Authors: Stephen Dando-Collins
Following the fall of Jerusalem, the 10th Fretensis Legion received a new commander, Lucillius Bassus, and in
AD
71 Bassus took the 10th campaigning in southern Judea to terminate the last Jewish resistance. After securing Hebron, Bassus led the legion east of the Dead Sea to the hill fortress of Machaerus. Rebels who had held the fortress since
AD
66 left the scene, but the town below it held out briefly. After leaving Machaerus a smoking ruin, the 10th Fretensis wiped out 3,000 partisans hiding in the Forest of Jardes, west of the Dead Sea. But when the legion’s commander Bassus died, of natural causes, the 10th Fretensis returned to its new base at Jerusalem.
By the spring of
AD
73, only one Jewish center of resistance remained to be taken. Masada. In March of that year, the 10th Fretensis’ new legate, Flavius Silva, led the legion out of Jerusalem and down the western side of the Dead Sea. Masada means, appropriately, “mountain fastness.” This barren, flat-topped limestone mountain is 1½ miles (2.4 kilometers) from the lake, and rises 1,700 feet (550 meters) from a desolate landscape devoid of greenery. On the 650-foot (200-meter) by 190-foot (60-meter)
summit, King Herod had built a palace within a fortress. When Silva and his troops arrived below it, the fortress was held by 960 rebels led by Eleazar ben Jair.
Silva had the 10th Fretensis and its supporting auxiliary units set up camps to the west of Masada. Traces of eight of those camps can still be seen today, as can the remains of a 10-foot (3-meter) stone wall that ran for 2 miles (3.2 kilometers) around Masada, dotted with forts and guard posts. To the west there was a promontory called White Cliff, 450 feet (140 meters) below the summit of Masada, and separated from it by a rocky valley. From here, Silva began a massive ramp of earth and rock, targeting the top of Masada’s fortifications. While Jewish prisoners were used to ferry water and supplies on their backs to the Masada camps, the men of the 10th Fretensis Legion did all the construction work on the ramp.
Steadily, the ramp closed the gulf at a slope of 1 in 3. Eventually, the ramp, 695 feet (880 meters) wide at it base, rose 300 feet (90 meters) and was topped by a 75-foot (20-meter) stone pier. A wooden 90-feet (25-meter) tall siege tower was rolled up the ramp. With catapults on the tower keeping up a constant rate of fire to clear
Masada’s nearest ramparts of Jewish defenders, a battering ram inside the wooden tower began pounding the base of the wall.
Eventually, the wall gave way, and men of the 10th Legion surged in through the breach, only to find that the defenders had built a second wall, of alternate layers of timber and stone, which was impervious to battering ram blows. So, on May 2, Silva had the wood in the wall set alight. Expecting the fire to weaken the wall sufficiently for it to be breached at dawn next day, the Roman troops retired.
That night, the Jewish men at Masada, knowing that sunrise would bring the final Roman assault, made a solemn pact. They then went around to their wives and children, and killed them. They then drew lots to decide which of them would die next. By the early hours of the morning, just ten partisans including commander Eleazar ben Jair remained alive. These men burned all their possessions then drew lots for the final act of their suicide pact. In the end, one man remained. He set fire to Herod’s Palace, then took his own life.
As the sun rose, men of the 10th Fretensis Legion stormed through the burned second wall and entered Masada, to discover the fortress eerily silent. Throughout the complex they found the bodies of the dead Jews. Then an old woman emerged, and a younger woman, a relative of Eleazar, with five small children. All had succeeded in evading the previous night’s murders by hiding in an underground water conduit. Masada had fallen. But it was a hollow victory for the 10th Fretensis.
Detachments of the legion would continue to occupy Masada for another forty years. Today, Israel Defense Force recruits take a vow—never to let Masada fall again.
AD
73
XXXIV. THE 6TH FERRATA TAKES COMMAGENE
The unnecessary invasion
After being part of the army that put down the Civilis Revolt on the Rhine, in
AD
71 the 6th Ferrata Legion had marched back to Syria and its old station at Raphanaea beside the Euphrates. The legion found that Gaius Caesennius Paetus had been appointed by the Palatium to replace Licinius Mucianus as governor of Syria. This was the same arrogant and inept Paetus who, in
AD
62, had led the 4th Macedonica
and 12th Fulminata legions into Armenia, only to be surrounded and cut off by the Parthians at Rhandeia and subjected to humiliating peace terms. At that time, the 6th Ferrata had been in the relief force that had gone to the aid of Paetus’ legions. Now, it had Paetus for its commander-in-chief.
In early
AD
73, an urgent dispatch reached Rome from Antioch. Governor Paetus advised Vespasian that he had received information that King Antiochus
IV
of Commagene, a small nation immediately to the north of Syria allied to Rome, was planning to revolt and take his little state over to the Parthians. Paetus recommended immediate preventative action. Vespasian was surprised at this, for Antiochus had long been loyal to Rome, and as a result “had flourished more than any other kings that were under the power of the Romans.” [Jos.,
JW
, 5, 11, 3]
As proof of his loyalty during the Jewish Revolt, Antiochus had supplied thousands of Commagene troops under his son Epiphanes to support the Roman army. Still, trusting in Paetus’ warning, Vespasian authorized the governor to do whatever he felt necessary.
Paetus quickly formed a task force from the 6th Ferrata Legion, auxiliaries and troops from two allied kings, then invaded sleepy Commagene. As the 6th Ferrata led the force up the west bank of the Euphrates into Commagene and advanced on Samosata, the kingdom’s capital, Antiochus and his people were taken completely by surprise. The king hurriedly left Samosata and set up camp with his small native army on the plain, 14 miles (22.5 kilometers) from the city. Samosata was occupied by the Roman force without resistance, and, leaving a detachment to garrison it, Paetus advanced on the king’s camp with the bulk of his force.
Protesting his innocence, King Antiochus refused to fight the Roman army, but his warlike sons Epiphanes and Callinicus were not prepared to surrender, and they and their few troops stubbornly defended their father’s camp for a full day, holding out against the 6th Ferrata. Fighting ceased at dusk, with the Romans encircling the camp. But in the night the old king slipped away with his wife and daughters, and fled to Cilicia. When Antiochus’ own troops learned that he had deserted them, they gave up the fight, forcing the king’s sons also to flee. With just ten cavalrymen for escort, Epiphanes and Callinicus splashed across the Euphrates and galloped east. On reaching Parthia, they were welcomed by King Vologases, Rome’s old enemy.
The king of Commagene took refuge at the city of Tarsus, capital of Cilicia. When Paetus learned this he sent a centurion with a 6th Ferrata detachment to arrest him
and take him to Rome to be tried by the emperor. Vespasian knew and liked the king, and could not bring himself to believe the old man had been disloyal to Rome, especially when Paetus was still unable to provide any incriminating evidence. When he heard that Antiochus was being brought to him in chains, the emperor issued orders that the centurion and his party should halt in Sparta, Greece, where the king was to be freed and, for the time being, housed in style and comfort. When the two sons of the king heard that Vespasian was treating their father kindly, they set out for Rome to plead his case. Vespasian then had Antiochus brought to Rome.
So that he did not appear to be overruling one of his most senior provincial governors, Vespasian did not restore the king to his throne. Instead, he took the opportunity to annex Commagene, pulling it into the empire as Rome’s latest province. Antiochus and his family spent the rest of their days residing in luxury in Rome and enjoying the patronage of the Flavian family, but deprived of their ancestral kingdom through the actions of a vain general with ambitions to be hailed a conqueror. At Rome in his unhappy old age, and welcoming the prospect of death, Antiochus would complain to Jewish historian Josephus, “We ought not call any man happy before he is dead.” [Jos.,
JW
, 5, 11, 3]
In
AD
74, a year after he invaded Commagene, Paetus was recalled to Rome. There is no record of him receiving any reward for his annexation of Commagene. Paetus was replaced as governor of Syria by Marcus Ulpius Trajanus, former commander of the 10th Fretensis Legion and a consul in
AD
70. Trajanus’ son Marcus would join his father in Syria in
AD
75 as a 22-year-old prefect of auxiliaries. In
AD
98, that son was to become the emperor Trajan.
AD
83
XXXV. THE CHATTIAN WAR
Domitian’s “sham” victory
Vespasian’s youngest son Domitian became emperor of Rome in
AD
81, following the death of his brother Titus after just two years in office. Always jealous of the military glory won by his father and brother, Domitian even envied the military success of his generals, men such as Gnaeus Agricola in Britain, even though that success brought spoils and security to Rome. In
AD
83, 31-year-old Domitian launched his own military
campaign. And to ensure that no one outshone him that year, he deprived his commanders of troops for his campaign; for example, vexillations several cohorts strong were shipped to Gaul from each of the four legions then serving in Britain under Agricola, to join Domitian’s task force.
To ensure an easy victory, Domitian chose to make war on an ally, the Chatti Germans. “The war against the Chatti was uncalled for” and “unprovoked,” said Suetonius later (he was 14 at this time). [Suet.,
XII
, 6] Because Rome had a peace treaty with the Chatti, Domitian was determined that his attack would be achieved with the benefit of total surprise. So, said Frontinus, three times consul, and governor of Britain during the reign of Domitian’s father Vespasian, Domitian “concealed the reason for his departure from Rome under the guise of taking a census of the Gallic provinces.” [Front.,
Strat
.,
I
,
I
, 8]
Through this ruse, Domitian was able to meet his assembled legions on the Upper Rhine without raising suspicions in Germany; news of the census-taking allayed any fears of Roman aggression. “Under cover of this, he plunged into sudden warfare,” said Frontinus. Domitian, “by advancing the frontier of the Empire along a stretch of 120 miles [193 kilometers], not only changed the nature of the war, but brought his enemies beneath his sway, by uncovering their hiding places.” [Front.,
I
,
III
, 10]
The Chatti and at least one neighboring tribe overcame their initial shock and attempted to mount organized resistance. “All their strength lies in their infantry,”
Tacitus wrote of the Chatti. [Tac.,
Germ
., 30] Said Frontinus of Domitian’s campaign, “When the Germans, in accordance with their usual custom, kept emerging from woodland pastures and unsuspected hiding places to attack our men, and then finding a safe refuge in the depths of the forest,” Domitian continued to advance on his broad front, driving the Germans from the Bavarian forests. [Front.,
I
,
III
, 10]
As Tacitus revealed, the Chatti were the most organized of the German tribes. “They know how to keep rank, and how to recognize an opportunity or postpone an attack.” A Chattian army, “in addition to arms, [was] burdened with entrenching tools and provisions” just like the Roman legions. [Tac.,
Germ
., 30] In this war, too, the Chatti succeeded in supporting their fighters with a baggage train carrying supplies, but Roman cavalry tracked it down. Chattian infantry harassed Domitian’s cavalry when they were attacking the baggage train, regularly withdrawing into dense forest where mounted troops could not follow, so Domitian ordered his cavalry to dismount and follow the Germans into the trees on foot, and in this way the Chatti were defeated. [Front.,
Strat
.,
II
,
III
, 23]
All along the broad front, surprise and Roman weight of numbers told. There were no major battles. The Germans were herded like sheep from their territory, and the campaign was over by the time autumn arrived. Frontinus would boast that Domitian “crushed the ferocity of these savage tribes, and thus acted for the good of the provinces.” [Front.,
Strat
.,
I
,
I
, 8] As a result of this campaign, Domitian expanded the Roman frontier east of the Rhine in the area of Bavaria and the Black Forest, beyond the frontier originally set by his father Vespasian. Domitian built a new line of forts—the limes—along the new frontier. When forts were constructed in the territory of the Cubii Germans, Domitian actually paid them compensation for the cropland included in the new fortifications. [Front.,
Strat
.,
II
,
XI
, 7]
Domitian would celebrate a Triumph in Rome for his Chattian War. Tacitus, then a senator, would have seen the celebration with his own eyes. He described it as a “sham Triumph,” and claimed that, to give the impression that large numbers of German prisoners had been taken, Domitian dressed slaves from the marketplace in German attire and had them grow their hair and beards, representing them in his Triumph as Chattian prisoners-of-war. [Tac.,
Agr
., 39]
As for the legionaries who had participated in the campaign, they went back to their original stations. The troops from Agricola’s army in Britain returned to their units in time for a real battle on the epic scale.