The Grand Alliance (74 page)

We must distinguish between two possibilities:
(a) England is close to collapse. If we accept this
assumption we shall encourage England by taking on a
new opponent. Russia is no potential ally of the
English. England can expect nothing good from Russia.

Hope in Russia is not postponing England’s collapse.

With Russia we do not destroy any English hopes.

(b) If we do not believe in the imminent collapse of
England, then the thought might suggest itself that by
the use of force we must feed ourselves from Soviet
territory. I take it as a matter of course that we shall
advance victoriously to Moscow and beyond that. I
doubt very much, however, whether we shall be able to
turn to account what we have won in the face of the
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well-known passive resistance of the Slavs. I do not
see in the Russian State any effective opposition
capable of succeeding the Communist system and
uniting with us and being of service to us. We should,
therefore, probably have to reckon with a continuation
of the Stalin system in Eastern Russia and in Siberia
and with a renewed outbreak of hostilities in the spring
of 1942. The window to the Pacific Ocean would
remain shut.

A German attack on Russia would only give the
British new moral strength. It would be interpreted there
as German uncertainty about the success of our fight
against England. We should thereby not only be
admitting that the war was going to last a long time yet,
but we might actually prolong it in this way, instead of
shortening it.

On May 7 Schulenburg hopefully reported that Stalin had taken over the chairmanship of the Council of People’s Commissars in place of Molotov, and had thereby become head of the Government of the Soviet Union.

The reason for this may be sought in the recent mistakes in foreign policy which led to a cooling-off of the cordiality of German-Soviet relations, for the creation and preservation of which Stalin had consciously striven.

In his new capacity Stalin assumes responsibility for all acts of the Government, in both the domestic and foreign fields…. I am convinced that Stalin will use his new position in order to take part personally in the maintenance and development of good relations between the Soviets and Germany.

The German Naval Attaché, reporting from Moscow, expressed the same point in these words: “Stalin is the pivot of German-Soviet collaboration.” Examples of Russian appeasement of Germany increased. On May 3 Russia had officially recognised the pro-German Government of Rashid Ali in Iraq. On May 7 the diplomatic representatives of The Grand Alliance

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Belgium and Norway were expelled from Russia. Even the Yugoslav Minister was flung out. At the beginning of June the Greek Legation was banished from Moscow. As General Thomas, the head of the economic section of the German War Ministry, later wrote in his paper on the war economy of the Reich: “The Russians executed their deliveries up to the eve of the attack, and in the last days the transport of rubber from the Far East was expedited by express trains.”

We had not, of course, full information about the Moscow moods, but the German purpose seemed plain and comprehensible. On May 16 I cabled to General Smuts: “It looks as if Hitler is massing against Russia. A ceaseless movement of troops, armoured forces, and aircraft northward from the Balkans and eastward from France and Germany is in progress.” Stalin must have tried very hard to preserve his illusions about Hitler’s policy. After another month of intense German troop movement and deployment, Schulenburg could telegraph to the German Foreign Office on June 13:

People’s Commissar Molotov has just given me the following text of a Tass dispatch which will be broadcast tonight and published in the papers tomorrow:

Even before the return of the English Ambassador Cripps to London, but especially since his return, there have been widespread rumours of an impending war between the U.S.S.R. and Germany in the English and foreign press. These allege:

That Germany supposedly has made various territorial and economic demands on the U.S.S.R., and negotiations are impending between Germany and the U.S.S.R. for a new and closer agreement.

2. That the Soviet Union is supposed to have declined these demands, and that as a result Germany has begun to concentrate her troops on the frontier of the Soviet Union in order to attack the Soviet Union.

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3. That on its side the Soviet Union is supposed to have begun intensive preparations for war with Germany and to have concentrated its troops on the German border.

Despite the obvious absurdity of these rumours, responsible circles in Moscow have thought it necessary to state that they are a clumsy propaganda manoeuvre of the forces arrayed against the Soviet Union and Germany, which are interested in a spread and intensification of the war.

Hitler had every right to be content with the success of his measures of deception and concealment, and with his victim’s state of mind.

Molotov’s final fatuity is worth recording.

Schulenburg

to

Moscow,

the

German

June

22,

Foreign Office

1941, 1.17 A.

M.

Molotov summoned me to his office this evening at
9.30 P.M. After he had mentioned the alleged repeated
border violations by German aircraft, with the remark
that Dekanosov had been instructed to call on the
Reich Foreign Minister in this matter, Molotov stated as
follows:

There were a number of indications that the German
Government was dissatisfied with the Soviet Government. Rumours were even current that a war was
impending between Germany and the Soviet Union.

They found sustenance in the fact that there was no
reaction whatsoever on the part of Germany to the
Tass report of June 15; that it was not even published
in Germany. The Soviet Government was unable to
understand the reasons for Germany’s dissatisfaction.

If the Yugoslav question had at the time given rise to
such dissatisfaction, he – Molotov – believed that by
means of his earlier communications he had cleared up
this question, which, moreover, was a thing of the past.

He would appreciate it if I could tell him what had

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brought about the present situation in German-Soviet
Russian relations.

I replied that I could not answer his question, as I
lacked the pertinent information; that I would, however,
transmit his communication to Berlin.

But the hour had now struck.

Ribbentrop

to

Berlin, June

Schulenburg

21, 1941

Upon receipt of this telegram all of the cipher material still there is to be destroyed. The radio set is to be
put out of commission.

2. Please inform Herr Molotov at once that you have
an urgent communication to make to him and would,
therefore, like to call on him immediately. Then please
make the following declaration to him:

“… The Government of the Reich declares that the
Soviet Government, contrary to the obligations it
assumed, (1) has not only continued, but even intensified, its attempts to undermine Germany and Europe;
(2) has adopted a more and more anti-German foreign
policy; (3) has concentrated all its forces in readiness at
the German border.

“Thereby the Soviet Government has broken its
treaties with Germany and is about to attack Germany
from the rear, in its struggle for life. The Fuehrer has.

therefore, ordered the German armed forces to oppose
this threat with all the means at their disposal.”

Please do not enter into any discussion of this
communication. It is incumbent upon the Government
of Soviet Russia to safeguard the security of the
Embassy personnel.

At 4 A.M. on June 22 Ribbentrop delivered a formal declaration of war to the Russian Ambassador in Berlin. At daybreak Schulenburg presented himself to Molotov in the

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Kremlin. The latter listened in silence to the statement read by the German Ambassador, and then commented, “It is war. Your aircraft have just bombarded some ten open villages.
Do you believe that we deserved that?
”
5

In the face of the Tass broadcast it had been vain for us to add to the various warnings which Eden had given to the Soviet Ambassador in London or for me to make a renewed personal effort to arouse Stalin to his peril. Even more precise information had been constantly sent to the Soviet Government by the United States. Nothing that any of us could do pierced the purblind prejudice and fixed ideas which Stalin had raised between himself and the terrible truth. Although on German estimates 186 Russian divisions were massed behind the Soviet boundaries, of which 119

faced the German front, the Russian armies to a large extent were taken by surprise. The Germans found no signs of offensive preparations in the forward zone, and the Russian covering troops were swiftly overpowered.

Something like the disaster which had befallen the Polish Air Force on September 1, 1939, was now to be repeated on a far larger scale on the Russian airfields, and many hundreds of Russian planes were caught at daybreak and destroyed before they could get into the air. Thus the ravings of hatred against Britain and the United States which the Soviet propaganda machine cast upon the midnight air were overwhelmed at dawn by the German cannonade. The wicked are not always clever, nor are dictators always right.

It is impossible to complete this account without referring to a terrible decision of policy adopted by Hitler towards his new foes, and enforced under all the pressure of the mortal

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struggle in vast barren or ruined lands and winter horrors.

Verbal orders were given by him at a conference on June 14, 1941, which to a large extent governed the conduct of the German Army towards the Russian troops and people, and led to many ruthless and barbarous deeds. According to the Nuremberg documents, General Halder testified: Prior to the attack on Russia the Fuehrer called a conference of all the commanders and persons connected with the Supreme Command on the question of the forthcoming attack on Russia. I cannot recall the exact date of this conference…. At this conference the Fuehrer stated that the methods used in the war against the Russians would have to be different from those used against the West…. He said that the struggle between Russia and Germany was a Russian struggle. He stated that since the Russians were not signatories of the Hague Convention the treatment of their prisoners of war did not have to follow the Articles of the Convention…. He [also] said that the so-called Commissars should not be considered prisoners of war.