Thought Manipulation: The Use and Abuse of Psychological Trickery (17 page)

Amulets that signify good luck were distributed to the Israeli public during the 1998 elections for the local authorities. The amulets were in the shape of miniature bottles of oil containing the picture of Rabbi Caduri and carrying his blessing. Rabbi Caduri was one of the spiritual leaders of “Shas,” the ultra-orthodox political party of the Sephardic religious Jews. Rabbi Caduri was well known as the eldest “mekubal,” a master of spiritual knowledge that related to Jewish mysticism (Kabala). The interesting questions are: What effect did those amulets have on voters? Were those amulets able to change the voting results?

It seems that these amulets would have marginal influence on the election’s outcome. On the one hand, it would have a negligible effect on those who do not believe in the holiness of Rabbi Caduri. On the other hand, followers of Rabbi Caduri do not need an amulet to remind them which party to vote. Of course, this observation is not completely correct, as there are some marginal cases where the amulet might have an impact on the decisions of certain voters. For example, amulets and spells might capture the heart of a desperate person looking for any fragment of hope and he, in return, might “express his gratitude” in the polling booth.

The impression is that the impact of Netanyahu’s slogan was much more substantial than the potential of Rabbi Caduri’s miniature bottles to shift voting. “Peres will divide Jerusalem” is a phrase that touches the heart of Jewish people and reaches a wide public across the entire political spectrum. However, one of the most fascinating issues is that the Israeli Supreme Court, which did not disqualify Netanyahu’s slogan, prohibited the use of the amulets as election propaganda. The upshot is that the verdict hardly considered, at least not directly, the potential of the amulets to divert the election’s result.

The judges were searching for answers in the law, which is supposed to offer the rules for a decent electoral process. The legislature had to have provided guidelines to determine the boundary between fair and unfair influence on the voters. Miraculously, the criterion was found.

The law that permits the use of slogans during elections prohibits the endowment of gifts because the legislators were afraid that gifting might distract the voters’ minds: “...The only means which can be used in election propaganda is the word: the spoken word or the written word. By using words the candidate is allowed to speak to the mind and the logic of the voters in logical items and with convincing reasons.

Also he is allowed to captivate by slogans and advertisement tricks...but the law completely prohibited the use of other means of propaganda. Paragraph 8 of law [659] prohibits the accompaniment of election propaganda with giving presents and other benefits...using such means, which might disrupt the voter’s mind, is unacceptable. The prohibition upon using them, as election propaganda or as part of the propaganda, is total.” As stated previously, in order to make a decision on the legitimacy of the amulets, the judges were looking for references in the law.

The result was that the attention was shifted to the question of whether the amulets can be regarded as gifts or not. The judges did not consider the possibility that the potential of these amulets to affect the election results is negligible. They did not examine the option that the potential of the amulets to mislead voters might be marginal compared to other means of propaganda, such as “the spoken word” or “slogans and advertisement tricks.” They preferred to interpret the law with regard to the definition of a gift: “...and inasmuch as the law does not distinguish between a rich and expensive entertainment show and a short voluntary artist performance, and inasmuch as it does not distinguish between serving a large expensive dinner and serving light refreshments, in this manner it does not support any distinction between one gift and another. This means that the prohibition against the endowment of gifts includes not only objects which hold economic value, but also objects without such value.”

In short, the dispute in the courtroom was reduced almost to self-parody centering on the burning question of whether the amulet, a miniature bottle of oil, is a forbidden gift or a permissible message like a badge or sticker. One of the highlights of the show was the testimony of the plaintiff’s expert witness regarding the testimony of Arie Derei, the political leader of Shas, the party accused in distributing amulets: “...the narrow definition of the member of parliament Arie Derei...completely ignores the subjective value of the oil bottles to the believers, which might be enormous and great.” In other words, the amulets indeed convince those who are already convinced.

To summarize, the judges were searching for answers in the law. Their presupposition was that the law is designed to ensure fair elections. It is the legislators’ task to formulate criteria—or, more precisely, general guidelines—to distinguish between fair and unfair influence on the voter. As this case illustrates, however, conclusive criteria may sometimes lead to absurd disputes in the courtroom. The lesson is that human limitations do not exempt even the most august of legislators, and justice, decency, and fairness are only manmade.

NOTES

1. For example, the brave general who carefully prepares the army to defend the west border while the sophisticated enemy plans a surprise attack from the east; the brilliant student who enthusiastically explains his new research to his mediocre, manipulative professor who needs new ideas for his upcoming book; the poor voter who supports the candidate who promise an attractive healthcare program without taking into account that the politician will have to raise taxes substantially to implement the program.

2. The line between manipulative criticism and wild slander is sometimes very thin. Moreover, manipulative slander might give the impression of criticism.

3. Another extreme situation is the case of a politician who is convinced that his blueprint is a verified recipe for failure in the polling booth. He hides his political view and builds his propaganda upon incisive criticism of his opponents. In this way, he crosses the line between decent criticism and manipulative criticism.

4. Compare to Popper, K. R.,
The Open Society and Its Enemies
(vol. 2) (London: Routledge, 1996), 162–163: “All political parties have some sort of ‘vested interest’ in their opponent’s unpopular moves. They live by them and are therefore liable to dwell upon, to emphasize, and even to look forward to them. They may even encourage the political mistakes of their opponents as long as they can do so without becoming involved in the responsibility for them. This, together with Engels’ theory, has led some Marxist parties to look forward to the political moves made by their opponents against democracy. Instead of fighting such moves tooth and nails, they were pleased to tell their followers: ‘See what these people do. That is what they call democracy. That is what they call freedom and equality! Remember it when the day of reckoning comes.’ (An ambiguous phrase which may refer to election day or to the day of revolution). This policy of letting one’s opponents expose themselves must, if extended to moves against democracy, lead to disaster. It is a policy of talking big and doing nothing in the face of real and increasing danger to democratic institutions. It is a policy of talking war and acting peace; and it taught the fascists the invaluable method of talking peace and acting war.”

5. Compare to Silone, I., The School for Dictators (New York and London: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1938) 45: “The secret of Fascism and National-Socialism must be sought in the first place in the mental state to which the Italian and German masses were reduced as a consequence of the war, the economic crisis, and the failure of the Socialist parties.”

6. See, for example, Hayek, F. A.,
The Road to Serfdom
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1944) and Silone, I.,
The School for Dictators
(New York and London: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1938).

7. Such cases indicate that a rhetorician who becomes a leader “suddenly” stops convincing.

8. The connection between political economics and choosing the appropriate rules to achieve a beneficial social game has a long scholarly tradition. Adam Smith, the founder of modern economics, perceived political economy as a science that can provide guidelines for choosing rules for the optimal conduct of society (Smith, Adam,
An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations
, Chicago: University of Chicago Press [1776] 1976). Friedrich Hayek, who has restated the ideas of classical liberalism in the twentieth century, forcefully argued that human beings, limited as we are, have to follow rules in order to better succeed in our personal and social affairs. See for example, Hayek, F. A.,
The Constitution of Liberty
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), 66: “We all know that, in the pursuit of our individual aims, we are not likely to be successful unless we lay down for ourselves some general rules to which we will adhere without reexamining their justification in every particular instance...The same considerations apply even more where our conduct will directly affect not ourselves but others and where our primary concern, therefore, is to adjust our actions to the actions and expectations of others so that we avoid doing them unnecessary harm.” And James Buchanan, the founder of public choice and modern constitutional economics, has argued that the socio-political-economic game must be dependent on an efficient constitution and not on the benevolence of politicians. For a further discussion, see Buchanan, James M., Choice, Contract and Constitutions, Vol. 16 of The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2001).

9. See Vanberg, V., “Market and State: The Perspective of Constitutional Political Economy,”
Journal of Institutional Economics
(1) (2005): 25: “...constitutional economics starts from the recognition that the human agents that populate the world of our experience are imperfect agents, with limited knowledge and limited mental capabilities. Its principal focus is on the working properties of alternative rule regimes or, in Hayek’s words, on how the order of rules affects the resulting order of actions. And it is on the practical question of how people can improve the socio-economic-political arrangements within which they live by adopting better ‘rules of the game.’ “

10. See Vanberg, V., “Market and State,” 26: Constitutional economics “as an applied science, as a science that seeks to contribute to the solution of practical social problems, it chooses to concentrate its analytical interest on exploring the issue of how people can jointly improve the constitutional or rule arrangements under which they live, where ‘improvement’ is strictly defined in terms of what the individuals concerned themselves regard as improvement.” Compare also to Hayek (
Rules and Order, Volume 1 of Law, Legislation and Liberty
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1993a), 45): “The question which is of central importance as much for social theory as for social policy is thus what properties the rules must possess so that the separate actions of the individuals will produce an overall order.”

11. By paranoia I do not necessarily refer to the common usage—excessive fear of persecution. My focus is more on the clinical sense, as defined by Fried and Agassi (
Paranoia: A Study in Diagnosis
, Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1976, 2): Paranoia is “an extreme case...of a systematic chronic delusion, logically sustained” or, to put it another way, “...paranoia is by definition a quirk of the intellectual apparatus, a logical delusion.”

12. Freud claims that a human being who finds full satisfaction in life never fantasizes (Storr, A., The Dynamics of Creation, New York: Ballantine Books, Random House, 1993,20). However, it is very difficult, especially according to Freud, to find such a superman in order to ask him if he ever fantasizes.

13. Such reinforced conception is like Popper’s emphasis of the pseudo-scientific components in Freud’s and Marx’s theories (Fried and Agassi, Paranoia, 1976, 44): “...if you accept Freudian theory, all the better; if not, your very resistance, since it expected in the theory, is its confirmation. Likewise, if the capitalist press opposes Marxism, this is as expected; if it on occasion concedes a point to Marxism, that is the result of an inability to resist the force of truth; and if it does neither, it is detracting public attention from the class-struggle—again as expected.” I am far from claiming that Popper saw in those theories manipulation for its own sake. Popper tried to show that it is impossible to refute conceptions based upon integrative principles. He cast doubts as to their scientific value. However, it is very hard for any creative human being, including Popper himself, to put aside his human propensity to offer theories immune to criticism.

14. Compare to Walzer, M., Exodus and Revolution (New York: Basic Books, 1985).

15. I am repeating and emphasizing throughout this work that, as far as I know, it is impossible to actually read another person’s mind, although sometimes we might make a good estimation of his thoughts. The thoughts of Netanyahu and Peres are their own private heritage, and I cannot guarantee that this case reflects manipulative behavior alone (as I am describing). Nevertheless, the historical situation and the documentary material that I read afterward all suggest that intellectual limited manipulation remains a fair categorization of the slogan, “Peres will divide Jerusalem.” In spite of my every intention to stick to the exact history, I have to stipulate that my presentation is intended to present a manipulative tactic.

16. The missing component in almost any Palestinian-Israeli substantial peace initiative is public involvement and participation. For a further discussion, see Handelman, S., “Two Complementary Views of Peacemaking: The Palestinian-Israeli Case,” in Middle East Policy 15 (3) (2008): 57–66.

17. Many additional factors stand in the background. For example, traumatic events in the history of the Jewish people—such as the Holocaust and the painful memory of the destruction of the Temple— passes from one generation to another. My emphasis here is on manipulative techniques. Therefore, the psychological and political background is sketched only in generality and without detailed analysis.