The Grand Alliance (84 page)

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movements of troops to and from the beleaguered fortress had to be undertaken and new weapons of many kinds, including tanks, had to be brought in. In all the Navy delivered to the garrison thirty-four thousand men, seventy-two tanks, ninety-two guns, and thirty-four thousand tons of stores. In addition they evacuated almost as many troops, besides wounded and enemy prisoners of war. This severe but indispensable work cost the Navy one minelayer, two destroyers, and twenty-two other naval vessels sunk, besides eighteen seriously damaged. Nine merchant ships and two hospital ships were also sunk or damaged. These sacrifices enabled the Tobruk garrison to survive constant attack for two hundred and forty-two days. During all this period the fortress played an active and conspicuous part in the strategy of the whole campaign, and especially of the forthcoming offensive.

On the night of October 25 the operation so greatly desired by both Australian parties was attempted under conditions of great danger, and not without appreciable loss. I telegraphed the news to Mr. Curtin.

Prime

Minister

to

26 Oct. 41

Prime

Minister

of

Australia

Our new last minelayer, Latona, was sunk and the
destroyer Hero damaged by air attack last night in
going to fetch the last twelve hundred Australians
remaining in Tobruk. Providentially, your men were not
on board. I do not yet know our casualties. Admiral
Cunningham reports that it will not be possible to move
these twelve hundred men till the next dark period, in
November. Everything in human power has been done
to comply with your wishes.

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Prime

Minister

to

27 Oct. 41

Prime

Minister

of

Australia

Fortunately, H.M.S. Latona was only carrying thirty-eight other ranks to Tobruk; remainder, to number of
about one thousand men, were in three accompanying
destroyers. About fifteen low bombing attacks between
19.00 and 22.30. Casualties: H.M.S. Latona – Naval
officers, four missing, one wounded; ratings, twenty-five
missing, seventeen wounded. Army officers, six wounded; other ranks, seven missing, one wounded. H.M.S.

Hero – No casualties. We must be thankful these air
attacks did not start in the earlier stages of the relief.

It has given me pain to have to relate this incident. To suppress it indefinitely would be impossible. Besides, the Australian people have a right to know what happened and why. On the other hand, it must be remembered that, apart from the limitations of their rigid Party system, the Australian Governments had little reason to feel confidence at this time in British direction of the war, and that the risks their troops had run when the desert flank was broken, and also in the Greek campaign, weighed heavily upon them.

We can never forget the noble impulse which had led Australia to send her only three complete divisions, the flower of her manhood, to fight in the Middle East, or the valiant part they played in all its battles.

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3

My Meeting with Roosevelt

A Divergence on Strategy in Our Circle — The
Invasion Problem,
1941 —
Sir John Dill’s Paper of
May
6
— Strength and Condition of Our Armour at
Home — Further Grounds for Anxiety
—
My Reply
of May
13 —
My Views Prevail — Harry Hopkins’s
Second Visit —

American Anxieties about

Invasion and Doubts about Our Trying to Hold the
Middle East — Our Conference of July
24 —

Views of the United States Officers — British
Solidarity — Singapore or Cairo? — Mr. Duff
Cooper’s Mission to the Far East — Scheme for
Resident Minister of State in Singapore as in
Cairo — Pressure upon Japan — Plan for My
Meeting with President Roosevelt in Newfoundland — Hopkins’s Mission to Moscow — An
Agreeable Voyage — Arrival of the “Prince of
Wales” at the Rendezvous — Meetings with the
President — Sunday Morning, August
10.

I
NVASION OF BRITAIN has often been discussed in this and previous volumes, but in May, 1941, Sir John Dill, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, presented it anew with formidable authority. On May 6 he submitted to me the following serious paper, copies of which he sent to his Naval and Air colleagues and to General Ismay.

Compliance with this would have meant a complete reversion to the defensive. There could be no further reinforcements other than drafts for the Middle East or the The Grand Alliance

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Far East. There would be nothing in hand for taking the initiative. Indeed, as the armour in the Middle East was merely to be maintained by supplying normal wastage of fifty tanks a month, General Auchinleck, so far from being himself able to attack, might well have been overpowered.

THE RELATION OF THE MIDDLE EAST TO THE SECURITY

OF THE UNITED KINGDOM

6 May 1941

The probability of invasion may seem to have
receded for the moment, but German land and air
forces could be concentrated for invasion within six to
eight weeks of their release from the Balkan theatre. As
American aid grows, the enemy must be closely watching for a favourable opportunity to launch the campaign
which might win him the war.

2. German successes both in the Balkans and
Libya, two widely different types of terrain, prove once
again the paramountcy of armoured forces supported
by a powerful air force. Throughout the war this combination has dominated every battlefield. The defence,
since the points of attack cannot be foretold, must
suffer the disadvantage of dispersion, and must depend
primarily for its success upon the maintenance of large
reserves of counter-attacking tanks, anti-tank weapons,
and aircraft.

3. The Chiefs of Staff, after exhaustive inquiry,
recently calculated the scale of armoured attack on this
country at six armoured divisions, a total of some 2400

tanks. In the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief Home
Forces, with which I fully concur, a total of six armoured
divisions and four army tank brigades (i.e., some 2600

tanks) are required to give security in Great Britain
against this scale of attack. Of these, two armoured
divisions and two army tank brigades would be
disposed in each of the Eastern and Southeastern
Commands for counter-attack against penetration
through East Anglia and the Kent and Sussex coasts
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respectively. The other two armoured divisions would
be in reserve, one being earmarked for use in the North.

He then set forth the state of the armoured formations at home by June, 1941, showing that our total strength for home defence would be about 1250 tanks, including 150

light, and 490 tanks in schools, etc., of which about 360

would be fit for action at three weeks’ notice. He dwelt upon the need for special training for armoured forces, and continued:

6. The infantry formations guarding our long and
vulnerable coastline are disposed over wide frontages –

a division covering forty-five miles can have little depth.

Our beach obstacles are good, but divisions have less
than half their full scale of anti-tank guns and are short
of anti-tank mines. German armoured forces, carried in
special craft, will certainly be able to land. The R.A.F.

will have many tasks to fulfil, and we have no air forces
designed and trained for close bombing co-operation
with the Army. The Luftwaffe will risk everything for
local air superiority over the lanes of advance. Our
defence on land therefore will rest primarily on our
ability to deliver strong and speedy armoured counterattacks. Yet, taking into account the training factor, I
calculate that the armoured forces in this country in
June will be the equivalent of three fully effective
armoured divisions – this against the six armoured
divisions of the enemy.

7. It is dangerous to discount the possibility of heavy
armoured attack on the grounds that Germany has not
command of the sea; that our own air force would
destroy the expedition before it sailed and on the
beaches, or would sweep its supporting air force out of
the sky; or that the technical difficulties of landing on
such a scale would be insuperable. It would take five to
seven days for us to concentrate adequate naval forces
in home waters. Our bombers cannot deal with more
than six invasion ports effectively, and then only if the
weather is favourable. Air attack cannot be relied on to
break up a disembarkation, any more than it did our
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embarkation at Dunkirk. Our fighters will not neutralise
completely the enemy’s bombers if he is ready to face
the heavy losses which he will certainly incur, and no
doubt the German plan will include measures for
smothering our fighters at their bases. As for technical
difficulties of landing, the Germans have given many
proofs of their skill and thoroughness in planning and in
the preparation of special equipment; and they have
had time to perfect their arrangements. Maintenance
will not tax their resources as much as might be expected; the quantities of food and petrol required for armoured formations over a short period are comparatively small, and the enemy may find enough in the country
for his needs.

8. We underestimated the Germans in Norway and
in Belgium, and recent events in Libya and the Balkans
have taught us once more their capacity for overcoming
the most formidable difficulties.

9. The loss of Egypt would be a calamity which I do
not regard as likely, and one which we would not
accept without a most desperate fight; but it would not
end the war. A successful invasion alone spells our
final defeat. It is the United Kingdom therefore and not
Egypt that is vital, and the defence of the United
Kingdom must take first place. Egypt is not even
second in order of priority, for it has been an accepted
principle in our strategy that in the last resort the
security of Singapore comes before that of Egypt. Yet
the defences of Singapore are still considerably below
standard.

10. Risks must of course be taken in war, but they
must be calculated risks. We must not fall into the error
of whittling away the security of vital points. If need be,
we must cut our losses in places that are not vital
before it is too late.