Hitler Moves East, 1941-1943 (15 page)

The following story used to be told about Guderian and the campaign in France. When the attack was being planned

his argument that the success of the armoured formations depended on rapid and ruthless penetration right into the rear of the enemy lines had not been shared by his colleagues. There had been much argument with Colonel-Generals von Rundstedt and Halder. When Guderian had pierced the Magi-not Line and wanted to drive through to the Channel coast with his XIX Panzer Corps, in order to cut off the British and French forces, he was slowed down time and again after wheeling to the west. The headquarters of Army Group A and the Fuehrer's headquarters alike were haunted by the spectre of exposed flanks. That was why they wanted to halt Guderian's rapid advance on 15th May and 17th May 1940.

"You're throwing away our victory," Guderian had pleaded with Colonel-General von Kleist, then his C-in-C. With clever cunning Guderian had time and again managed to get his views accepted, but at Dunkirk he failed. At Dunkirk the victory was really thrown away.

"You're throwing away our victory," Guderian had been shouting down the telephone ever since the beginning of July 1941, whenever he was instructed by Field-Marshal Hans Günther von Kluge, C-in-C Fourth Army, to await the infantry on the Dnieper.

On 9th July Field-Marshal von Kluge personally appeared at Guderian's headquarters in Tolochino. A heated discussion began. "Clever Hans"—"der kluge Hans," as the C-in-C was called in a pun on his name—and "Fast Heinz"—as Guderian was known to his troops—clashed head on. Guderian wanted to cross the Dnieper. Kluge said no. Guderian passionately defended his plan. Kluge remained cool. Thereupon Guderian resorted to a white lie. He maintained that most of his armour was already deployed along the Dnieper bank for an attack across the river—a disposition which could not be kept up indefinitely without risk.

"Moreover, I am convinced of the success of the operation," Guderian implored Kluge. "And if we strike quickly at Moscow I believe that this campaign can be decided before the end of this year."

So much resolution and confidence impressed even the unemotional Kluge. "Your operations invariably hang by a silken thread," he said. But he let Guderian have his way.

The Colonel-General nodded towards his officers. "We're off, gentlemen. We're crossing. First thing to-morrow." Tomorrow was 10th July.

Fortune favours the bold. That applied also to Guderian. The development of the action proved him right. His advanced detachments had discovered that the Russians had fortified and were strongly holding the principal Dnieper crossings at Rogachev, Mogilev, and Orsha. Attempts to seize these crossings by surprise had been costly failures.

Reconnaissance detachments of the Panzer Corps, however, quickly discovered the soft spots between the enemy's strongpoints on the western bank of the Dnieper. They found these soft spots at Staryy Bykhov, Shklov, and Kopys.

Staryy Bykhov was in the south, in the area of
XXIV
Panzer Corps; Shklov was in the centre, in the area of XLVI Panzer Corps; and in the area of XLVII Corps in the north there was Kopys. They were miserable dumps, without bridges, and no one had ever heard of them. The Russians never dreamed that the Germans would attack at these points. But the great secret in war is always to hit the enemy where he expects it least.

In fact, the Dnieper was crossed at all three points without great losses on 10th and llth July. Above and below Staryy Bykhov the 3rd and 4th Panzer Divisions got across at their first attempt. The 1st Battalion, 3rd Rifle Regiment, as well as the 10th Motorized Infantry Division, crossed the river at Soborovo, secured the bridgehead, and repelled all counterattacks. At Staryy Bykhov the 2nd Company, Motorcycle Battalion 34, under Captain Rode, forced a crossing and in this way covered the first bridgehead. Engineers Battalion 79 instantly began building an emergency bridge which was ready for use during the night of 10th/11th July.

At Kopys the crossing did not at first succeed. The 29th Motorized Infantry Division had to fight hard to get across the river in the face of enemy air-attacks and artillery-fire. At 0515 hours on 1 1th July Lieutenant-Colonel Hecker's engineer companies crossed the river in assault boats under cover of self-propelled guns, and ferried the infantry to the other bank. Within 45 minutes four assault battalions had gained the far bank. They underran the enemy fire and dug in.

At Shklov, where 10th Panzer Division crossed, the "Grossdeutschland" Infantry Regiment clashed with the "Stalin Scholars," a crack unit of officer cadets. Lieutenant Hänert's machine-gun company of 1st Battalion, "Grossdeutschland" Infantry Regiment, eventually gained the regiment the elbow-room it needed by driving the Soviets back into the woods. The sappers built their bridge in record time. The heavy weapons were brought across.

As for the strongly fortified towns of Orsha, Mogilev, and Rogachev, Guderian's divisions simply bypassed them and drove farther east. Their objective was Smolensk.

Guderian was pressed for time, for Marshal Timoshenko had already built up a strong concentration of 20 divisions in the south, in the Gomel area. He tried to attack Guderian's units from the flank and thus to save Smolensk. The extremely heavy defensive fighting in which the German units were engaged testified to the seriousness of the situation. However, Timoshenko's plan miscarried. The credit for this must go above all to 1st Cavalry Division, under General Feldt, which hurled itself against Timoshenko's attacks. Together with 10th Motorized Infantry Division and parts of 4th Panzer Division, this cavalry division covered the flank of Second Panzer Group.

This crucial action by the 1st Cavalry Division deserves special mention. The only major German cavalry unit in the Second World War until 1944, Major-General Feldt's cavalry brigades operated along the fringe of the impassable Pripet Marshes, on ground not negotiable by the tanks. The roads were no more than bridle-paths, and shrubs and moorland provided an ideal terrain for enemy ambushes and traps. The 1st Cavalry Division acquitted itself exceedingly well on this ground, protected Guderian's flank, and efficiently maintained contact with the units of Rundstedt's Army Group operating south of the great marshes. It was the successful repulse of all attacks against his flank that enabled Guderian to strike towards Smolensk.

Blow now followed blow. In the evening of 15th July the 7th Panzer Division, which was part of Colonel-General Hoth's Third Panzer Group, drove past Smolensk to the north, with strong Luftwaffe support, and cut both the motor highway and the railway-line from Smolensk to Moscow. The town was thus cut off from supplies and reinforcements, and a new pocket had been formed with 15 Soviet divisions in it.

The Soviet High Command wanted to hold Smolensk at all costs. Smolensk was something rather like Stalingrad—a symbol as well as a vital strategic position. Smolensk was the key to the gates of Moscow, a fortress on the upper Dnieper, one of the most ancient Russian settlements. It was here that, on 16th and 17th August 1812, Napoleon won the victory which enabled him to march to Moscow. It was here that exactly three months later, on 16th and 17th November 1812, the Tsarist General Kutuzov defeated France's Grand Armée. This explains the emotional intensity with which Smolensk was defended. The men of General von Boltenstern's 29th Motorized Infantry Division were to encounter it very soon.

Those were days which the 71st and 15th Regiments, the 29th Artillery Regiment, the engineers, and the Motorcycle Battalion, above all 2nd Company, under Second Lieutenant Henz, who throughout six days hung on to the Dnieper bridge east of the town after it had been taken by a surprise attack, will never forget.

According to General Yeremenko's report the commandant of the Smolensk garrison had been ordered to practise 'total defence.' The streets were barricaded, and concrete pill-boxes had been set up. Every house, every cellar was a centre of resistance. Workers and clerks had been armed and, with units of the State police and militia, had been organized into street-fighting detachments. They had orders to hold their blocks of buildings or die. The military backbone of the city's defence was provided by the rifle regiments of the Soviet XXXIV Rifle Corps.

Nevertheless Smolensk fell. What was more, it fell quickly. The defence was no match for the bold and cunning assault by the Thuringian 71st Infantry Regiment. In the morning of 15th July, at 0700 hours, Colonel Thomas went into action with his regiment. He circumvented the enemy lines by taking a farm track 9 miles south-west of the town. He attacked from the south. At 1100 his 2nd Battalion stormed the heavy Russian batteries on the hills of Konyukhovo.

Prisoners reported that the southern exit from the town was also heavily fortified. Thomas therefore wheeled his regiment once more to the right and attacked the town from the south-east. When the defenders spotted the German spearheads at 1700 hours it was too late. By nightfall assault detachments of the 71st Regiment were already in the streets of the southern suburbs.

On the following morning at 0400 the main attack was launched jointly with 15th Infantry Regiment. Heavy artillery, 8-8-cm. AA guns, mortars, self-propelled guns, and flame-throwing tanks cleared the way for the infantry. In the northern part of the town, in the industrial suburbs, police and workers' militia units resisted stubbornly. Every house and every cellar had to be taken separately by pistol, hand-grenade, and bayonet. Towards 2000 hours on 16th July the troops reached the northern edge of the town. Smolensk was in German hands.

Thus, on the twenty-fifth day of the campaign, the first strategic objective of Operation Barbarossa had been reached: the first troops of Army Group Centre were in the area Yarzevo-Smolensk-Yelnya-Roslavl. They had covered 440 miles. It was another 220 miles to Moscow.

Only at Mogilev, now far behind the German lines, did fierce fighting continue. This regional centre of the Belorus- sian Soviet Socialist Republic, a town on the upper Dnieper, with 100,000 inhabitants and a large railway repair-shop, the centre of the West Russian silk industry and the ancient see of the Archbishop of all Catholics in the Russian Empire, was being stubbornly defended by three divisions of the Soviet Thirteenth Army, under Lieutenant-General Gerasimenko.

On 20th July the town west of the river was surrounded by four German divisions, forming VII Corps.

At 1400 hours on the same day Major-General Hellmich's 23rd Infantry Division from Berlin—Brandenburg attacked with two regiments. The 9th Infantry Regiment from Potsdam, successor to the traditions of the old Potsdam Foot Guard Regiments, succeeded in crossing the river, but was presently pinned down in a small bridgehead. The 68th Infantry Regiment was unable to break through the Soviet defences, and 67th Infantry Regiment fared no better the next day.

As the frontal attack had got stuck near the edge of the town, Hellmich attempted to strike at the bridge linking Mogilev with Lupolovo from the south-east—in an upstream direction. He succeeded. In a hard-fought night engagement 9th Infantry Regiment managed to dislodge the skilfully dug-in enemy.

But the German losses were heavy. The llth Company, 67th Infantry Regiment, under Lieutenant Schrottke, was smashed up. In an orchard it had come under enemy fire from the flank. All its officers were killed. The company lost two-thirds of its combat strength. Meanwhile, on the western side of the Dnieper, Second Lieutenant Brandt, with 10th Company, 67th Infantry Regiment, worked his way right up to the road-bridge under cover of the river-bank. Dodging between Russian vehicles, his men raced over the bridge and established contact with 9th Infantry Regiment pinned down on the eastern bank.

Brandt held the bridge and the bridgehead against furious Soviet attacks, against sudden sharp artillery bombardments, and against the more dangerous snipers, who would pick off any man who so much as put his head out of cover. When Major Hannig stormed into the eastern part of the town with the 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment, the attack ran into Soviet machine-gun fire. The major fell on the bridge, seriously wounded. He ordered his men to press on. Snipers finished him off.

In the morning of 26th July the Russians, under cover of mist lying over the Dnieper valley, succeeded in blowing up the 200-yard-long wooden bridge into the eastern part of the town and wrecking part of it completely. In this way the Soviet units literally burned their bridges. They were holding out in lost positions. They fought to their last round.

Eventually, caught in the stranglehold of 78th Infantry Division, 15th Infantry Division, 23rd Infantry Division, and 7th Infantry Division, the defenders ran out of breath. Some of them attempted to break out to the west in lorries, but they were shot up.

The wooden bridge was quickly repaired, and 23rd Infantry Division crossed to the east. The 15th Infantry Division occupied Mogilev. A strange-smelling brown liquid was flowing down the main streets: the Russians had shot up the huge vats of a big brewery. Streams of beer were running into the Dnieper. It was not to be enjoyed by the conquerors.

The 23rd Infantry Division and 15th Infantry Division took 12,000 prisoners. There were surprisingly few officers among them. The officers had been killed or had fought their way out. The losses of 23rd Infantry Division alone

totalled 264 killed, 83 missing, and 1088 wounded. It was a heavy price to pay for a town far behind the front line.

Inferno in the Yelnya bend—A visit from the Mauerwald— Hitler does not want to make for Moscow—Guderian flies to see Hitler—Dramatic wrangling at Hitler's headquarters—"My generals do not understand wartime economics."

NO general, no officer, no rank-and-file trooper on the Eastern Front had any doubts about the further course of operations after Smolensk, or about the next objective. Moscow, of course—Moscow, the heart and brain of the Soviet empire. Anyone looking at a pre-war map of Russia will find that all roads lead to Moscow. The intellectual and political metropolis was at the same time the main traffic junction, the heart of the Red empire. If this heart was stabbed it seemed reasonable to suppose that the vast country would collapse. That was how Field-Marshal von Brauchitsch, Commander-in-Chief of the Army, argued. His opinion was shared by Halder. It was also shared by Guderian, Hoth, Bock, and all the other commanders-in-chief on the Eastern Front. They all agreed with Clausewitz, the father of modern strategy, who had described Napoleon's Moscow campaign, in spite of his defeat in Russia, as logical and correct. The objective in a war is the enemy country, its capital, its seat of political power. However, Clausewitz points out, "the gigantic Russian empire is not a country which can be kept formally conquered—that is to say, occupied. A profound upheaval, extending right into the heart of the state, was needed. Only by dealing a vigorous blow at Moscow itself could Bonaparte hope . . ." Indeed, only thus could he hope to shake the Russian empire, to precipitate the country into internal disorder, to arouse discord, and to sweep away the regime. The reasons for Napoleon's failure were his inadequate forces, the strategy of deliberate withdrawal successfully practised by the Russians, and the firm, unshakable ties between people and tsar.

The German generals had closely studied their Clausewitz. Was not everything working out in accordance with his precepts? The Russians had not withdrawn into their vast hinterland. They had stood and fought. The German forces had proved superior to them. The Russian people appeared to hate Bolshevism, and in many places in Western Russia the invaders had been hailed as liberators. What could possibly go wrong? Nothing. Well, then, on to Moscow.

But Hitler was reluctant to proclaim Moscow as the strategic objective of the second phase of his campaign. Suddenly he shied away from Stalin's capital. Was he afraid he might suffer Napoleon's fate? Did he distrust the traditional strategic concepts? Or did he fail to understand Moscow and Russia?

Whatever the reasons—he did not want to move against Moscow. And when at Smolensk all the preparations had been made for the thrust at Russia's heart, when the great victory seemed within arm's reach, when all the world was waiting for the order, "Panzers forward! Destination Kremlin!" Hitler suddenly scotched these plans. Flabbergasted, the generals at Army High Command and at Army Group Centre on 22nd August, after five weeks of waiting and five weeks of tug-of-war behind the scenes, read Hitler's order dated 21st August: "The most impotrant objective to be achieved before the onset of winter is not the capture of Moscow but the seizure of the Crimea. . . ."

Towards midnight on 22nd August the telephone rang at Second Panzer Group headquarters in Prudki. A call from Borisov: Guderian was wanted by Army Group headquarters. Field-Marshal von Bock himself was on the line: "Will you please come over here to-morrow morning, Guderian? We're expecting a visit from the Mauerwald," said the Field-Marshal.

Guderian thought quickly. A top-level visit? Had the die been cast? Was the green light for Moscow to be given at last? But Guderian sensed at once that Bock was not in a good mood. He therefore asked briskly, "At what time do you wish me to report to you, Herr Feldmarschall?" "Let's say 10 o'clock," Bock replied, and rang off.

A visit from the Mauerwald. That was the name of the forest in East Prussia in the immediate neighbourhood of the Fuehrer's headquarters, where the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and the Chief of General Staff had their wartime headquarters. Or would Hitler come in person?

Guderian inquired if his chief of staff and his chief of operations were still awake? Two minutes later he was sitting at the map-table in the bus, together with von Liebenstein and Bayerlein. Entered on the big situation map were all the

many engagements of the past few weeks—black and red arrows, little flags and numbers, continuous and dotted lines, arcs, and those even stranger shapes, the pockets. It was all neatly drawn, yet it stood for blood and fear and death. But the cost was not entered on the map. There was nothing to show that a great many men had had to die so that this arrow could be drawn across the village of Kruglovka.

Guderian and his staff had been at Prudki, west of Pochinok, for the last four weeks. The German motorized divisions had taken the notorious Desna bend with the little town of Yelnya in the middle of July. Since then they had had only one thought—Moscow. They had reached their jumping-off position—even though they were panting for breath and with tank regiments greatly shrunk and supply columns decimated. But they had achieved their task according to plan. Now for a short halt, organization of a new supply base—and off again for the last push of this campaign, into the very heart of the Soviet Union. That was the order they were all waiting for.

On 4th August Guderian and Hoth had had an interview with Hitler—also at Bock's headquarters in Borisov. They had reported to him that the Panzer divisions would be ready to move off again for their attack on Moscow between 15th and 20th August. Guderian had added: "My Fuehrer, we shall take it." But Hitler had shown a strange reserve. He left no doubt about the fact that he had different ideas. He wanted to make for Leningrad first. And perhaps also for the Ukraine. The generals had listened in amazement. They had shaken their heads. They had reacted coldly. Hitler had sensed their opposition and had left the question open. No decision had been taken. He had hesitated ever since. And meanwhile the generals in the field were hoping that he might after all decide to strike at Moscow. In fact, they had made their preparations for the offensive quite deliberately. Since the beginning of August infantry divisions of General Geyer's IX Corps—the 137th Infantry Division and the 263rd Infantry Division— had been in the line. During the night of 18th/19th August they had relieved armoured and motorized units. All was ready for the start. Staying put and defending the line merely meant losses.

"How far is it to Moscow from the most forward lines of 292nd Infantry Division in the Yelnya bend?" Guderian asked. Lieutenant-Colonel Bayerlein did not have to work it out. "One hundred and eighty-five miles to the outskirts of the city," he answered promptly.

One hundred and eighty-five miles. Guderian glanced at his situation map. Like a springboard the Yelnya bend projected from the front line. Right at its tip was the so-called "Graveyard Corner." There, for the past few weeks, the fighting had been more bitter than at any other point on the Eastern Front.

This is borne out by a Corps Order of the Day issued by XLVI Panzer Corps headquarters on 10th August 1941, and read out in all companies:

After a heavy defensive engagement on the north-eastern front of Yelnya Unterscharführer [ Rank in Waffen SS equivalent to Army corporal.] Förster's section of the 1st Company, SS Motorcycle Battalion "Langemarck" of "Das Reich" Division, whose task it had been to cover the company's left flank, were found as follows: section-leader Unterscharführer Förster, his hand on the pull-ring of his last hand-grenade, shot through the head; his number one, Rottenführer [Rank in Waffen SS equivalent to Army lance-corporal.] Klaiber, his machine-gun still pressed into his shoulder and one round in the breech, shot through the head; the number two, Sturmmann [ Rank in Wafien SS equivalent to Army private.] Oldeboershuis, still kneeling by his motor- cycle, one hand on the handlebar, killed at the moment when leaving with his last dispatch; driver Sturmmann Schwenk, dead in his foxhole. As for the enemy, only dead bodies were found, lying at hand-grenade range in a semicircle around the German section's position. An example of what defence means.

That was Yelnya—a desolate wrecked dump on the Desna, 47 miles east of Smolensk. It gave its name to a sector of the front where the battles raged for five weeks. The Soviet resistance at Yelnya was not accidental. Just as it was not accidental that "the high ground of Yelnya" was mentioned alongside Smolensk as the first strategic objective of Army Group Centre in the deployment directives for Operation Barbarossa. What was the reason? As a road junction and a commanding ridge of high ground it represented an important strategic position for whoever wanted to get to Moscow and for whoever defended the city.

The Germans knew it, and so, of course, did the Russians. Ruthlessly, Timoshenko had employed the civilian population on fortification works, in order to develop the Desna sector south of Yelnya into a strong obstacle to

armour. Whatever forces Moscow managed to scrape together were directed into the Yelnya area. The Desna position was to become the great new blocking line. German aerial reconnaissance discovered these intentions. It was therefore advisable to strike quickly, before the Russians had strengthened their defences. Lieutenant-General Schaal's 10th Panzer Division and General Haus-ser's Motorized Waffen SS Division "Das Reich" were assigned the task of taking Yelnya and the area behind it.

That sounded simple enough, but it was anything but simple for Guderian's Panzer divisions, which had by then fought their way across roughly 600 miles—through deserts of dust, over unmetalled roads, and through virgin forest. The artillery's fire-power had also been greatly diminished by the loss of many heavy and medium batteries. Given fresher formations, with stronger armoured and artillery support, the high ground of Yelnya would have been no problem. But in the circumstances it was quite a task.

General Schaal, then commanding the 10th Panzer Division, has described the operation to the author. Beyond the Dnieper, he explained, the Russians no longer stood up and fought openly, but increasingly adopted the tactics which were to be practised later by the large partisan units. General Schaal quoted the following instance:

"Between Gorodishche and Gorki the division's vanguard had driven through a patch of thick forest. The bulk of the division got past the same spot during the night. But the artillery group which followed was suddenly smothered with mortar-fire from both sides and attacked by infantry at close quarters. Fortunately a motor-cycle battalion of the SS Division 'Das Reich' was bivouacking near by. They came to the assistance of the gunners and hacked them free.

"More serious than this kind of skirmish was the wear and tear on armoured fighting vehicles. The shocking roads, the heat, and the dust were more dangerous enemies than the Red Army. The tanks were enveloped in thick clouds of dust. The dust and grit wore out the engines. The filters were continually clogged up with dirt. Oil-consumption became too heavy for supplies to cope with. Engines got overheated and pitons seized up. In this manner the 10th Panzer Division lost the bulk of its heavy Mark IV tanks on the way to Yelnya. They were defeated not by the Russians but by the dust. The men of the maintenance units and engineer officers worked like Trojans. But they were short of spares. And the spares did not arrive because supplies no longer functioned. The distances from the army stores had become too great. Every single ammunition or supply convoy lost about a third of its vehicles en route, either through breakdown or through enemy ambushes. Not only the machines but the men too were overtaxed. It would happen, for instance, that parts of a column on the march failed to move off again after a short rest because its officers and men had dropped off into a comatose sleep "

These conditions applied not only to 10th Panzer Division. It was the same throughout the central sector—on Hoth's part of the front as much as on Guderian's. In a letter to Field-Marshal von Bock, Hoth wrote: "The losses of armoured fighting-vehicles have now reached 60 to 70 per cent, of our nominal strength." Nevertheless, the troops accomplished their task. On 19th July the 10th Panzer Division took Yelnya.

The wide anti-tank ditch which Russian civilians had built around the town in ceaseless round-the-clock work was overcome by the infantry of 69th Rifle Regiment in spite of murderous gunfire. The division suffered heavy losses, but worked its way forward yard by yard. By evening the infantry had pushed through Yelnya and dug in on the far side.

Lieutenant-General Rokossovskiy, commanding hurriedly collected reserves, drove his regiments against the German positions. But the line of 10th Panzer Division held. On 20th July the SS Division "Das Reich" took up position on the high ground to the left of them. The troops needed a breather.

The Yelnya bend projected a long way eastward from the German front line. It was its most advanced spearhead. South of it the front ran back as far as Kiev, and north of it there was a kink in the direction of Smolensk and thence a wide semicircle towards Leningrad. A glance at the map made it obvious that the Yelnya bend was a bridgehead, the logical strategic starting-point for an offensive against Moscow. The Soviets understood that too, and therefore determined to smash the Yelnya bend. From the end of July until the beginning of September Army Group Centre was engaged here in its first great defensive battle. Nine German divisions passed through the hell of Yelnya in the course of these weeks—the 10th Panzer Division, the SS Division "Das Reich," the 268th, 292nd, 263rd, 137th, 87th, 15th, and 78th Infantry Divisions, as well as the reinforced "Grossdeutschland" Infantry Regiment.