The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (135 page)

209.
A. F. Lowenthal, “Ronald Reagan and Latin America: Coping with Hegemony in Decline,” in Oye et al. (eds.),
Eagle Defiant
, pp. 31 Iff; R. Bonachea, “The United States and Central America,” in Kaplan,
Global Power
, pp. 209–41; P. A. Armella et al. (eds.),
Financial Policies and the World Capital Markets: The Place of Latin American Countries
(Chicago, 111., 1983).

210.
“An Economy Struggles to Break Its Fall,”
New York Times
, June 8, 1986, p. E3; “Hard Times in Mexico Cause Concern in U.S.,”
New York Times
, Oct. 19, 1986, pp. 1, 20.

211.
Report of the Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger to the Congress, on Fiscal Year 1984 Budget
(Washington, D.C., 1983), p. 17.

212.
“NATO: Burdens Shared,”
Economist
, Aug. 4, 1984, p. 3. See also the discussion of this in Calleo,
Imperious Economy
, pp. 169–71, and in fns. 16–17 on pp. 256–57; E. Conine, “Do the Interests of the U.S. Really Cover the World?” (syndicated column),
New Haven Register
, Feb. 7, 1985, p. 11; M. Kahler, “The United States and Western Europe,” in Oye et al. (eds.),
Eagle Defiant, ch
. 9; and, especially, Treverton,
Making the Alliance Work
, passim.

213.
There are useful discussions in Mako,
U.S. Ground Forces and the Defense of Central Europe
, passim; Treverton,
Making the Alliance Work
, passim; L. Sullivan, “A New Approach to Burden-Sharing,”
Foreign Policy
, no. 60 (Fall 1985), pp. 9Iff; K. Knorr, “Burden-Sharing in NATO: Aspects of U.S. Policy,”
Orbis
, vol. 29, no. 3 (Fall 1985), pp. 517–36.

214.
Report of the Secretary of Defense … Fiscal Year 1984
, p. 17.

215.
“Military Forces Stretched Thin, Army Chief Says,”
New York Times
, Aug. 10, 1983, pp. Al, A3.

216.
“U.S. Forces: Need Arising for More Troops, Ships and Planes,”
New York Times
, Oct. 26, 1983, p. A16 (with map).

217.
See, for example, the map in the endpapers of Barnett,
Collapse of British Power
, and of Marder,
Anatomy of British Sea Power
.

218.
C. W. Weinberger, “U.S. Defense Strategy,”
Foreign Affairs
, vol. 64, no. 4 (Spring 1986), p. 678. In this connection, see also B. R. Posen and S. Van Evera, “Defense Policy and the Reagan Administration: Departure from Containment,” in Miller (ed.)
Conventional Forces and American Defense Policy
, pp. 19–61.

219.
For the statistical evidence of this, see Oye et al. (eds.),
Eagle Defiant, ch
. 1; Bairoch, “International Industrialization Levels from 1750 to 1980,” passim. For other measurements, see A. Bergeson and C. Sahoo, “Evidence of the Decline of American Hegemony in World Production,”
Review
, vol. 8, no. 4 (Spring 1985), pp. 595–611; and S. D. Krasner, “United States Commercial and Monetary Policy,” in Katzenstein (ed.),
Between Power and Plenty
, pp. 58–59, 68–69.

220.
Military Balance 1985–86
, p. 13.

221.
For a good example, see E. A. Cohen, “When Policy Outstrips Power—American Strategy and Statecraft,”
Public Interest
, no. 75 (Spring 1984), pp. 3–19.

222.
Luttwak,
Pentagon and the Art of War
, p. 256.

223.
See especially E. A. Cohen,
Citizens and Soldiers: The Dilemma of Military Service
(Ithaca, N.Y., 1985), chs. 7–9; and Canby’s interesting remarks on the European experience, in “Military Reform and the Art of War,” Wilson Center, International Security Studies Program, working paper no. 41, pp. 8ff.

224.
For a sampling, see G. Hart with W. S. Lind,
America Can Win
(Bethesda, Md., 1986); Kaufman,
Reasonable Defense
, passim; Luttwak,
Pentagon and the Art of War
, passim; J. Record, “Reagan’s Strategy Gap,”
New Republic
, Oct. 29,
1984, pp. 17–21; J. Fallows,
National Defense
(New York, 1981); idem, “The Spend-Up,”
Atlantic
, July 1986, pp. 27–31; Gansler,
Defense Industry
, passim; S. L. Canby, “Military Reform and the Art of War,” passim; “Forum: Military Reform and Defense Planning,”
Orbis
, vol. 27, no. 2 (Summer 1983), pp. 245–300. Also very important in this connection is the powerful exposé of A. T. Hadley,
The Straw Giant: Triumph and Failure: Americas Armed Forces
(New York, 1986).

225.
Kaufman,
Reasonable Defense
, p. 35; “Bungling the Military Build-Up,”
New York Times
, Jan. 27, 1985, business section, pp. 1, 8; Gansler,
Defense Industry
, passim; Fallows, “The Spend-Up,” passim; but see also Luttwak,
Pentagon and the Art of War, ch
. 5, for interesting correctives.

226.
Weinberger, “U.S. Defense Strategy,” p. 694; but see the doubts expressed in Record, “Reagan’s Strategy Gap”; Fallows, “The Spend-Up”; and Canby, “Military Reform and the Art of War;” as well as the reasoned defense of high-technology weapons by K. N. Lewis in the
Orbis
forum “Military Reform.”

227.
Among which I would include Luttwak,
Pentagon and the Art of War;
Canby, “Military Reform and the Art of War”; and Cohen, “When Policy Outstrips Power.”

228.
See, for example, R. W. Komer,
Maritime Strategy or Coalition Defense?
(Cambridge, Mass., 1984), passim, and the debate in 1986 in journals such as
International Security
upon the Reagan administration’s “maritime strategy.”

229.
Recently spelled out again in Weinberger, “U.S. Defense Strategy,” pp. 684ff. See also “Schultz-Weinberger Discord,”
New York Times
, Dec. 11, 1984, pp. Al, A12.

230.
See, for example, L. C. Thurow, “Losing the Economic Race,”
New York Review of Books
, Sept. 27, 1984, pp. 29–31; cf. W. D. Nordhaus, “On the Eve of a Historic Economic Boom,”
New York Times
, April 6, 1986, which followed shortly after P. G. Petersen’s article in the same paper, “When the Economic Valium Wears Off.”

231.
S. M. Bodner, “Our Trade Gap Is Really a Standard of Living Gap,”
New York Times
, May 6, 1986 (letters); and “Why America Cannot Pay its Way,”
Economist
, July 13,1985, p. 69, both cover the problems facing traditional industries. For the debate upon future technologies, see “High Technology: Clash of the Titans,”
Economist
, Aug. 23, 1986. For the congressional study, see “A Disturbing New Deficit,”
Time
, Nov. 3, 1986, p. 56.

232.
For example, while
The Global 2000 Report to the President
(Washington, D.C., 1980), vol. 1, pp. 18–19, referred to absolute increases in world grain production, it forecast increasing deficits in China, South Asia, and western Europe.

233.
“Farmers’ Slipping Share of the Market,”
New York Times
, May 26, 1986; “Farm Imports Rise as Exports Plunge,”
New York Times
, April 20, 1986; “Elephant-High Farm Debts,”
Economist
, Sept. 14, 1985, p. 17.

234.
For a good brief survey, see P. Cain, “Political Economy in Edwardian England: The Tariff-Reform Controversy,” in A. O’Day (ed.),
The Edwardian Age
, (London, 1979), pp. 34–59.

235.
Petersen, “When the Economic Valium Wears Off,” passim; F. Rohatyn, “The Debtor Economy: A Proposal,”
New York Review of Books
, Nov. 8, 1984, pp. 16–21; J. Chace,
Solvency, the Price of Survival
(New York, 1981), chs. 1–2.

236.
Presidents Private Sector Survey on Cost Control
, report, as reprinted in “Of Debt. Deficits, and the Death of a Republic” (Figgie International advertisement),
New York Times
, April 20,1986, p. F9. This advertisement misprints the 1985 total of interest as $179 billion; it is in fact $129 billion.

237.
Ibid.

238.
“Cost of Paying Interest Eases Dramatically for U.S.,”
New York Times
, Dec. 28, 1986, pp. 1, 24.

239.
The quotation is from Drucker, “Changed World Economy,” p. 782. See also M. Shubik and P. Bracken, “Strategic Purpose and the International Economy,” in McCormick and Bissell (eds.),
Strategic Dimensions of Economic Behaviour
, p. 212.

240.
Drucker, “Changed World Economy,” passim; S. Marriss,
Deficits and the Dollar: The World Economy at Risk
(Washington, D.C., 1985); and the comments in “As America Diets, Allies Must Eat” (lead article),
New York Times
, Jan. 17, 1986; “A Nation Hooked on Foreign Funds,”
New York Times
, Nov. 18, 1984, business section, pp. 1,24; “U.S. as Debtor: A Threat to World Trade,”
New York Times
, Sept. 22, 1985, business section, p. 3.

241.
See again Nordhaus, “On the Eve of a Historic Economic Boom”; the uncharacteristically rosy argument in “America Manufactures Still,”
Economist
, April 19, 1986, p. 81; and L. Silk, “Can the U.S. Remain No. 1?”
New York Times
, Aug. 10, 1984, p. D2 (a question, incidentally, which would not have been asked ten to twenty years ago).

242.
Rasler and Thompson, “Global Wars, Public Debts, and the Long Cycle,” passim; Gilpin,
War and Change in World Politics
, passim.

243.
This is best described in G. R. Searle,
The Quest for National Efficiency: A Study in British Politics and British Political Thought, 1899–1914
(Oxford, 1971).

244.
Quoted in ibid., p. 101.

245.
See above, p. 228–29.

246.
See the Brookings study by J. Grunwald and K. Flamm,
The Global Factory: Foreign Assembly in International Trade
(Washington, D.C., 1985); and P. Sea-bury, “International Policy and National Defense,”
Journal of Contemporary Studies
, Spring 1983.

247.
See, for example, the British experience in the late 1930s, as detailed in Gibbs,
Grand Strategy
, vol. 1, p. 311.

248.
Gansler,
Defense Industry
, pp. 12ff; and especially R. W. DeGrasse,
Military Expansion, Economic Decline
(Armonk, N.Y., 1985 edn.); G. Adama,
The Iron Triangle
(New York, 1981); Thurow, “How to Wreck the Economy,”
New York Review of Books
, May 14, 1981, pp. 3–8; Kaufmann,
A Reasonable Defense
, pp. 33–34; more generally, G. Kennedy,
Defense Economics
(London, 1983), espec. ch. 8; S. Chan, “The Impact of Defense Spending on Economic Performance: A Survey of Evidence and Problems,”
Orbis
, vol. 29, no. 2 (Summer 1985), pp. 403ff; B. Russett, “Defense Expenditures and National Well-Being,”
American Political Science Review
, vol. 76, no. 4 (December 1982), pp. 767–77.

249.
Kaldor,
Baroque Arsenal
, passim; DeGrasse,
Military Expansion, Economic Decline
, passim; Thurow, “How to Wreck the Economy,” passim; Chace,
Solvency, ch
. 2; E. Rothschild, “The American Arms Boom,” in E. P. Thompson and D. Smith (eds.),
Protest and Survive
(Harmondsworth, Mddsx., 1980), pp. 170ff; Rosecrance,
Rise of the Trading State
, chs. 6 and 10.

250.
E. Rothschild, “The Costs of Reaganism,”
New York Review of Books
, March 15, 1984, pp. 14–17.

251.
See again Cipolla,
Economic Decline of Empires;
and Rasler and Thompson, “Global Wars, Public Debts, and the Long Cycle,” passim.

252.
The quip is from
Misalliance
(1909), and in the original reads “Hindhead’s turn will come.” As Hobsbawm notes, in
Industry and Empire
, p. 193, this was an obvious jibe at the stockbroker townships south of London, prospering while other parts of the economy were coming under pressure.

253.
See above, p. 357. Also useful in this connection is B. Russett, “America’s
Continuing Strengths,”
International Organization
, vol. 39, no. 2 (Spring 1985), pp. 207–31.

254.
W. Lippman,
U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic
(Boston, Mass., 1943), pp. 7–8; and see again Cohen, “When Policy Outstrips Power”; and the conclusions in E. Bottome,
The Balance of Terror
(Boston, Mass., 1986 edn.), pp. 235–42.