Read The Ghosts of Cannae: Hannibal and the Darkest Hour of the Roman Republic Online
Authors: Robert L. O'Connell
Tags: #Ancient, #Italy, #Battle of, #2nd, #Other, #Carthage (Extinct city), #Carthage (Extinct city) - Relations - Rome, #North, #218-201 B.C, #Campaigns, #Rome - Army - History, #Punic War, #218-201 B.C., #216 B.C, #Cannae, #218-201 B.C - Campaigns, #Rome, #Rome - Relations - Tunisia - Carthage (Extinct city), #Historical, #Military, #Hannibal, #History, #Egypt, #Africa, #General, #Biography & Autobiography
59.
Polybius, 3.105; Livy, 22.29–30.
60.
Shean, “Hannibal’s Mules,” p. 183.
CHAPTER VI: CANNAE
1.
Livy, 22.35.37.
2.
Goldsworthy,
Cannae
, p. 74.
3.
Livy, 22.39–40.4; Plutarch, Fabius Maximus, 14.
4.
Ibid., 22.45.
5.
Goldsworthy,
Cannae
, p. 60.
6.
Goldsworthy,
The Punic Wars
, p. 199.
7.
Lazenby,
Hannibal’s War
, p. 74.
8.
Goldsworthy,
Cannae
, p. 67.
9.
Ibid.
10.
The force that defeated the Gauls at Telamon was of a similar size, but this had been the accidental result of two double consular armies trapping a large body of Gallic troops between them.
11.
Polybius, 3.107.9–15.
12.
Daly,
Cannae
, p. 27.
13.
Samuels (“The Reality of Cannae,” p. 12) argues that there is little sign of any formal Roman military training beyond experience. This seems extreme. It is true that the evidence is fairly shallow, but there do seem to have been well-established procedures. When, for instance, Scipio Africanus established a training program for his troops at New Carthage (Polybius, 10.20.1–4), it seemed far too well organized to have been simply extemporized.
14.
See for example Lazenby,
Hannibal’s War
, p. 77; Goldsworthy,
The Punic Wars
, pp. 200–1.
15.
Goldsworthy,
The Punic Wars
, p. 200; Goldsworthy,
Cannae
, p. 67.
16.
Samuels, “The Reality of Cannae,” p. 12.
17.
Livy, 22.37.7–9.
18.
Livy, 22.41–43; Polybius, 3.107.1–7.
19.
Dodge,
Hannibal
, pp. 348–50.
20.
Goldsworthy,
Cannae, p
. 75.
21.
Ibid., p. 57.
22.
Samuels, “The Reality of Cannae,” pp. 18–19.
23.
Polybius, 3.114.5; Livy, 22.46.6; Lazenby,
Hannibal’s War, p
. 81; Goldsworthy,
The Punic Wars, p
. 207. However, Daly
(Cannae, p
. 29) adds that this figure does look “suspiciously like an estimate.”
24.
Lazenby
(Hannibal’s War, p
. 81) estimates around 28,600 line infantry, with 11,400 skirmishers, while Goldsworthy
(The Punic Wars
, p. 207) and Parker
(Cannae
, p. 32) assign around 32,000 to the heavy infantry and 8000 to skirmishers.
25.
Delbrück,
Warfare in Antiquity, p
. 326.
26.
Foster Grunfeld, “The Unsung Sling,”
MHA: The Quarterly Journal of Military History
, vol. 9, no. 1 (Autumn 1996).
27.
Samuels, “The Reality of Cannae,” pp. 19–20.
28.
Appian, Han. 17, also states that Hannibal was short on supplies; Paul Erdkamp, “Polybius, Livy and the ‘Fabian Strategy,’”
Ancient Society
, vol. 23 (1992), pp. 127–47.
29.
Polybius, 3.110–112; Lazenby,
Hannibal’s War
, p. 78.
30.
Delbrück,
Warfare in Antiquity, p
. 315.
31.
Goldsworthy,
Cannae, p
. 101.
32.
Dodge,
Hannibal
, p. 396.
33.
See Appian, Han. 22; Livy, 22.48.
34.
Edward Fry, “The Field of Cannae,”
The English Historical Review, vol
. 12, no. 48 (1897), p. 751, for the geography of the battlefield.
35.
Polybius, 3.112.
36.
Polybius, 3.117.8; Daly
(Cannae
, p. 29) discusses the disposition of those left behind and agrees with Polybius that the great majority would have been left in the main camp, since the smaller camp would be behind the Roman line and therefore need no more than a token garrison.
37.
Polybius, 3.113.2–3.
38.
K. Lehmann,
Klio
, vol. 15 (1917), p. 162; Delbrück,
Warfare in Antiquity, pp
. 324–5.
39.
J. Kromayer and G. Veith,
Antike Schlachtfelder
, vol. 3, no. 1 (1903–31), pp. 278–388; Lazenby,
Hannibal’s War
, pp. 77–9.
40.
Connolly,
Greece and Rome at War
, p. 184; Goldsworthy,
Cannae
.
41.
Polybius, 3.113; Livy, 22.46.1.
42.
Appian, Han. 20; Ennius, Fragment, 282; Livy (22.46.9) also refers to the dust problem.
43.
Appian, Han. 21; Livy, 22.47.1; Polybius, 3.115.1.
44.
Martin Samuels’s characterization of the Roman cavalry (“The Reality of Cannae,” p. 13) as being more like “an English public school outing, rather than a military unit,” is probably appropriate, considering the losses it had recently taken.
45.
Plutarch, Fabius Maximus, 16. Livy (22.47.1–5) roughly follows this version also.
46.
Daly,
Cannae
, p. 165.
47.
Delbrück,
Warfare in Antiquity
, p. 316.
48.
Goldsworthy,
Cannae
, pp. 111–12.
49.
Daly,
Cannae
, pp. 185-6.
50.
Adrian Goldsworthy’s insights
(Cannae
, pp. 127–39) into the nature of this kind of combat are very persuasive. See also Zhmodikov, “The Roman Heavy Infantrymen in Battle,” p. 71.
51.
Lazenby,
Hannibal
, p. 83.
52.
Polybius, 3.116.5–6.
53.
Polybius, 3.117.2
54.
Daly,
Cannae
, pp. 195–6.
55.
Sabin, “The Mechanics of Battle in the Second Punic War,” p. 76.
56.
Victor Davis Hanson, “Cannae,” in Robert Cowley, ed.,
Experience of War
(New York: Norton, 1992), p. 42.
57.
Daly,
Cannae
, pp. 196–8.
58.
Goldsworthy,
Cannae, p
. 153.
59.
Polybius, 3.117.1–2; see also Appian, Han. 24.
60.
Grossman,
On Killing
, p. 71.
61.
Goldsworthy,
Cannae, p
. 155.
62.
R. J. Ridley, “Was Scipio Africanus at Cannae?”
Latomus
, vol. 34 (1975), p. 161.
63.
Lazenby
(Hannibal’s War
, p. 84) reaches this number using a variety of Livy’s figures from 22.49–54.
64.
Daly,
Cannae
, p. 198.
65.
Polybius, 3.117.7–11.
66.
Goldsworthy,
Cannae, p
. 159; Frontinus, Stratagems, 4.5.7; Livy, 22.52.4.
67.
Livy’s figures (22.49.15) are the most convincing and consistent in this regard.
68.
Livy, 22.51.5–9.
69.
Again, this is Lazenby’s compilation
(Hannibal’s War
, p. 84) using Livy’s figures.
70.
Polybius (3.117.6) puts Carthaginian losses at four thousand Gauls, fifteen hundred Spaniards and Libyans, and two hundred cavalry, while Livy (22.52.6) places the losses at around eight thousand total.
71.
Lancel,
Hannibal
, p. 108.
72.
There is considerable disagreement about whether the incident ever took place. John Lazenby (“Was Maharbal Right?” in Cornell, Rankov, and Sabin, eds.,
The Second Punic War: A Reappraisal
, p. 39) argues that “like most good stories, this one is probably apocryphal.” Lazenby maintains that because Polybius does not mention Maharbal in his accounts of Cannae, Maharbal was probably not there. On the other hand, Dexter Hoyos (“Maharbal’s Bon Mot,” pp. 610–11) points out that Livy did have Maharbal commanding the Numidians at Cannae, and that Maharbal may well have urged Hannibal to march on Rome after Trasimene and possibly again after Cannae, because, after all, it was good advice.
73.
Shean, “Hannibal’s Mules,” pp. 167–73.
74.
B. L. Hallward, “Hannibal’s Invasion of Italy,” in
Cambridge Ancient History
, vol. 3 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1930), p. 55.
75.
Hoyos, “Hannibal: What Kind of Genius,”
Greece and Rome
, pp. 176–7.
76.
Daly,
Cannae, p
. 46; Lancel,
Hannibal, pp
. 109–10.
77.
Bernard Montgomery,
A History of Warfare
(London: World Publishing Co., 1968), p. 98.
78.
The story is contained in Livy (22.53). Some modern authorities question its veracity. R. J. Ridley (“Was Scipio Africanus at Cannae?” pp. 162–3) calls it a “romantic story” and cites Scullard, Scipio’s biographer, as casting doubt, since Polybius didn’t mention it. Yet Scullard himself
(Scipio Africanus
, p. 30) points out that this section of Polybius is not completely preserved, and that Canusium later struck a coin almost certainly depicting Scipio, apparently as a tribute to the incident.