History of the Second World War (62 page)

Japanese reaction was prompt — and, ironically, all the quicker because reports had led the Japanese to believe that the American landing force was only a fraction of its actual numbers. Thus they did not pause to prepare an adequate response, but sent off a series of reinforcing driblets, repeatedly increased, so that what the two sides had conceived as a swift stroke and counterstroke developed into a protracted campaign.

The Japanese naval escorts were stronger, however, and their successive advances produced a series of momentous naval clashes. The first of these, and the worst for the Americans, was the Battle of Savo Island, off the north-west coast of Guadalcanal. On the evening of August 7 Vice-Admiral Mikawa, the Japanese Commander-in-Chief at Rabaul, assembled a force of five heavy cruisers, with two light cruisers, and set off for Guadalcanal. Slipping undetected next day through what was called ‘the Slot’, the narrow waters between the two chains of the Solomons, he approached Savo Island in the evening — just after Fletcher had withdrawn the American carriers because their fuel and fighter strength were running short. Although the Allied cruiser and destroyer force had taken up precautionary dispositions for the night, co-operation and watch-keeping were poor. In the early hours of the morning Mikawa took by surprise in turn its southerly and northerly groups, and within an hour was steaming back through the Slot, leaving behind four Allied heavy cruisers sunk or sinking, and one badly damaged — five out of five — while his own were almost undamaged.

The Japanese profited greatly from their superior skill at night-fighting, helped by their superior optical instruments, and especially their 24-inch ‘long lance’ torpedoes. It was one of the worst defeats that the U.S. Navy suffered at sea in the war. Fortunately for the Allies, Mikawa did not complete his mission by destroying the mass of transport and supply ships lying defenceless in Lunga Roads — being unaware that the Allied carriers had been withdrawn, and thus expecting early counterattack from the air if he did not quickly regain the relative shelter of the Slot. Moreover, he did not know that the American landing on Guadalcanal was on any such large scale as it actually was. A commander should be judged in the light of the information he has at the moment he makes his decisions.

But all that remained of the Allied naval forces withdrew southward that afternoon to avoid further attack, although less than half the Marines’ supplies of food and ammunition had been unloaded by then. Troop rations were reduced to two meals a day, and for the next two weeks the Marines were isolated — without naval support and also without air cover until Henderson Field was brought into use on the 20th with the arrival of the first squadrons of Marine aircraft. Even then, such air cover was narrowly limited.

The Japanese forfeited the opportunity largely because they still greatly underestimated the strength of the Marine force landed on Guadalcanal — estimating it at 2,000 men, and assuming that a force of 6,000 would be sufficient to overcome them and regain the island. They sent off two advanced detachments, totalling 1,500 men, carried in destroyers, which landed east and west of Lunga Point on August 18; these attacked without waiting for the follow-up convoy, and were promptly wiped out by the Marines. The follow-up convoy — of only 2,000 men — sailed from Rabaul on the 19th. While small in itself, it was given strong naval aid — being intended as a bait to draw the U.S. fleet into a trap, as had been the idea at Midway. The advance was led by the light carrier
Ryujo,
itself part of the bait, while behind came two battleships and three cruisers under Admiral Kondo, and behind them the fleet carriers
Zuikaku
and
Shokaku
under Admiral Nagumo.

This baited plan led to what was called the Battle of the Eastern Solomons, but not to the achievement of the trap that the Japanese intended. For Admiral Ghormley received timely warning of their approach from ‘Coast-watchers’ — an organisation composed mostly of Royal Australian Navy Intelligence officers and local planters. He concentrated three naval task forces south-east of Guadalcanal, built round the carriers
Enterprise
,
Saratoga,
and
Wasp.
The
Ryujo
was sighted on the morning of the 24th, and sunk in the afternoon by aircraft from the American carriers. Meanwhile the two Japanese fleet carriers had also been sighted, so that when the expected attacks came from them the American carriers had their full fighter strength in the air to meet them, and took heavy toll, knocking out over seventy of eighty enemy planes employed, and losing only seventeen of their own. The
Enterprise
was the only ship that suffered any serious damage. After this indecisive battle the Japanese fleet retired during the night, and so did the American.

After this ineffectual naval effort there was a lull, except on land, where the weak Japanese forces made unsuccessful efforts to reach Henderson Field, being beaten off by the Marines, although they so ‘fought to the death’ that almost all of them were killed. But they were replaced by a series of small detachments brought along by destroyers — in such regular succession that the process came to be called by the Marines the ‘Tokyo Express’. Thereby the Japanese ground strength on Guadalcanal was steadily increased, a further 6,000 men being shuttled there by early September. On the night of September 13/14 this force fiercely attacked the Marines’ position — which came to be called ‘Bloody Ridge’ — but all its attacks were repelled, and its loss was over 1,200 men.

Meanwhile, however, the U.S. Navy in that area was badly depleted by the loss of the carriers
Saratoga
and
Wasp
to Japanese submarine attacks — the former badly damaged and the latter sunk. As the
Enterprise
was still under repair, this left only the
Hornet
to provide air cover.

After the failure of the earlier Japanese attempts to retake Guadalcanal, Imperial General Headquarters issued a new directive on September 18 that gave this campaign priority to the one in New Guinea. But the Japanese still greatly underestimated the size of the Marine force there, putting it as no more than 7,500, and on this calculation reckoned that the despatch of a division would suffice, in co-operation with the temporary use of their Combined Fleet. The preliminary seaborne move of the first reinforcing contingent led to another naval battle off the coast of Guadalcanal, on October 11/12. In this fight, called the Battle of Cape Esperance, the respective losses were not heavy but on balance favourable to the Americans — which came as a moral tonic. During the battle, however, the Japanese managed to land reinforcements that brought their total of troops up to 22,000. At the same time the Americans brought their strength up to 23,000 — with 4,500 more on Tulagi.

Even so, mid-October was the most critical period of the campaign for them, particularly when a bombardment from two Japanese battleships ploughed up Henderson Field, set fuel stocks on fire, and reduced the number of their planes there from ninety to forty-two — while they also forced the U.S. Army’s heavy bombers to fly back to the New Hebrides. Repeated Japanese bombing attacks were another strain, while the humid heat and inadequate diet were taking a heavy toll.

On October 24 the Japanese land offensive developed, having been delayed by torrential rain and the dense jungle. The main attack came up from the south, but the Marines were well-posted in their defensive position and their artillery was well handled. The Japanese were beaten off, their losses running into thousands compared with a few hundred on the American side, and by the 26th they were driven to retreat, leaving behind about 2,000 dead.

Meanwhile the Combined Fleet under Yamamoto had advanced with two fleet carriers, two light carriers, four battleships, fourteen cruisers, and forty-four destroyers, and cruised to the north-east of the Solomons, awaiting the expected news that Henderson Field had been captured by the Army. On the American side, the naval strength was barely half, despite the arrival of the new battleship
South Dakota
and several cruisers. In battleships, there was only one against four. But the carrier
Hornet
had now been reinforced by the repaired
Enterprise
, and that was more important in modern naval terms. Fresh vigour also came with the appointment of Admiral Halsey to replace the overtired Ghormley. The two fleets clashed on October 26 in what was called the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands, a battle once again dominated by air action on either side. The
Hornet
was sunk and the
Enterprise
damaged, while on the other side the
Shokaku
was badly damaged and also the light carrier
Zuiho,
before the two fleets retired from the scene on the 27th. But in planes lost the Japanese suffered much the worse — seventy of them failed to return, and in the ten-day period culminating in this battle they lost 200 — to add to the 300 they had lost since the last week of August. Moreover the Americans soon received a reinforcement of over 200 planes, as well as the rest of the 2nd Marine Division and part of the American Division.

Nevertheless the Japanese were also reinforced sufficiently to resume their efforts — impelled by pride, and also gulled by absurdly optimistic reports of the damage they had inflicted. These efforts led to the two clashes known as the ‘Naval Battle of Guadalcanal’. The first took place in the early hours of Friday November 13, and although it lasted barely half an hour, the Americans had two cruisers sunk while the Japanese battleship
Hiei
was so badly crippled that it had to be scuttled next day — the first Japanese battleship lost in the war.

The second part of this naval battle came on the night of the 14th/15th, and with roles reversed, when the Japanese tried to bring down a reinforcement of 11,000 troops in a convoy with a large destroyer escort under the indomitable Rear-Admiral Tanaka, covered by Admiral Kondo’s heavier ships. Seven of the transports were sunk in the approach, and although the other four reached Guadalcanal they were smashed by air attack in the morning, so that only 4,000 of the troops were landed, and very few of the urgently needed supplies.

In the accompanying naval battle, the American destroyers suffered badly, but then Kondo’s remaining battleship, the
Kirishima
, was crippled when, at midnight, the radar-controlled guns of the U.S. battleship
Washington
opened fire on it at a range of 8,400 yards, and hit it so devastatingly that it was put out of action within seven minutes, and soon had to be scuttled.

Meanwhile on land the Marines and the other American troops, having now the advantage in supplies, had gone over to the offensive, and were expanding their perimeter. By the end of the month the American air strength on the island had risen to 188, and the Japanese no longer dared to ship either reinforcements or supplies by slow convoy. In December they were reduced to sending driblets of both in submarines.

The Japanese Navy had suffered so heavily that its chiefs urged the abandonment of Guadalcanal, but the Army chiefs, who had now assembled 50,000 troops at Rabaul, were still hoping to send them to reinforce the 25,000 now on the island. Meanwhile, however, the Americans had built up their strength on Guadalcanal to over 50,000 by January 7, 1943, which were now well-supplied, while the Japanese, who had been reduced to one-third of normal rations, were so weakened by hunger and malaria that they could not hope to take the offensive — tenaciously as they still fought on the defensive.

So on January 4 Imperial G.H.Q. reluctantly faced realities, and gave the order for them to be gradually evacuated. Unaware of this decision, the Americans pushed forward cautiously, so that the Japanese were able to take away all their troops in three moves, starting on the night of February 1 and completed on the night of February 7, losing only one destroyer in the process.

On balance, however, the prolonged struggle for Guadalcanal was a very serious defeat for Japan. She had lost some 25,000 men, including 9,000 from hunger and disease, while American losses were much smaller. Worse still she had lost at least 600 planes, with their trained crews. At the same time America’s strength in all spheres was continually increasing, as her mobilisation of manpower and industry got into its stride.

BURMA MAY 1942-MAY 1943 — THE RIPOSTE MISCARRIES

By May 1942, with the British withdrawal from Burma into India, the Japanese had achieved the planned limit of their expansion in South-east Asia, so they changed over to the defensive and sought to consolidate their conquests. Meanwhile the British made plans for a come-back when the next dry season came, in November 1942. None of them proved feasible — because of logistical difficulties. And the only one even attempted, the very limited Arakan offensive, resulted in a disastrous failure.*

* For map, see p. 514.

The crucial area logistically, Assam and Bengal, had never been regarded or planned as a military base area. Airfields, depots, roads, railways, and pipelines all had to be built, ports enlarged, and the whole region reorganised.

First of the major difficulties facing the India Command was shipping, as most of its needs had to come from overseas. But all other theatres of war had priority, and little shipping was left for India, even when threatened with invasion, after providing for the Atlantic and Arctic convoys, the Mediterranean and Pacific theatres. The amount allotted for India was only about one-third of what was necessary for the build-up of the area as the springboard for an offensive.

Internal transport was also a major difficulty. The road and rail systems of north-east India were old and haphazard. They required great improvement before the supplies coming from Calcutta and the other ports could be carried to the front line. Shortages of all kinds hampered the progress of the work. So did the monsoons, which caused landslides and carried away bridges. Japanese air raids also contributed, while labour troubles and political unrest were worse hindrances — particularly the widespread disorder and risks that followed the failure of the Cripps mission in the late summer of 1942, when the Indian Congress called for a civil disobedience campaign. This was fomented by pro-Japanese elements as well as by the worsening economic situation in India. The worst handicap of all was the lack of locomotives — Wavell had begged for at least 185, but was given four!