Thought Manipulation: The Use and Abuse of Psychological Trickery (20 page)

9. For a different formulation of this question, see Mansfield, H., “Necessity in the Beginnings of Cities” in A. Parel (ed.) The Political Calculus (Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1972), 102.

10. See Strauss,
An Introduction to Political Philosophy
, 44–47, and Agassi, J., Technology: Philosophical and Social Aspects (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1985), 193.

11. Compare to Dietz (“Trapping The Prince,” 780).

12. See, for example, Wantchekon, L., “The Paradox of ‘Warlord’ Democracy: A Theoretical Investigation,” in
American Political Science Review
Vol. 98 (1) (2004): 17–32.

13. Hayek F. A., interviews in El Mercurio (Santiago, Chile, 1981) from
http://www.hayekcenter.org/takinghayekseriouslyarchive/005571.html

14. This point arises many times in Machiavelli’s text. See, for example, Machiavelli (The Prince, 153).

15. Compare to Femia, who claims that “the ideology of Italian fascism is permeated by Machiavellian themes and principles.” Femia J., “Machiavelli and Italian Fascism,” History of Political Thought 25 (1) (2004): 1–15., 16. Compare to Freud’s (1968) opinion—or more precisely, diagnosis—of the religion phenomenon. Freud, Sigmund, “The Future of an Illusion,” in
The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud
21: 3–56, Translated by James Strachey (London: Hogarth Press, 1968).

17. See Machiavelli (The Prince, 165–166).

18. Compare to Strauss (
An Introduction to Political Philosophy
, 42): “The passion in question is the desire for glory. The highest form of the desire for glory is the desire to be a new prince in the fullest sense of the term, a wholly new prince: a discoverer of a new type of social order, a molder of many generations of men. The founder of society has a selfish interest in the preservation of society, of his work. He has therefore a selfish interest in the members of his society being and remaining sociable, and hence good.”

19. See, for example, Hirst, D., and I. Beeson, Sadat (London: Farber and Farber, 1981), 252–254.

20. It appears that the fear and worry which are fundamental to the Jewish-Israeli essence were well known to the Egyptian president. In his historical speech in the Israeli parliament, Sadat had repeated several times that every peace agreement will have to include guarantees to ensure security for Israel: “What is peace for Israel? It means that Israel lives in the region with her Arab neighbors, in security and safety. To such logic, I say yes. It means that Israel lives within her borders, secure against any aggression. To such logic, I say yes. It means that Israel obtains all kinds of guarantees that ensure those two factors. To this demand, I say yes. More than that: we declare that we accept all the international guarantees you envisage and accept.” Sadat, A., “Statement to the Knesset by President Sadat,” in Special Meeting of the Knesset: the Forty-Third Meeting of the Ninth Knesset (November 20, 1977), Jerusalem.

21. Sadat’s speech at the Israeli parliament on November 20, 1977 (“Statement to the Knesset by President Sadat”).

22. For a further discussion on Sadat’s trip to Jerusalem as a major turning point in the Arab-Israeli conflict, see Kelman, H. C., “Overcoming the Psychological Barrier: An Analysis of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Process,”
Negotiation Journal
1, (3) (1985): 213–234.

23. In this context, it seems important to pay attention that Sadat’s historical speech in the Israeli parliament is not clean from demagogic motifs. For example, he approaches the Israeli Jews and says: “You have to give up...the belief that force is the best method for dealing with the Arabs.” Of course, such preaching does not come from a liberal ruler that respects the democratic rights of his people.

24. See Machiavelli (
The Prince
, 133).

25. See Bickerton, I. J., and C. L. Klausner,
A Concise History of the Arab Israeli Conflict
5th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2007), 190–191.

26. Compare to famous controversial quotation by Carl von Clausewitz, the well-known philosopher of war: “War is not a mere act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political activity by other means.” Or the Sun Tzu’s famous maxim: “All is War.”

27. About two hundred years later, Adam Smith formulated a basic principle in modern economics: “It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity, but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our necessities but of their advantages.” In a similar vein to Machiavelli, Smith points out that it is better to count on the self-interest of human beings than to expect altruistic initiatives. Smith, A.,
An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, [1776] 1976).

28. Compare to Kelman, H. C., “The Palestinianization of the Arab-Israeli Conflict,” The Jerusalem Quarterly 46 (1988): 3–15.

CHAPTER 9

Introducing Manipulations That Open Our Minds

INTRODUCTION

“Expanding manipulations,” or manipulations that open minds, steer the target’s mind to consider additional options. The tendency is to enable the target, entrenched in old habits or erroneous fixations, to take a wider world view, but without the manipulator directly intervening in his final decision. I present two manipulative strategies, emotional and intellectual, to achieve the desired effect. The emotional strategy maneuvers the target to examine his world view from different perspectives by playing on his most intimate emotions. The intellectual strategy maneuvers the target to doubt his world view by employing a dramatic and even shocking move. Let us explore, examine, and understand the logic, motivations, and difficulties behind these unusual manipulative strategies.

BETWEEN FIXATION AND MANIPULATION

I have demonstrated that manipulating people to adopt a biased world perception can be an effective motivating strategy, as it affects the target’s judgment of reality and maneuvers him to take the manipulator’s goal as first priority. Unfortunately, people are often fervently delusional enough on their own. The individual “possessed” by conviction is entirely unwilling to engage in any critical discussion regarding his beliefs, behavior, and actions, even when he asks for help.

Conviction in a closed, biased world view is a well-known phenomenon in almost every walk of life. Let me demonstrate this tragic phenomenon and its disastrous implications in three important areas: military, psychotherapy, and science. Research indicates that many strategic surprises in wars succeeded because of the sheer closed-mindedness of military leaders. Generals who were so possessed by a biased, closed conviction confused real, false, relevant, and irrelevant information. They veritably turned reality on its head. They interpreted almost any reliable and credible information that contradicted their mistaken view as false and, vice versa, any false information that supported their mistaken conception as naked truth. For example, Israel was almost exterminated in the 1973 war, which began with a surprise attack. There was a broad consensus among Israeli military and political leaders that the enemy would not attack. The Egyptians and the Syrians took the opportunity to surprise the Israeli army, which was not prepared for a war.

Observations in the field of psychology show that often enough there is a gap between the source of suffering (the “real” reason) and the rational explanation that the psychological patient gives to his misery (the “good” reason). Constructing a logical but mistaken paradigm (the “good” reason) is often called rationalization. Rationalization is a defense mechanism that helps people view unbearable reality in a better light by employing rational justifications. (For example, a parent may claim that his son fails at school because the teachers cannot appreciate the student’s unique talents.) In the more extreme cases, the patient who cries for help is not willing to cast doubts on his rational conception, which plays a key role in his suffering. He continues to employ every good reason and rational argument to support his biased explanation. (As far as I know, this phenomenon is labeled as insanity.)

Thomas Kuhn, the famous historian of science, was fully aware of the phenomenon of closed, biased conviction in the progressive world of science. He reminded us that science changes because old scientists die. Sir Francis Bacon, the great thinker, showed hysterical hostility toward the idea of inventing scientific theories on the metaphorical drawing board. Bacon was afraid that the scientist would refuse to consider the possibility that his theory might be false, even when the evidence lay before his very eyes. Indeed, there are many jokes about the crazy scientist enamored with a pet theory even when its falsification is quite obvious.

Conviction in a mistaken conception is a multidimensional phenomenon. For example, it has social aspects, cultural components, and psychological factors. Of course, fixation is not without cost. Often enough, the closed-minded individual pays a heavy personal price for his stubbornness and inflexibility. On the other hand, it is reasonable to assume that he finds certain functionality, and even survival functionality, in holding to a problematic conception (otherwise he would not so obsessively refuse to examine it critically). For example, it is more pleasant for us to believe that our suffering results from too much importance than from impotence (similarly to the miserable paranoid, who is persecuted by the dark forces because he has to save the world). It is sometimes easier for a proud young man to blame his family in the failure of his relationship than to simply admit that the love of his life has someone else in mind.

The crucial point is that a closed-minded person not only refuses to give up his paradigm, but also goes to every effort to prevent any critical discussion that seems to be relevant to the subject. He is not listening to the facts, nor to others, and not even to certain aspects of himself. Unfortunately, the more pathological cases, such as the clinical paranoid, seem helpless. We do not have a cure for chronic delusional disorders like the disease Paranoia Vera. However, in the more “normal” instances, the hope to achieve an effective change might be found in an unusual action. The default alternative seems to be a sophisticated manipulative strategy. (Of course, the option to leave the fixated individual alone, as long has he does not hurt someone else, always remains.)

THE “LIBERAL” MANIPULATOR

Almost every manipulation interferes in the decision making of a person without his approval. Even the most benevolent manipulator, who has the best intentions, employs questionable moral means, such as misdirection, trickery, and leading astray, to influence the target. The practical meaning is that manipulation’s intentions to maneuver the target for his own benefit seem somewhat paternalistic. Paternalism means to act for the benefit of another person without getting his approval. The paternalist acts like a father who treats his fellow like a little child.

Paternalism is considered distinctly inconsistent with the liberal tradition, which has always emphasized the importance of liberty, independence, and free choice. Expanding manipulations are intended to provide the opportunity to manipulate the target for his benefit without contradicting liberal values.

In contrast with limiting manipulations that aim to limit the target’s field of vision, expanding manipulations are designed to enable the target to consider a wider range of possible options before making a decision. To be more specific, expanding manipulations maneuver the target to examine his decisions and problems from different perspectives and with respect to any final choice that the target is going to make.

The liberal philosophy, in general, praises the expansion of options and condemns limitations. Our “liberal manipulator” identifies an improvement in his target’s condition with an expanded field of vision. Moreover, a liberal manipulator operates under the assumption that a successful expanding manipulation will lead the target to choose the best option according to the target’s preferences, priorities, and best interests. Indeed, this is a significant liberal characteristic. On the other hand, the “benevolent manipulator” believes that there is a strong resistance in the target’s mind to consider additional options. The meaning is that expanding manipulations, after all, encompass paternalistic elements. The different, or even contrasting, tendencies of paternalism versus liberalism suggest that expanding manipulation appears a strange admixture that can be labeled as “liberal paternalism.” The question is: Could manipulation ever rightly be considered paternalistic?

Often enough it appears that the target is speaking in two voices. On the one hand, he may ask for help and even pay good money to get it, such as seeing a therapist. On the other hand, he consistently operates against his own benefit and best interests. For example, he may enter psychoanalysis but refuse to discuss his most intimate secrets that cause him a great deal of suffering; he may strictly take diabetic medicines but continue to smoke and eat sugary food; he may wish to get over his ex-wife but continue to keep the bond alive through unproductive litigation. To which voice of the target should the liberal manipulator listen, the one that is crying for help or to the other that objects to any practical option for change?

The term liberal paternalism might sound all the more jarring for a more general reason. Usually, paternalism is related to the physical sphere in that one person is acting, physically, for the benefit of another one without getting his permission. In contrast, the manipulations that are discussed within the scope of this book operate mainly in the mental dimension. Therefore, speaking about paternalism in the context of manipulation might sound strange and inappropriate. The next example will demonstrate the difficulty.

Classical liberals support the right to commit suicide and object to almost any attempts to physically prevent a person from killing himself. However, even the most radical liberals are not against arguing with, convincing, and even manipulating a person in order to change his mind about committing suicide. Therefore, coining the term liberal paternalism, especially in the context of expanding manipulations, might be an unnecessary semantic complication. The examples in the next chapter demonstrate that a theoretical debate on the meaning, or perhaps nonmeaning, of the term liberal paternalism might run into serious practical problems. To be more specific, trying to manipulate the target’s mind for his best interests is not an easy task even for the most capable manipulator, and such a move might lead to unexpected results.