating in the Mediterranean in the third century. When a treaty or alliance was possible, clemency was in order. A city that resisted could expect harsh treatment if it fell and the Saguntines put up a fierce resistance. Livy’s version of events is detailed, although the siege of Saguntum receives the most elaborate treatment in Silius Italicus’ epic poem the
Punica
.
⁷⁰
Hannibal looms large as ‘his war-trumpets sounded first before the gates of dismayed Saguntum, and he chose this war in his eagerness for a greater war to come’, wrote the poet (
Pun.
1.271–272).

The Carthaginians made a three-pronged attack on the city and applied the most advanced siegecraft, with catapults, ballistas, platforms and assault towers. The Saguntines were determined in defence and used a weapon of their own that caused havoc among the Carthaginian troops. Livy calls it a
phalarica
, a kind of flaming iron javelin, its head wrapped with ‘tow and smeared with pitch. The head was three feet long, and so able to pass through a man’s body as well as his shield’ (Livy 21.8.10–12). The
phalarica
was effective even if it did not penetrate the body and only stuck to the shield, as the ‘flames made the soldier drop the shield in alarm and expose himself’ to more conventional weapons.