Hitler Moves East, 1941-1943 (96 page)

By the afternoon a wide gap had been punched into the enemy lines. The combat group under von Witzleben was able to break through towards the south-east, mounted on armour, and on the following day, 24th July, it reached the Liska sector, north-west of Kalach. It was only another 12 miles to their objective.

The Panzer battalion under Count Strachwitz—the 1st Battalion 2nd Panzer Regiment, reinforced by artillery, motorcycle units, and grenadiers mounted on armour—raced eastward under the command of Colonel Lattmann's combat group, and at dawn had reached the last enemy barrier north of Kalach. After heavy fighting the Soviets were dislodged from their positions. Count Strachwitz wheeled south and rolled up the entire Soviet defences. Only 6 more miles to go.

Meanwhile units of the 60th and 3rd Motorized Infantry Divisions, coming from the north-west, had moved between 16th Panzer Division and the Don, facing south. There they were engaged in exceedingly tough defensive fighting with enemy armoured brigades and rifle divisions brought up from beyond the river over the bridges at Kalach and Rychov. In consequence, units of both German attacking groups were already fighting in the rear of the Soviet bridgehead forces. The pocket behind General Kolpakchi's divisions was beginning to take shape.

The Soviets realized the danger and flung all available forces against the northern prong. It was a life-and-death struggle, a battle fought by the Soviets not only with furious determination but also with surprisingly strong armour.

The official history of the 16th Panzer Division provides a dramatic picture of the tank battles at the time. Strong mobile armoured forces were facing each other. They stalked one another, each side trying to surround and cut off the other. There was no front line proper.

Like destroyers and cruisers at sea, the tank units manoeuvred in the sandy ocean of the steppe, fighting for favourable firing positions, cornering the enemy, clinging to villages for a few hours or days, bursting out again, turning back, and again pursuing the enemy. And while these armoured forces were getting their teeth into each other in the grass-grown steppe, the cloudless sky above the Don became the scene of fierce fighting between the opposing air forces, with each side trying to strike at the enemy in the numerous gorges which crossed the territory, to blow up his ammunition columns and to set fire to his fuel supplies.

In the sector of Reinisch's combat group alone the Russians employed 200 tanks. Sixty-seven of them were shot up. The remainder turned tail.

Colonel Krumpen's group was surrounded by the Soviets. The division switched all available forces to the danger- point. There were no rearward communications left: the fighting units had to be supplied with fuel from the air. The crisis was averted only by a supreme effort.

On 8th August the spearheads of 16th and 24th Panzer Divisions linked up at Kalach. The pocket was firmly closed. The ring itself was formed by XIV and XXIV Panzer Corps, as well as XI and LI Infantry Corps. Inside the pocket were nine Soviet rifle divisions, two motorized and seven armoured brigades of the Soviet First Tank Army and the Sixty-second Army. One thousand tanks and armoured vehicles as well as 750 guns were captured or destroyed.

At long last another successful battle of encirclement had been fought—the first since the early summer, since the battle of Kharkov. It was also to be the last of Operation Barbarossa. It was fought 40 miles from the Volga, and it is worth noting that here, outside the gates of Stalingrad, the officers and men of the Sixth Army once again demonstrated their marked superiority in mobile operations against a numerically far superior enemy. Once more it was made patent that, provided their material strength was anything like adequate to the fighting conditions, the German formations could deal with any Soviet opposition.

Mopping-up operations in the Kalach area and the capture of bridges and bridgeheads across the Don for the advance on Stalingrad took another fortnight in view of the tough opposition offered by the Soviets. Meanwhile the 24th Panzer Division and 297th Infantry Division were returned from Sixth Army to Hoth's Fourth Panzer Army.

All the courage of their desperation was of no avail to the Russians. On 16th August the great bridge of Kalach was taken by Second Lieutenant Kleinjohann with units of 3rd Company Engineers Battalion 16 by a daring coup which involved putting out a fire on the bridge. The damage done to its roadway and sub-structure was quickly repaired. And now developments followed one another in rapid succession.

On 21st August infantry units of von Seydlitz's Corps—the 76th and 295th Infantry Divisions—crossed the river Don at two points, where it was about 100 yards wide and flowed between steep banks, and established bridgeheads at Luchins-koy and Vertyachiy. Paulus's plan was clear: he intended to drive a corridor from the Don to the Volga, to block off Stalingrad in the north and then take the city from the south.

Lieutenant-General Hube, originally an infantryman but now a brilliant tank commander, was crouching by the pontoon bridge of Vertyachiy, in the garden of a peasant cottage, together with Lieutenant-Colonel Sieckenius, commanding 2nd Panzer Regiment. Spread out on a little hummock of grass in front of them was a map.

Hube moved his right hand over the sheet. The left sleeve of his tunic was empty, its end tucked into a pocket. Hube had lost an arm in World War I. The commander of 16th Panzer Division was the only one-armed tank general in the German Wehrmacht.

"We have here the narrowest point of the neck of land between Don and Volga, just about 40 miles," he was saying. "The ridge of high ground marked as Hill 137, which Army orders have assigned to us as our route of attack, is ideal ground for armour. There are no streams or ravines crossing our line of advance. Here's our opportunity to drive a corridor right through the enemy to the Volga in one fell swoop."

Sieckenius nodded. "The Russians are bound to try to defend this neck of land with everything they've got, Herr General, Indeed, it's an ancient defensive position of theirs. The Tartar Ditch running across from the Don to the Volga was an ancient defensive rampart against incursions from the north which aimed at the Volga estuary."

Map 31.
The battle of Stalingrad was opened at Kalach on the Don. The Soviet forces west of the Don were surrounded and the path cleared to the strip of land between Don and Volga.

Hube traced the Tartar Ditch with his forefinger. He said, "No doubt the Russians will have developed it into an antitank ditch. But we've taken anti-tank ditches before. The main thing is that it's got to be done fast—quick as lightning, in the usual way."

A dispatch-rider came roaring up on his motor-cycle. He was bringing last-minute orders from Corps for the thrust to the Volga.

Hube glanced at the sheet of paper. Then he rose and said, "The balloon goes up at 0430 hours to-morrow, Sieckenius."

The lieutenant-colonel saluted. Every detail of the attack, with the exception of the time of attack, had been laid down by Army order ever since 17th August. Now they also knew H hour—0430 on 23rd August.

The 16th Panzer Division was to drive through to the east as far as the Volga in one continuous movement, close to the northern edge of Stalingrad. The flanks of this bold armoured thrust were to be covered on the right by the 60th Motorized Infantry Division from Danzig and on the left by the 3rd Motorized Infantry Division from Brandenburg. It was an operation entirely to Hübe's taste, entirely in the manner of the armoured thrusts of the early months of the war.

To-morrow they would reach Stalingrad. They would stand on the Volga. Hube and Sieckenius both realized that Stalingrad and the Volga were the ultimate targets, the easternmost points to be reached. There the offensive war would end; there Operation Barbarossa would come to its final stop, culminating in victory.

"Till to-morrow, Sieckenius." "Till to-morrow, Herr General."

Hübe's right hand touched the peak of his cap. Then he turned once more and added, "To-morrow night in Stalingrad." During the night the 16th Panzer Division moved in a huge column into the bridgehead which 295th Infantry Division had established at Luchinskoy. Ceaselessly Russian bombers attacked the vital bridge, guided to their target by blazing vehicles. But the Russians were unlucky. The bridge remained intact. About midnight the formations were in position close behind the main fighting-line, in ground providing no cover. The grenadiers immediately dug foxholes for themselves, and for additional safety the armoured vehicles were driven on top of them. Throughout the night Soviet artillery and "Stalin's organ-pipes" smothered the bridgehead, about three miles long and one and a half miles deep, with carpet fire. It was not an enjoyable night.

In the morning of 23rd August 1942 the spearheads of 16th Panzer Division crossed the pontoon bridge of Vertyachiy. On the far side the formations fanned out to form a broad wedge. In front was the Combat Group Sieckenius; behind it, in echelon, the Combat Groups Krumpen and von Arenstorff.

Undeterred by the presence of enemy forces to the right and left of the ridge of high ground, as well as in the small river-courses and ravines, the tanks, armoured infantry carriers, and towing vehicles of 16th Panzer Division and the armoured units of 3rd and 60th Motorized Infantry Divisions rolled eastward. Above them droned the armoured ground-attack and Stuka formations of VIII Air Corps on their way to Stalingrad. On their return flight the machines dipped low over the tanks, exuberantly sounding their sirens.

The Soviets tried to halt the German armoured thrust along the Tartar Ditch. It was in vain. The Russian opposition was overcome and the ancient ditch with its high dykes over-run. Clearly the Soviets were taken by surprise at the vigorous attack, and—as nearly always in such a situation—lost their heads and were unable to improvise an effective defence against the Germans.

Frequently the penetrations were no more than 150 to 200 yards wide. General Hube was leading the attack from the command vehicle of the Signals Company, in the foremost line. In this way he was kept fully informed about the situation at any one moment. And full information was the secret of successful armoured attack.

It was a field day for the signallers—Sergeant Schmidt and Corporals Quenteux and Luckner. Altogether, they had an important share in the success of the offensive. The signals section of the division dealt with 456 coded radio signals on the first day of the fighting alone.

A particular problem were the Soviet nests of resistance which, commanded by resolute officers and commissars, continued to fight on along the narrow penetrations. They had to be overcome by a new technique. Reconnaissance aircraft reported their positions by radio or smoke markers, and individual combat groups would then hive off the main attacking wedge to deal with them.

In the early afternoon the commander in the lead tank called out to his men over his throat microphone: "Over on the right the skyline of Stalingrad." The tank commanders were all up in their turrets, looking at the long-drawn-out silhouette of the ancient Tsaritsyn, now a modern industrial city extending some 25 miles along the Volga. Pithead gear, factory smoke-stacks, tall blocks of buildings, and, farther south in the old city, the onion-topped spires of the cathedrals were towering into the sky. Clouds of smoke were hanging over those parts of the city where Stukas were bombing road intersections and barracks.

The tanks' tracks crunched through the scorched grass of the steppe. Trails of dust rose up behind the fighting vehicles. The leading tanks of Strachwitz's battalion were making for the northern suburbs of Spartakovka, Rynok, and Latashinka. Suddenly, as if by some secret command, an artillery salvo came from the outskirts of the city—Soviet heavy flak inaugurating the defensive battle of Stalingrad.

Strachwitz's battalion fought down gun after gun—thirty-seven emplacements in all. One direct hit after another was scored against the emplacements, and the guns together with their crews were shattered.

Strangely enough, the battalion suffered hardly any losses itself. The reason why was soon to become plain. As the Panzer crews penetrated into the smashed gun emplacements they found to their amazement and horror that the crews

of the heavy anti-aircraft guns consisted of women—workers from the "Red Barricade" ordnance factory. No doubt they had had some rudimentary training in anti-aircraft defence, but clearly they had no idea of how to use their guns against ground targets.