The Grand Alliance (80 page)

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4. This cannot be improved upon in the months of
July and August, except by certain American arrivals
and a few replacements from home. Even thereafter
remember we have to be at concert pitch to resist
invasion from September 1, and General Staff are
naturally reluctant to send another substantial instalment of tanks round the Cape (now the only way), thus
putting them out of action till early October at either
end. After October American supplies should grow and
our position here be easier, but much will have happened before then.

5. At present our Intelligence shows considerable
Italian reinforcements of Libya, but little or no German.

However, a Russian collapse might soon alter this to
your detriment, without diminishing invasion menace
here.

6. Scale of our air reinforcement has been laid
before you. It seems probable that during July, August,
and part of September you should have decided air
superiority; but then, again, a Russian collapse would
liberate considerable German air reinforcements for
Africa, and if enemy do not attempt invasion, but merely
pretend, they can obtain air superiority on your western
front during September.

7. On top of this comes the question of Tobruk. We
cannot judge from here what the offensive value of
Tobruk will be in two months’ time, or what may happen
meanwhile. It would seem that reduction of complete
penning-in of Tobruk by enemy is indispensable preliminary to [their] serious invasion of Egypt.

8. From all these points of view it is difficult to see
how your situation is going to be better after the middle
of September than it is now, and it may well be worsened. I have no doubt you will maturely but swiftly
consider the whole problem….

11. About the air. I feel that for all major operational
purposes your plans must govern the employment of
the whole air force throughout the Middle East, bearing
in mind of course that the air force has its own
dominant strategic rôle to play, and must not be
frittered away in providing small umbrellas for the Army,
as it seems to have been in the Sollum battle. In your
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telegram you speak of aircraft supporting the Army and
aircraft supporting the Navy and aircraft employed on
independent strategic tasks. The question is, what are
the proportions? These will have to be arranged from
time to time by the Commanders-in-Chief in consultation. But nothing in these arrangements should mar the
integrity of the air force contribution to any major
scheme you have in hand. One cannot help feeling that
in the Sollum fight [“Battleaxe”] our air superiority was
wasted and that our force in Tobruk stood idle while all
available enemy tanks were sent to defeat our desert
offensive.

To this message the General replied on July 15 that he proposed to reinforce Cyprus as soon as possible by one division; that he appreciated the need tor regaining Cyrenaica, but that he could not be confident that Tobruk could be held after September. About the six regiments of trained armoured personnel, he said that the features and armament of the new American tanks introduced modifications in tactical handling, and time must be allowed for these lessons to be studied. He agreed that by the end of July he would have about five hundred cruiser, infantry, and American tanks. For any operation however fifty per cent reserves of tanks were required, thus permitting twentyfive per cent in the workshops and twenty-five per cent for immediate replacement of battle casualties. This was an almost prohibitive condition. Generals only enjoy such comforts in Heaven. And those who demand them do not always get there. Auchinleck stressed the importance of time both for individual and collective training, and the team spirit, which was essential for efficiency. He thought that the North (that is, a German attack through Turkey, Syria, and Palestine) might become the decisive front rather than the Desert.

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It is clear from the foregoing telegrams that there were serious divergences of views and values between us. This caused me sharp disappointment. The General’s early decisions were also perplexing. By long persistence I had at last succeeded in having the 50th British Division brought to Egypt. I was sensitive to the hostile propaganda which asserted that it was the British policy to fight with any other troops but our own and thus avoid the shedding of United Kingdom blood. British casualties in the Middle East, including Greece and Crete, had in fact been greater than those of all our other forces put together, but the nomenclature which was customary gave a false impression of the facts. The Indian divisions, of which one-third of the infantry and the whole of the artillery were British, were not described as British-Indian divisions. The armoured divisions, which had borne the brunt of the fighting, were entirely British, but this did not appear in their names. Repeated injunctions to add the word “British” did not overcome the practice which had become habitual.

Many battalions of the 6th British Division had been heavily engaged, but it had not been possible in the stress of events to form the division as a united entity. This was not a trifle. The fact that “British” troops were rarely mentioned in any reports of the fighting gave colour to the enemy’s taunts, and provoked unfavourable comment not only in the United States but in Australia. I had looked forward to the arrival of the 50th Division as an effective means of countering these disparaging currents. General Auchinleck’s decision to pick this as the division to send to Cyprus certainly seemed unfortunate, and lent substance to the reproaches to which we were unjustly subjected. The Chiefs of Staff at home were equally astonished on military grounds that so strange a use should be made of this magnificent body of men. Indeed, it could not be reconciled The Grand Alliance

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with any strategic conception comprehensible to our thought.

A far more serious resolve by General Auchinleck was to delay all action against Rommel in the Western Desert, at first for three and eventually for more than four and a half months. The vindication of Wavell’s action of June 15,

“Battleaxe,” is found in the fact that, although we were somewhat worsted and withdrew to our original position, the Germans were utterly unable to advance for the whole of this prolonged period. Their communications, threatened by Tobruk, were insufficient to bring them the necessary reinforcements of armour or even of artillery ammunition to.

enable Rommel to do more than hold on by his will-power and prestige. The feeding of his force imposed so heavy a strain upon him that its size could only grow gradually. In these circumstances he should have been engaged continuously by the British Army, which had ample road, rail, and sea communications, and was being continually strengthened at a much greater rate both in men and material.

Generals are often prone, if they have the chance, to choose a set-piece battle, when all is ready, at their own selected moment, rather than to wear down the enemy by continued unspectacular fighting. They naturally prefer certainty to hazard. They forget that war never stops, but burns on from day to day with ever-changing results not only in one theatre but in all. At this time the Russian armies were in the crisis of their agony.

A third misconception seemed to me to be a disproportionate concern for our northern flank. This indeed required the utmost vigilance and justified many defensive preparations and the construction of strong fortified lines in Palestine and Syria. The situation in this quarter however

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soon became vastly better than in June. Syria was conquered. The Iraq rebellion had been suppressed. All the key points in the Desert were held by our troops. Above all, the struggle between Germany and Russia gave new confidence to Turkey. While this hung in the balance there was no chance of a German demand for the passage of her armies through Turkish territory. Persia was soon to be brought into the Allied camp by British and Russian action.

This would carry us beyond the winter. In the meanwhile the general situation favoured decisive action in the Western Desert.

On July 19 the Chiefs of Staff telegraphed to General Auchinleck:

Chiefs of Staff to

19 July 41

General Auchinleck

You said that an offensive in the Western Desert
could not be contemplated until you had at least two
and preferably three properly trained armoured divisions. Until Germany attacked Russia it was impossible
for us to contemplate sending any considerable reinforcement of cruiser tanks from here, since we had to
regard invasion in August or September as a distinct
probability. We cannot say this probability has now
disappeared altogether, since Russia might crack quite
soon, but we are prepared to take a chance if by doing
so we can regain Cyrenaica, with all the benefits that
this implies. … In your telegram of July 15 you expressed a doubt whether you can maintain Tobruk after
September. We therefore assume that any offensive to
regain Cyrenaica cannot be postponed beyond that
month. In our estimation there is every chance of our
relative air strengths improving up to September, and
possibly even continuing to improve after that date, but
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this of course depends upon the outcome of the
present Russian campaign.

Having regard to the above considerations, it looks
from here that the best, if not the only, chance of
retaking Cyrenaica is to launch an offensive by the end
of September at the latest. Would you feel like doing
this if we were to send you an additional one hundred
and fifty cruiser tanks at once? We reckon they could
reach Suez by September 13–20. We should also be
prepared to send you up to forty thousand men in

[Convoy] W.S.ll, leaving it to you to decide what you
most need from what we can make available. If, on the
other hand, you do not feel that you can undertake the
offensive in the Western Desert by the end of September, we would not feel justified in taking ships from food
imports, breaking up the 1st Armoured Division, and
sending you one hundred and fifty cruisers before it is
practically certain that invasion cannot take place this
year.

In full accord I also telegraphed personally:
Prime

Minister

to

19 July 41

General Auchinleck

Prolonged consideration has been given both by the
Chiefs of Staff and the Defence Committee of the War
Cabinet to your telegram of July 15 in reply to mine of
the 6th. The Chiefs of Staff now send you their view,
with which we are in full agreement.

2. It would seem that if you had a substantial further
consignment of tanks from here and the United States
approaching during the middle of September, together
with other large reinforcements, this might act as a
reserve on which you could count either to press your
offensive if successful or to defend Egypt if it failed.

3. The Defence Committee were concerned to see
the 50th Division, your one complete, fresh British
division, locked up in Cyprus in what appeared to be a
purely defensive rôle, and wonder whether other troops
might not have been found.

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4. They did not see how a German offensive could
develop upon Syria, Palestine, and Iraq from the north
before the end of September at the earliest. The
Defence Committee felt that Persia was in far greater
danger of German infiltration and intrigue, and that
strong action may have to be taken there. This however
is in General Wavell’s sphere, and his evident wish to
act is receiving urgent and earnest attention here.