Authors: Matthew M. Aid
13. Defense Intelligence Agency, OGA-1040-23-91,
Defense Intelligence Assessment: Mobile Short-
Range Ballistic Missile Targeting in Operation DESERT STORM
, November 1, 1991, p. 7, partially declassified and on file at the National Security Archive, Washington, DC; Cummins,
National
Reconnaissance Support
, p. 70.
14. Confidential interviews with a number of U.S. Army and Marine Corps division, brigade, and regimental commanders conducted
between 1992 and 1995. For “sanitization” problems, see Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communication
and Intelligence), Intelligence Program Support Group,
Final Report: Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm
Intelligence Dissemination Study
, 1992, p. 4–15, DoD Electronic FOIA Reading Room. See also Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner,
The Lessons of Modern War
, vol. 4,
The Gulf
War
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), p. 296.
15. Use of Iraqi Americans in the military for SIGINT service from anonymous letter, “Army Linguists,”
Soldiers
, August 2001, http:// www.army.mil/Soldiers/ aug2001/ feedback.html. The secret hiring of three hundred Kuwaitis from U.S.
Army Intelligence and Security Command,
Annual Historical Review, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM): Fiscal Year
1991
, appendix K, 1992, p. 31, INSCOM FOIA. Quote from Brigadier General John F. Stewart, Jr., USA,
Operation Desert Storm: The Military Intelligence Story: A View from the G-2 3rd U.S. Army
, April 1991, p. 22, INSCOM FOIA
16. Major William E. David, USA,
Modularity: A Force Design Methodology for the Force XXI Divisional
Military Intelligence Battalion
(Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1995), pp. 18–19.
17. U.S. House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Report No. 101-1008,
Report by the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
, 101st Congress, 2nd session, January 2, 1991, p. 9.
18. Defense Department, Office of the Inspector General, Report No. 96-03,
Final Report on the
Verification Inspection of the National Security Agency
, February 13, 1996, p. 2, DOD FOIA.
19. NSA/CSS, report of the Director’s Task Force on Organizational and Procedural Dysfunction,
Bureaucracy and NSA: Management’s Views
, March 1991, pp. 1–2, NSA FOIA.
20. This conclusion came through loud and clear in a March 1992 report to the director of the CIA, which held NSA out to be
a model of what the U.S. intelligence community should have been aspiring to, stating, “NSA’s control and influence over almost
all aspects of the SIGINT discipline offers a sense of cohesion, focus and accountability that would be advantageous to invest
in.” ICS-4548/92, memorandum, Imagery Blue Ribbon Task Force to Director of Central Intelligence,
Transmittal of Report Regarding Restructuring the Imagery Community
, March 6, 1992, p. 11, MOR DocID: 924226, CIA FOIA.
21. President George H. W. Bush, “Remarks at a Presen tation Ceremony for the National Security Agency Worldwide Awards in
Fort Meade, Mary land,” May 1, 1991, http://csdl.tamu.edu/ bushlibrary/papers/1991/91050101.html.
22. U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence,
Report Together with Additional and Minority
Views: Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1994 for Intelligence Activities
, 103rd Congress, 2nd session, July 28, 1993, p. 4; memorandum, Studeman to All Employees,
Farewell
, April 8, 1992, p. 1, NSA FOIA; “A Visit with the Deputy Director,”
NSA Newsletter
, November 1990, p. 2, NSA FOIA.
23. Confidential interviews.
24. Cummins,
National Reconnaissance Support
, p. 5.
25. Memorandum, Studeman to All Employees,
Farewell
, April 8, 1992, NSA FOIA.
26. Memorandum, Taylor to DIRNSA,
Thoughts on Strategic Issues for the Institution
, April 9, 1999, p.3. The author is grateful to Dr. Jeffrey T. Richelson for making available a copy of this document.
27. SOV 91-10039X, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence,
The Implications of a Breakup of the USSR:
Defense Assets at Risk
, September 1991, CIA Electronic FOIA Reading Room, Document 0000499575, http://www.foia.cia.gov.
28. Confidential interview.
29. “Third Party Nations: Partners and Targets,”
Cryptologic Quarterly
, vol. 7, no. 4 (Winter 1989): p. 17, DOCID: 3221078, NSA FOIA.
30. Confidential interviews.
31. McConnell background from biographical data sheet, Rear Admiral John Michael McConnell, Department of the Navy, Office
of Public affairs, August 1, 1991; “Agency Welcomes New Director Vice Admiral John Michael McConnell,”
NSA Newsletter
, August 1992, p. 2, NSA FOIA.
32. For McConnell’s recollections of this time period, see John M. McConnell, “The Role of the Current Intelligence Officer
for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” Seminar on Intelligence, Command and Control, Center for Information Policy
Research, Harvard University, August 1994.
33. Lawrence Wright, “The Spymaster,”
New Yorker
, January 21, 2008, p. 44.
34. Letter, McConnell to Senator Sam Nunn with enclosure, April 28, 1992, p. 5, NSA FOIA.
35. “NSA Plans for the Future,”
NSA Newsletter
, January 1993, p. 4, NSA FOIA; Department of Defense, Office of the Inspector General, Report No. IR 96-03,
Final Report on the Verification Inspection
of the National Security Agency
, February 13, 1996, p. 6. “Not warmly embraced” quote from John M. McConnell, “The Evolution of Intelligence and the Public
Policy Debate on Encryption,” p. 153, Seminar on Intelligence, Command and Control, Center for Information Policy Research,
Harvard University, January 1997.
36. This period at NSA is detailed in Aid, “Time of Troubles.” For the decline in the size of the bud get and personnel of
the U.S. intelligence community, see Charlie Allen, Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Collection, PowerPoint
presentation, “Intelligence Community Overview for Japanese Visitors from Public Security Investigation Agency,” June 22,
1998, http://cryptome.org/cia-ico.htm; “Statement for the Record by Lt. General Michael V. Hayden, USAF, Director NSA/CSS
Before the Joint Inquiry of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,”
October 17, 2002, p. 6. “One of the side effects” quote from U.S. Senate, Report No. 107-351, and U.S. House of Representatives,
Report No. 107-792, report of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence,
Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and
After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001
, 107th Congress, 2nd session, December 2002 (declassified and released in July 2003), p. 76.
37. Major Harold E. Bullock, USAF,
Peace by Committee: Command and Control Issues in Multinational
Peace Enforcement Operations
(Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: School of Advanced Airpower Studies, 1994), pp. 9–10; Norman L. Cooling, “Operation Restore Hope
in Somalia: A Tactical Action Turned Strategic Defeat,”
Marine Corps Gazette
, September 2001, p. 92. “Somalis from salami” quote from Robert F. Baumann, Lawrence A. Yates, and Versalle F. Washington,
“My
Clan Against the World”: US and Co alition Forces in Somalia, 1992–1994
(Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2003), p. 48.
38. For the Marine Corps radio battalion detachment SIGINT operations in Somalia, see I Marine Expeditionary Force,
I MEF Command Chronology 1992
, sec. 2, pp. 22–23, passim, Marine Corps Historical Center, Quantico, VA. For examples of the SIGINT collected from Aideed’s
militia, see U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command,
Annual Command History, U.S. Army Intelligence
and Security Command (INSCOM): Fiscal Year 1993
, 1994, p. 35, INSCOM FOIA; trial transcript, April 23, 2001, in 98 Cr. 1028,
United States of America v. Usama bin Laden et al.
, pp. 4458–59, U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. For Travis Trophy award, see press release, “1st
Radio Battalion Wins NSA’s Director’s Trophy for 1993,” Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, Division of Public Affairs, May 4,
1994; “Honoring the Best of the Best,”
NSA Newsletter
, July 1994, p. 3, NSA FOIA.
39. U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command,
Annual Command History, U.S. Army Intelligence
and Security Command (INSCOM): Fiscal Year 1994
, 1995, p. 32, INSCOM FOIA; Air Intelligence Agency,
History of the Air Intelligence Agency: 1 January–31 December 1994
, vol. 1, pp. 30–31, AIA FOIA; Lt. Commander Darren Sawyer, USN, “JTF JIC Operations: Critical Success Factors,”
Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin
, April–June 1995, p. 11; “704th MI Brigade,”
Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin
, April–June 1996; “23rd IS Thrives in Joint Environment,”
Spokesman
, October 1995, p. 20, AIA FOIA; Lt. Col. Bob Butler, “23rd IS Inactivation Ceremony,”
Spokesman
, August 1996, p. 5, AIA FOIA; George J. Church, “Destination Haiti,”
Newsweek
, September 26, 1994, p. 23; Scott Shane and Tom Bowman, “America’s Fortress of Spies,”
Baltimore Sun
, December 3, 1995.
40. CALL,
Operation Uphold Democracy Initial Impressions: Haiti D-20 to D
+
40
, vol. 1, December 1994, p. 93; CALL,
Operation Uphold Democracy Initial Impressions: Haiti D-20 to D
+
40
, vol. 2, April 1995, p. 175, both in the library of CALL, Fort Leavenworth, KS. See also 2nd Lt. Tania Chacho, “XVII Airborne
CMISE Support in Haiti,”
Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin
, April–June 1995, pp. 14–17.
41. “Yugo slavia: Army Fails to Ease Tension,”
National Intelligence Daily
, April 2, 1991, p. 9, CIA Electronic FOIA Reading Room, Document No. 0000372387, http://www.foia.cia.gov. Zimmermann quote
from oral history,
Interview with Warren Zimmermann
, December 10, 1996, Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, Library of
Congress, Washington, DC. For Zimmermann’s account of his time in Belgrade, see Warren Zimmermann, “The Last Ambassador: A
Memoir of the Collapse of Yugoslavia,”
Foreign
Affairs
, March/April 1995, pp. 2–21; Warren Zimmermann,
Origins of a Catastrophe: Yugo-
slavia and Its Destroyers—America’s Last Ambassador Tells What Happened and Why
(New York: Crown, 1996).
42. Confidential interview. See message, DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force to members,
Task
Force Information
, December 29, 1992, CIA Electronic FOIA Reading Room, http://www.foia.cia.gov; Major William P. Clappin, USA,
Moving Signals Intelligence from National Systems to
Army Warfighters at Corps and Division
(Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, June 5, 1998), p. 34. For SIGINT targeting of Bosnian
Serb air defense systems, see Tim Ripley, “Operation Deny Flight,”
World Air Power Journal
, vol. 16 (Spring 1994): pp. 19–20; Dylan Eklund, “The Reconnaissance Squadron,”
Air World International
, November 1995, p. 36; Chris Pocock, “U-2: The Second Generation,”
World Air Power Journal
, vol. 28 (Spring 1997): p. 94.
43. Urban,
UK Eyes Alpha
, p. 216; Tim Ripley,
Operation Deliberate Force
(Lancaster, U.K.: Center for Defence and International Security Studies, 1999), p. 64; Paul Quinn-Judge, “Serbs Called Low
on Fuel, Options,”
Boston Globe
, June 1, 1995, p. 1; Karsten Prager, “Message from Serbia,”
Time
, July 17, 1995.
44. Walter Pincus, “U.S. Sought Other Bosnia Arms Sources,”
Washington Post
, April 26, 1996; James Risen, “Iran Paid Bosnian Leader, CIA Says,”
Los Angeles Times
, December 31, 1996.
45. Robert C. Owens, Col., USAF,
Deliberate Force: A Case Study in Effective Air Campaigning
(Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: School of Advanced Airpower Studies, 1988), pp. 8-14–8-16; Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron
Six,
Command History Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron Six for
CY 1995
, enclosure 1, 1996, p. 3, Navy FOIA; “Operation Deliberate Force,”
World Air Power
Journal
, vol. 24 (Spring 1996): pp. 24, 28.
46. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology,
Report of the Defense Science
Board Task Force on Improved Application of Intelligence to the Battlefield: May–July 1996
, July 1996, p. 49, DoD FOIA; Clappin,
Moving Signals Intelligence
, p. 34; Major Kathleen A. Gavle, USA,
Division Intelligence Requirements for Sustained Peace Enforcement Operations
(Fort Leaven-worth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2000), pp. 16–17.
For a few examples of SIGINT success stories in the post–Dayton Peace Accords period, see Rick Atkinson, “GIs Signal Bosnians:
Yes, We’re Listening,”
Washington Post
, March 18, 1996; Rick Atkinson, “Warriors Without a War,”
Washington Post
, April 14, 1996.
47. Seymour M. Hersh,
Chain of Command: The Road from 9/11 to Abu Ghraib
(New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2004), pp. 324–30.
48. John M. Goshko, “Transcripts Show Joking Cuban Pilots,”
Washington Post
, February 28, 1996; Barbara Crossette, “U.S. Says Cubans Knew They Fired on Civilian Planes,”
New York Times
, February 28, 1996; Mabell Dieppa, “Basulto: U.S. Conspired with Cuba,”
Miami Herald
, January 18, 1997. For intelligence coverage of the Cuban reaction to the shootdown incident, see “Cuba: Casting Shootdown
as Bilateral Issue,”
National Intelligence Daily
, February 27, 1996, CIA Electronic FOIA Reading Room, Document No. 0000957791, http://www.foia.cia.gov; “Cuba: Handling Aftermath
of Shootdown,”
National Intelligence Daily
, February 29, 1996, CIA Electronic FOIA Reading Room, Document No. 0000957792, http://www.foia.cia.gov; “Cuba: Behind the
Shootdown,”
National Intelligence Daily
, March 2, 1996, CIA Electronic FOIA Reading Room, Document No. 0000957793, http://www.foia.cia.gov.