Hitler Moves East, 1941-1943 (101 page)

Hitler was right about Russian difficulties due to the ice on the river. This is confirmed by Lieutenant-General Chuykov's notes. In connection with the situation reports of the Soviet Sixty-second Army and its supply difficulties, Chuykov observes in his diary:

"14th November. The troops are short of ammunition and food. The drifting ice has cut communications with the left bank.

"27th November. Supplies of ammunition and evacuation of wounded have had to be suspended."

The Soviet Command thereupon got Po-2 aircraft to carry ammunition and foodstuffs across the Volga. But these machines were not much help since they had to drop their cargoes over a strip only about 100 yards wide. The slightest error, and the supplies dropped either into the river or into enemy hands.

Paulus had Hitler's message urging him to make a quick end at Stalingrad read out to all commanding officers on 17th November. On 18th November the assault parties of the Stalingrad divisions renewed their attack. They hoped that this would be the final charge.

And so they stormed against the Russian positions—the emaciated men of Engineers Battalions 50, 162, 294, and 336. The grenadiers of 305th Infantry Division leapt out of their dug-outs, bent double, weapons at the ready, knapsacks bulging with hand-grenades. Panting, they dragged machine-guns and mortars across the pitted ground and through the maze of ruined factory buildings. Bunched around self-propelled AA guns, behind tanks or assault guns, they attacked

—amid the screaming roar of Stukas and the rattle of enemy machine-guns. Soaked to the skin by drizzling rain and driving snow, filthy, their uniforms in tatters. But they stormed—at the landing-stage of the ferry, at the bread factory, at the grain elevator, among the sidings of the "tennis racket." On their first day they "conquered" 30, 50, or even 100 yards. They were gaining ground—slowly but surely. Another twenty-four hours, or perhaps forty-eight hours, and the job would be done.

However, on the following morning, 19th November, at first light, just as the assault parties were resuming their step- by-step advance through the labyrinth of masonry among the factory buildings, storming barricades made of old Russian gun-barrels, flinging explosive charges down manholes into effluent tunnels, slowly inching their way to the Volga bank, the Russians launched their attack against the Rumanian Third Army on the Don, 90 miles away to the north-west.

Colonel-General von Richthofen, commanding Fourth Air Fleet, notes in his diary: "Once again the Russians have made masterly use of the bad weather. Rain, snow, and freezing fog are making all Luftwaffe operations on the Don impossible."

The Soviet Fifth Tank Army was striking from the Serafim-ovich area—the exact spot where there should have been a strong German Panzer Corps, but where in fact there was only the shadow of a Panzer Corps, Heim's Corps. The Soviets came in strength of two armoured Corps, one cavalry Corps, and six rifle divisions. On the left of the Fifth Tank Army the Soviet Twenty-first Army simultaneously struck southward from the Kletskaya area with one armoured Corps, one Guards cavalry Corps, and six rifle divisions.

This multitude of Soviet Corps sounds rather frightening. But a Soviet Army as a rule had only the fighting strength of a German Corps at full establishment, a Soviet Corps more or less equalled a German division, and a Soviet division was roughly the strength of a German brigade. Colonel-General Hoth very rightly observes: "We over-rated the Russians on the front, but we invariably under-rated their reserves."

The Soviet attack was prepared by eighty minutes of concentrated artillery-fire. Then the first waves came on through the thick fog. The Rumanian battalions resisted bravely. Above all, the 1st Cavalry Division and the regiments of the Rumanian 6th Infantry Division, belonging to General Mi-hail Lascar, fought stubbornly and held their positions.

But the Rumanians soon found themselves faced with a situation they were not up to. They fell victim to what Gud- erian has called "tank fright," the panic which seizes units inexperienced in operations against armour. Enemy tanks, which had broken through the line, suddenly appeared from behind, attacking. A cry went up: "Enemy tanks in the rear!" Panic followed. The front reeled. Unfortunately the Rumanian artillery was more or less paralysed by the fog, and fire at pin-point targets was impossible.

By mid-day on 19th November the catastrophe was taking shape. Entire divisions of the Rumanian front, in particular the 13th, 14th, and 9th Infantry Divisions, disintegrated and streamed back in panic.

The Soviets thrust behind them, westward towards the Chir, south-westward, and towards the south. Presently, however, their main forces wheeled towards the south-east. It was becoming obvious that they were making for the rear of Sixth Army.

Now it was up to XLVIII Panzer Corps. But everything suddenly seemed to go wrong with General Heim's formations. Army Group directed the Corps to counter-attack in a north-easterly direction towards Kletskaya—
i.e.,
against the infantry of the Soviet Twenty-first Army, which had 100 tanks at their disposal. But no sooner had the Corps been set in motion than an order came from the Fuehrer's Headquarters at 1130 hours, countermanding the original order: the attack was to be directed towards the north-west, against what was realized to be the much more dangerous breakthrough of the fast formations of the Soviet Fifth Tank Army in the Blinov— Peschanyy area. Everything about turn! To support its operations the Corps was assigned the three divisions of the Rumanian II Corps—badly mauled and disintegrating units with little fight left in them.

By nightfall on 19th November the Soviet armoured spearheads had penetrated some 30 .miles through the gap at Blinov.

The German Corps, in particular the armoured group of 22nd Panzer Division under Colonel von Oppeln-Bronikow- ski, performed an exemplary wheeling manœuvre through an angle of 180 degrees and flung itself into the path of the enemy armoured forces at Peschanyy. But the full damage done by the mice now began to show: the forced march through icy gorges, without track-sleeves to stop the tanks slithering about, resulted in further losses. As a result, the gallant but unlucky division arrived at the battlefield of Peschanyy with only twenty tanks, to face a vastly superior opponent. Fortunately the Panzer Jäger Battalion was near by and, in some dashing actions and hotly fought duels of antitank gun against tank, succeeded in battering the Soviet armoured spearhead.

Twenty-six T-34s lay blazing in front of the hurriedly established defensive lines. If there had been just one Panzer regiment on the right and left of them, one single Panzer regiment, the Red storm might have been broken here, at its most dangerous point. But there was nothing at all to the right or left—nothing except fleeing Rumanians. The Soviets simply streamed past.

The 22nd Panzer Division, which apart from the Armoured Group Oppeln had nothing left except its Panzer Jägers, one Panzer grenadier battalion, and a few batteries, was threatened with encirclement. It was forced to take evasive action.

As a result, the Rumanian 1st Armoured Division, engaged in gallant fighting under General Radu farther to the east, now became separated from 22nd Panzer Division. The Corps was split up and its fighting power gone. Army Group realized the danger and hurriedly sent an order by radio to the Rumanian 1st Armoured Division to wheel to the south- west to regain contact with Oppeln's group. But things continued to go wrong with Heim's Corps—almost as if there

was a curse on it. The German signals unit with the Rumanian 1st Armoured Division had been knocked out and so did not receive the order. As a result, instead of facing south-west, the gallant division continued to fight with its front towards the north. Meanwhile the Russians were driving south-east unopposed.

The intentions of the Soviets now emerged clearly. They were aiming at Kalach. There was nothing left to oppose them with. The bulk of the Rumanian Third Army was in a state of dissolution and panic. Within four days it lost 75,000 men, 34,000 horses, and the entire heavy equipment of five divisions.

The Soviet offensive was well conceived and followed the pattern of the German battles of encirclement of 1941. While its two-edged northern prong was cutting through the shattered Rumanian Third Army, the southern prong launched its attack on 20th November against the southern flank of the Stalingrad front, from the Beketovka- Krasnoarmeysk area and from two other concentration points farther south.

Here too the Soviets had chosen for their offensive an area held by Rumanian units. It was the sectors of the Rumanian VI and VII Corps. With two fully motorized Corps, so-called mechanized Corps, as well as a cavalry Corps and six rifle divisions, the Soviet Fifty-seventh and Fifty-first Armies of Yeremenko's Army Group launched their attack.

Between these two Armies lurked the IV Mechanized Corps with a hundred tanks. As soon as a breakthrough was achieved this Corps was to race off for a wide outflanking attack on Kalach.

The bulk of the Soviet Fifty-seventh Army, with its tanks and motorized battalions, encountered the Rumanian 20th Division west of Krasnoarmeysk and smashed it with the first blow.

A dangerous situation developed, since that blow was aimed directly, and by the shortest route, at the rear of the German Sixth Army.

Map 34.
On 19th November, just as Sixth Army was mounting one more attack to storm the last Soviet

positions, four Soviet Armies and one Armoured Corps burst through the Rumanian-held sectors on the northern and southern flanks of Sixth Army and raced towards Kalach. The inset map shows the front line of Army Group B before the Soviet breakthrough.

But now it was seen what a single experienced and well-equipped German division was able to accomplish; it was also seen that the Soviet offensive armies were by no means outstanding fighting units.

When the disaster struck, the experienced 29th Motorized Infantry Division from Thuringia and Hesse was stationed in the steppe some 30 miles south-west of Stalingrad, as an Army Group reserve. It had been pulled out of the Stalingrad front at the end of September, reinforced to full fighting strength, and earmarked by the Fuehrer's Headquarters for the drive to Astrakhan. At the beginning of November, in view of the difficult situation on the Caucasus front, it received orders through Hoth's Panzer Army to prepare to leave for the Caucasus at the end of November. Once there, the 29th was to prepare for the spring offensive. Such was the optimism in the German High Command at the beginning of November— notwithstanding the situation at Stalingrad. Shortly afterwards a special leave train took some thousand men of the division back to Germany.

Then, on 19th November, this division in full combat strength, under the command of Major-General Leyser, was a real godsend. Since Colonel-General Hoth was unable to get through to Army Group on the telephone, he acted independently, and at 1030 hours on 20th November dispatched Ley-ser's Division straight from a training exercise to engage the units of the Soviet Fifty-seventh Army which had broken through south of Stalingrad.

The 29th set off hell for leather. The Panzer Battalion 129 roared ahead, in a broad wedge of fifty-five Mark III and Mark IV tanks. Along the flanks moved the Panzer Jägers. Behind came the grenadiers on their armoured carriers. And behind them was the artillery. In spite of the fog they drove forward, towards the sound of the guns.

The commanders were propped up in the open turrets. Visibility was barely 100 yards. Suddenly the fog cleared.

At the same moment the tank commanders jerked into action. Immediately ahead, barely 400 yards away, the Soviet tank armada of the XIII Mechanized Corps was approaching. Tank-hatches were slammed shut. The familiar words of command rang out: "Turret 12 o'clock—armour-piercing—400— numerous enemy tanks—fire in your own time!"

Everywhere there were flashes of lightning and the crash of the 7-5-cm. tank cannon. Hits were scored and vehicles set on fire. The Soviets were confused. This kind of surprise engagement was not their strong suit. They were milling around among one another, falling back, getting stuck, and being knocked out.

Presently a new target was revealed. A short distance away, on a railway-line, stood one goods train behind another, disgorging masses of Soviet infantry. The Russians were being shipped to the battlefield by rail.

The artillery battalions of the 29th Motorized Infantry Division spotted the promising target and started pounding it. The break-through of the Soviet Fifty-seventh Army was smashed up.