Authors: Matthew M. Aid
49. For radio scanner usage in Haiti, see CALL,
Operation Uphold Democracy Initial Impressions: Haiti
D-20 to D
+
40
, December 1994, vol. 1, p. 93; CALL,
Operation Uphold Democracy Initial Impressions:
Haiti D-20 to D
+
40
, April 1995, vol. 2, p. 175, both in the library of CALL, Fort Leavenworth, KS. For Bosnia, see Larry K. Wentz, ed.,
Lessons from Bosnia: The IFOR Experience
(Washington, DC: National Strategic Studies Institute, 1997), p. 105.
50. This conclusion is drawn from a review of a large number of declassified “lessons learned” reports currently on file at
CALL, in Fort Leavenworth, KS, as well as unclassified papers written by army intelligence officers for the U.S. Army Command
and Staff College at Fort Leaven-worth. The most incisive of these studies is David W. Becker,
Coming in from the Cold War: Defense
Humint Services Support to Military Operations Other than War
(Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2000).
51. Confidential interviews; Alfred Monteiro, Jr., “Mustering the Force: Cryptologic Support to Military Operations,”
Defense Intelligence Journal
, vol. 4, no. 2 (Fall 1995): pp. 75–76; General Accounting Office, NSIAD-96-6,
Personnel Practices at CIA, NSA and DIA Compared with Those
of Other Agencies
, March 1996, p. 5.
52. Confidential interviews.
53. Defense Department, Office of the Inspector General, Report No. 96-03,
Final Report on the Verification
Inspection of the National Security Agency
, February 13, 1996, p. 2, DOD FOIA.
54. U.S. House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
IC21: Intelligence
Community in the 21st Century
, 104th Congress, 1st session, 1996, pp. 120–21; Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence
Community,
Preparing for the 21st
Century: An Appraisal of U.S. Intelligence
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1996), p. 125. “Bite us in the ass” quote from confidential interview.
55. Confidential interviews.
56. Minihan background from USAF biography, Lt. General Kenneth A. Minihan, U.S. Air Force, Office of Public Affairs, September
1995; “Agency Welcomes New Director, Lt. General Kenneth A. Minihan,”
NSA Newsletter
, April 1996, p. 2, NSA FOIA; R. Jeffrey Smith, “Military Men Named to Top Intelligence Posts,”
Washington Post
, January 25, 1996; Tom Bowman, “Air Force General to Head NSA,”
Baltimore Sun
, January 25, 1996; “Minihan Biography,”
Spokesman
, June 1993, p. 9, AIA FOIA.
57. NSA OH-1999-21, oral history,
Interview with Lt. General Kenneth A. Minihan, USAF (Ret.)
, March 8, 1999, p. 1, NSA FOIA.
58. George Tenet,
At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA
(New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2007), p. 108.
59. Minihan’s “pitch” for more money is contained in Lt. General Ken Minihan, USAF, DIR-540,
NSA/CSS Position Report
, November 9, 1998, NSA FOIA.
60. U.S. House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Report 105-508,
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999
, 105th Congress, 2nd session, May 5, 1998, pp. 9–11; Walter Pincus, “Panel Ties NSA Funds to Changes at Agency,”
Washington Post
, May 7, 1998; interview with John Millis.
61. NSA/CSS, “National Cryptologic Strategy for the 21st Century,” June 1996, NSA FOIA; confidential interviews.
62. Confidential interview. Minihan’s briefing is contained in Lt. General Ken Minihan, USAF, DIR-152, PowerPoint presentation,
“NSA Integration with Military Operations,” March 13, 1997, NSA FOIA.
63. Frank J. Cilluffo, Ronald A. Marks, and George C. Salmoiraghi, “The Use and Limits of U.S. Intelligence,”
Washington Quarterly
, vol. 25, no. 1 (Winter 2002): p. 62.
64. Bill Gertz, “Bin Laden’s Several Links to Terrorist Units Known,”
Washington Times
, August 23, 1998. See also Bill Gertz,
Breakdown: How America’s Intelligence Failures Led to September 11
(Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, 2002), pp. 7, 9. The Gertz 1998 article specifically cites NSA SIGINT intercepts for
the intelligence about these phone calls. The 2002 book does not. For Alexandria, VA, indictment, see FBI, press release and
attached indictment, June 21, 2001, http:// www.fbi.gov/ pressrel/ pressrel01/khobar.htm.
65. Confidential interviews.
66. Trial transcript, May 1, 2001, in 98 Cr. 1028,
United States of America v. Usama bin Laden et al.
, pp. 5287–92, U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York; Nick Fielding and Dipesh Gadhery, “The Next Target:
Britain?,”
Sunday Times
, March 24, 2002. See also government exhibits 48 and 321, attached to trial transcript, April 4, 2001, in
United States of America
v. Usama bin Laden et al.
67. Anonymous [Michael Scheuer], “How
Not
to Catch a Terrorist,”
Atlantic Monthly
, December 2004, p. 50.
68. Confidential interviews; DCI Counterterrorist Center,
Bin Laden Preparing to Hijack US Aircraft
and Other Attacks
, December 4, 1998, CIA Electronic FOIA Reading Room, Document No. 0001110635, http://www.foia.cia.gov; Walter Pincus and
Vernon Loeb, “CIA Blocked Two Attacks Last Year,”
Washington Post
, August 11, 1998; “Islam Rising,”
Atlantic Monthly
, February 17, 1999, http:www.theatlantic.com/unbound/bookauth/ba990217.htm; “Terrorism Directed at America,” ERRI Daily Intelligence
Report, February 24, 1999, http://www.emergency.com/ 1999/bnldn -pg.htm; Walter Pincus, “CIA Touts Successes in Fighting Terrorism,”
Washington
Post
, November 1, 2002.
69. For NSA designating al Qaeda its top target in the aftermath of the East Africa bombings, see U.S. Senate, Report No.
107-351, and U.S. House of Representatives, Report No. 107-792, report of the U.S. Senate Select Committee in Intelligence
and U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After
the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001
, 107th Congress, 2nd session, December 2002 (declassified and released in July 2003), p. 377. The 9/11 Commission identified
a specific
Washington
Times
article as having alerted bin Laden to the fact that NSA was monitoring his phone calls. The article in question was Martin
Sieff, “Terrorist Is Driven by Hatred for U.S., Israel,”
Washington Times
, August 21, 1998. See National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States,
The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks upon the United States
(New York: W. W. Norton, 2004), p. 127.
70. Vernon Loeb, “General Named to Head NSA,”
Washington Post
, February 25, 1999; “DIRNSA’s Desk” and “Agency Welcomes New Director Lieutenant General Michael V. Hayden,”
NSA
Newsletter
, May 1999, pp. 3–4, NSA FOIA. A very readable rendition of Hayden’s days in the former Yugo slavia in the mid-1990s can be
found in Michael V. Hayden, “Warfighters and Intelligence: One Team—One Fight,”
Defense Intelligence Journal
, vol. 4, no. 2 (Fall 1995): pp. 17–30.
71. U.S. Naval Academy, PowerPoint presentation, “Information Warfare Information Operations,” undated, http://prodevweb.prodev.usna.edu/
SeaNav/ns310/Web%20Documents/ppt %20docs/ iwlesson.ppt.
72. Confidential interview.
73. NSA Scientific Advisory Board, Panel on Conventional Collection,
Report to the Director
NSA/CSS
, March 9, 1999, NSA FOIA; NSA Scientific Advisory Board, Panel on Digital Network Intelligence (DNI) (formerly “C2C”),
Report to the Director
, June 28, 1999, NSA FOIA; memorandum, Taylor to DIRNSA,
Thoughts on Strategic Issues for the Institution
, April 9, 1999, p. 3. The author is grateful to Dr. Jeffrey T. Richelson for making available a copy of this document.
74. NSA/CSS, New Enterprise Team (NETeam) recommendations,
The Director’s Work Plan for
Change
, October 1, 1999, NSA FOIA; NSA/CSS, external team report,
A Management Review for
the Director, NSA
, October 22, 1999, NSA FOIA.
75. DIRgram-00, “100 Days of Change,” November 10, 1999; DIRgram-01, “Change, Candor, and Honesty,” November 15, 1999; DIRgram-02;
“Our New Executive Leadership Team,” November 16, 1999; DIRgram-05, “Expanded Role for Our Executive Director,” November 19,
1999; DIRgram-06, “Deputy Chief Central Security Service,” November 22, 1999; DIRgram-07, “Getting Our Financial House in
Order,” November 23, 1999; DIRgram-08, “Bringing in Outside Help,” November 24, 1999; DIRgram-11, “Major Dollar Decisions,”
December 1, 1999; DIRgram-28, “Resuming the Journey,” January 3, 2000, all NSA FOIA; NSA/CSS,
Transition
2001
, December 2000, p. 19. The author is grateful to Dr. Jeffrey T. Richelson for making a copy of this document available. Hayden
announcement quote from “DIRNSA’s Desk,”
NSA Newsletter
, January 2000, p. 3, NSA FOIA.
76. Seymour M. Hersh, “The Intelligence Gap: How the Digital Age Left Our Spies out in the Cold,”
New Yorker
, December 6, 1999.
77. Diane Mezzanotte,
Infocentricity and Beyond: How the Intelligence Community Can Survive the
Challenge of Emerging Technologies, Shrinking Budgets, and Growing Suspicions
(Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2000), p. 2.
78. NSA/CSS,
Transition 2001
, December 2000, p. 33. See also John McWethy, “Major Failure: NSA Confirms Serious Computer Problem,” ABC News, January 29,
2000; Walter Pincus, “NSA System Inoperative for Four Days,”
Washington Post
, January 30, 2000; Walter Pincus, “NSA System Crash Raises Hill Worries,”
Washington Post
, February 2, 2000; Laura Sullivan, “Computer Failure at NSA Irks Intelligence Panels,”
Baltimore Sun
, February 2, 2000.
79. For the widespread practice by Yemeni tribesmen of taking hostages in order to obtain political or economic concessions
from the Yemeni government, see Director of Central Intelligence, National Intelligence Estimate 94-33/11,
Global Humanitarian Emergencies, 1995
, vol. 2, December 1994, p. 16, CIA Electronic FOIA Reading Room, Document No. 0000619031, http://www.foia.cia.gov.
80. Details of al-Hada’s background from confidential interviews with U.S. and Yemeni intelligence officials.
81. Government exhibits 48 and 321, attached to trial transcript, April 4, 2001, in 98 Cr. 1028,
United States of America v. Usama bin Laden et al.
, U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. See also Fielding and Gadhery, “The Next Target: Britain?”; Rohan
Gunaratna,
Inside
Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror
(New York: Berkley Books, 2003), p. 188.
82. Al-’Owhali was extradited to the United States tostand trial for murder. In 2001, he and three other defendants were convicted
of murder and sentenced to life in prison without parole. He is currently serving his life sentence at the ADX Florence Supermax
prison.
83. For use of the phrase “suspected terrorist facility in the Middle East,” see U.S. Senate, Report No. 107-351, and U.S.
House of Representatives, Report No. 107-792, report of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and U.S. House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence,
Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of
September 11, 2001
, 107th Congress, 2nd session, December 2002 (declassified and released in July 2003), pp. 155–57. For general examination
of the role played by al-Hada, see Michael Isikoff and Daniel Klaidman, “The Hijackers We Let Escape,”
Newsweek
, June 10, 2002, p. 6.
84. U.S. Senate, Report No. 107-351, and U.S. House of Representatives, Report No. 107-792, report of the U.S. Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence and U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After
the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001
, 107th Congress, 2nd session, December 2002 (declassified and released in July 2003), p. 11.
85. “Citing Threats, Britain Joins U.S. in Closing Embassies in Africa,” CNN, June 25, 1999; David Phinney, “Fund-Raising
for Terrorism,” ABC News, July 9, 1999; John McWethy, “U.S. Tries to Get Bin Laden,” ABC News, July 9, 1999; Barbara Starr,
“Bin Laden’s Plans,” ABC News, July 16, 1999.
86. U.S. Senate, Report No. 107-351, and U.S. House of Representatives, report No. 107-792, report of the U.S. Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence and U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the
Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001
, 107th Congress, 2nd session, December 2002 (declassified and released in July 2003), p. 11; National Commission, pp. 156–57.
87. U.S. Senate, Report No. 107-351, and U.S. House of Representatives, Report No. 107-792, report of the U.S. Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence and U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After
the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001
, 107th Congress, 2nd session, December 2002 (declassified and released in July 2003), pp. 12, 143–44; 9/11 Commission,
9/11 Commission Report
, pp. 181, 353.
88. 9/11 Commission,
9/11 Commission Report
, pp. 215–18.
89. Justice Department, Office of the Inspector General,
Special Report: A Review of the FBI’s Handling
of Intelligence Information Related to the September 11 Attacks
, chap. 5, part B, “Hazmi and Mihdhar in San Diego,” sec. 3, Hazmi and Mihdhar’s Communications, November 2004 (released Jan.
2006); U.S. Senate, Report No. 107-351, and U.S. House of Representatives, Report No. 107-792, report of the U.S. Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence and U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities
Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001
, 107th Congress, 2nd session, December 2002 (declassified and released in July 2003), pp. 16–17, 157.