Authors: Matthew M. Aid
45. Interview with Charles R. Lord; confidential interviews with former NSA officials. For damage done by Pelton generally,
see Woodward,
Veil
, pp. 448–51. For loss of the data from the Moscow listening posts, see Mike Frost,
Spyworld
(Toronto: Doubleday Canada, 1994), pp. 245–52; “Alleged Radio Intelligence Operations from US Embassy in Moscow,”
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts
, March 31, 1980. For the tree stump operation, see “US Espionage Activities in USSR: Two CIA Agents Detected,”
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts
, March 28, 1980; “Izvestiya on Alleged Espionage Operations by US Diplomats,”
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts
, March 29, 1980.
46. Indictment, December 20, 1985, in CRIMINAL No. HM85-0621,
United States of America v.
Ronald William Pelton
, U.S. District Court for the District of Mary land, Baltimore, Maryland.
47. Richard Whittle, “Libya Jets Intercept U.S. Plane,”
Dallas Morning News
, January 15, 1986.
48. Message, JCS 280015Z Feb 86, JCS to multiple recipients, February 28, 1986, JCS FOIA; Command Historian 6916th Electronic
Security,
History of the 6916th Electronic Security Squadron:
1 January–30 June 1986
, 1986, vol. 2, tab 36, AIA FOIA;
1986 Command History, USS Caron
, 1987, p. 1, Ships Histories Division, Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC; confidential interview. See also Joseph S.
Bermudez, “Libyan SAMs and Air Defenses,”
Jane’s Defence Weekly
, May 17, 1986, p. 880; Seymour M. Hersh, “Target Qaddafi,”
New York Times Magazine
, January 22, 1987, p. 71; Capt. Don East, USN, “The History of U.S. Naval Airborne Electronic Reconnaissance: Part 2, the
Eu ropean Theater and VQ-2,”
Hook
, Summer 1987: p. 42.
49. Confidential interviews; U.S. Sixth Fleet,
1986 Sixth Fleet Command History
, 1987, p. III-6, Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC; George C. Wilson, “Alert Brings Out Libyan
Military’s Weaknesses,”
Washington Post
, January 9, 1986; “Gadaffi’s men fear getting lost,”
Jane’s Defence Weekly
, January 18, 1986, p. 43.
50. George C. Wilson, “U.S. Planes Retaliate for Libyan Attack,”
Washington Post
, March 25, 1986.
51. Woodward,
Veil
, pp. 444–45; Oliver R. North and William Novak,
Under Fire: An American
Story
(New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1991), p. 216; Bob Woodward and Patrick E. Tyler, “U.S. Shows Spy Systems’ Capabilities,”
Washington Post
, April 15, 1986; Bob Woodward, “Intelligence ‘Coup’ Tied Libya to Blast,”
Washington Post
, April 22, 1986; Leslie H. Gelb, “How Libya Messages Informed U.S.,”
New York Times
, April 23, 1986; Rick Atkinson, “Bomb Suspect Sent to Germany,”
Washington Post
, May 24, 1996; “Trial Begins in the 1986 Bombing of Berlin Disco,”
Seattle Times
, November 18, 1997.
52. Frank Greve, “Spying on Libya Yields Information Bonanza,”
Houston Chronicle
, May 18, 1986.
53. Hersh, “Target Qaddafi,” p. 74.
54. W. O. Studeman, “The Philosophy of Intelligence,” p. 105, Seminar on Intelligence, Command and Control, Center for Information
Policy Research, Harvard University, December 1991.
55. Stephen Engelberg, “Head of National Security Agency Plans to Retire,”
New York Times
, February 23, 1988; Molly Moore, “Odom to Resign as Head of NSA,”
Washington Post
, February 23, 1988; Gertz, “Superseded General.”
56. Studeman background from biographical data sheet, RADM William Oliver Studeman, Department of the Navy, Office of Public
Affairs, October 1, 1987; “Agency Welcomes New Director RADM William O. Studeman,”
NSA Newsletter
, September 1988, p. 2, NSA FOIA.
57. John Barron,
Breaking the Ring: The Rise and Fall of the Walker Family Spy Network
(New York: Avon Books, 1987), pp. 196–97.
58. Confidential interviews.
59. Mark Urban,
UK Eyes Alpha
(London: Faber and Faber, 1996), p. 111; Bernard E. Trainor, “Bush Bars Normal Ties Now; Beijing Is Warned,”
New York Times
, June 9, 1989; Daniel Williams and David Holley, “China Hard-Liners Appear in Control,”
Los Angeles Times
, June 9, 1989; “Communications Vacuumed: Satellite Intelligence Provides Key to Bush China Decision,”
Communications Daily
, June 12, 1989, p. 5; “Reign of Terror,”
Newsweek
, June 19, 1989, p. 14. See also the declassified morning intelligence summaries for the secretary of state, examples of which
are at http://www.seas.gwu.edu/ nsarchive/NSAEBB16/ documents.
60. Oral history,
Interview with Warren Zimmermann
, December 10, 1996, Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, Library of
Congress, Washington, DC.
61. For the deterioration of U.S. relations with Panama, see Seymour M. Hersh, “Our Man in Panama: The Creation of a Thug,”
Life
, March 1990, pp. 81–93. For intelligence efforts in Panama prior to the U.S. invasion, see U.S. Army Intelligence and Security
Command,
Annual Historical
Report INSCOM Fiscal Year 1990
, 1991, pp. 41–42, INSCOM FOIA. Also, confidential interviews. For quote concerning elimination of SOUTHCOM and CIA HUMINT
sources, see Captain Brian J. Cummins, USA,
National Reconnaissance Support to the Army
(Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1994), p. 101.
62. Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Annual Historical
Review: 1 October 1989 to 30 September 1990
, 1991, p. 4-52, National Security Archive, Washington, DC;
Command Chronology, Marine Support Battalion, for the Period 1 July–31 December 1989
, 1990, enclosure 4;
Command Chronology 2nd Radio Battalion for the Period 1 July–31 December 1989
, 1990, enclosure 2, pp. 1, 4, both in Marine Corps Historical Center, Quantico, VA; “Just Cause,”
Insight
, January–March 1990, pp. 11–13, AIA FOIA; Technical Sergeant. Mark Harlfinger, “Flight Operations End at 94th IS,”
Spokesman
, May 1997, p. 23, AIA FOIA. For creation of a Panama Cell at NSA, see W. O. Studeman, “The Philosophy of Intelligence,” p.
109, Seminar on Intelligence, Command and Control, Center for Information Policy Research, Harvard University, December 1991.
63. Cummins,
National Reconnaissance Support
, pp. 104–05. For more concerning NSA’s attempts at tracking Noriega, see Christopher Andrew,
For the President’s Eyes Only
(New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1995), p. 514; Bill Gertz, “NSA Eavesdropping Was Vital in Panama,”
Washington
Times
, January 10, 1990.
64. Patrick E. Tyler, “U.S. Commander Decries Leak on Panamanian Invasion,”
Washington Post
, February 27, 1990; Cummins,
National Reconnaissance Support
, pp. 104–05.
65. Dr. Thomas R. Johnson,
American Cryptology During the Cold War, 1945–1989
, bk. 3,
Retrenchment
and Reform, 1972–1980
(Fort Meade: Center for Cryptologic History, 1995), p. 21, NSA FOIA. For the seventy-five thousand NSA personnel figure, see
declaration of Dr. Richard W. Gronet, Director of Policy, National Security Agency, June 14, 1989, in CIV. No. HM87-1564,
Ray Lindsey v. National
Security Agency/Central Security Service
, p. 5, U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland.
66. Confidential interviews.
67. Bob Drogin, “NSA Blackout Reveals Downside of Secrecy,”
Los Angeles Times
, March 13, 2000.
68. Memorandum, Vice Admiral Bobby R. Inman, USN, to Special Assistant, Office of the Secretary of Defense,
Transition Coordination
, sec. 8, Modernization Objectives, December 9, 1980, NSA FOIA; Codev illa,
Informing Statecraft
, p. 124; Loch K. Johnson,
Secret Agencies: U.S. Intelligence
in a Hostile World
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996), p. 21.
11: Troubles in Paradise
1. This era in NSA’s history is covered in greater detail in Matthew M. Aid, “The Time of Troubles: The US National Security
Agency in the Twenty-first Century,”
Intelligence and National Security
, vol. 15, no. 3 (Autumn 2000): pp. 1–32.
2. David Y. McManis, “Technology, Intelligence, and Control,” p. 20, Seminar on Intelligence, Command and Control, Center
for Information Policy Research, Harvard University, February 1993.
3. The literature on Operations Desert Shield/Storm is substantial. The most detailed official accounts of the war can be
found in: United States Central Command,
Operation Desert Shield/Desert
Storm: Executive Summary
, July 11, 1991, p. 1, National Security Archive, Washington, DC; Department of Defense,
Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress
(Washington, DC: GPO, April 1992); Brigadier General Robert H. Scales Jr., USA,
Certain Victory: The U.S.
Army in the Gulf War
(Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 1994). The conduct of the air campaign is detailed in Dr. Thomas A. Keaney and Dr. Eliot A. Cohen,
eds.,
Gulf War Air Power Survey
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1993), 5 vols. The best all-around books on the war are Rick Atkinson,
Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War
(New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1993); Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor,
The General’s War
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1995). The Saudi perspective on the war can be found in HRH General Khaled bin Sultan,
Desert Warrior
(New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1995).
4. NSA’s successes and failings in Operation Desert Storm are detailed in David A. Hatch,
Shield
and Storm: The Cryptologic Community in the Desert Operations
, vol. 5, Special Series, Crisis Collection (Fort Meade: Center for Cryptologic History, 1992). SIGINT’s success against the
Iraqi air defense system from Department of Defense,
Conduct of the Persian Gulf War
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1992), pp. 12, 150, 154, 164; Keaney and Cohen,
Gulf War Air Power
, vol. 2, part 1, pp. 77–82, vol. 4, p. 182, and vol. 5, part 2, pp. 51, 190; Scales,
Certain Victory
, p. 178; Richard G. Davis,
On Target: Orga nizing and Executing the Strategic Air Campaign Against Iraq
(Washington, DC: Air Force History and Museums Program, 2002), p. 152.
5. Final draft,
SIGINT 101 Seminar Course Module
, 2002, NSA FOIA. McConnell quote from letter, McConnell to Senator Sam Nunn with enclosure, April 28, 1992, p. 6, NSA FOIA.
6. Monograph,
John F. Stewart Jr. and the Vigilant Eye of the Storm
(Fort Huachuca, AZ: History Office, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, no date), p. 18.
7. bin Sultan,
Desert Warrior
, p. 399; Mark Urban
UK Eyes Alpha
(London: Faber and Faber, 1996), p. 170; David A. Fulghum, “Yugoslavia Successfully Attacked by Computers,”
Aviation Week &
Space Technology
, August 23, 1999, p. 31.
8. Keaney and Cohen,
Gulf War Air Power
, summary vol., p. 98.
9. Brigadier General John F. Stewart, Jr.,
Operation Desert Storm. The Military Intelligence Story: A
View from the G-2, 3rd U.S. Army
, April 1991, p. 6, INSCOM FOIA; U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command,
Annual Historical Review, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command
(INSCOM): Fiscal Year 1991
, appendix K, 1992, p. 29, INSCOM FOIA; Daniel F. Baker, “Deep Attack: A Military Intelligence Task Force in Desert Storm,”
Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin
, October–December 1991, p. 39; Lt. Colonel Richard J. Quirk, III, USA,
Intelligence for the
Division: A G2 Perspective
(Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1992), p. 307; Major Raymond E. Coia, USMC,
A Critical Analysis of the I MEF Intelligence Performance in the 1991 Persian
Gulf War
(Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 1995), p. 6; Major Robert H. Taylor, USA,
Heavy Division Organic Signals Intelligence (SIGINT): Added Value or
Added Baggage
(Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1996), p. 24; Lt.
Colonel John J. Bird, USA,
Analysis of Intelligence
Support to the 1991 Persian Gulf War: Enduring Lessons
(Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2004), pp. 7–8. For Iraqi communications security
being more thorough than the Soviets’ during the Cold War, see Barbara Starr, “Measur ing the Success of the Intelligence
War,”
Jane’s Defence Weekly
, April 20, 1991, p. 636.
10. Keaney and Cohen,
Gulf War Air Power
, vol. 1, part 2, p. 270. McManis quote from David Y. McManis, “Technology, Intelligence, and Control,” p. 31, Seminar on
Intelligence, Command and Control, Center for Information Policy Research, Harvard University, February 1993.
11. U.S. Senate, Armed Services Committee,
Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriation,
FY 1992 and FY 1993
, part 2, 102nd Congress, 1st session, 1991, p. 19; Scales,
Certain Victory,
pp. 222, 237, 251; Gordon and Trainor,
General’s War
, p. 365; Taylor,
Heavy Division
p. 24; Colonel John Patrick Leake,
Operational Leadership in the Gulf War: Lessons from the Schwarzkopf-Franks
Controversy
, undated, http:// www.cfcsc.dnd.ca/irc/ amsc1/024.html.
12. According to Defense Department records, the Iraqis fired forty-two Scud missiles at Israel, targeting Tel Aviv, Haifa,
and the Israeli nuclear reactor and weapons facility at Dimona in the Negev Desert. OGA-1040-23-91, Defense Intelligence Agency,
Defense Intelligence Assessment:
Mobile Short-Range Ballistic Missile Targeting in Operation DESERT STORM
, November 1, 1991, p. 1, partially declassified and on file at the National Security Archive, Washington, DC; Captain Brian
J. Cummins, USA,
National Reconnaissance Support to the Army
(Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, June 1994), pp. 69–70.