In the remaining state conventions to occur over June and July of 1976, the fate of several hundred delegates would be decided. Of the conventions, some would be the culmination of weeks and sometimes months of extended selection processes. Others would be more isolated events, where all the delegates to the national convention would be selected at a given state Republican Party convention over a one or two day period.
The fight would be furious and the future of the GOP was at stake. State and local activists were accustomed to getting along despite their ideological differences. But this time, activists at all levels would be at each other’s throats. Finding common ground was the least of their worries, and the tactic of offering a delegate slot or two to the losing side was rarely an option. This time, every single delegate mattered. As one Virginia GOP activist told the
Washington Post
after the Old Dominion’s state convention, “There’s no room for charity now.”
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Also, there was the matter of around 150 uncommitted delegates.
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It is easy to understand why they stayed uncommitted for so long; they loved being wooed. Many had achieved a measure of success in their own chosen fields of endeavor: homemakers, small businessmen, elected officials, or community leaders. They paid their bills, worked hard at their jobs, worshiped each Sunday, participated in local Republican Party politics, and tried to raise their children to be upright, moral, contributing members of society. But it was quite another thing when these delegates received personal phone calls from the President of the United States, inviting them to breakfast, lunch, or to a private meeting in the Oval Office where their advice would be solicited on relations with the Soviets. It tended to turn one’s head. And when Ronald Reagan sent them personal notes and called them on the phone, inviting them to have dinner with him and “Nancy” and “By the way, do you mind if I bring along John Wayne and Jimmy Stewart?” Well, that can be a real head-turner too.
To top it all off, Walter Cronkite was calling, trying to find out who they were leaning towards today, Ford or Reagan? And so was Tom Brokaw from NBC, Frank Reynolds from ABC, and other reporters from all the networks, and the
New York Times
, the
Washington Post
, the
Wall Street Journal
, and the Associated Press. And then, at the backdoor, there was a photographer from UPI who wanted to take their picture. These reporters wanted their advice too. They wanted to know what they thought of Ford’s speech, or Reagan’s newest announcement, how the Ford campaign was being run, and did Reagan make a mistake by not going into Ohio more aggressively?
And then, there they were, quoted on the evening news, and in the big newspapers. Someone on the radio mentioned their names because they were “uncommitted” delegates. And then the neighbors and friends called them, squealing with delight that they also saw them on television, being interviewed by John Chancellor of NBC. So after months of being wined and dined, of being sought after by the biggest politicians, the biggest movie stars and the biggest people in media, what have they finally decided to do?
They decided that this was a tough decision, one that would require a lot more thought.
The upshot was that all the attention and wooing had gone to many of their heads, and both the Ford and the Reagan campaign came to regard many of these uncommitted delegates as royal pains in the ass. “Some of these delegates probably have learned it’s romantic to be an uncommitted delegate,” James Baker wryly noted for the
Washington Post
.
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“The words, ‘The President is calling,’ dazzled many of the uncommitted. Missouri’s Marlene Zinzel, who with four other delegates had been flown to Chicago at the Reagan campaign’s expense to meet the Californian for an hour was nevertheless ‘shocked’ when Ford tracked her down by phone at a beauty shop in Oakville, MO. ‘I couldn’t believe it,’ she recalls. ‘I can hardly remember it. He told me he could win over Carter. He asked me if I would consider him and I said that I would,’” reported
Time
.
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One of the best political cartoonists at the time, Jeff MacNelly, summarized the situation by drawing a huge Marine One helicopter hovering over a small country store bearing the name “Merle R. Spruggins Groceries.” Two women were sitting on the front porch and one said to the other, “That must be President Ford again . . . Merle’s an uncommitted delegate, y’know.”
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Of those approximately 150 uncommitted delegates, thirty were from Mississippi. All parties and everybody in the media had long ago counted those delegates for Reagan. Nonetheless, the fight for Mississippi ended up as a collision involving the animosities between the two campaigns and the over-feted, self-patronizing uncommitted delegates of 1976. Long friendships would end and some people would never speak to each other again. Political careers were wrecked in the wake of this bitter intra-state fight that occurred on the national stage under the full glare of the national media.
“In its final days, the Ford-Reagan contest was marked by a bitterness that reflected the effects of four grueling months of campaigning that was still likely to leave the GOP nomination out of the grasp of either man. And, at the end as in the beginning, the dominant issues in the Republican race were foreign policy and military power,” wrote Ed Walsh for the
Washington Post
, the day after the June 8 primaries.
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Only ten weeks remained before the gathering in Kansas City, and there was plenty of work to go around. Both sides conceded that Reagan’s campaign had done a better job of organizing the state conventions and that he had an additional advantage since many were in the West and South. But Ford had a delegate lead of around ninety votes, and it was open to question whether Reagan could close the gap in time.
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In late June 1976,
Time
reported, “As the struggle for the nomination moves toward what looks like a close brawling finish, Reagan’s superior organization shows, especially in the remaining Western convention states that still are electing delegates. For months Reagan’s men burrowed into the bedrock, taking control of the local parties at the ward and precinct levels. While Ford built his organization from the top down, Reagan built from the bottom up.” In the same story, a Ford spokesman bemoaned the situation, saying of Ford’s local supporters, “We let them go. We didn’t even have any pros to guide us. . . . [O]ur poor dumb people.”
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Betty Ford, who was never at a loss for words, told
Women’s Wear Daily
of her husband’s campaign staff, “I can tell you that they just sat back complacently, thinking that the President would be nominated, that it was some sort of shoe-in.”
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If Ford was nervous, Jimmy Carter was supremely confident, as his totals for June 8 put him at 1,514 delegates, nine more than needed for a first ballot nomination. At this point, the “stop Carter” movement collapsed, and the Democrats began to fall in line behind their improbable nominee.
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While Carter was soaring, an old and legendary political aide to Franklin Roosevelt, James Farley, passed away at age eighty-eight. He was the architect of FDR’s political career until 1940, when Roosevelt decided to break the “No third term” rule of all previous Presidents. Farley broke with FDR and ran for President himself in fit of pique.
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In many ways, Farley was the political architect of the modern Democratic Party and his efforts led to the party’s forty-year dominance.
With George Wallace thoroughly trounced by Carter, Myra MacPherson of the
Washington Post
did an interesting profile of the Alabamian, which perceptively covered how Carter, Reagan, and Scoop Jackson had superseded his populist appeal. The reporter wrote, “He was an old face selling old wares, wares that had been picked up and polished and improved upon by new faces that lent them a new respectability. Busing and law and order became issues for everyone from President Ford and Ronald Reagan to Jimmy Carter and Scoop Jackson. ‘All of them done stole my water. They’re drinking out of my dipper,’ he complained.”
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Wallace was by and large right. But he had always been just an “aginner” and never really proposed solutions to the problems he identified in America. Reagan and Carter not only identified the problems, albeit it in softer tones than Wallace, but they also proposed concrete solutions. Still, Carter flew to Alabama to express his appreciation when Wallace released his delegates to the former Governor of Georgia.
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Illinois and Texas had to go through pro forma state conventions, but since Reagan had destroyed Ford in Texas and Ford had routed Reagan in Illinois, the selection of their final delegates was a
fait accompli
. Missouri, Minnesota, Idaho, and Colorado had to complete their selection processes at their respective state conventions. And Utah, Montana, Connecticut, North Dakota, Iowa, Delaware, New Mexico, and Washington still had to host conventions where all their respective delegates would be chosen.
Ford met with his strategists at the White House to map out his plans for winning the delegates that would be allocated at the state conventions. Reagan met with his team at Lake Tahoe for two days. Both predicted first ballot nominations, naturally, but virtually all of the national media reported that neither side would have enough committed delegates before the national convention. Yet Reagan was feeling a bit more confident, as five of the conventions would be in his stronghold areas in the South and the West. Part of Ford’s strategy to win delegates was to continue to raise the specter of Goldwater’s landslide defeat in 1964 in order to scare GOP activists into turning away from Reagan.
Although Reagan had not backed away from his earlier statement that he might not support Ford in the fall if he lost the nomination, Sears was telling reporters that yes, Reagan would support the President. But he did go so far as to say that he questioned whether or not Reagan would be doing any campaigning for the Ford ticket or if Reagan’s supporters would be backing Ford.
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Some in the Ford camp were seriously debating the wisdom of the Stu Spencer commercials suggesting Reagan could start a war, fearing that they enraged Reagan’s supporters too much. There was deep concern over their interest in supporting Ford if he were the nominee. “The issue was working for us, but we couldn’t let it alone. Instead, we tried overkill and drove away the very people we’ll need to win in November,” one campaign insider complained.
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Many felt that Spencer was engaged in a vendetta against Reagan that affected his judgment.
Reagan’s forces attempted to strike back on their own. At a Reagan event in California, a helicopter trailed a sign that read, “Reagan’s ahead because Ford bumped his.” Of the deteriorating relations between the two campaigns, the
Washington Post
referred to the GOP’s Eleventh Commandment as a “dead letter.”
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The first major post-primary contest between Ford and Reagan was the Missouri state convention over the weekend of June 12-13. Ford arrived on Friday to speak to and meet with delegates. His in-state leader, Governor Kit Bond, kept up the “Reagan can’t win” drumbeat by telling a crowd about a poll that showed Ford running better against Jimmy Carter than Reagan.
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The entire hierarchy of Republican officials was supporting Ford, including Attorney General John Danforth and his Deputy John Ashcroft.
20
Reagan also arrived Friday evening and met with delegates, but he would speak to the convention on Saturday, while Ford would depart for Washington Friday evening after a brief stay in Springfield.
Missouri would send a total of forty-nine delegates to the national convention. Of those, thirty had already been selected by balloting in congressional districts. As the state convention began, where the final nineteen delegates would be chosen, Ford had a slight lead over Reagan, fifteen to twelve with three uncommitted.
21
Once again, the Reagan and Ford forces did not even attempt to put on a show of harmony or good humor. Ford’s team filed challenges to 395 of Reagan’s delegates to the state convention and included language that would have prevented those challenged Reagan delegates any voice in deciding their own fate.
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Sears had sent Don Devine and Morton Blackwell to handle things for Reagan at the convention. When the Ford forces attempted to disenfranchise the Reagan state delegates, Devine immediately held a press conference in which he announced the Reagan campaign’s determination to hold a competing convention, elect its slate of delegates and send them to Kansas City.
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Signs which read, “Thou Shalt Not Steal,” a brainstorm of Blackwell’s, also appeared on the floor of the Shrine Mosque, the convention’s venue. Blackwell and Devine successfully used intimidation tactics to bluff the Ford camp, including a harsh draft of a newsletter that Blackwell taped on the door of the Ford offices. After a night of intense negotiations, the challenges to the Reagan delegates were withdrawn.
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While Ford was slightly ahead in the count of Missouri delegates already elected for the national convention, he was behind in delegates for the Missouri state Republican convention in Springfield that weekend. A total of 1,439 state delegates attending this event would determine the final nineteen national delegates who would join the other thirty in Kansas City.
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Reagan’s forces rammed through a slate of nineteen individuals and would have won all nineteen had Governor Bond’s wife not made a tearful plea for her husband to be included as a delegate so that he would not be embarrassed.
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