The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (125 page)

154.
Kindleberger,
World in Depression, ch
. 12 and pp. 280–87.

155.
Table from Hillman, “Comparative Strength of the Great Powers,” in Toynbee (ed.),
World in March 1939
, p. 439.

156.
Hathaway, “Economic Diplomacy in a Time of Crisis,” in Becker and Wells (eds.),
Economics and World Power
, p. 285.

157.
Ibid., pp. 309, 312. For a brief survey, Schulzinger,
America Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century
, pp. 147ff.

158.
This is well covered in MacDonald,
United States, Britain and Appeasement 1936–1939
, passim; and Carr,
Poland to Pearl Harbor, ch
. 1. See also D. Reynolds,
Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance 1937–1941
, chs. 1–2; A. Offner,
American Appeasement. United States Foreign Policy and Germany 1933–1938
(Cambridge, Mass., 1969); and N. Graebner,
America as a World Power
(Wilmington, Del., 1984), ch. 2.

159.
Millett and Maslowski,
For the Common Defense
, pp. 386ff; Mills,
Arms and Men
, pp. 237ff; J. A. Iseley and P. A. Crowl,
The U. S. Marines and Amphibious War
(Princeton, N.J., 1945); M. H. Gillie,
Forging the Thunderbolt
(Harrisburg, Pa., 1947); M. S. Watson,
Chief of Staff: Pre-War Plans and Preparations
(Washington, D.C., 1950); J. Major, “The Navy Plans for War, 1937–1941,” in Hagan (ed.),
In Peace and War
, pp. 237ff; Weighley,
History of the United States Army
, pp. 416ff.

160.
Robertson,
History of the American Economy
, pp. 709ff. The steel statistics
come from Hillmann, “Comparative Strength of the Great Powers,” in Toynbee (ed.),
World in March 1939
, p. 443 and fn.

161.
Figures from Wright,
Study of War
, p. 672.

162.
Figures from Hillmann, “Comparative Strength of the Great Powers,” in Toynbee (ed.),
World in March 1939
, p. 446.

163.
M. S. Kendrick,
A Century and a Half of Federal Expenditures
(New York, 1955), p. 12.

164.
The extensive literature upon Hitler’s views of the United States are conveniently summarized in Herwig,
Politics of Frustration
, pp. 179ff. See also the commentaries in Weinberg,
Foreign Policy of Hitlers Germany
, vols. 1–2; idem,
World in the Balance
(New Hampshire/London, 1981) pp. 53–136.

165.
Cited in Willmott,
Empires in the Balance
, p. 62; see also Pelz,
Race to Pearl Harbor
, pp. 217–18, 224.

166.
Cited in Thome,
Limits of Foreign Policy
, p. 90—a book which makes superfluous all previous studies of the Manchurian crisis.

167.
Ibid., pp. 148ff, 23Iff.

168.
Ibid., passim; Crowley,
Japans Quest for Autonomy
, pp. 161ff; A. Rappaport,
Henry L. Stimson and Japan, 1931–1933
(Chicago, 1963); Schulzinger,
American Diplomacy
, pp. 148ff.

169.
Crowley,
Japans Quest for Autonomy, ch
. 2; Storry,
History of Modern Japan
, pp. 186ff.

170.
Bennett,
German Rearmament and the West
, is best here.

171.
See above, pp. 315–20; and Howard,
The Continental Commitment, ch
. 5. The 1934 arguments for and against an Anglo-Japanese understanding are nicely covered in W. R. Louis, “The Road to Singapore: British Imperialism in the Far East 1932–42,” in Mommsen and Kettenacker (eds.),
Fascist Challenge and the Policy of Appeasement
, pp. 359ff.

172.
Ross,
The Great Powers and the Decline of the European States System
, pp. 85–87; Ulam,
Expansion and Coexistence, ch
. 5.

173.
This is now most fully covered in Rostow,
Anglo-French Relations 1934–36
, espec. ch. 5; but see also Taylor,
Origins of the Second World War, ch
. 5; Ross,
Great Powers
, pp. 90ff. The Anglo-German naval agreement is treated in E. Haraszti,
Treaty-Breakers or “Realpolitiker”? The Anglo-German Naval Agreement of June 1935
(Boppard, 1974).

174.
F. Hardie,
The Abyssinian Crisis
(London, 1974), passim; A. J. Marder, “The Royal Navy in the Italo-Ethiopian War 1935–36,”
American Historical Review
, vol. 75 (1970), pg. 1327–56; R.A.C. Parker, “Great Britain, France and the Ethiopian Crisis 1935–1936,”
English Historical Review
, vol. 89 (1974), pp. 293–32; Mack Smith,
Mussolini’s Roman Empire, ch
. 5; F. D. Laurens,
France and the Italio-Ethiopian Crisis, 1935–6
(The Hague, 1967); G. Baer,
Test Case: Italy, Ethiopia, and the League of Nations
(Stanford, Calif., 1976).

175.
Pelz,
Road to Pearl Harbor
, pt. 4.

176.
Now covered in J. T. Emmerson,
The Rhineland Crisis
(London, 1977), and E. Haraszti,
The Invaders: Hitler Occupies the Rhineland
(Budapest, 1983). See also Rostow,
Anglo-French Relations 1934–36
, pp. 233ff.

177.
See again Rohe (ed.),
Die Westmächte und das Dritte Reich
, passim.

178.
Ross,
Great Powers
, p. 98; see also MacDonald,
The United States, Great Britain, and Appeasement
, passim.

179.
See above, pp. 313–14.

180.
Although we still await the second volume of D. Dilks’s authoritative biography, the literature upon Chamberlain and “appeasement” is already enormous. For surveys, see the relevant chapters in Mommsen and Kettenacher (eds.),
Fascist Challenge and the Policy of Appeasement;
K. Middlemas,
Diplomacy of
Illusion: The British Government and Germany 1937–39
(London, 1972); M. Cowling,
The Impact of Hitler: British Politics and British Policies 1933–1940
, passim; Barnett,
Collapse of British Power, ch
. 5. Also very important is M. Gilbert,
Winston Churchill
, vol. 5,
1922–1939
(London, 1976).

181.
By far the most comprehensive analysis is now T. Taylor,
Munich: The Price of Peace
(New York, 1979); but see also A.J.P. Taylor,
Origins of the Second World War, ch
. 8; Middlemas,
Diplomacy of Illusion
, pp. 21 Iff; Weinberg,
Foreign Policy of Hitler’s Germany
, vol. 2, chs. 10–11; K. Robbins,
Munich, 1938
(London, 1968).

182.
W. Murray, “Munich, 1938; The Military Confrontation,”
Journal of Strategic Studies
, vol. 2 (1979), pp. 282–302; Barnett,
Collapse of British Power
, pp. 505ff; Kennedy,
Realities Behind Diplomacy
, pp. 291–93.

183.
The unfolding of events in 1939 is covered in Murray,
Change in the European Balance of Power
, chs. 8–10; Taylor,
Origins of the Second World War
, chs. 9–11; S. Aster,
1939: The Making of the Second World War
(London, 1973); Weinberg,
Foreign Policy of Hitlers Germany
, vol. 2, pp. 465ff; Barnett,
Collapse of British Power
, pp. 554ff; H. Graml (ed.),
Summer 1939: Die Grossmächte und der europäische Krieg
(Stuttgart, 1979); D. Kaiser,
Economic Diplomacy and the Origins of the Second World War
, pp. 263ff.

184.
For the overall strategical dimension in 1939–1940, see Kennedy,
Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery
, pp. 300ff; Murray,
Change in the European Balance of Power
, pp. 310ff; B. H. Liddell Hart,
History of the Second World War
(London, 1970), pp. 16ff;
Grand Strategy
, vols. 1 (Gibbs) and 2 (Butler).

185.
Murray,
Change in the European Balance of Power
, pp. 314–21; cf. Pratt,
East of Malta, West of Suez, ch
. 6; Gibbs,
Grand Strategy
, pp. 664ff; G. Schreiber et al.,
Der Mittelmeerraum und Südosteuropa
, vol. 3 of
Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg
(Stuttgart, 1984), ch. 1.

186.
K. A. Maier et al.,
Die Errichtung des Hegemonie auf dem europäischen Continent
, vol. 2 of
Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg
(Stuttgart, 1979), passim; Murray,
Change in the European Balance of Power, ch
. 10; idem,
Luftwaffe, ch
. 2; Overy,
Air War
, pp. 26–30; Posen,
Sources of Military Doctrine, ch
. 3; J. A. Gunsberg,
Divided and Conquered: The French High Command and the Defeat of the West, 1940
(Westport, Conn., 1979). For a good analysis of the reasons for the Allied inertia and the German decision to attack, see also J. Mearsheimer,
Conventional Deterrence
(Ithaca, N.Y., 1983), chs. 3–4.

187.
Knox,
Mussolini Unleashed
, is best on those repeated Italian disasters; but see also Schreiber et al.,
Mittelmeerraum
, pts. 2–3 and 5. For a more sympathetic account of Italy’s weaknesses, see J. L. Sadkovich, “Minerals, Weapons and Warfare: Italy’s Failure in World War II,” accepted for
Storia contemporanea
.

188.
Overy,
Air War
, p. 28; Kennedy,
Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery
, p. 309.

189.
Carr,
Poland to Pearl Harbor
, pp. 99ff; Reynolds,
Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance
, pp. 108ff. See also J. Leutze,
Bargaining for Supremacy: Anglo-American Naval Relations 1937–1941
(Chapel Hill, N.C., 1977).

190.
J. Lukacs,
The Last European War, September 1939/December 1941
(London, 1977); H. Baldwin,
The Crucial Years 1939–41
(New York, 1976); Carr,
Poland to Pearl Harbor
, passim. For the German side, A. Hillgruber,
Hitlers Strategie: Politik und Kriegsfuhrung 1940–41
(Frankfurt, 1965).

191.
Van Creveld,
Supplying War, ch
. 5; Murray,
Luftwaffe
, chs. 3–4; Milward,
German Economy at War
, pp. 39ff. For full details of the early campaigning, see H. Boog et al.,
Der Angriff auf die Sowjetunion
, vol. 4 of
Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg
(Stuttgart, 1983); and A. Clark,
Barbarossa: The Russo-German Conflict 1941–1945
(London, 1965), pp. 71–216. For the Russian
side, Erickson,
Road to Stalingrad
, passim; A. Seaton,
The Russo-German War 1941–45
(London, 1971).

192.
Erickson,
Stalingrad
, pp. 237ff; Carr,
From Poland to Pearl Harbor
, pp. 150ff.

193.
Willmott,
Empires in the Balance
, pp. 68ff, is best here; but see also J. Morley (ed.),
The Fateful Choice: Japans Advance into Southeast Asia, 1939–1941
(New York, 1980).

194.
Dupuy,
Genius for War
, appendix E.

1.
Quoted in Spector,
Eagle Against the Sun
, p. 123.

2.
For a brief summary, Liddell Hart,
History of the Second World War
, pp. 230–33; J. Neidpath,
The Singapore Naval Base and the Defense of Britain’s Eastern Empire 1919–41
(Oxford, 1981), ch. 8; Barclay,
Empire Is Marching
, chs. 8–9.

3.
Spector,
Eagle Against the Sun
, chs. 8–12; Liddell Hart,
History of the Second World War
, chs. 23 and 29.

4.
Liddell Hart,
History of the Second World War
, chs. 20–22, and 25.

5.
Ibid., ch. 24; S. W. Roskill,
The War at Sea
, 3 vols. (London, 1954–1961); F. H. Hinsley et al.,
British Intelligence in the Second World War
, vol. 2 (London, 1981), ch. 26.

6.
By far the best survey now is Murray,
Luftwaffe
, chs. 5–7; but see also N. Frankland,
The Bomber Offensive Against Germany
(London, 1965).