Hitler Moves East, 1941-1943 (59 page)

Radio communication with Division had been cut off since 2nd January. Contact with the neighbouring unit on the left was maintained by patrols shuttling between them. Nevertheless Major Mummert was determined to hold Mologino.

During the night of 2nd/3rd January the signals section succeeded in restoring contact with Division. At Division there was much surprise that Mologino was still being held, and the order was given to evacuate the place at once and to rejoin Division. Towards 0600 hours Mummert evacuated Mologino. The heavy equipment was left behind. Through the black night and the Siberian lines, moving silently in single file along a trail normally used by patrols, the men made their way to the neighbouring unit.

Once more 206th Infantry Division succeeded in sealing the gap torn in the front ot Ninth Army, but on 4th January 1942 the front cracked for good. Between VI and XXIII Corps a yawning gap appeared, between 9 and 12 miles wide. Through this opening strong Soviet forces now thrust across the Volga. The Soviet Twenty-ninth Army wheeled round towards Rzhev and tried to take the town from the south-west. Major Disselkamp, chief of the supply services of 6th Division, an energetic officer, intercepted the first thrust with hurriedly scraped-together emergency units. These consisted of drivers and other supply personnel, a few self-propelled and antitank guns, units of a repair company, and above all the veterinary surgeons and orderlies of Veterinary Company, 6th Infantry Division. With these men Disselkamp halted the Soviets. In this manner VI Corps was given a chance to establish a new defensive front with 26th and 6th Infantry Divisions. Rzhev was held as a cornerstone for future counteractions. The Soviet Thirty-ninth Army and General Gorin's Soviet Cavalry Corps, however, bypassed the town in the west and drove on southward via Sychevka towards Vyazma.

Although the front was in flames along its entire length, the key sectors and the long-term objectives of the Russians were beginning to emerge clearly. Colonel-General Konev, having torn a hole in XXIII Corps on the northern wing of Army Group Centre, intended to envelop and wipe out the Ninth Army. On the southern wing Marshal Zhukov was racing through the gap between Second Panzer Army and Fourth Army, aiming at Vyazma, and at the same time hoping to strike at the flank of Second Panzer Army.

General Golikov with his Soviet Tenth Army was already encircling the town of Sukhinichi. But General Gilsa's 4000- strong combat group refused to give way and turned the town into a breakwater against the Soviet storm. Gilsa's group held out for four weeks. It was a chapter that will have to be mentioned later.

The year 1941, which had begun with such confidence in victory, drew to its close in an atmosphere of gloom and anxiety. On Boxing Day Hitler had seized the occasion of a complaint by the new Commander-in-Chief Army Group Centre to rid himself of Guderian, whose constant warnings he had found irksome. Field-Marshal von Kluge had accused the Colonel-General of disobedience: he had had some major differences with him earlier in December. Hitler thereupon deposed Guderian. The troops in the field were dumbfounded. What was to become of them if they were deprived of the best military brains?

Full of forebodings, Guderian concluded his farewell order to his combat-tested Second Panzer Army: "My thoughts will be with you in your difficult task."

And a difficult task it was. Nowhere could the German Command raise sufficient reserves to halt the Russian penetrations. Red cavalry formations were already pressing against the weak covering lines north of Yukhnov and threatening the vital supply routes to Smolensk. Soviet airborne troops were being put down behind the German lines. The partisans became a major threat.

Hitler was ranting against fate, cursing the Russian winter, railing against God and his generals. His wrath fell also upon the well-tried Commander-in-Chief 4th Panzer Group. Early in January, when Colonel-General Hoepner withdrew his 4th Panzer Group—since the New Year raised to Fourth Panzer Army—without, as it was thought at the Fuehrer's Headquarters, asking for permission, Hitler seized on this 'disobedience' in order to make, an example.

Hoepner was deposed, degraded, and dismissed the service with ignominy. After Guderian, the troops in the field thus lost their second outstanding tank leader.

That there was no factual justification whatever for this measure is attested by Major-General Negendanck, then signals chief of the Panzer Army, who was a direct witness of the incident. This is the account he has given to the author: "A few of us were having lunch with Colonel-General Hoepner, who had just come back from the front. At table he expounded his view to his chief of staff, Colonel Châles de Beaulieu, that the right wing of Fourth Panzer Army should be taken back since the adjoining wing of Fourth Army would not be able to stand up to a Russian thrust

into the gap which had arisen there. This view was presently conveyed by telephone to the Chief of Staff of Army Group Centre. We were still at table when Field-Marshal von Kluge rang through to discuss the matter with Colonel- General Hoepner, and I remember clearly how Colonel-General Hoepner repeated at the end of the conversation, 'Very well, then, Herr Feldmarschall, we'll only withdraw the heavy artillery and baggage trains to begin with, to make sure we don't lose them. You will explain to the Fuehrer the need for this measure and request his authorization.' When the colonel-general rejoined us after his conversation he said, 'All right, Beaulieu, you will make all the necessary preparations.' At midnight, suddenly, came the dumbfounding news of Hoepner's dismissal. I was shortly afterwards told by a General Staff officer of Army Group Centre that Field-Marshall von Kluge had reported the affair to Hitler not on the lines agreed with Colonel-General Hoepner, but describing the withdrawal of the front as an accomplished fact. Hitler immediately exploded and ordered the dismissal of our outstanding and universally revered Army commander."

Thus far Major-General Negendanck's report. It represents an exceedingly interesting and valuable contribution to milltary history, on the much-discussed question of Hoepner's dismissal and on the equivocal role played by Field- Marshal von Kluge in Hoepner's as well as in Guderian's recall from their commands.

The fishing village of Vzvad—Charge across the frozen lake-Four Soviet Armies over-run one German Division— Staraya Russa—The Valday Hills—Yeremenko has a conversation with Stalin in the Kremlin shelter-The Guards are starving-Toro-pets and Andreapol—The tragedy of 189th Infantry Regiment.

TO return to the hard-pressed front. Having struck at the middle and at the northern and southern flanks of Army Group Centre, the Soviet High Command now also struck at the right wing of Army Group North. South of Lake Urnen, where the 290th Infantry Division from Northern Germany was in position, the great Soviet breakthrough battle opened early in January.

Viktor Nikolayevich was an experienced fisherman on Lake Ilmen. He wore a goatee beard and was known by his fellow . villagers as "The Counsellor." He was the leader of Vzvad's eighty-strong village guard against partisan attacks. Viktor Nikolayevich and his friends simply wanted to be left in peace. At the beginning of September 1941 the Germans had arrived with their pleasant Lieutenant-Colonel Iffland and his Panzerjäger Battalion 290. They had settled down at the northernmost point of the strategically important neck of land between Lakes Seliger and Ilmen.

That point marked the end of the only road leading up from Staraya Russa through 10 miles of steppe, forest, and swamp to the lake and the Lovat estuary.

The fishing village of Vzvad was therefore a strongpoint, a roadside fortress, and the terminal point of the front between Lakes Seliger and Ilmen, on the wing of 290th Infantry Division. In the autumn the Panzerjägers had left. What point was there in guarding swamps and marshes? But towards the end of December units of the battalion had returned. For what in the summer had been impassable territory—except for those with local knowledge—might become an easy passage through the German front in the winter, once the swamp was frozen solid. Scouts and supply columns for the partisans tried their luck there. Patrols sent out by the Russian units holding a line through the forests north of Sinetskiy Bay were crossing the marshes and frozen lakes and ponds on skis.

A major Soviet breakthrough in the direction of the traffic junction of Staraya Russa would have been a mortal threat to the two Corps holding the line between Lakes Ilmen and Seliger. The Russians had tried before—and often successfully—to unhinge entire sectors of the German front by capturing their rearward supply bases.

The temperature on 6th January 1942 was 41 degrees below zero Centigrade. The ice-cover on the lake and on other waters was over two feet thick. The depth of the snow was nearly two feet. German patrols were constantly on the move, searching the area for tracks. They found nothing.

In the early afternoon "The Counsellor" came to see Captain Pröhl, the commander of the Panzerjägers in Vzvad and Lieutenant-Colonel Iffland's representative there. "There's talk in the village that the liberation battle for Staraya Russa is starting to-day, our Russian Christmas Day," he said.

The captain knew that Viktor Nikolayevich was not given to gossip. He also knew that no amount of patrolling could prevent secret contacts between the fishermen on both sides of the fighting-line. He immediately sent out two ski patrols.

Two hours later the first patrol was back. "Numerous ski tracks by the Lovat river," they reported. The second patrol brought back three prisoners—two Soviet infantrymen and a suspect civilian.

Night fell. Pröhl put his men on immediate alert. On the far side, over the Russian lines, red and green flares rose into the sky.

The icy night passed quietly and uneventfully. Not a shot was fired along the snow-bound front between Lakes Ilmen and Seliger.

The prisoners were interrogated through an interpreter. The civilian claimed to come from a near-by village. He had been forced by the two soldiers, he said, to show them the way to Vzvad. His shaven head, however, suggested that he too was a soldier, probably on an Intelligence assignment. Captain Pröhl had him locked up in a sauna.

The interrogation of the two uniformed men yielded some interesting facts. Both belonged to the Soviet 71st Ski Battalion. They reported that their battalion had been freshly sent up to the front and was equipped with snow-ploughs and motor-sledges. Food was poor, they complained. All the supplies consisted of were weapons and ammunition.

Was there any talk about attack, the interpreter asked. For a moment the prisoners hesitated, but presently they started talking. "Yes, it's said that the balloon's going up tomorrow."

Pröhl received the interrogation protocol with caution. Surely they would notice soon enough when the artillery started its preliminary bombardment. That was the invariable sign of an impending attack.

On the morning of 7th January Pröhl informed Division. Then he sent out more patrols. The icy eastern wind was freshening, developing into a blizzard and obliterating tracks, paths, and even the road to Staraya Russa. The thermometer outside "The Counsellor's" cottage showed 45 degrees below zero.

At dusk the sound of aircraft was heard. The lighthouse at Zhelezno was blinking all the time, no doubt acting as a beacon to the Soviet aircraft. Strangely enough, not a single machine came anywhere near the front. Not a shot was fired. Not a gun opened up.

At 2120 hours the telephone rang. Second Lieutenant Richter reported from strongpoint "Hochstand 5." two miles south-east of Vzvad: "Strong enemy movements. Motor-sledges and ski troops bypassing us."

A runner arrived from the observation post on top of the church tower of Vzvad: "Columns of motor vehicles approaching from the south-east with headlights full on."

Two strong patrols left at once. Panting, runner after runner came back: "Scrub-covered ground at 'Hochstand 5' held by enemy." "Enemy ski troops near the hamlet of Pod-borovka—
i.e.,
south-west of Vzvad, on the road to Staraya Russa. They are providing cover for snow-ploughs employed on road-clearing."

What could it mean? The Soviets, unobtrusively and well camouflaged, had clearly broken through the German front, which was held only intermittently, by separate strongpoints. They had moved without artillery preparation.

Action stations! The telephone-line to "Hochstand 5" was still intact. Pröhl rang Second Lieutenant Richter: "Pack up at once and get through to Vzvad with your men."

"We'll try," Richter replied.

A continuous procession of Soviet columns was moving past the German strongpoint. Richter and his twelve men

pulled their snow-smocks firmly over their uniforms. Then they infiltrated into the Soviet columns. At a suitable spot they dropped out again and reached Vzvad unmolested.

At 0300 hours the Russians attacked the German strong-point. Telephone connection with Division was abruptly cut.

But Captain Pröhl knew even without orders from above that the strongpoint of Vzvad had to be held as a 'breakwater.' Meanwhile the 6th Company, 1st Luftwaffe Signals Regiment, units of Motorcycle Battalion 38, under 18th Motorized Infantry Division, and 2nd Company Local Defence Battalion 615 had moved into Vzvad to avoid being over-run by the Russians. As a result, Pröhl now had 543 men under his command.

These 543 men held the isolated strongpoint on Lake Urnen, far ahead of the main German fighting-line, for thirteen days—an island in the enemy flood.

Furiously the Russians tried to wipe out Vzvad, the strong-point controlling the road. They employed ski battalions. They tried "Stalin's organ-pipes." They brought on fighter bombers. And eventually they came with tanks. But Vzvad held out.

The Soviets fired incendiary shells into the village in order to destroy the troops' quarters: each of the shells contained twenty to thirty phosphorus sets. The wooden houses blazed like torches. Hospital quarters and dressing stations were consumed by the flames. Twenty-eight wounded had to be laid out in the open on mattresses and blankets, behind the ruins of buildings, in the snow. In 35 degrees below.

The operations diary and the radio signals sent to 18th Motorized Infantry Division in Staraya Russa, under which Pröhl was placed after contact had been lost with 290th Infantry Division, are profoundly moving in their unadorned, matter-af-fact account, and compel the admiration of every reader.

12th January. Ceaseless enemy artillery bombardment. A German aircraft dropped ammunition. But instead of HE shells the container was full of AA shells, which were useless. In another container was the Knights Cross for Captain Pröhl. Five Iron Crosses 1st Class and 20 Iron Crosses 2nd Class were, moreover, awarded by radio signal from Division.

By 1640 hours ammunition and bandages were getting low. An urgent signal was sent to Division asking for supplies. A request was added that these should be dropped from greater height; the day before all four ammunition containers had exploded on hitting the ground.

At 1900 hours Pröhl urgently repeated his demand for ammunition and food supplies. The wounded horses were slaughtered, and one day's ration gained as a result. But there were no potatoes or bread whatever.

By 2000 hours five men had been killed and thirty-two wounded.

14th January. The commander of the Soviet 140th Rifle Regiment sent a horseman under a white flag. He demanded capitulation. He was sent back, and a salvo was fired by antitank and infantry guns against Podborovka, where the Russian regimental headquarters were situated.

During the night the Russians came with tanks. A T-26 broke through and stopped right outside Prohl's command post. Inside, the men waited calmly to see if the Russian would open his turret. He did not. They flung explosive charges at the tank The crash of the grenades seemed to worry the Russians. The tank withdrew to the southern end of the village. There it passed right in front of Sergeant Schlunz's anti-tank gun. Two shots rang out. Both were direct hits. The tank went up in flames.

A Fieseier Storch aircraft arrived with a medical officer, Dr Günther, and medical supplies. A signal from Hitler commended the defenders and simultaneously informed them that relief was impossible. Pröhl was given permission to evacuate Vzvad if the garrison was threatened with annihilation.

This
carte blanche
faced Pröhl with a difficult mental conflict: were they already threatened with annihilation, or not

just yet? The strongpoint had already been bypassed by the Soviets to a depth of 10 miles. Should Pröhl evacuate it? At that moment of doubt came a signal from 18th Motorized Infantry Division: "Staraya Russa is holding out, in spite of being encircled."

Pröhl realized that these island fortresses tied down the enemy and broke the momentum of his headlong advance. Vzvad too would hold out.

18th January, the llth day of encirclement. The thermometer had dropped to 51 degrees below. Minus 51 degrees Centrigrade! At night patrols went out and stripped the felt boots off the Soviet dead in front of the lines. They collected their fur caps and cut the fur coats off the bodies frozen into rigid postures.

19th January. Soviet large-scale attack during the night. Penetrations. Hand-to-hand fighting in the flickering light of blazing houses. Savage battles for the sauna and the collective farm store. Four tanks knocked out with hand-grenades in close combat.

The fighting lasted eight hours. The Soviets were repulsed.

German casualties totalled seventeen killed and seventy-two wounded. "One more such attack and we're finished," Lieutenant Baechle reported to Captain Pröhl in a calm voice on the following morning, the morning of 20th January.

Pröhl nodded. He had already made his decision. "Tonight's our last chance. After the losses they've suffered the Russians will be regrouping. That's when we must act."

Officers, platoon leaders, and the commander of the local civilian guard were summoned to a meeting. It was decided to break out across the ice of Lake Ilmen. The objective was Ushin on the western shore of Tuleblskiy Bay. It meant marching 12 miles over the piled-up ice of the lake and through chest-deep snow.

The dead were buried by the "House Olga," which had burnt down, and where, as a result, the ground was still thawed from the blaze. A mass grave was blasted and dug there. Sixty-two wounded men, incapable of marching, were put on sledges and the last remaining healthy horses harnessed to them. Snow was falling. There was a haze. On the other hand, it was not quite as cold as the day before—a mere 30 degrees below.

At nightfall they moved off. A patrol with local guides went in front, trampling a firm path for the rest. The men of Motorcycle Battalion 38 were waist-deep in snow. The lead group had to be relieved every half-hour: that was as much as even the strongest man could stand. The separate marching units followed at ten-minute intervals, m close order. The civilian guard of Vzvad moved off with them, with "The Counsellor'' Viktor Nikolayevich at their head. Not one of them dared stay behind. It would have meant death.

The last signal to 18th Motorized Infantry Division read: "Breakthrough beginning. Our identification signal: Flares in sequence green—white—red."

Second Lieutenant Richter, left behind with two platoons as the rearguard, continued for the next two hours to put up as much harassing fire as possible, simulating positions held in strength. Then Sergeant Steves moved off with the sapper platoon. No. 3 Platoon of the Reconnaissance Squadron stayed behind for another thirty minutes, keeping the machine-guns stuttering. After that one gun after another fell silent. A strange stillness fell over Vzvad—now utterly gutted and wrecked. Sergeant Willich was the last to move out—past "House Olga," where the dead were resting.