Hitler Moves East, 1941-1943 (100 page)

Now the next floor. Cautiously the men crept up the stone staircase. Each door-frame was covered by one man.
"Ruki verkh!"
Aghast, the Russians raised their hands. In this way Esser captured the building with a mere twelve men, taking eighty prisoners and capturing an anti-tank gun and sixteen heavy machine-guns. Hundreds of Soviet dead were left behind on the macabre battlefield of the second block of a bread factory.

Across the road, in the line of buildings forming the administrative block, Captain Domaschk was meanwhile fighting with the remnants of the 103rd Rifle Regiment. All the company commanders had been killed.

The brigade sent Second Lieutenant Stempel from its headquarters personnel, so that at least one officer should be available as company commander. A sergeant put him in the picture about the situation.

A moment later Stempel moved off with his motor-cycle troops to attack between a railway track and a shattered wall. In front of him Stukas were pasting all nests of resistance. In short bounds the men followed the bombs, seizing the ruins of the administrative block and approaching the steep Volga bank.

But there were only two dozen men left. And from the gorges of the steep bank ever new masses of Soviet troops were welling up. Wounded men with bandages, commanded by staff officers, drivers from transport units, even the sailors from the ferries. They were mown down, and dropped to the ground like dry leaves in the autumn. But they kept on coming.

Stempel sent a runner: "I cannot hold out without reinforcements!"

Shortly afterwards came seventy men, thrown into the fighting by a forward command. They were led by a lieutenant. Two days later all seventy were dead or wounded. Stempel and the men of 103rd Rifle Regiment had to withdraw and give up the river-bank.

Nevertheless some four-fifths of Stalingrad were in German hands during those days. Towards the end of October, when the Westphalian 16th Panzer Division and the infantrymen of 94th Infantry Division had at last captured the hotly contested suburb of Spartakovka, which had been fought over ever since August, and smashed the Soviet 124th and 149th Rifle Brigades, as much as nine-tenths of the city were in German hands.

Outside Chuykov's headquarters in the steep cliff the Soviet 45th Rifle Division was holding only a short strip of bank, approximately 200 yards across. South of it, in the "Red October" metallurgical works, only the ruins of its eastern block, the sorting department, the steel foundry, and the tube mill remained in Russian hands. Here units of the 39th Guards Rifle Division under Major-General Guryev were fighting stubbornly for every piece of projecting masonry.

Every corner, every scrapheap, had to be paid for dearly with the blood of the assault parties of 94th and 79th Infantry Divisions. Contact towards the north, with 14th Panzer Division, was maintained by the companies of 100th Jäger Division, which at the end of September had been switched from the Don bend to Stalingrad—a further illustration of how the long Don front was being everywhere denuded of German troops for the sake of capturing that accursed city of Stalingrad. South of the "Red October" metallurgical works only the "Lazur" chemical works with its "tennis racket" sidings, as well as a minute bridgehead around the steam ferry landing-stage in the central river port, were still being held by the Soviets.

By the beginning of November Chuykov was altogether holding only one-tenth of Stalingrad—a few factory buildings and a few miles of river-bank.

Danger signals along the flank of Sixth Army—Tanks knocked out by mice—November, a month of disaster—Renewed assault on the Volga bank—The Rumanian-held front collapses—Battle in the rear of Sixth Army—Break-through also south of Stalingrad—The 29th Motorized Infantry Division strikes—The Russians at Kalach—Paulus flies into the pocket.

STALINGRAD is on the same parallel as Vienna, Paris, or Vancouver. At that latitude the temperature in early November is still fairly mild. That was why General Strecker, commanding XI Corps in the great Don bend, was still wearing his light-weight overcoat as he drove to the headquarters of the Austrian 44th Infantry Division, the Hoch- und-Deutsch-meister Division.

In the fields the soldiers were busy lifting potatoes and fodder beet, and raking maize straw and hay—supplies for the winter.

General Strecker's XI Corps was to have covered the left flank of Stalingrad along the big Don bend. But this loop of the river was 60 miles long—and 60 miles cannot be held by three divisions. As a result, the general was compelled to adopt a position along a chord of the arc; in this way he saved about 30 miles, but it meant surrendering to the Soviets the river-bend at Kremenskaya.

Lieutenant-General Batov, commanding the Soviet Sixty-fifth Army, immediately seized his opportunity, crossed the Don, and was now established in a relatively deep bridgehead on the southern bank. Batov's regiments made daily attacks on the positions of Strecker's divisions in an attempt to bring about the collapse of the German flank on the Don.

But Strecker's divisions were established in good positions. Colonel Boje, for instance, when he welcomed the Corps Commander at the headquarters of 134th Infantry Regiment, was able to point to such a clever system of positions on the high ground behind the river that he confidently assured him: "There will be no Russian getting through here, Herr General."

Strecker asked for
very
detailed reports, especially about everything that had been noticed from the division's observation post at the edge of a small wood south-west of Sirotin-skaya since the end of October.

From the edge of that wood there was an excellent view far across the Don. Through the trench telescope it was even possible to make out the German positions of VIII Corps all the way across to the Volga. But above all the enemy's hinterland lay revealed to the eye, like a relief map. And, indeed, a great many significant moves had been spotted: the Russians were bringing up troops and materials to the Don in continuous day-and-night transports, both against Strecker's front and against that of the Rumanian Third Army adjoining it on the left.

Anxiously Corps headquarters recorded these reports every evening. They were fully confirmed by aerial reconnaissance of Fourth Air Fleet. Every morning Strecker passed the reports on to Golubinskaya, where General Paulus had his headquarters. And Paulus, in turn, had been passing the reports on to Army Group since the end of October.

Army Group's reports to the Fuehrer's Headquarters stated: The Russians are deploying in the deep flank of Sixth Army.

On this flank along the Don there stood, next to Strecker's Corps, the Rumanian Third Army along a front of about 90 miles. Next to it was the Italian Eighth Army, and next to that the Hungarian Second Army.

"Why is such a broad sector held only by Rumanians, Hen-General?" the staff officers would ask their GOC. They had nothing against the Rumanians—they were brave soldiers— but it was common knowledge that their equipment was pitiful, even more pitiful than that of the Italians. Their weapons were antiquated, they lacked adequate anti-tank equipment, and their supplies were insufficient. Everybody knew that.

But Marshal Antonescu, the Rumanian Head of State, had insisted—as had also Italy's Mussolini—that the forces he was making available for the Eastern Front must be employed as complete units only, and under their own officers.

Hitler had reluctantly agreed, although he would have preferred to follow his generals' advice to adopt the "boned corset" method—
i.e.,
to employ alternate foreign and German formations, the latter acting as stiffening units. This idea, however, was ruled out by the national susceptibilities of Germany's allies. As a result, the flank cover of the main German forces at Stalingrad, with their thirteen infantry divisions, three motorized divisions and three Panzer divisions, was entrusted to foreign Armies whose operational effectiveness was inadequate.

Naturally, Hitler too read the reports about Soviet troop concentrations opposite the Rumanian front. At his situation conferences he heard the Rumanian Colonel-General Dumi-trescu warn of the danger and ask that the Rumanian Third Army should be given anti-tank and Panzer formations to support it, or else should be allowed to shorten its front. To shorten a front was a proposal which invariably aroused Hitler's indignation. To yield ground was not part of his tactics. He wanted to hold everything, forgetting Frederick the Great's old adage: "He who would defend everything defends nothing at all."

In judging the situation on the Don front in the autumn of 1942 Hitler was confirmed in his optimistic assessment by a paper prepared by the Army General Staff, a document so far not widely known. This suggested that an analysis of the General Staff section for "Foreign Armies East" of 9th September 1942 showed that the Russians had no operational reserves of any importance left on the Eastern Front. This Hitler was only too ready to believe. Why then yield ground?

As for the Rumanians' request for anti-tank and Panzer support, Hitler proved reasonable. But the only major formation that could be made available and directed behind the Rumanian Third Army—apart from a few formations of flak, Panzers, Jäger battalions, and Army artillery—was Lieutenant-General Heim's XLVIII Panzer Corps with one German and one Rumanian Panzer division, as well as units of 14th Panzer Division. This Corps was temporarily detached from Fourth Panzer Army and transferred to the area south of Ser-afimovich.

Normally a German Panzer Corps represented a very considerable fighting force, and more than adequate support for an infantry Army. It would have been quite sufficient to protect the threatened front of the Rumanian Third Army. But Heim's Corps was anything but a Corps. Its centre-piece was the German 22nd Panzer Division. This division had been lying behind the Italian Eighth Army since September in order to be rested and replenished. Contrary to the plans

of the Army High Command, it had been only partially re-equipped with German tanks, to take the place of the Czech- manufactured ones, and as yet had few Mark Ills and Mark IVs. Moreover, the division had parted with its 140th Panzer Grenadier Regiment under Colonel Michalik a few months before to send it to Second Army in the Voronezh area. There the "Brigade Michalik" was made into 27th Panzer Division. The division's Panzer Engineers Battalion finally had been engaged in street fighting in Stalingrad for several weeks.

It is important to remember these facts to understand with what kind of shadow unit the German High Command was hoping to meet a very palpable threat to the Rumanian front on the Don.

Was Hitler aware of all this? Was he informed of the fact that 22nd Panzer Division had not yet been re-equipped? There are many indications that this had been kept from him.

On 10th November Corps headquarters and 22nd Panzer Division received orders for the division to move into the sector of the Rumanian Third Army. The division's last units left for the south on 16th November, making for the big Don loop. It was a 150-mile journey through frost and snow.

But neither the frost nor the snow was the main problem. There seemed to be a jinx on this Panzer Corps: one nasty surprise was followed by another.

While stationed on a "quiet front" the 22nd Panzer Division had received practically no fuel for training or testing runs. Its 204th Panzer Regiment, consequently, had been lying scattered behind the Italian Don front, camouflaged under reeds and entirely immobile. The tanks had been well hidden in pits dug into the ground and protected against the frost with straw. The Panzer men had been unable to convince their superior commands that a motorized unit must keep its vehicles moving even during rest periods, and for that purpose required fuel. But no fuel was assigned to it, and engines therefore could not be tested. That then was how Colonel von Oppeln-Bronikowski found the 204th Panzer Regiment shortly before it was moved. When departure was suddenly decided upon and the tanks were to be brought

out hurriedly from their pits, only 39 out of 104 could be started up, and that only with difficulty. A further 34 dropped out in the course of the move: the engines simply conked out and the turrets of many tanks refused to turn. In short, the electrical equipment broke down.

What had happened? The answer is staggeringly simple. Mice, nesting in the straw with which the tank-pits were covered, had entered the tanks in search of food and had nibbled the rubber insulation of the wiring. As a result, faults developed in the electrical equipment, and ignition, battery-feeds, turret-sights, and tank guns were out of action.

Indeed, several tanks caught fire from short circuits and sparking. And since disasters never come singly, there was a severe drop in temperature just as the unit set out on its march—but the Panzer Regiment had no track-sleeves for winter operations. Somewhere these had been lost on the long journey to the Don.

The result was that the tanks slithered from one side of the icy roads to the other and made only very slow headway. The Tank Workshop Company 204 had not been taken along on this move because of fuel shortage, which meant that no major repairs could be carried out en route.

Instead of the 104 tanks listed in the Army Group records as constituting the strength of 22nd Panzer Division, the Division in fact reached the assembly area of XLVIII Panzer Corps with 31 armoured fighting vehicles. Another 11 followed later. On 19th November, therefore, the Division could boast 42 armoured vehicles—just about enough to amalgamate the tanks, armoured carriers, and motor-cycles, as well as a motorized battery, under the name of Panzer Combat Group Oppeln.

The second major formation of the Corps—the Rumanian 1st Panzer Division—had 108 tanks at its disposal on 19th November. But of that total 98 were Czech 38-T types—perfectly good armoured fighting vehicles, but inferior in armour and fire-power even to the Soviet medium tanks. The "corset boning" designed to stiffen the Rumanian Third Army on the middle Don about mid-November was therefore no real stiffening at all. Yet it was here that the Russian Armies were massing.

November 1942 was a month of disasters. On 4th November Rommel's Africa Army was badly mauled by Montgomery at El Alamein and had to save itself by withdrawing from Egypt into Tripoli. Four days later Eisenhower's invasion army landed in the rear of the retreating German forces, on the west coast of Africa, and started advancing on Tunis.

The long-range effects of the shocks in Africa were felt on all German fronts. Hitler now found himself compelled to secure also that part of Southern France which had hitherto been unoccupied. As a result, four magnificently equipped major mobile formations, which might otherwise have been available for the Eastern Front, were tied down in France

— the 7th Panzer Division, and the "Leibstandarte," "Reich," and "Death's Head" Waffen SS Divisions. Against the firepower and effective combat strength of these four divisions Chuykov with his troops on the Volga bank would not have stood up for forty-eight hours.

On 9th November Hitler returned to Berchtesgaden from a visit to the Munich Lowenbrau Cellar, where he had assured his old comrades of the 1923 putsch: "No power on earth will force us out of Stalingrad again!"

Jodl now handed him the latest reports. They indicated that the Russians were deploying not only north-west of Stalingrad, on the middle Don, opposite the Rumanian Third Army, but also south of the hotly contested city, where two Corps of the Rumanian Fourth Army were covering the flank of Hoth's Fourth Panzer Army. These Soviet moves, reported from various sources, indicated an early attack.

Scowling, Hitler read the reports and bent down over his map. One glance was enough to show him what was at stake. The Soviet deployment along both wings of the Stalingrad front suggested an intended pincer operation against Sixth Army.

Although he was still inclined to under-rate Soviet reserves, Hitler nevertheless realized the danger threatening along the extensive Rumanian sectors of the front. "If only this front were held by German formations I wouldn't lose a moment's sleep over it," he observed. "But this is different. The Sixth Army really must make an end of this business and take the remaining parts of Stalingrad quickly."

Quick action was what Hitler wanted. He was anxious to put an end to the strategically useless tying down of so many divisions in one city; he wanted to regain his freedom of operation. "The difficulties of the fighting at Stalingrad and the reduced combat strength of the units are well known to me," the Fuehrer said in a radio message to General Paulus on 16th November. "But the difficulties on the Russian side must be even greater just now with the ice drifting down the Volga.

If we make good use of this period of time we shall save a lot of blood later on. I therefore expect that the commanders will once again display their oft-proved energy, and that the troops will once again fight with their usual dash in order to break through to the Volga, at least at the ordnance factory and the metallurgical works, and to take these parts of the city."