History of the Second World War (58 page)

On the early evening of the 10th two well-protected convoys sailed from Algiers, carrying the leading brigade group (the 36th) of the British 78th Division (Major-General Vyvyan Evelegh) and the stores for the expedition. It arrived off Bougie early next morning, but lost time by landing on nearby beaches, in heavy surf, from fear of a hostile reception — although in the event it proved a friendly one. Because of heavy surf an intended landing close to Djidjelli was not attempted, and the airfield was not occupied in time to provide effective fighter protection until two days later, so that several ships were destroyed in air raids. Early on the 12th, however, a Commando force slipped into the port of Bone and a parachute detachment dropped on the airfield, both being well received by the French there.

* For maps, see pp. 280, 404, 414.

By the 13th the brigade group at Bougie was moving forward, while other elements of the division were advancing overland from Algiers, quickly followed by Blade Force, an armoured column just landed, which was composed of the 17th/21st Lancers and attached troops, under Colonel R. A. Hull — it was the leading contingent of the 6th Armoured Division.* To pave the way it was planned that on the 15th a British parachute battalion would be dropped ahead at Souk el Arba eighty miles from Tunis inside the Tunisian border, and an American parachute battalion near Tebessa to cover the southern flank and secure a forward airfield there. The American drop was carried out as planned — and two days later this battalion, under Colonel E. D. Raff, made an eighty miles bound south-eastward to secure the airfield at Gafsa, barely seventy miles from the Gulf of Gabes and the bottleneck approach from Tripoli. The British drop was delayed a day because of weather conditions, and the leading ground troops came up so fast that they also reached Souk el Arba on the 16th. By then, too, the small Tunisian port of Tabarka, on the road to Bizerta, was reached by another column advancing along the coast road.

* In the 17th/21st Lancers, and other armoured regiments of this division, two troops of each squadron had the new, and fast, Crusader III tank armed with the powerful 6-pounder gun, while the other two troops were equipped with the 2-pounder armed Valentine which, although slower, was far more reliable and also better armoured.

Next day, the 17th, General Anderson gave orders for the 78th Division ‘to advance on Tunis and destroy the Axis forces’ after completing its forward concentration. That pause to concentrate, however desirable it seemed, was unfortunate in view of the slenderness of the Axis forces that had so far arrived — an understrength parachute regiment of two battalions at Tunis, which had been flown over from Italy on the 11th, and two battalions at Bizerta (one of parachute engineers, and one of infantry). On the 16th General Nehring — the former Commander of the Afrika Korps, who had been badly wounded in the Alam Haifa battle and just recovered — arrived with a solitary staff officer to command this nucleus, some 3,000 troops of what was entitled the ‘90th Corps’. Even at the end of the month it had only the strength of a division.

The Germans, without waiting to concentrate, quickly thrust to the westward, and by that boldness disguised their weakness. The French troops in Tunisia, although much more numerous, fell back before them to avoid a premature clash before Allied reinforcements arrived. On the 17th a German parachute battalion (of some 300 men only) under Captain Knoche pushed out along the Tunis-Algiers road, and the French group posted there withdrew to the road-centre of Medjez el Bab (thirty-five miles west of Tunis), with its important bridge across the Medjerda River. Here the French were reinforced on the night of the 18th by elements of Blade Force, including a British parachute battalion and an American field artillery battalion. (The 17th/21st Lancers and their tanks had not yet arrived; the leading squadron reached Souk el Arba on the 18th, but was not sent forward.)

At 4 a.m. the French commander in Tunisia, General Barre, was called there to meet a German envoy who presented an ultimatum from Nehring that French troops must withdraw to a line near the border of Tunisia. Barre tried to parley, but the Germans realised that it was merely an attempt to gain time, and early morning reconnaissance spotted the presence of Allied troops. So at 9 a.m. they broke off parleys, and a quarter of an hour later opened fire. An hour and a half later German dive-bombers came on the scene to add punch to the bluff. Following up the bombing attacks, which shook the defenders badly, the paratroopers made two small ground attacks, and that air of vigorous effect created an exaggerated impression of their strength. The opposing commanders felt that they could not hold out unless further reinforcements came to the rescue — and General Anderson’s instructions curbed such aid pending the completion of the Allied concentration for the planned advance on Tunis.

After dark Captain Knoche sent small parties to swim across the river, and these very effectively simulated an attack with growing strength. The Allied troops fell back from the bridge, leaving it intact. Just before midnight the local British commander called the French commander to his command post and insisted that an immediate withdrawal should be made to a more secure position on the high ground eight miles back. This was done, and the Germans occupied Medjez el Bab. It was a striking example of bluff achieved by boldness by a small detachment less than a tenth of the size of the force in possession.

Farther north, Major Witzig’s parachute engineer battalion from Bizerta, with some tanks, had pushed west along the coast-road, and met the leading battalion of the 36th Infantry Brigade Group, the 6th Royal West Kents, at Jebel Abiod. But although the Germans overran part of the battalion it held on until the rest of the brigade came up to its relief.

Meantime smaller German parties, sent south, had secured the key towns on the approach from Tripoli — Sousse, Sfax, and Gabes. Some fifty paratroopers, carried by air, bluffed the French garrison into evacuating Gabes. They were reinforced on the 20th by two Italian battalions marching from Tripoli, which arrived just in time to foil an American move on Gabes by Colonel Raff’s paratroopers. On the 22nd a small German armoured column drove the French out of the central road-junction at Sbeitla, and installed an Italian detachment there before returning to Tunis — but this was promptly expelled by another detachment of Raff’s battalion.

Nevertheless, Nehring’s skeleton force had not only preserved their bridgeheads at Tunis and Bizerta, but extended these into a very large bridgehead embracing most of the northern half of Tunisia.

Anderson’s planned offensive to capture Tunis did not start until the 25th. During the interval the slender German strength had been trebled, although its close combat component comprised only two small parachute regiments (of two battalions apiece), a battalion of parachute engineers, three infantry draft-holding battalions, and two companies of a panzer battalion (the 190th) with thirty tanks. These included a number of the new model Panzer IV with the long 75-mm. gun, an important asset. Thus the extreme disparity between the Axis and Allied forces had diminished through Anderson’s lengthy pause near the border of Tunisia to complete the process of concentration.

He himself on the 21st expressed doubt whether his strength was sufficient to gain that objective. So he was hurriedly reinforced with more American units on Eisenhower’s orders, particularly Combat Command B of the 1st Armored Division, which came all the way from Oran, 700 miles back — the wheeled and half-track vehicles by road, and the tanks by rail.* Only part of this, however, arrived in time for the start of the operation.

* American armoured divisions at this period of the war included two armoured regiments, each comprising one light and four medium battalions, an armoured infantry regiment of three battalions, and three armoured field artillery battalions. It had an establishment of 390 tanks — 158 light and 232 medium tanks. Operationally, it was distributed in two Combat Commands, A and B, and a third was later added.

It was a three-pronged offensive, the 36th Infantry Brigade Group on the left near the coast, the much larger Blade Force in the centre, and the 11th Infantry Brigade Group on the right along the main highway — each reinforced with American armoured and artillery units.

The left prong, on the hilly coastal road, started a day late and advanced only six miles on each of the first two days, in a cautious way — Witzig’s small battalion of parachute engineers falling back before it. Then on the 28th it pushed on twice as far, but ran into an ambush that Witzig had laid in a pass near Djefna station, and the leading battalion was badly mauled. A larger attack on the 30th failed against a strengthened defence, and the attack was then abandoned. That repulse, in turn, led to the failure of an amphibious move by a mixed Anglo-American Commando which landed on the coast north of Djefna early next morning, and blocked the road behind, east of Mateur, but was driven to withdraw three days later as no sign of relief had come and its supplies were running low.

The centre prong was formed by Blade Force, which had been further strengthened by the inclusion of an American light tank battalion (the 1st Battalion, 1st Armored Regiment, equipped with Stuarts), so that it now had well over a hundred tanks. It thrust forward thirty miles on the 25th to the Chouigui pass, after breaking through an outpost line held by a small Axis detachment. Next morning, however, a check came from a German detachment, a panzer company of ten tanks followed by two foot-fighting companies, which struck southward from Mateur. Eight of these tanks were knocked out, most by the American 37-mm. anti-tank guns, but their sacrifice in creating this flank threat led the British higher command to break off Blade Force’s thrust, and distribute this force to cover the flank of the right prong.

Both sides were groping in ‘the fog of war’ but such caution at a crucial moment was in unwise contrast to the Germans’ boldness — and all the more because on the previous afternoon a small detachment of Blade Force had by chance given the German higher command a bad fright, Hull had ordered Lieutenant-Colonel John K. Waters, commanding the American light tank battalion, to reconnoitre the bridges across the Medjerda River near Tebourba and Djedeida. Company C, under Major Rudolph Barlow, was sent on this mission and thus happened to arrive on the edge of the Djedeida airfield, newly brought into use. Seeing and seizing the opportunity, Barlow swept over the airfield with his seventeen tanks and destroyed some twenty aircraft — in reports it was magnified to forty. This deep penetration, also magnified in the reports that reached Nehring, came as such a shock that he pulled back his forces for a close-in defence of Tunis.

The Allied right prong, on the main highway, had met an early check in attacking Medjez el Bab,* and small counterattacks produced a disorganised retirement. But after nightfall on the 25th Nehring — shaken by the Djedeida raid — ordered the defenders to withdraw, fearing that they might be overwhelmed by a renewed attack. Following them up, the Allied column occupied Tebourba, twenty miles further on, in the early hours of the 27th. But after a short advance next day it was abruptly checked at Djedeida, twelve miles from Tunis, by a mixed battalion group. A renewed assault on the 29th was also repulsed. General Evelegh then advised a pause until further reinforcements came up and closer fighter protection had been provided against the German dive-bombers, which had harassed Allied troops increasingly and frayed their nerves.

* Medjez el Bab was held by a German parachute battalion, an Italian anti-tank company, and two 88 mm. guns, supported by a company of the 190th Panzer Battalion, with 17 tanks.

This recommendation was accepted by Anderson, and by Eisenhower. He visited the forward area on those two days, and was greeted by American officers with ‘the constant plaint, “Where is this bloody Air Force of ours? Why do we see nothing but Heinies?”.’ In his memoirs he remarks: ‘Every conversation along the roadside brought out astounding exaggerations’ about the damage, but it was nonetheless ominous to hear such comments as: ‘Our troops will surely have to retreat; humans cannot exist in these conditions.’*

* Eisenhower:
Crusade in Europe,
p. 120.

Meanwhile Field-Marshal Kesselring, who visited Tunis at the same time, was reproaching Nehring for being too cautious and defensive. He brushed aside arguments about the much larger strength of the Allied forces, and the fact that the inflow of Axis reinforcements was being badly hindered by Allied bombing of the airfields. Criticising the decision to withdraw from Medjez el Bab, he ordered him to regain the lost ground, as far as Tebourba at least. So, on December 1, a counterthrust was delivered by three panzer companies† with some forty tanks and a few supporting elements, including a field battery of three guns and two companies of anti-tank guns. The counterthrust was aimed, not direct at the force which had attacked Djedeida, but from the north towards the Chouigui pass, on the flank, with the intention of swinging round onto its rear near Tebourba. The Germans, in two converging columns, first hit Blade Force, which suffered from being widely distributed in its flank protective role, part of it being overrun and destroyed. Then, in the afternoon, the Germans pushed towards Tebourba but were checked by artillery fire and bombing before they reached their objective and got astride the main road.

† The leading elements of the 10th Panzer Division had just arrived in Tunisia, and included two companies of a fresh panzer battalion — with 32 Panzer IIIs and two of the new model Panzer IVs. These two companies were immediately used for the counterthrust along with one company of the panzer battalion that had arrived earlier.

But their continued pressure produced such a close threat to this artery that the Allies’ spearhead at Djedeida was pulled back to a position nearer Tebourba. On the 3rd the pressure was increased to strangling pitch, and became concentric as Nehring threw in all the other German detachments that were within reach, leaving only a tiny handful on guard in the city of Tunis. That night the Allies’ spearhead force was squeezed out of Tebourba, and barely managed to escape — by using a dirt track along the river bank, which entailed the abandonment of much equipment and transport. The Germans in their counterstroke took more than a thousand prisoners, and their ‘bag’ also included more than fifty tanks.