Authors: Matthew M. Aid
35. Confidential interview.
36. 3rd Infantry Division,
Operation Iraqi Freedom: 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized) “Rock of the
Marne” After Action Report
, Operational Overview Section, Battle for Tallil, March 21, 2003, final draft, 2003, Army FOIA.
37. Major Walker M. Field, USMC, “Marine Artillery in the Battle of An Nasiriyah,”
Field Artillery
, November–December 2003, p. 29.
38. Oral history,
Interview with Major Steven Bower
, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, October 30, 2006, p. 7; oral history,
Interview with Major Nicole Stanford
, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, May 4, 2007, p. 7.
39. Julian Borger, “The Crucial Moment; US Must Defeat Elite Iraqi Troops,”
U.K. Guardian
, March 25, 2003.
40. Confidential interview. For the importance placed on defeating the Medina Division by army planners, see Kitfield, “Army’s
Race to Baghdad.”
41. Dana Priest and Walter Pincus, “Havens Offered to Defectors,”
Washington Post
, March 22, 2003; Walter Pincus, “Evidence on Hussein Detailed,”
Washington Post
, March 24, 2003; David E. Sanger, “Officials Fear Iraqis Plan to Use Gas,”
New York Times
, March 25, 2003.
42. Corey Pein, “The Tech Fix,”
Metro Spirit
, June 20, 2006, http://metrospirit.com.
43. Col. Gregory R. Fontenot, U.S. Army, Ret.,
On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi
Freedom
(Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2004), p. 89.
44. Sig Christenson, “Flight into Ambush,”
San Antonio Express-News
, March 21, 2004, http://www.mysanantonio.com/ news/military/stories/ MYSA21.01A.Longbow_1_0321.7d24b3c.html.
45. Transcript,
Fifth Corps Commander Live Briefing from Baghdad
, May 7, 2003, http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid =2573.
46. For the Guardrail mission over the Karbala Gap, confidential interviews. For the artillery strike on the Medina Division,
see Colonel Theodore J. Janosko and Lt. Colonel Robert G. Cheatam Jr., “The Sound of Thunder: VCA in Operation Iraqi Freedom,”
Field Artillery Journal
, September– October 2003, p. 36.
47. Col. James Poss, “Intelligence Family Made NTI Successful,”
Spokesman
, July 2003, AIA FOIA. This article was pulled from the AIA Web site at some point after its publication in 2003.
48. Bernard Weinraub, “Army Reports Iraq Is Moving Toxic Arms to Its Troops,”
New York Times
, March 28, 2003.
49. “Rumsfeld Warns Syria,”
Chicago Sun-Times
, March 28, 2003.
50. Interview, Lt. General William Scott Wallace, “The Invasion of Iraq,” PBS,
Frontline
, February 26, 2004, http:// www.pbs.org/wgbh/ pages/frontline/shows/invasion/interviews/ wallace.html.
51. “Blood. Blood. Blood.” quote from General Tommy Franks (USA, Ret.),
American Soldier
(New York: Regan Books, 2004), p. 515. See also H.A.S.C. No. 108-15, U.S. House of Representatives, Armed Services Committee,
Operation Iraqi Freedom: Operations and Reconstruction
, 108th Congress, 1st session, July 10, 2003, p. 79; Rick Atkinson, Peter Baker, and Thomas E. Ricks, “Confused Start, Decisive
End,”
Washington Post
, April 13, 2003.
52. Interview, Lt. General James Conway, “The Invasion of Iraq,” PBS,
Frontline
, February 26, 2004, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/ pages/frontline/ shows/invasion/ interviews/ conway.html.
53. James Kitfield, “March on Baghdad Brings Mix of Power, Flexibility,”
National Journal
, April 4, 2003.
54. Bob Drogin, “Iraqi ‘Chatter’ Threatens Use of Chemicals,”
Los Angeles Times
, April 3, 2003.
55. Oral history,
Interview with Major Erik Berdy
, January 20, 2006, p. 17, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS.
56. Confidential interviews.
57. Greg Grant, “Network Centric Blind Spot: Intelligence Failed to Detect Massive Iraqi Counterattack,”
Defense News
, September 12, 2005, p. 1.
58. Gordon and Trainor,
Cobra II
, p. 352; David Talbot, “How Technology Failed in Iraq,”
Technology
Review
, November 2004.
59. The most detailed coverage of the incident at the Diyala Canal bridge can be found in John Koopman, “The Compound,”
San Francisco Chronicle
, November 14, 2003.
60. Confidential interview.
61. Choate, “Knowing,” p. 20. SIGINT’s role in preventing this ambush is also obliquely referred to in Lt. General Keith B.
Alexander, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2, U.S. Senate, statement before the Armed Services
Committee,
Hearings on Fiscal
Year 2005 Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP) and Army Tactical Intelligence and Related
Activities (TIARA)
, 108th Congress, 2nd session, April 7, 2004, p. 21.
62. John Koopman, “Iraq, Not Friendly Fire, Killed Marines, U.S. Says,”
San Francisco Chronicle
, April 10, 2003.
63. Lt. General Keith B. Alexander, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2, Statement before the
U.S. Senate Armed Ser vices Committee,
Hearings on Fiscal Year 2005 Joint
Military Intelligence Program (JMIP) and Army Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA)
, U.S. Senate, 108th Congress, 2nd session, April 7, 2004, p. 21; oral history,
Interview with Major
Christopher Carter
, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, June 28, 2006, p. 19; Bernard Weinraub, “U.S. Military Says It Hears Hussein
Son Calling Shots,”
New York Times
, April 8, 2003.
64. Fred Kaplan, “Smart Bombs, Dumb Targets,”
Slate
, December 16, 2003, http://www.slate.com/ id/ 2092759/.
65. Confidential interview.
66. Poss, “Intelligence Family.”
67. Confidential interview.
68. Confidential interviews.
69. Confidential interviews. See also U.S. Marine Corps, Major J. P. Myers, Enduring Freedom Combat Assessment Team, PowerPoint
presentation, “Intelligence Operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom,” slide 13, August 2003, https:// www.mccdc.usmc.mil.
70. U.S. Marine Corps, Enduring Freedom Combat Assessment Team, PowerPoint presentation, briefing to MORS, “Information Management
Issues Emerging from USMC Experience in Operation Iraqi Freedom,” slide 16, October 28, 2003, http:www.mors.org/meetings/c2_2003/Exner.pdf.
71. Department of the Navy, Office of Naval Research, BAA #07-008, presentation, “Command and Control Systems (C2 and CS),
Programmic Issues,” January 29, 2007, http:www.onr.navy.mil/sci_tech/31/docs/c2cs_Fy08_industry_day_academia.pdf.
72. U.S. Marine Corps, Major J. P. Myers, Enduring Freedom Combat Assessment Team, Power-Point presentation, “Intelligence
Operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom,” slide 19, August 2003, https://www.mccdc.usmc.mil.
73. Oral history,
Interview with Major Steven Bower
, October 30, 2006, p. 7, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS.
74. Oral history,
Interview with Major Kris Arnold
, April 1, 2005, p. 7, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS; confidential interviews.
15: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly
1. Sean Loughlin, “Rumsfeld on Looting in Iraq: ‘Stuff Happens,’ ” CNN, April 12, 2003.
2. Oral history,
Interview with Colo nel James Boozer
, January 24, 2006, p. 5, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS.
3. Warren P. Strobel and John Walcott, “Post-war Planning Non-Existent,” Knight Ridder Newspapers, October 17, 2004; Michael
R. Gordon, “The Strategy to Secure Iraq Did Not Foresee a 2nd War,”
New York Times
, October 19, 2004.
4. “513th Military Intelligence Brigade,”
Mirage
, vol. 1, Fourth Quarter ed. (2003): p. 20; Dr. Donald P. Wright and Col. Timothy R. Reese,
On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign
(Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008), p. 193.
5. Oral history,
Interview with Major Ronald Beadenkopf
, November 15, 2006, p. 9, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS.
6. Confidential interviews.
7. Oral history,
Interview with Major Ronald Beadenkopf
, November 15, 2006, p. 4, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS.
8. Douglas Jehl, “U.S. Withdraws a Team of Weapons Hunters from Iraq,”
New York Times
, January 8, 2004.
9. “Rumsfeld Blames Iraq Problems on ‘Pockets of Dead-Enders,’ ”
USA Today
, June 18, 2003.
10. Michael Keane, “The Guerrilla Advantage in Iraq,”
Los Angeles Times
, November 18, 2003.
11. Anthony Shadid, “Two U.S. Soldiers Killed in Iraqi Baath Bastion,”
Washington Post
, May 28, 2003.
12. Eric Schmitt, “New Spy Gear Aims to Thwart Attacks in Iraq,”
New York Times
, October 23, 2003; David Rieff, “Blueprint for a Mess,”
New York Times
, November 2, 2003.
13. Oral history,
Interview with Major Steven Bower
, October 30, 2006, p. 8, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS.
14. Michael J. Gearty, “Lessons Learned: Task Force Sentinel Freedom OEF/OIF,”
Military Intelligence
Professional Bulletin
, October–December 2003; CALL,
Initial Impressions Report: Operations
in Samarra, Iraq: Stryker Brigade Combat Team 1, 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry
, December 2004, p. 38, CALL, Fort Leavenworth, KS; oral history,
Interview with Major Chris Budihas
, January 31, 2006, p. 12, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS.
15. Oral history,
Interview with Major Ronald Beadenkopf
, November 15, 2006, p. 6, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS.
16. Confidential interviews.
17. 3rd Infantry Division,
Operation Iraqi Freedom: 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized) “Rock of the
Marne” After Action Report
, 2003, p. 15, Army FOIA.
18. D.J. Reyes, “Intelligence Battlefield Operating System Lessons Learned: Stability Operations and Support Operations During
Operation Iraqi Freedom,”
Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin
, January–March 2004.
19. For Korean linguists, see oral history,
Interview with Major Greg Ford
, May 23, 2007, p. 8, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS. Joe Bauman, “Long Iraq Stay Irks Utahns,”
Salt
Lake City Deseret Morning News
, September 8, 2003; Anne O’Donnell, “The Translator Crisis,”
New Republic
, December 22, 2003. For Serbo-Croatian linguists with the First Armored Division, confidential interview.
20. Kendall G. Gott, ed.,
Eyewitness to War: The US Army in Operation AL FAJR: An Oral History
, vol. 1 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006), p. 3; oral history,
Interview
with Major Ronald Beadenkopf
, November 15, 2006, pp. 3–5, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS.
21. CALL,
Initial Impressions Report: Operations in Mosul, Iraq, Stryker Brigade Combat Team 1, 3rd
Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division
, December 21, 2004, pp. 68, 75, CALL, Fort Leavenworth, KS.
22. Confidential interview.
23. Oral history,
Interview with Lt. Colonel David Seigel
, October 5, 2006, p. 6, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS.
24. Confidential interviews. For the formation of Cobra Focus, Collin Agee, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2, “PowerPoint presentation,
Army Intelligence Transformation,” given at Association of the U.S. Army (AUSA) Annual Conference, “Actionable Intelligence
Panel,” October 26, 2004. The slides accompanying this presentation were removed from the AUSA Web site at some point after
2004.
25. Oral history,
Interview with Sergeant Major Kevin Gainey
, December 9, 2005, p. 9, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS.
26. Wright and Reese,
On Part II
, p. 222.
27. Confidential interview; Thomas E. Ricks,
Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq
(New York: Penguin Press, 2006), pp. 408–09.
28. Confidential interviews; oral history,
Interview with Major Greg Ford
, May 23, 2007, p. 9, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS; Lt. Colonel Robert P. Whalen, Jr., “Everything Old Is
New Again: Task Force Phantom in the Iraq War,”
Military Review
, May–June 2007, pp. 31–35.
29. Oral history,
Interview with Major Thomas Neemeyer
, December 2, 2005, p. 8, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS; oral history,
Interview with Lt. Colo nel Henry A. Arnold
, October 21, 2005, p. 15, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS.
30. Confidential interviews; Scott Wilson, “Chalabi Aides Suspected of Spying for Iran,”
Washington
Post
, May 22, 2004; Rupert Cornwell, “Chalabi Falls from Grace as US Spy Row Erupts,”
U.K. Independent
, June 3, 2004.
31. James Risen and David Johnston, “Chalabi Reportedly Told Iran That U.S. Had Code,”
New
York Times
, July 2, 2004; David Johnston and James Risen, “Polygraph Testing Starts at Pentagon in Chalabi Inquiry,”
New York Times
, June 3, 2004.
32. Confidential interviews.
33. The background on the Battle of Fallujah can be found in Colonel John R. Ballard, “Lessons Learned from Operation AL FAJR:
The Liberation of Fallujah,” presented at the 10th Annual Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium: The Future
of C2, April 6, 2005, pp. 4–5.
34. A detailed description of the first Battle of Fallujah can be found in U.S. Army National Ground Intelligence Center,
Complex Environments: Battle of Fallujah I, April 2004
, March 6, 2006, https://www.wikileaks.org/leak/fallujah.pdf.
35. Oral history,
Interview with Captain Natalie Friel
, July 28, 2006, p. 6, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS.