The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (134 page)

168.
On which see Dibb, Soviet Union:
The Incomplete Superpower
, pp. 44ff, “The Nationality Problem”; Hosking,
History of the Soviet Union, ch
. 14; Daniels,
Russia, The Roots of Confrontation
, pp. 315ff; as well as the more detailed studies, like H. Carrere d’Encausse,
Decline of an Empire
(New York, 1979); M. Rywkin,
Moscow’s Muslim Challenge
(New York, 1982); A. Bennigsen and M. Broxup,
The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State
(London, 1983); and S. E. Wimbush (ed.),
Soviet Nationalities in Strategic Perspective
(New York, 1985).

169.
J. Anderson, “Ukraine a Hotbed of Dissent, Nationalism” (syndicated article),
New Haven Register
, June 13, 1985; but see also P. T. Potichny (ed.),
The Ukraine in the Seventies
(Oakville, Ont., 1982); Hosking,
History of the Soviet Union
, pp. 432ff.

170.
Apart from Kazokins, “Nationality in the Soviet Army,” passim, see the eye-opening details in Cockburn,
Threat
, pp. 74ff; E. Jones, “Minorities in the Soviet Armed Forces,”
Comparative Strategy
, vol. 3, no. 4 (1982), pp. 285–318; and the Rand Corporation studies S. Curran and D. Ponomoreff,
Managing the Ethnic Factor in the Russian and Soviet Armed Forces: An Historical Overview
(Santa Monica, Calif., 1982); and E. Brunner, Jr.,
Soviet Demographic Trends and the Ethnic Composition of Draft Age Males, 1980–1985
(Santa Monica, Calif., 1981).

171.
On which term see, for example, the coverage in D. Leebaert (ed.),
Soviet Military Thinking
(London, 1981), espec. the essays in pt. 1; J. Baylis and G. Segal (eds.),
Soviet Strategy
(London, 1981), espec. essays 4 and 5.

172.
Military Balance 1985–86
, p. 180.

173.
For example, Gervasi,
Myth of Soviet Military Supremacy
, passim, but espec. pp. 116–18.

174.
For examples: J. Schell,
The Fate of the Earth
(New York, 1982); H. Caldicott,
Nuclear Madness
(Brookline, Mass., 1979); E. P. Thompson,
Zero Option
(London, 1982).

175.
There is a good brief survey of these strategic ideas in E. Bottome,
The Balance of Terror
(Boston, Mass., 1986 edn.), chs. 4–7 (and a glossary of terms, pp. 243–54); A. W. Garfinkle,
The Politics of the Nuclear Freeze
(Philadelphia, Pa., 1984); and T. Powers,
Thinking About Nuclear Weapons
(New York, 1983).

176.
Of the vast array of studies on this problem, I prefer M. Mandelbaum,
The Nuclear Future
(Ithaca, N.Y., 1983); R. Jervis,
The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy
(Ithaca, N.Y., 1984); and S. Zuckerman,
Nuclear Illusion and Reality
(London, 1982). Also useful is S. M. Keeny and W.K.H. Panofsky, “MAD vs. NUTS: the Mutual Hostage Relationship of the Superpowers,”
Foreign Affairs
, vol. 60, no. 2 (Winter 1981–82), pp. 287–304.

177.
See again “In Battle of Wits, Submarines Evade Advanced Efforts at Detection,”
New York Times
, April 1, 1986, p. C1; and the comments in McGwire, “Rationale for the Development of Soviet Seapower,” passim, on the difficulties the USSR has had with integrating American SLBMs into its strategic planning.

178.
The quote is from Jervis,
Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy
. For an example of “war-fighting” writers, see C. Gray, “Nuclear Strategy: A Case for a Theory of Victory,”
International Security
, vol. 4 (Summer 1979), pp. 54–87.

179.
See especially P. Bracken,
The Command and Control of Nuclear Weapons
(New Haven, Conn., 1983); also N. Calder,
Nuclear Nightmares
(Harmondsworth, Mddsx., 1981).

180.
On which theme, see in particular J. C. Snyder and S. F. Wells (eds.),
Limiting Nuclear Proliferation
(Cambridge, Mass., 1985); Mandelbaum,
Nuclear Future, ch
. 3; G. Quester (ed.),
Nuclear Proliferation: Breaking the Chain
(Madison,
Wis., 1981). By contrast, K. N. Waltz, “Toward Nuclear Peace,” Wilson Center, International Security Studies Program, Working Paper no. 16.

181.
D. L. Strode, “Arms Control and Sino-Soviet Relations,”
Orbis
, vol. 28, no. 1 (Spring 1984), espec. p. 168ff.

182.
The Economist
, 9 February, 1985, “Not Trident,” p. 16. See also, Gervasi,
The Myth of Soviet Military Supremacy
, p. 171.

183.
“France Tests Longer-Range Sub Missile,”
New York Times
, March 6, 1986, p. A3. See also the table outlining the buildup of French nuclear warheads in
New York Times
, April 6, 1986, “The Week in Review” section, p. 2.

184.
For example, “Powell Derides Nuclear ‘Last Resort,’ ”
Times
(London), June 1, 1983, p. 4; Lord Carver, “Why Britain Should Reject Trident,”
Sunday Times
(London), Feb. 21, 1982.

185.
See again Yost, “Radical Change in French Defense Policy?”

186.
Dibb,
Soviet Union: The Incomplete Superpower
, p. 161. By contrast, see Gervasi,
Myth of Soviet Military Supremacy, ch
. 26, which argues that NATO numbers are in fact superior. Also important are the
International Security
essays edited by S. E. Miller,
Conventional Forces and American Defense Policy
(Princeton, N. J., 1986).

187.
Statement on the Defense Estimates, 1985
, vol. 1 (Cmnd 9430), summarized in
Survey of Current Affairs
, vol. 15, no. 6 (June 1985), p. 179.

188.
As pointed out by F. D. Holzman, “What Defense-Spending Gap?”
New York Times
, March 4, 1986.

189.
See Dibb,
Soviet Union: The Incomplete Superpower
, p. 162;
Military Balance 1985–86
, pp. 186–87; R. L. Fischer,
Defending the Central Front: The Balance of Forces
(Adelphi Papers, no. 127, London, 1976).

190.
This is a tricky (and highly disputed) topic. For the optimists’ view—with which, for what it is worth, this author agrees—see J. Mearsheimer, “Why the Soviets Can’t Win Quickly in Central Europe,” pp. 121–57, and B. R. Posen, “Measuring the European Conventional Balance,” pp. 79–120, both in Miller (ed.),
Conventional Forces and American Defense Policy
. See also Steele,
Soviet Power
, pp. 76ff; and C. N. Donnelly, “Tactical Problems Facing the Soviet Army: Recent Debates in the Soviet Military Press,”
International Defense Review
, vol. 11, no. 9 (1978), pp. 1405–12. More sobering assessments are provided by R. A. Mason, “Military Strategy,” in E. Moreton and G. Segal (eds.),
Soviet Strategy Toward Western Europe
(London, 1984), pp. 175–202; P. A. Peterson and J. G. Hines, “The Conventional Offensive in Soviet Theater Strategy,”
Orbis
, vol. 27, no. 3 (Fall 1983), pp. 695–739; and—calling attention to the possibility of Soviet use of dual-purpose missiles (i.e., tactical nuclear missiles)—D. M. Gormley, “A New Dimension to Soviet Theater Strategy,”
Orbis
, vol. 29, no. 3 (Fall 1985), pp. 537–69. There is a good recent survey, “NATO’s Central Front,” in
Economist
, Aug. 30, 1986.

191.
This is now best treated in Treverton,
Making the Alliance Work
, passim; but see also J. Joffe, “European-American Relations: The Enduring Crisis,”
Foreign Affairs
, vol. 59 (Spring 1981).

192.
V. Bunce, “The Empire Strikes Back: The Evolution of the Eastern Bloc from a Soviet Asset to a Soviet Liability,”
International Organization
, vol. 39, no. 1 (Winter 1985), pp. 13–28. See also the articles on “Cracks in the Soviet Empire?” in
International Security
, vol. 6, no. 3 (Winter 1981–82); D. R. Herspring and I. Volgyes, “Political Reliability in the Eastern European Warsaw Pact Armies,”
Armed Forces and Society
, vol. 6, no. 2 (Winter 1980), pp. 270–96; A. R. Johnson et al.,
East European Military Establishments: The Warsaw Pact Northern Tier
(New York, 1982).

193.
D. A. Andelman, “Contempt and Crisis in Poland,”
International Security
, vol. 6, no. 3 (Winter 1981–82), pp. 90–104.

194.
Herspring and Volgyes, “Political Reliability,” passim; B. S. Lambeth, “Uncertainties for the Soviet War Planner,” in Miller (ed.),
Conventional Forces and American Defense Policy
, pp. 181–82; W. E. Griffith, “Superpower Problems in Europe: A Comparative Assessment,”
Orbis
, vol. 29, no. 4 (Winter 1986), pp. 748–49.

195.
See the controversial proposal of S. P. Huntington, “Conventional Deterrence and Conventional Retaliation in Europe,” in Miller (ed.),
Conventional Forces and American Defense Policy
, pp. 251–75. And for a wide-ranging consideration of all these issues, see E. R. Alterman, “Central Europe: Misperceived Threats and Unforeseen Dangers,”
World Policy Journal
, vol. 2, no. 4 (Fall 1985), pp. 681–709.

196.
See the discussion in Dibb,
Soviet Union: The Incomplete Superpower
, pp. 165–66; Segal,
Defending China
, passim; idem, “Defense Culture and Sino-Soviet Relations,” passim; and pp. 449–51 above.

197.
Dibb,
Soviet Union: The Incomplete Superpower
, pp. 147ff; Segal, “The China Factor,” in Moreton and Segal (eds.),
Soviet Strategy Towards Western Europe
, pp. 154–59; Strode, “Arms Control and Sino-Soviet Relations,” passim.

198.
See Steele,
Soviet Power, ch
. 8, “Asian Anxieties”; also T. B. Millar, “Asia in the Global Balance,” in D. H. McMillen (ed.),
Asian Perspectives on International Security
(London, 1984); Segal (ed.),
The Soviet Union in East Asia
(Boulder, Colo., 1983); M. Hauner, “The Soviet Geostrategic Dilemma” (ms. article for Foreign Policy Research Institute).

199.
See again McGwire, “Rationale for the Development of Soviet Seapower,” in Baylis and Segal (eds.),
Soviet Strategy
, pp. 210–54; Polmar,
Soviet Naval Developments
, passim.

200.
Figures from Dibb,
Soviet Union: The Incomplete Superpower
, p. 172.

201.
The quotation is from ibid., p. 171; but see also Steele,
Soviet Power
, pp. 33–36; and Cockburn,
Threat, ch
. 15.

202.
McGwire, “The Rationale,” pp. 226ff; Dibb,
Soviet Union: The Incomplete Superpower
, pp. 167–74.

203.
See the comparative statistics in Smith,
Pattern of Imperialism
, p. 215; the argument in Steele,
Soviet Power
, chs. 9–12; F. Fukuyama, “Gorbachev and the Third World,”
Foreign Affairs
, vol. 64, no. 4 (Spring 1986), pp. 715–31; K. Menon,
Soviet Power and the Third World
(New York, 1985).

204.
Quoted in Dibb,
Soviet Union: The Incomplete Superpower
, p. 160. Note also, N. Eberstadt, “ ‘Danger’ to the Soviet,”
New York Times
, Sept. 26, 1983, p. A21, which argues how weak the USSR’s influence would be if nuclear weapons did not exist.

205.
“If Gorbachev Dares,”
Economist
, July 6, 1985.

206.
Quotations from Bialer, “Politics and Priorities,” in Bergson and Levine (eds.),
Soviet Economy: Toward the Year 2000
, pp. 403, 405.

207.
For considerations of Russia’s problems and future, see H. S. Rowen, “Living with a Sick Bear,”
National Interest
, no. 2 (Winter 1985–86), pp. 14–26; Garthoff,
Détente and Confrontation
, chs. 29–30; Colton,
Dilemma of Reform in the Soviet Union
, passim; Goldman,
USSR in Crisis, ch
. 7; Dibb,
Soviet Union: The Incomplete Superpower, ch
. 8; and the entire issue of
Orbis
, vol. 30, no. 2 (Summer 1986).

208.
B. Rubin, “The Reagan Administration and the Middle East,” in Oye et al., (eds.),
Eagle Defiant
, p. 367—a good survey. See also H. Saunders,
The Middle East Problem in the 1980s
(Washington, D.C., 1981). For particular problems, see P. Jabber, “Egypt’s Crisis, America’s Dilemma,”
Foreign Affairs
, vol. 64, no.
5 (Summer 1986), pp. 960–80; and R. W. Tucker, “The Arms Balance and the Persian Gulf,” in
The Purposes of American Power
(New York, 1981), ch. 4.