Strategy (131 page)

33
. William Riker,
The Strategy of Rhetoric
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996), 4.

1
. Cited by Martin Hollis and Robert Sugden, “Rationality in Action,”
Mind
102, no. 405 (January 1993): 3.

2
. Anthony Downs,
An Economic Theory of Democracy
(New York: Harper & Row, 1957), 5.

3
. Riker,
The Theory of Political Coalitions
, 20 (see chap. 36, n. 17).

4
. See pp. 153–154.

5
. Brian Forst and Judith Lucianovic, “The Prisoner's Dilemma: Theory and Reality,”
Journal of Criminal Justice
5 (1977): 55–64.

6
. For example, Nalebuff and Brandenburger granted that the “simple textbooks present a view of ‘rational man' that doesn't apply very well to the mixed-up, real world of business. But that's a problem with the textbooks.” For Nalebuff and Brandenburger, a rational person “does the best he can” depending on his perception, which is affected by the amount of information available and how he evaluates the various outcomes. This argued for remembering to look at a game from multiple perspectives. “To us,” they concluded, “the issue of whether people are rational or irrational is largely beside the point.” There is something refreshing about a book purporting to represent game theory to a wider business audience ducking so brazenly the fundamental conceptual issue that had shaped its methodology and potentially limited its application. Nalebuff and Brandenburger,
Co-Opetition
, 56–58.

7
. Introduction in Jon Elster, ed.,
Rational Choice
(New York: New York University Press, 1986), 16. Green and Shapiro,
Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory
, 20 (see chap. 36, n. 13) cite Elster to demonstrate the burdens strict criteria place on researchers. Elster was an early advocate for rational choice theory who later became disenchanted.

8
. On the inability of individuals to manage formal reasoning and understand statistical methods, see John Conlisk, “Why Bounded Rationality?”
Journal of Economic Literature
34, no. 2 (June 1996): 670.

9
. Faruk Gul and Wolfgang Pesendorfer, “The Case for Mindless Economics,” in A. Caplin and A. Shotter, eds.,
Foundations of Positive and Normative Economics
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

10
. Khurana,
From Higher Aims to Higher Hands
, see Chapter 32, n. 10, 284–285.

11
. Herbert A. Simon, “A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics
69, no. 1 (February 1955): 99–118. See also “Information Processing Models of Cognition,”
Annual Review of Psychology
30, no. 3 (February 1979): 363–396. Herbert A. Simon and William G. Chase, “Skill in Chess,”
American Scientist
61, no. 4 (July 1973): 394–403.

12
. Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,”
Science
185, no. 4157 (September 1974): 1124. See also Daniel Kahneman, “A Perspective on Judgment and Choice: Mapping Bounded Rationality,”
American Psychologist
56, no. 9 (September 2003): 697–720.

13
. “IRRATIONALITY: Rethinking thinking,”
The Economist
, December 16, 1999, available at
http://www.economist.com/node/268946
.

14
. Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice,”
Science
211, no. 4481 (1981): 453–458; “Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions,”
Journal of Business
59, no. 4, Part 2 (October 1986): S251–S278.

15
. Richard H. Thaler, “Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice,”
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
1, no. 1 (March 1980): 36–90; “Mental Accounting and Consumer Choice,”
Marketing Science
4, no. 3 (Summer 1985): 199–214.

16
. Joseph Henrich, Steven J. Heine, and Ara Norenzayan, “The Weirdest People in the World?”
Behavioral and Brain Sciences
, 2010, 1–75.

17
. Chris D. Frith and Tania Singer, “The Role of Social Cognition in Decision Making,”
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society
363, no. 1511 (December 2008): 3875–3886; Colin Camerer and Richard H. Thaler, “Ultimatums, Dictators and Manners,”
Journal of Economic Perspectives
9, no. 2: 209–219; A. G. Sanfey, J. K. Rilling, J. A. Aronson, L. E. Nystrom, and J. D. Cohen, “The Neural Basis of Economic Decisionmaking in the Ultimatum Game,”
Science
300, no. 5626 (2003): 1755–1758. For a survey, see Angela A. Stanton,
Evolving Economics: Synthesis
, April 26, 2006, Munich Personal RePEc Archive, Paper No. 767, posted November 7, 2007, available at
http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/767
/.

18
. Robert Forsythe, Joel L. Horowitz, N. E. Savin, and Martin Sefton, “Fairness in Simple Bargaining Experiments,”
Game Economics Behavior
6 (1994): 347–369.

19
. Elizabeth Hoffman, Kevin McCabe, and Vernon L. Smith, “Social Distance and Other-Regarding Behavior in Dictator Games,”
American Economic Review
86, no. 3 (June 1996): 653–660.

20
. Joseph Patrick Henrich et al., “‘Economic Man' in Cross-Cultural Perspective: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small-Scale Societies,”
Behavioral Brain Science
28 (2005): 813.

21
. Stanton,
Evolving Economics
, 10.

22
. Martin A. Nowak and Karl Sigmund, “The Dynamics of Indirect Reciprocity,”
Journal of Theoretical Biology
194 (1998): 561–574.

23
. Altruistic punishment has been shown to have a vital role in maintaining cooperation in groups. See Herbert Gintis, “Strong Reciprocity and Human Sociality,”
Journal of Theoretical Biology
206, no. 2 (September 2000): 169–179.

24
. Mauricio R. Delgado, “Reward-Related Responses in the Human Striatum,”
Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences
1104 (May 2007): 70–88.

25
. Fabrizio Ferraro, Jeffrey Pfeffer, and Robert I. Sutton, “Economics, Language and Assumptions: How Theories Can Become Self-Fulfilling,”
The Academy of Management Review
30, no. 1 (January 2005): 14–16; Gerald Marwell and Ruth E. Ames, “Economists Free Ride, Does Anyone Else? Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods,”
Journal of Public Economics
15 (1981): 295–310.

26
. Dale T. Miller, “The Norm of Self-Interest,”
American Psychologist
54, no. 12 (December 1999): 1055, cited in Ferraro et al., “Economics, Language and Assumptions,” 14.

27
. “Economics Focus: To Have and to Hold,”
The Economist
, August 28, 2003, available at
http://www.economist.com/node/2021010
.

28
. Alan G. Sanfey, “Social Decision-Making: Insights from Game Theory and Neuroscience,”
Science
318 (2007): 598.

29
. See Guido Möllering, “Inviting or Avoiding Deception Through Trust: Conceptual Exploration of an Ambivalent Relationship,” MPIfG Working Paper 08/1, 2008, 6.

30
. Rachel Croson, “Deception in Economics Experiments,” in Caroline Gerschlager, ed.,
Deception in Markets: An Economic Analysis
(London: Macmillan, 2005), 113.

31
. Erving Goffman,
The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life
(New York: Doubleday, 1959), 83–84. Students of deception have sought to revive an old word
paltering
, which is defined as acting insincerely or misleadingly, creating a false impression through “fudging, twisting, shading, bending, stretching, slanting, exaggerating, distorting, whitewashing, and selective reporting.” Frederick Schauer and Richard Zeckhauser, “Paltering,” in Brooke Harrington, ed.,
Deception: From Ancient Empires to Internet Dating
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), 39.

32
. Uta Frith and Christopher D. Frith, “Development and Neurophysiology of Mentalizing,”
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, London
358, no. 1431 (March 2003): 459–473. Responses to another's pain were found in the same area of the brain where individuals respond to their own pain. An individual's own pain, however, would lead to an effort to do something about it, and this required the activation of other parts of the brain. It was perhaps a legacy of the evolutionary process that by looking at others, important clues could be discerned about what to feel. In the faces of others could be seen warnings of an impending danger. T. Singer, B. Seymour, J. O'Doherty, H. Kaube, R. J. Dolan, and C. D. Frith, “Empathy for Pain Involves the Affective but Not Sensory Components of Pain,”
Science
303, no. 5661 (February 2004): 1157–1162; Vittorio Gallese, “The Manifold Nature of Interpersonal Relations: The Quest for a Common Mechanism,”
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, London
358, no. 1431 (March 2003): 517; Stephany D. Preston and Frank B. M. de-Waal, “Empathy: the Ultimate and Proximate Bases,”
Behavioral and Brain Scences
25 (2002): 1.

33
. R. P. Abelson, “Are Attitudes Necessary?” in B. T. King and E. McGinnies, eds.,
Attitudes, Conflict, and Social Change
(New York: Academic Press, 1972), 19–32, cited in Ira J. Roseman and Stephen J. Read, “Psychologist at Play: Robert P. Abelson's Life and Contributions to Psychological Science,”
Perspectives on Psychological Science
2, no. 1 (2007): 86–97.

34
. R. C. Schank and R. P. Abelson,
Scripts, Plans, Goals and Understanding: An Inquiry into Human Knowledge Structures
(Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1977).

35
. R. P. Abelson, “Script Processing in Attitude Formation and Decision-making,” in J. S. Carroll and J. W. Payne, eds.,
Cognition and Social Behavior
(Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1976).

36
. M. Lyons, T. Caldwell, and S. Shultz, “Mind-Reading and Manipulation—Is Machiavellianism Related to Theory of Mind?”
Journal of Evolutionary Psychology
8, no. 3 (September 2010): 261–274.

37
. Mirowski,
Machine Dreams
, 424.

38
. Alan Sanfey, “Social Decision-Making: Insights from Game Theory and Neuroscience,”
Science
318, no. 5850 (October 2007): 598–602.

39
. Stephen Walt, “Rigor or Rigor Mortis?” (see chap. 36, n. 14).

40
. Jonah Lehrer,
How We Decide
(New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2009), 227.

41
. George E. Marcus, “The Psychology of Emotion and Passion,” in David O. Sears, Leonie Huddy, and Robert Jervis, eds.,
Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 182–221.

42
. The designations System 1 and System 2 come from Keith Stanovich and Richard West, “Individual Differences in Reasoning: Implications for the
Rationality Debate,”
Behavioral and Brain Sciences
23 (2000): 645–665. Daniel Kahneman has popularized the terms in his
Thinking Fast and Slow
(London: Penguin Books, 2011). J. St. B. T. Evans, “In Two Minds: Dual-Process Accounts of Reasoning,”
Trends in Cognition Science
7, no. 10 (October 2003): 454–459; “Dual-Processing Accounts of Reasoning, Judgment and Social Cognition,”
The Annual Review of Psychology
59 (January 2008): 255–278.

43
. Andreas Glöckner and Cilia Witteman, “Beyond Dual-Process Models: A Categorisation of Processes Underlying Intuitive Judgement and Decision Making,”
Thinking & Reasoning
16, no. 1 (2009): 1–25.

44
. Daniel Kahneman,
Thinking Fast and Slow
, 42.

45
. Alan G. Sanfey et al., “Social Decision-Making,” 598–602.

46
. Colin F. Camerer and Robin M. Hogarth, “The Effect of Financial Incentives,”
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty
19, no. 1–3 (December 1999): 7–42.

47
. Jennifer S. Lerner and Philip E. Tetlock, “Accounting for the Effects of Accountability,”
Psychological Bulletin
125, no. 2 (March 1999): 255–275.

48
. Daniel Kahneman, Peter P. Wakker, and Rakesh Sarin, “Back to Bentham? Explorations of Experienced Utility,”
The Quarterly Journal of Economics
112, no. 2 (May 1997): 375–405; Daniel Kahneman, “A Psychological Perspective on Economics,”
American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings
93, no. 2 (May 2003): 162–168.

49
. J. K. Rilling, A. L. Glenn, M. R. Jairam, G. Pagnoni, D. R. Goldsmith, H. A. Elfenbein, and S. O. Lilienfeld, “Neural Correlates of Social Cooperation and Noncooperation as a Function of Psychopathy,”
Biological Psychiatry
61 (2007): 1260–1271.

50
. Philip Tetlcok,
Expert Political Judgement
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 23.

51
. Alan N. Hampton, Peter Bossaerts, and John P. O'Doherty, “Neural Correlates of Mentalizing-Related Computations During Strategic Interactions in Humans,”
The National Academy of Sciences of the USA
105, no. 18 (May 6, 2008): 6741–6746; Sanfey et al.,
Social Decision-Making
, 598.

52
. David Sally, “Dressing the Mind Properly for the Game,”
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society London B
358, no. 1431 (March 2003): 583–592.

1
. Charles Lindblom, “The Science of ‘Muddling Through,' ”
Public Administration Review
19, no. 2 (Spring 1959): 79–88.