Hitler Moves East, 1941-1943 (87 page)

General Pflugbeil.

The XL Panzer Corps burst forward from the Volchansk area, a powerful mailed fist of combat-tested units—the 3rd and 23rd Panzer Divisions, the 100th Jäger Division, and the 29th Motorized Infantry Division. Only the 23rd Panzer Division was still new in the East in 1942. Its tactical sign was the Eiffel Tower, indicating where it came from; until recently it had been stationed in France as an occupation unit. The Soviets exploited this circumstance for their psychological warfare. Over the sector of the 23rd they dropped leaflets saying: "Men of 23rd Panzer Division, we welcome you to the Soviet Union. The gay Parisian life is now over. Your comrades will have told you what things are like here, but you will soon find out for yourselves." The ruse worked. The men of 23rd Panzer Division were shaken to know that the Russians were so well informed about their presence.

Freiherr von Geyr's first instruction was: On reaching the Oskol the troops will wheel north in order to form a pocket in the Staryy Oskol area in co-operation with Kempf's XLVIII Panzer Corps.

But something strange happened. The troops discovered that although enemy rearguards were fighting stubbornly in well-prepared defensive positions, the bulk of the Soviets was withdrawing eastward in good order. For the first time the Russians were refusing large-scale battle. They were pulling out of the incipient pocket. What did it mean? Were they so accurately informed about German intentions?

Fatal mistake at Voronezh—Timoshenko refuses battle—Hitler again changes his plan-Council of War at the Kremlin

—The battle moves to the southern Don-Fighting for Rostov—Street fighting against NKVD units—The bridge of Bataysk.

WHEN the general commanding XL Panzer Corps was informed about the Soviet withdrawals he realized instantly that this move was jeopardizing the whole first phase of the German operation. In view of the changed situation he asked for authority to drive on eastward to the Don without further delay. But Sixth Army insisted on its plan for a pocket and ordered: "XL Panzer Corps will turn northward in order to link up with Fourth Panzer Army." Orders are orders. The pocket was sealed off. But inside there was nothing. The Russians had withdrawn even their heavy weapons. The mountain had laboured and a mere mouse had been born.

By then even the Fuehrer's Headquarters began to realize that things were not going according to plan. The Russians were rapidly withdrawing towards the Don. Would they be able to get away across the river while Fourth Panzer Army was still operating against Voronezh? In that case the entire first phase of "Operation Blue" would be a blow into thin air. The danger was considerable. There was no time to be lost.

Faced with this situation, Hitler on 3rd July arrived at the entirely correct opinion that clinging to the idea of taking Voronezh first might threaten the whole of "Operation Blue." On a lightning-like visit to von Bock's Headquarters he therefore informed the Field-Marshal: "I no longer insist on the capture of the town, Bock; nor, indeed, do I consider it necessary. You are free, if you wish, to drive southward at once." That was the moment of decision. The fortunes of war hung in the balance. Which way would the scales tip?

Geyr heaved a sigh of relief when, late at night on 3rd July, he received orders from Sixth Army to drive straight to the east towards the Don, in order to cut off the Russian retreat.

But by noon on the following day, 4th July, a new order arrived: he was not to drive east after all, but to the north, in the direction of Voronezh, in order to cover the southern flank of Fourth Panzer Army. What was up? What had happened at Voronezh? What was behind all this vacillation?

It is an odd fact that all Hitler's correct decisions during the first half of the war were made by him in a strange and otherwise quite untypical, diffident manner. That was true also of Voronezh.

He did not command Field-Marshal von Bock: you will bypass the town and pursue our schedule towards Stalingrad without losing any more time. No—he merely informed Bock that he no longer insisted on the capture of Voronezh.

Thus the responsibility for the decision whether the force should be wheeled round without the previous seizure of this important traffic centre was left to the Commander-in-Chief Army Group South. It was a difficult decision for the Field-Marshal: should he take the town or should he bypass it? On careful consideration von Bock began to wonder whether it might not be better after all to take the cornerstone of Voronezh first—provided it could be taken quickly.

Ought he not at least to try it? Bock hesitated and wavered.

At that point came the news that 24th Panzer Division with its reinforced 26th Rifle Regiment had gained a bridgehead over the Don at a crossing-point. Over a Soviet army bridge the German battalions were moving across the river, mixed up with retreating Russian columns. By nightfall reconnaissance units were within two miles of Voronezh.

On the left of the 24th the "Grossdeutschland" Motorized Infantry Division, which provided the northern flank cover for 24th Panzer Division, had likewise made rapid headway, and towards 1800 hours on 4th July had reached the Don. Farther south the 16th Motorized Infantry Division had also reached the river with its reinforced motor-cycle battalion.

At Semiluki the Soviets had left intact the bridge over the Don carrying the road to Voronezh. This circumstance proved that they were themselves hoping to get the bulk of their Armies across the river. By means of strong counterattacks, supported by T-34s, they were trying to keep the Germans away from the bridge and to hold a wide bridgehead on the western bank.

Towards 2000 hours on 4th July Lieutenant Blumenthal with men of his 7th Company, 1st Motorized Infantry Regiment "Grossdeutschland," seized the road bridge over the Don to Voronezh and established a bridgehead on the eastern bank. The Soviets tried to blow up the bridges at the last moment, but evidently had no electric detonation equipment in position. They therefore lit an ordinary fuse leading to stacks of dynamite under the piers. The small flame was already snaking along the cord.

Sergeant Hempel of Blumenthal's Company jumped into the river and, with the water reaching to his chin, waded underneath the bridge and wrenched away the burning cords within inches of the 120 Ib. of explosives.

Meanwhile Russian columns were still moving over the bridge from the west, straight into the arms of a reception committee formed by Blumenthal's 7th Company on the eastern bank.
"Ruki verkh!"
("Hands up!") The bridge had been taken. Could Voronezh be taken as easily?

Groups of 1st Infantry Regiment "Grossdeutschland," riding on assault guns, made a reconnaissance thrust in force against the town and got as far as the railway. Admittedly, they had to withdraw again in the face of furious counterattacks by the strong defending forces—but nevertheless the Germans were virtually inside. It was this kind of support which induced Field-Marshal von Bock not to take up Hitler's suggestion to bypass Voronezh, but to attack it. He wanted to exploit the favourable opportunity as he saw it and to take the important town by a coup. He believed that his fast troops would still be able to get from Voronezh into the rear of Timoshenko's Armies in good time to cut off their retreat over the Don. That was the fundamental mistake from which, step by step, the tragedy of Stalingrad was to take shape.

At nightfall on 5th July, after a scorching day with the temperature at 40 degrees Centigrade, the fast formations of XLVIII and XXIV Panzer Corps, as well as the two motorized infantry regiments of the "Grossdeutschland" Division, the 24th Panzer Division, and the motor-cyclists of the 3rd and 16th Motorized Infantry Divisions, were holding extensive bridgeheads east of the Don before Voronezh. In the north cover was provided by the approaching infantry divisions. But Army Group had made a mistake in assessing the enemy's strength. The town was crammed full with Soviet troops. At the last moment the Russians had reinforced Voronezh by a very special effort. Clearly, Timo-shenko had drawn the right conclusion from the plans found on Major Reichel.

When Hitler was informed he was suddenly galvanized into action again. He now strictly vetoed any further attack on the town. The attack, he insisted, must be turned towards the south: that was where the objective lay.

But on 6th July units of 24th Panzer Division and "Grossdeutschland" Division were inside the town. The Russians appeared to be giving ground. Hitler, consequently, allowed this to influence him on the spur of the moment, and once again authorized the capture of Voronezh. However, he commanded that at least one Panzer Corps, the XL Corps,

must continue the southward thrust launched on 4th July and drive on down the Don without further delay. Fourth Panzer Army was instructed to release further armoured formations as soon as possible in order to follow up the drive of XL Panzer Corps.

The second phase of "Operation Blue" therefore op_ened in a watered-down way. First the battles for the important town of Voronezh had been waged by armoured formations— not the most suitable for this kind of action—and now Bock was being progressively deprived of his most effective striking forces. To make matters worse, some of them presently ground to a standstill south of Voronezh for lack of fuel. As a result, Army Group South was no longer strong enough to force a decision in the battle for Voronezh itself, while for a drive to the south and a rapid cutting of the Don one Panzer Corps, evert though reinforced by the subsequent assignment of further mobile formations, proved too weak.

On 7th July 3rd Motorized Infantry Division and 16th Motorized Infantry Division took the western part of Voronezh after heavy righting. But the battalions were unable to get across the Voronezh river, which runs through the town from north to south. Time and again the Russians mounted counter-attacks, employing infantry and large packs of armour.

Timoshenko had concentrated at Voronezh the bulk of the Soviet Fortieth Army, with nine rifle divisions, four rifle brigades, seven armoured brigades, and two anti-tank brigades. This concentration Jeft no doubt at all that Timoshenko was acquainted with Hitler's plan and was now making the correct counter-moves—tying down the bulk of the German forces on the northern wing outside Voronezh, in order to gain time to detach the bulk of his own Army Group from the Oskol and Donets and pull it back over the Don.

And in which direction was he withdrawing his force? Oddly enough, towards Stalingrad.

Although the German radio reported the capture of Voronezh on 7th July, fighting continued in the university quarter and in the woods north of the town until 13th July. Even after that date the Germans did not succeed in taking the eastern part of the town, or the bridge in its northern part, which would have enabled them to paralyse the north-south railway along the eastern bank of the river—a railway vital for Soviet supplies. The great supply road from Moscow to the south also remained in Russian hands.

The original plan had provided for the German motorized formations, after the rapid fall of Voronezh, to strike south down the Don in order to bar the way to Timoshenko's divisions withdrawing from the vast area between Donets and Don, and to intercept them on the Don. Instead, the precious motorized and Panzer divisions of XLVIII Corps and units of XXIV Panzer Corps were heavily involved in that accursed town, while 9th and llth Panzer Divisions were still tied down in the northern blocking position of Fourth Panzer Army. Marshal Timoshenko personally conducted the operation. Voronezh was to be held as long as possible in order to delay the German drive to the south-east. Every day gained meant a clear advantage to Timoshenko. In the evening of 6th July the spearheads of XL Panzer Corps were south of Voronezh, with the 1st Battalion, 3rd Rifle Regiment, of 3rd Panzer Division roughly 50 miles from Rossosh. But fuel was running low. Major Wellmann, with great faith in the supplies group, decided nevertheless to continue the drive with two armoured companies and one battery of 75th Artillery Regiment.

On a clear starlit night they drove through the steppe. In front was Busch's company, followed by Bremer's. The battalion commander has given the following account: "We knew that if the bridges over the Kalitva were to be captured intact we would have to reach Rossosh at dawn and would have to avoid all contact with the enemy, if only because of our shortage of ammunition and motor-fuel. Thus, keeping rigidly to our time-table, we drove on, past advancing Russian artillery and infantry units who, luckily, did not realize who we were."

Shortly before 0300 hours the first shabby houses of Rossosh lay ahead. The battalion's interpreter, Sergeant Kra- kowka, picked up a surprised Russian and grilled him. The terrified comrade revealed that in addition to the two bridges over the Kalitva marked on the map there was yet another— a tank bridge, completed only recently. Bremer and Busch, the company commanders, made their plan of operations with the battalion commander.

In the grey light of dawn Wellmann's columns drove through Rossosh, still asleep and unsuspecting. On a sports ground stood a number of Kurier aircraft. There was an occasional tank. In front of a massive three-storied building

stood a few sentries, but they did not associate the approaching cloud of dust with anything hostile.

Major Wellmann's command carrier was driving a short way behind the armoured carriers of 1st Company. The company crossed the bridge. Wellmann reached the Soviet bridge guard on the northern bank. The sentry realized what had happened and snatched his rifle from his shoulder. Wellmann's radio operator, Private Tenning, leapt from the vehicle like lightning, rammed his machine pistol into the Russian's stomach, knocked his rifle out of his hands, and hauled him back to the command carrier—their first prisoner, and an important one. The Russian stated that Rossosh contained a very high-ranking headquarters and that its defending forces included at least eight tanks.

At that moment the first shots came from the far river-bank. They were followed by nearly five hours of ferocious fighting against the town's surprised but tough defenders.

Firing came from all directions. T-34s roamed all over the place. Soviet infantry reformed. But Wellmann's men held the bridges. Their salvation was the field howitzer battery which they had brought along with them; its pieces had been positioned so cleverly by their experienced crews that they dominated the wide road along the river.

The fighting was fierce and confused. But the greater dash and stronger nerves of the Germans gave them victory. The Soviet tanks were mostly immobilized in hand-to-hand fighting. Sergeant Naumann made a particular catch: he cleared out the map section of Timoshenko's Army Group headquarters and captured twenty-two senior staff officers, mostly of the rank of colonel. Timoshenko himself had still been in Rossosh during the night, but must have got away at the last moment.