Hitler Moves East, 1941-1943 (17 page)

    1. The capture of the Crimean peninsula is of paramount importance to ensure our oil-supplies from Rumania. For this reason a rapid crossing of the Dnieper in the direction of the
      Crimea is
      to be attempted with all available means, including the employment of fast units, before the enemy has had time to bring up fresh forces.
    2. Only the tight sealing off of Leningrad, the link-up with the Finns and the annihilation of the Russian Fifth Army will provide the prerequisites and the available forces for attacking the enemy's Army Group under Timoshenko with any prospect of success, and of defeating it, in line with the supplementary order to Directive No. 34 of 12.8.
    (Signed)
    ADOLF HITLER.
    This then was the decision. It was what the generals had always feared and what they had hoped would never happen. Now it had been uttered.
    It has been fashionable to describe Hitler's turning away from Moscow as the key error of the summer campaign. This view cannot be proved wrong, but the author does not believe that Hitler's decision to turn towards Kiev, with the time lost in consequence, was the sole cause of the subsequent disaster before Moscow. Upon objective consideration Hitler's decision seems, in many respects, justified and reasonable. The battles of the summer had shown one thing clearly: the different rate of advance of armour and infantry had inevitably divided the army into two successive parts which not only moved separately but also fought their engagements separately. This represented a serious weakness which the enemy might well exploit as soon as he had realized the German mode of operation. Various attested remarks of Stalin show that he had understood the German method by the end of July 1941. Moreover, the debilitating effect of the geographically vast area and the heavy wastage which resulted mean that no further justification is required. It is also true that owing to the much slower advance of Army Groups North and South the flanks of Army Group Centre remained exposed. The Soviet Fifth Army was a real threat to Bock's extended flank. Something had to be done to protect the flanks. The experience gained in battles of encirclement, moreover, suggested that in future the Russian forces ought not to be crushed in operations involving such great distances, but in closer cooperation between Panzer Groups and infantry. In the light of what has since become known about the strength of Soviet armour and their inexhaustible reserves of manpower, Hitler's caution does not appear unreasonable.
    But—and this is an important but—for a strategy of caution it was then too late. On the Central Front Germany was already involved far too deeply in Russian territory. If the idea of a Blitzkrieg against the heart of the Soviet Union was dropped altogether and the enemy given time to recover, then surely the campaign and probably the whole war was lost. Seen in this light, Hitler's decision represented an admission that Yelnya-Smolensk had broken the impetus of the German Blitzkrieg. If the generals accepted that view it meant the basis of Operation Barbarossa had become invalid. It was this view that Halder, the Chief of the General Staff, and the commanders in the field, especially Guderian, were trying to oppose.
    "What can we do against this decision?" asked Bock. Halder shook his head. "It is immutable."
    "We've got to upset it," Guderian persisted. "If we head for Kiev first we shall inevitably get involved in a winter campaign before we can reach Moscow. What the roads and our supply difficulties will be like then I shudder to think. I doubt that our tanks are up to the strain. My Panzer corps, especially XXIV Corps, have not had a single day's rest since the beginning of the campaign."
    Field-Marshal von Bock agreed. There was a heated discussion. Eventually it was decided that Guderian should accompany Halder to the Fuehrer's headquarters, request an interview, and try to change Hitler's mind. Late in the afternoon the aircraft started for Rastenburg, in East Prussia. As Guderian said good-bye to von Bock, the Field-
    Marshal quoted the words attributed to the officer of the guard at the bishop's palace in Worms on 17th April 1521, to Martin Luther, as he set forth to justify his teaching to the Emperor: "Little monk, little monk, yours is a difficult road."
    The Ju-88 droned on above vast harvested cornfields. Guderian was making notes and studying the maps. At dusk they touched down at the airfield of the Fuehrer's headquarters near Lötzen, in East Prussia. They drove across to the "Wolfsschanze," the camp of concrete huts under tall oak-trees where Hitler and the High Command of the Wehrmacht resided. The sentry saluted, raised the barrier, and let the car through. They rolled along an asphalted road. On the left, just inside the compound, was the press office. Scattered on both sides were the low grey huts on whose roofs shrubs had been planted. They passed the
    Teehaus,
    the canteen. On the left was Keitel's hut. And right at the end of the road, in a small dip, was the "Fuehrer hut"—surrounded by a double fence and guarded by double sentries. A special yellow pass was needed to enter the inner sanctum of Hitler's headquarters.
    Hitler's hut was exactly like the others—gloomy, Spartan, with simple oak furniture and a few prints on the walls. Here 'he' sat through the night, bending over maps and reports, over photographs, tables of figures, and memoranda.
    Within two hours of his arrival Guderian stood in the map-room of the Fuehrer's hut, making his report on the state of his Panzer Group. The following account is based on information supplied by General Bayerlein, to whom Guderian had given a detailed account of his conversation with Hitler for inclusion in the group diary, and on notes left by Guderian himself.
    Hitler had not been told what Guderian wanted. Moreover, Field-Marshal von Brauchitsch had specifically forbidden Guderian to broach the subject of Moscow himself. He therefore began by speaking about his Panzer Corps—about engine breakdowns, about the supply situation, about Russian resistance, and about his losses. The picture he painted was not gloomy but realistic. And, as he had hoped, Hitler himself gave him his cue. "Do you consider your troops are still capable of a major effort?" Hitler asked.
    Everybody's eyes were on Guderian. He answered, "If the troops are set a great objective, the kind that would inspire every man of them—yes."
    Hitler: "You are, of course, thinking of Moscow."
    Guderian: "Yes, my Fuehrer. May I have permission to give my reasons?" Hitler: "By all means, Guderian. Say whatever's on your mind."
    The crucial moment had come.
    Guderian: "Moscow cannot be compared with Paris or Warsaw, my Fuehrer. Moscow is not only the head and the heart of the Soviet Union. It is also its communications centre, its political brain, an important industrial area, and above all it is the hub of the transport system of the whole Red empire. The fall of Moscow will decide the war."
    Hitler listened in silence. Guderian continued: "Stalin knows this. He knows that the fall of Moscow would mean his final defeat. And because he knows this he will employ his entire military strength before Moscow. He is already bringing up everything he has left. We have seen it at Yelnya for weeks. Outside Moscow we shall encounter the core of Russian military might. If we want to destroy the vital force of the Soviets it is here that we shall encounter it; here is our battlefield, and if we rally all our strength we shall pull it off at first try." Hitler was still silent. Guderian was now in full flight. "Once we have defeated the enemy's main forces before Moscow and in Moscow, and once we have eliminated the Soviet Union's main marshalling yard, the Baltic area and the Ukrainian industrial region will fall to us much more readily than with Moscow still intact in front of our fighting une, able to switch reserves—mainly from Siberia—to the north or to the south." Guderian had warmed to his subject. There was silence in the situation room.
    Keitel stood leaning against the map-table, Jodl was taking notes. Heusinger was listening intently.
    Through the open windows came the cool evening air. Fine mosquito-netting kept out the midges and flies which Hitler detested. Vast swarms of them hovered over the little lakes and ponds outside the compound. The unit of
    sappers had repeatedly attacked them by spraying petrol over a stagnant pool near the Fuehrer's hut. The smell had hung about the place for days, but the midges had survived.
    Guderian strode over to the map. He put his hand on the Yelnya bend. "My Fuehrer, 1 have kept this bridgehead towards Moscow open till to-day. Deployment plans and operational orders are ready. Routing instructions and transport schedules for the advance to Moscow are already worked out. In many places the troops have even painted the signposts: so-and-so many miles to Moscow. If you give the order the Panzer corps can move off this very night and break through Timoshenko's massive troop concentrations before Yelnya. 1 need only telephone a code-word to my headquarters. Let us march towards Moscow—we shall take it."
    In the long history of the Prussian and German Armies there has never been such a scene between a general and his supreme commander, a scene so packed with exciting drama as this. It was probably the last time that Hitler listened so long and so patiently to a general who disagreed with him. He looked at Guderian. He rose. With a few quick steps he was by the map. He stood next to Jodl, the chief of the operations staff in the High Command of the Wehrmacht. He put his hand on the Ukraine and launched on a lecture to justify his position.
    In a sharp voice Hitler began: "My generals have all read Clausewitz, but they understand nothing of wartime economics. Besides, I too have read Clausewitz and I remember his dictum, 'First the enemy's armies in the field must be smashed, then his capital must be occupied.' But that is not the point. We need the grain of the Ukraine. The industrial area of the Donets must work for us, instead of for Stalin. The Russian oil-supplies from the Caucasus must be cut off, so that his military strength withers away. Above all, we must gain control of the Crimea in order to eliminate this dangerous aircraft-carrier operating against the Rumanian oilfields."
    Guderian felt the blood rising to his ears. Wartime economics were not strategy. War meant crushing the enemy's military might—not rye, eggs, butter, coal, and oil. That was the approach of a colonialist, not of a Clausewitz.
    But Guderian remained silent. After what he had said what else could he, a commander in the field, say to the man who held the supreme political and military power? A decision had been made by the politician, and there was nothing left for the soldiers to do.
    At midnight the historic meeting was at an end. When Guderian reported to Halder, who had not been invited by Hitler to be present, the Chief of the General Staff broke down and raved, "Why don't you fling your command in his face?"
    Guderian was surprised. "Why don't you?"
    "Because there's no point in our doing it," Halder replied. "He'd be glad to get rid of us, but we've got to hold on."
    Half an hour later the telephone rang at Second Panzer Group headquarters in Prudki. The chief of operations was on duty and lifted the receiver. Wearily Guderian's voice came over the line: "Bayerlein, the thing we've prepared for is not coming off. The other thing is being done, lower down —you understand?"
    "I understand, Herr Generaloberst."
  1. Stalin's Great Mistake
    Battles of annihilation at Roslavl and Klintsy-Stalin trusts his secret service-Armoured thrust to the south-Yeremenko expects an attack on Moscow.
    BAYERLEIN had understood Guderian very well. During the day the first directives had come down from Army Group Centre revealing the new plan: parts of Second Panzer Group were to drive south into the Ukraine.
    Immediately after Guderian's telephone call Colonel Freiherr von Liebenstein, chief of staff of Second Panzer Group, summoned the staff officers. He knew Guderian. When he came back from Rastenburg he would expect the new plan to be ready in outline.
    There was no one at headquarters who was not deeply depressed by Hitler's decision to turn against the Ukraine instead of against Moscow. Nobody understood it. Every one regarded it as a mistake. The staff officers' trained minds rebelled against the fundamental violation of one of the basic strategic rules in the spirit of Clausewitz—not to be seduced away from one's main objective, always to stick to the basic framework of one's operational plan, and to concentrate all one's forces against the enemy's strong point.
    This turning away from Moscow at the very moment when it seemed within reach, barely two hundred miles away and, as far as anyone could predict, almost certain to fall to Gu-derian's and Hoth's now refreshed armoured forces, was very soon to be seen as a serious error of judgment.
    The directives for the new operation were clear. As far as Guderian's two Panzer Corps were concerned, they read: "Drive to the south into the rear of the Soviet Fifth Army, the core of Marshal Budennyy's Army Group South-west Sector, defending the Ukraine beyond the Dnieper to both sides of Kiev." Guderian's first target was the big railway junction of Konotop on the Kiev-Moscow line. The next step would depend on the situation, according to the progress made by Army Group South.
    When, on 24th August, Guderian arrived at Shumyachiy, a small village on the Moscow highway where Liebenstein had set up the headquarters of the Panzer Group, he was again full of zest. He greeted Liebenstein, Bayerlein, and Major von Heuduck, his Intelligence officer, who were all patently disappointed, and went with them straight to his headquarters bus.
    "I know what you're thinking," he said calmly. "Why didn't he succeed—why did he give in?" He did not wait for an answer. "There was nothing I could do, gentlemen," he continued. "I had to give in. I was out there alone. Neither Field-Marshal von Brauchitsch, the Commander-in-Chief, nor the Chief of the General Staff had accompanied me to the Fuehrer. I was faced by a solid front of the High Command of the Wehrmacht. All those present nodded at every sentence the Fuehrer said, and I had no support for my views. Clearly the Fuehrer had expounded his arguments for his strange decision to them before. I spoke with a silver tongue —but it was in vain. Now we can't go into mourning over our plans. We must tackle our new task with all possible vigour. Our hard-won jumping-off positions for Moscow—at Roslavl, Krichev, and Gomel—will serve us now as a springboard into the Ukraine."
    Guderian was right. The operations conducted by his Army Group around Roslavl and Krichev at the beginning of August, resulting in about 54,000 Russian prisoners, now proved a valuable prerequisite also for the new operation. Let us look back at the three weeks which have passed.
    On 1st August Guderian had started operations against Roslavl. His plan was a typical battle of encirclement. He operated with two Infantry Corps and one Panzer Corps. The bulk of the infantry divisions attacked the enemy frontally in order to tie him down. The 292nd Infantry Division, acting as IX Corps' striking division, strongly supported by artillery and rocket mortars, pushed to the south in the Russian rear. From the south-western wing 3rd and 4th Panzer Divisions performed a rapid outflanking movement, first to the east, then north across the Roslavl- Moscow road, and closed the ring with 292nd Infantry Division on the Moscow highway. The plan worked. Roslavl became a genuine, if minor, battle of encirclement.
    The war diary of Captain Küppers, artillery liaison-officer of 197th Infantry Division, the combat report of VII Army Corps, and the day-to-day reports of engagements of an infantry battalion—all of them extant—provide an impressive picture of the fighting.
    H-hour was 0430. Along the entire line of VII Corps the attack was launched without artillery preparation. The spearheads of the infantry regiments worked their way forward— past the communications group of the artillery commander, who had been lying in the front line with Lieutenant-Colonel Marcard since 0300 hours, watching the Russian positions. Everything was quiet on the Russian side. Suddenly the quiet of the morning was broken by the first rifle-shots from the infantrymen who had just moved forward. Triggers were pulled too soon by nervous fingers. They roused the Russian night sentries. At once Soviet machine-guns opened up. Mortars plopped. Major-General Meyer- Rabingen, the commander of 197th Infantry Division, drove in his jeep to the foremost line. Farther down, in the village of Shashki, Major Weichhardt's 3rd Battalion, 332nd Infantry Regiment, had already broken into the Russian positions. It was a case of bayonets, spades, and pistols. Thirty minutes later the white Very lights went up: "We are
    here!"
    "Artillery forward," the advanced observer radioed back. A moment later Captain Bried was on the move. He commanded the 2nd Battalion, 229th Artillery Regiment. His car got as far as the edge of the village. Then there was a flash and a crash—a minefield.
    The nearside front wheel of Bried's car sailed through the air. The observer's car, which followed behind, suffered the same fate as it tried to swing off the road. In response to the signal "Sappers forward!" Engineers Battalion 229 cleared the mines. Meanwhile the guns of the 2nd Battalion had moved into position and were supporting the infantry with their fire. The first few prisoners were brought in for interrogation. A short Ukrainian was found to speak German. He looked trustworthy. An interpreter unit supplied him with a denim uniform and a white armlet lettered "German Wehrmacht."
    On 2nd August at 0400 hours the infantry went into action again. Their objective was the main road from Smolensk to Roslavl. It was a particularly hard day for 347th Infantry Regiment. Its battalions were stuck in difficult terrain in front of a thick and swampy patch of woodland and were only able to advance inch by inch and at the cost of heavy losses. The Russians again proved their mastery in forest fighting. With sure instinct they moved among the impenetrable undergrowth. Their positions, not on the forest's edge but deep inside, were superbly camouflaged. Their dugouts and foxholes were established with diabolical cunning, providing for a field of fire only to the rear. From in front and from above they were invisible. The German infantrymen passed them unsuspecting, and were picked off from behind.
    The Russians were also very good at infiltrating into enemy positions. Moving singly, they communicated with each other in the dense forest by imitating the cries of animals, and after trickling through the German positions they rallied again and re-formed as assault units. The headquarters staff of 347th Infantry Regiment fell victim to these Russian tactics.
    In the night, at 0200, the shout went up, "Action stations!" There was small-arms fire. The Russians were outside the regimental headquarters. They had surrounded it. With fixed bayonets they broke into the officers' quarters. The regimental adjutant, the orderly officer, and the regimental medical officer were cut down in the doorway of their forest ranger's hut. NCOs and headquarters personnel were killed before they could reach for their pistols or carbines. Lieutenant-Colonel Brehrner, the regimental commander, succeeded in barricading himself behind a woodpile and defending himself throughout two hours with his sub-machine-gun. An artillery unit eventually rescued him.
    Meanwhile, 332nd Infantry Regiment had reached the main road from Roslavl to Smolensk. First Lieutenant Wehde blocked the road with his 10th Company and stormed the village of Glinki. The Soviets in Roslavl realized they were in danger of being encircled. They left the town in lorries and tried to run down the positions of 10th Company. They scattered hand-grenades among them by the armful and fired wildly from machine-guns and sub-machine-guns. But 10th Company held out, but only until midday. After that they were unable to stand up to the Soviet attacks. The Russians retook the village.
    Now for an immediate counter-attack. Lieutenant Wehde scraped up anyone he could lay his hands on—supply personnel, cobblers, bakers—and dislodged the Russians, But in the afternoon they were back in Glinki. Another immediate counter-attack. House after house was recaptured with flamethrowers and hand-grenades. The place was to change hands many more times.
    On Sunday, 3rd August, 197th Infantry Division found itself in difficulties because 347th Infantry Regiment was hanging back a long way. The Soviets tried to break through at the contact point between 347th and 321st Infantry Regiments. The gunners fired from every barrel they had. To make matters worse it started to pour with rain. Roads became quagmires. At 1600 hours Lieutenant Wehde was killed outside Glinki. The 321st Infantry Regiment was fighting desperately. Several groups were encircled and had to defend themselves on all sides.
    Things went better on the right wing of VII Corps. Towards 1100 hours 78th Infantry Division had reached the Krichev-Roslavl road with the bulk of its units. Fascinated, the infantrymen watched 4th Panzer Division moving off for its outflanking attack on Roslavl.
    On the extreme left wing, meanwhile, in the area of 292nd Infantry Division, the 509th and 507th Regiments were struggling towards the south along soft, muddy roads. In the leading company of 507th Infantry Regiment, the regiment forming the left wing, a man with crimson stripes down the seams of his trousers was marching by the side of the captain— Colonel-General Guderian.
    Reports of the difficulties which 292nd Infantry Division had with its advance—difficulties that might affect the overall plan—had induced him to find out for himself by taking the part of an ordinary infantryman. As though this were the most natural thing in the world, Guderian later told his headquarters staff, "In this way I kept them on the move without having to waste words."
    "Fast Heinz as an infantryman!" the troops were shouting to each other. They pulled themselves together. When the leading self-propelled gun stopped a few miles from the Moscow highway, the target for the day, Guderian was up on the vehicle in a flash. "What's the trouble?"
    "There are tanks along the highway, Herr Generaloberst," the gun-layer reported. Guderian looked through his binoculars. "Fire white Very lights!" The white flare streaked from the pistol. And from the highway in the distance came the reply: also white Very lights. That meant that the 35th Panzer Regiment, of 4th Panzer Division, was already on the Moscow highway. At 1045 hours 23rd Infantry Division penetrated into the northern part of Roslavl.
    On 4th August Glinki was lost once more. Stukas attacked the Soviet strongpoint. Russian tank attacks against the left and right flanks of 197th Infantry Division collapsed in the concentrated fire from all available guns. Glinki was taken again. The Russians wavered and withdrew. Hastily they reformed for desperate break-through attempts along the Moscow highway.
    On 5th August it was discovered that a strong Soviet armoured unit had fought its way out of the pocket at Kazaki, in the area of 292nd Infantry Division. The division's regiments were so extended, and, moreover, so involved in heavy defensive fighting, that they were unable to close the gap. The Russians were pouring through—supplies, infantry, artillery units. Guderian at once drove to the gap. Personally he moved a tank company against the Russians streaming through the gap; he organized a combat group from armoured units, self-propelled guns, and artillery; and this group, under General Martinek, the artillery commander of VII Corps, at last closed the gap. The Russians still coming through met their doom.
    On 8th August it was all over. Some 38,000 prisoners were counted. Booty included two hundred tanks, numerous guns and vehicles. The Soviet Twenty-eighth Army under Lieutenant-General Kachalov had been smashed. But that was not the main thing. For 25 miles in the direction of Bryansk and towards the south there was no enemy left. A huge gate had been opened towards Moscow. But Guderian wanted to play safe. In order to have truly free flanks for a drive against Stalin's capital he must first eliminate the threat from the deep right flank at Krichev.
    General Freiherr Geyr von Schweppenburg, the shrewd and resolute commander of XXIV Panzer Corps, whose divisions had only just closed the trap at Roslavl, ordered his armour to turn about in a bold operation and attack Timoshenko's divisions in the Krichev area by an encircling move. On 14th August this operation too was successfully concluded. Three more Russian divisions were smashed, 16,000 prisoners were taken, and large quantities of guns and equipment of all kinds captured. As with a heavy hammer, Guderian had smashed Timoshenko's bolt on the gate to Moscow.
    Guderian's success now whetted the appetite of the High Command of the Wehrmacht, On the very next day it demanded that Timoshenko's strong force in the Gomel area should also be attacked, so as to bring relief to Colonel- General Freiherr von Weichs's Second Army. Guderian was to make one Panzer division available to Second Army. But Guderian's reply was: "If anything, a whole corps must be used. One division alone is not enough for an operation over such a distance." He made sure he got his way.

Other books

The Dying Beach by Angela Savage
333 Miles by Craig Birk
The House With the Green Shutters by George Douglas Brown
And in time... by Jettie Woodruff
Haydn of Mars by Al Sarrantonio
Normal by Jason Conley
Chance to Be King by Sue Brown
Shadow Grail #2: Conspiracies by Mercedes Lackey, Rosemary Edghill