The Grand Alliance (77 page)

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inconvenience, which I realise, to maintain their
morale…. The squadron would no doubt go to
Archangel.

Pray let me know about this at your earliest.

We also hoped at this early stage to establish the general basis of a war alliance between the two countries.

Prime Minister to Sir

10 July 41

Stafford Cripps

Please immediately convey following message from
Prime Minister to M. Stalin:

Ambassador Cripps having reported his talk with you
and having stated the terms of a proposed Anglo-Russian agreed declaration under two heads, namely,
(1) mutual help without any precision as to quantity or
quality, and (2) neither country to conclude a separate
peace, I have immediately convened the War Cabinet,
including Mr. Fraser, Prime Minister of the Dominion of
New Zealand, who is with us now. It will be necessary
for us to consult with the Dominions of Canada, Australia, and South Africa, but in the meanwhile I should
like to assure you that we are wholly in favour of the
agreed declaration you propose. We think it should be
signed as soon as we have heard from the Dominions,
and published to the world immediately thereafter.

2. For your own information, what we have in mind
is a declaration in the following terms: H.M. Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of the
U.S.S.R. have agreed and declare as follows: (1) The
two Governments mutually undertake to render each
other assistance of all kinds in the present war against
Germany. (2) They further undertake that during this
war they will neither negotiate nor conclude an
armistice or treaty of peace except by mutual agreement.

3. As Dominions Governments have to be consulted,
you should not yet communicate actual text to Stalin.

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But it will help to show you what we mean and to give
him any explanations he may require.

Official communications passed between the two Foreign Offices, but it was not until July 19 that I received the first direct communication from M. Stalin. On that day M.

Maisky, the Soviet Ambassador in London, called on me to deliver the following message:

M.

Stalin

to

the

18 July 41

Prime Minister

Let me express my gratitude for the two personal
messages which you have addressed to me.

Your messages were the starting-point of developments which subsequently resulted in agreement
between our two Governments. Now, as you said with
full justification, the Soviet Union and Great Britain have
become fighting allies in the struggle against Hitlerite
Germany. I have no doubt that in spite of the difficulties
our two States will be strong enough to crush our
common enemy.

Perhaps it is not out of place to mention that the
position of the Soviet forces at the front remains tense.

The consequences of the unexpected breach of the
Non-Aggression Pact by Hitler, as well as of the sudden
attack against the Soviet Union – both facts bringing
advantages to the German troops – still remain to be
felt by the Soviet armies.

It is easy to imagine that the position of the German
forces would have been many times more favourable
had the Soviet troops had to face the attack of the
German forces, not in the regions of Kishinev, Lwow,
Brest, Kaunas, and Viborg, but in the region of Odessa,
Kamenets Podolski, Minsk, and the environs of
Leningrad.

It seems to me therefore that the military situation of
the Soviet Union, as well as of Great Britain, would be
considerably improved if there could be established a
front against Hitler in the West – Northern France, and
in the North – the Arctic.

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A front in Northern France could not only divert
Hitler’s forces from the East, but at the same time
would make it impossible for Hitler to invade Great
Britain. The establishment of the front just mentioned
would be popular with the British Army, as well as with
the whole population of Southern England.

I fully realise the difficulties involved in the establishment of such a front. I believe however that in spite of
the difficulties it should be formed, not only in the
interests of our common cause, but also in the interests
of Great Britain herself. This is the most propitious
moment for the establishment of such a front, because
now Hitler’s forces are diverted to the East and he has
not yet had the chance to consolidate the position
occupied by him in the East.

It is still easier to establish a front in the North. Here,
on the part of Great Britain, would be necessary only
naval and air operations, without the landing of troops
or artillery. The Soviet military, naval, and air forces
would take part in such an operation. We would welcome it if Great Britain could transfer to this theatre of
war something like one light division or more of the
Norwegian volunteers, who could be used in Northern
Norway to organise rebellion against the Germans.

Thus the Russian pressure for the establishment of a Second Front was initiated at the very beginning of our correspondence, and this theme was to recur throughout our subsequent relations with monotonous disregard, except in the Far North, for physical facts. This, my first telegram from Stalin, contained the only sign of compunction I ever perceived in the Soviet attitude. In this he volunteered a defence of the Soviet change of side, and of his agreement with Hitler before the outbreak of the war, and dwelt, as I have already done in my first volume, on the Russians’ strategic need to hold a German deployment as far as possible to the west in Poland in order to gain time for the fullest development of Russian far-drawn military The Grand Alliance

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strength. I have never underrated this argument, and could well afford to reply in comprehending terms upon it.

Prime

Minister

to

20 July 41

Monsieur Stalin

I am very glad to get your message, and to learn
from many sources of the valiant fight and the many
vigorous counter-attacks with which the Russian armies
are defending their native soil. I fully realise the military
advantage you have gained by forcing the enemy to
deploy and engage on a forward westerly front, thus
exhausting some of the force of his initial effort.

2. Anything sensible and effective that we can do to
help will be done. I beg you however to realise limitations imposed upon us by our resources and geographical position. From the first day of the German attack
upon Russia we have examined possibilities of
attacking Occupied France and the Low Countries. The
Chiefs of Staff do not see any way of doing anything on
a scale likely to be of the slightest use to you. The
Germans have forty divisions in France alone, and the
whole coast has been fortified with German diligence
for more than a year, and bristles with cannon, wire,
pillboxes, and beach-mines. The only part where we
could have even temporary air superiority and air-fighter protection is from Dunkirk to Boulogne. This is
one mass of fortifications, with scores of heavy guns
commanding the sea approaches, many of which can
fire right across the Straits. There is less than five
hours’ darkness, and even then the whole area is
illuminated by searchlights. To attempt a landing in
force would be to encounter a bloody repulse, and petty
raids would only lead to fiascos doing far more harm
than good to both of us. It would all be over without
their having to move or before they could move a single
unit from your front.

3. You must remember that we have been fighting
alone for more than a year, and that, though our
resources are growing and will grow fast from now on,
we are at the utmost strain both at home and in the
Middle East by land and air, and also that the Battle of
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the Atlantic, on which our life depends, and the movement of all our convoys in the teeth of the U-boat and
Focke-Wulf blockade, strains our naval resources, great
though they be, to the utmost limit.

4. It is therefore to the North we must look for any
speedy help we can give. The Naval Staff have been
preparing for three weeks past an operation by
seaborne aircraft upon German shipping in the north of
Norway and Finland, hoping thereby to destroy enemy
power of transporting troops by sea to attack your
Arctic flank. We have asked your Staffs to keep a
certain area clear of Russian vessels between July 28

and August 2, when we shall hope to strike. Secondly,
we are sending forthwith some cruisers and destroyers
to Spitzbergen, whence they will be able to raid enemy
shipping in concert with your naval forces. Thirdly, we
are sending a flotilla of submarines to intercept German
traffic on the Arctic coast, although owing to perpetual
daylight this service is particularly dangerous. Fourthly,
we are sending a minelayer with various supplies to
Archangel.

This is the most we can do at the moment. I wish it
were more. Pray let the most extreme secrecy be kept
until the moment when we tell you publicity will not be
harmful.

5. There is no Norwegian Light Division in existence,
and it would be impossible to land troops, either British
or Russian, on German-occupied territory in perpetual
daylight without having first obtained reasonable fighter
air cover. We had bitter experiences at Namsos last
year, and in Crete this year, of trying such enterprises.

6. We are also studying as a further development
the basing of some British fighter air squadrons on
Murmansk. This would require first of all a consignment
of anti-aircraft guns, then the arrival of the aircraft,
some of which could be flown off carriers and others
crated. When these were established our Spitzbergen
squadron could come to Murmansk and act with your
naval forces. We have reason to believe that the
Germans have sent a strong group of dive-bombers,
which they are keeping for our benefit should we arrive,

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and it is therefore necessary to proceed step by step.

All this however will take weeks.

7. Do not hesitate to suggest anything else that
occurs to you, and we will also be searching earnestly
for other ways of striking at the common foe.

From the first moment I did my utmost to help with munitions and supplies, both by consenting to severe diversions from the United States and by direct British sacrifices. Early in September the equivalent of two Hurricane squadrons were dispatched in H.M.S.
Argus
to Murmansk, to assist in the defence of the naval base and to co-operate with Russian forces in that area. By September 11 the squadrons were in action, and they fought valiantly for three months. I was well aware that in the early days of our alliance there was little we could do, and I tried to fill the void by civilities.