The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (124 page)

106.
In particular, see Young, “La Guerre de Longue Durée: Some Reflections on French Strategy and Diplomacy in the 1930s,” in Preston (ed.),
General Staffs and Diplomacy Before the Second World War
, pp. 41–64; and Posen,
Sources of Military Doctrine
, pp. 112ff, 127ff. For full diplomatic details, see Adamthwaite,
France and the Coming of the Second World War
, especially pt 3; the contributions to
Les Relations Franco-Britanniques 1935–39
(Paris, 1975); and Young,
In Command of France
, chs. 8–9.

107.
Apart from the details in Adamthwaite’s and Young’s books, see also Barnett,
Collapse of British Power;
Howard,
Continental Commitment;
and last but not least, J. C. Cairns, “A Nation of Shopkeepers in Search of a Suitable France,”
American Historical Review
, vol. 79 (1974), pp. 710–43.

108.
Figures from Kennedy,
Realities Behind Diplomacy
, p. 240. It is impossible to list even one-tenth of the studies upon British “appeasement” policies in the 1930s; but there are very useful summative essays in Mommsen and Kettenacker (eds.),
Fascist Challenge and the Power of Appeasement
, chs. 6–13 and 19–25; and massive detail (and an enormous bibliography) in G. Schmidt,
England in der Krise: Grundzüge und Grundlagen der britischen Appeasement-Politik, 1930–1937
(Opladen, 1981).

109.
See especially R. Ovendale,
Appeasement and the English-Speaking World
(Cardiff, 1975), as well as his ch. 23 in Mommsen and Ketternacker (eds.),
Fascist Challenge;
R. F. Holland,
Britain and the Commonwealth Alliance, 1918–1939
(London, 1981).

110.
B. Bond,
British Military Policy Between Two World Wars
(Oxford, 1980), espec. chs. 1 and 4, is best here.

111.
R. Meyers, “British Imperial Interests and the Policy of Appeasement,” and W. R. Louis, “The Road to Singapore: British Imperialism in the Far East 1932–1942,” both in Mommsen and Kettenacher (eds.),
Fascist Challenge;
A. J. Marder,
Old Friends, New Enemies: The Royal Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy
(Oxford, 1981); L. R. Pratt,
East of Malta, West of Suez: Britain’s Mediterranean Crisis
(London, 1975); S. W. Roskill,
Naval Policy Between the Wars
, vol. 2 (London, 1976).

112.
Kennedy,
British Naval Mastery, ch
. 10. For details of the policy implications, see the varying assessments in G. C. Peden,
British Rearmament and the Treasury 1932–1939
(Edinburgh, 1979); R. P. Shay,
British Rearmament in the Thirties: Politics and Profits
(Princeton, N.J., 1977); Barnett,
Collapse of British Power, ch
. 5; and N. H. Gibbs,
Grand Strategy
, vol. 1 (London, 1976), passim.

113.
For the economic recovery and newer industries, see Pollard,
Development of the British Economy, ch
. 3; H. W. Richardson,
Economic Recovery in Britain, 1932–1939
(London, 1967); B.W.E. Alford,
Depression and Recovery: British Economic Growth 1918–1939
(London, 1972).

114.
Cited in Howard,
Continental Commitment
, p. 99. For fuller details, see Peden,
British Rearmament and the Treasury
, chs. 3–4; see also R. Meyers,
Britische Sicherheitspolitik 1934–1938
(Düsseldorf, 1976); and Gibbs,
Grand Strategy
, vol. 1, ch. 4.

115.
Howard,
Continental Commitment
, pp. 120–21.

116.
Details in U. Bialer,
The Shadow of the Bomber: The Fear of Air Attack and British Politics 1932–1939
(London, 1980); M. Smith,
British Air Strategy Between the Wars
(Oxford, 1984), espec. pt. 2.

117.
For this argument, see especially Barnett,
Collapse of British Power
, and Murray,
Change in the European Balance of Power
.

118.
D. C. Watt,
Too Serious a Business: European Armed Forces and the Approach of the Second World War
(London, 1975), is the key work here.

119.
See again Dehio,
Precarious Balance
. For good surveys of the British Cabinet’s awareness of the country’s strategical dilemmas, see Barnett,
Collapse of British Power;
Howard,
The Continental Commitment;
Posen,
Sources of Military Doctrine, ch
. 5; D. Dilks, “The Unnecessary War? Military Advice and Foreign Policy in Great Britain 1931–1939,” in Preston (ed.),
General Staffs and Diplomacy Before the Second World War
, pp. 98–132; and G. Schmidt’s thoughtful essay in Rohe (ed.),
Die Westmächte und das Dritte Reich
, pp. 29–56.

120.
Schmidt, in Rohe (ed.),
Die Westmächte
, pp. 46ff; C. A. MacDonald,
United States, Britain and Appeasement, 1936–1939
, passim.

121.
Schmidt,
England in der Krise, ch
. 1, is best here; but see also the above-named works by Howard, Bond, Barnett, Dilks, Gibbs, and Meyers; and the good summary in G. Niedhart, “Appeasement: Die Britische Antwort auf die Krise des Weltreichs und des internationalen Systems vor dem Zweiten Weltkrieg,”
Historische Zeitschrift
, vol. 226 (1978), pp. 68–88.

122.
Barnett,
Collapse of British Power
, passim; Murray,
Change in the European Balance of Power
, passim; Kennedy,
Realities Behind Diplomacy
, pp. 290ff; A. Adamthwaite, “The British Government and the Media, 1937–1938,”
Journal of Contemporary History
, vol. 18 (1983), pp. 281–97.

123.
Cited in Barnett,
Collapse of British Power
, p. 564.

124.
Hillmann, “Comparative Strength of the Great Powers,” in Toynbee (ed.),
World in March 1939
, pp. 439, 446.

125.
For more details of this argument, see Kennedy, “Strategy versus Finance in Twentieth-Century Britain,” in
Strategy and Diplomacy
, pp. 100–6; and for an even more deterministic view, Porter,
Britain, Europe and the World
, pp. 86ff, 95ff.

126.
Figures from Pollard,
Peaceful Conquest
, p. 294; but see also Munting,
Economic Development of the USSR
, pp. 45ff; Nove,
Economic History of Russia
, chs. 6–10; and the interesting discussion in Grossman, “The Industrialization of Russia and the Soviet Union,” in Cipolla (ed.),
Fontana Economic History of Europe
, vol. 4, pt. 2, pp. 50Iff.

127.
S. H. Cohn,
Economic Development in the Soviet Union
(Lexington, Mass., 1970), pp. 70–71; F. D. Holzmann, “Financing Soviet Economic Development,” in Blackwell (ed.),
Russian Economic Development from Peter the Great to Stalin
, pp. 259–76; Kochan and Abraham,
Making of Modern Russia
, pp. 361ff. See also M. Lewin,
Russian Peasants and Soviet Power
(Evanston, 111., 1968).

128.
W. A. Lewis,
Economic Survey 1919–1939
(London, 1949), p. 131; Nove,
Economic History, ch
. 7; Munting,
Economic Development of the USSR
, p. 99; H. J. Ellison, “The Decision to Collectivize Agriculture,” in Blackwell (ed.),
Russian Economic Development from Peter the Great to Stalin
, pp. 241–55.

129.
On which see Munting,
Economic Development of the USSR
, pp. 106ff.

130.
Nove,
Economic History
, p. 232; Lewis,
Economic Survey
, p. 133; M. McCauley,
The Soviet Union Since 1917
(London, 1981), pp. 85–87.

131.
Munting,
Economic Development of the Soviet Union
, p. 93; Nove,
Economic History
, pp. 187ff; Blackwell,
Industrialization of Russia
, pp. 132ff; Lewis,
Economic Survey
, p. 125.

132.
See Hillmann, “Comparative Strength of the Great Powers,” in Toynbee (ed.),
World in March 1939
, pp. 439, 446; Black et al.,
Modernization of Japan and Russia
, pp. 195–97; S. H. Cohn, “The Soviet Economy: Performance and Growth,” in Blackwell (ed.),
Russian Economic Development from Peter the Great to Stalin
, pp. 321–51.

133.
Nove,
Economic History
, p. 236. For further details, see Kochan and Abraham,
Making of Modern Russia
, pp. 382ff; R. Conquest,
The Great Terror
(London, 1968).

134.
Nove,
Economic History
, p. 236.

135.
Figures from Overy,
Air War
, p. 21. The Italian figures for the years 1932–37 (not available in Overy) were provided by my colleague Brian Sullivan, but are only rough estimates; the same is true of the 1932–34 French figures, generally thought to be about 50 a month—see Young,
In Command of France
, p. 164. Relative neglect of the navy is covered in Mitchell,
History of Russia and Soviet Sea Power, ch
. 17.

136.
McNeill,
Pursuit of Power
, p. 350, fn. 77. For the subsequent comments on Soviet military development generally, see J. Erickson,
The Soviet High Command, 1918–1941
(London, 1962), passim; E. F. Ziemke, “The Soviet Armed Forces in the Interwar Period,” in Millett and Murray (eds.),
Military Effectiveness
, vol. 1; B. H. Liddell Hart (ed.),
The Red Army
(New York, 1956), chs. 3–9. Russian defense expenditures are detailed in Nove,
Economic History
, pp. 227–28; and Munting,
Economic Development of the USSR
, p. 114.

137.
Ulam,
Expansion and Coexistence
, chs. 5–6; J. Haslam,
The Soviet Union and the Struggle for Collective Security in Europe 1933–39
(New York, 1984); and J. Hochmann,
The Soviet Union and the Failure of Collective Security 1934–1938
(Ithaca, N.Y., 1984), are best here.

138.
Hillmann, “Comparative Strength of the Great Powers,” p. 446.

139.
M. Mackintosh, “The Red Army 1920–36,” in Liddell Hart (ed.),
Red Army
, p. 63.

140.
Erickson,
Soviet High Command
, pp. 532ff, 542ff; K. Dittmar and G. J. Antonov, “The Red Army in the Finnish War,” in Liddell Hart (ed.),
Red Army
, pp. 79–92. Above all, Coox,
Nomonhan
, passim.

141.
Erickson’s works—
The Soviet High Command; The Road to Stalingrad
, early chapters; and “Threat Identification and Strategic Appraisal by the Soviet Union, 1930–1941,” in May (ed.),
Knowing One’s Enemies
, pp. 375–423—are best here. For diplomatic background, see W. Carr,
Poland to Pearl Harbor
(London, 1985), chs. 3–4.

142.
Figures from Nove,
Economic History
, p. 228.

143.
Quoted in Munting,
Economic Development of the USSR
, p. 86; see also Ziemke, “Soviet Armed Forces,” passim, for the frantic preparations in 1939–1941.

144.
Rostow,
World Economy
, p. 210.

145.
See the excellent analysis in M. P. Leffler, “Expansionist Impulses and Domestic Constraints, 1921–1932,” in Becker and Wells (eds.),
Economics and World Power
, pp. 246–48.

146.
Hillmann, “Comparative Strength of the Great Powers,” in Toynbee (ed.),
World in March 1939
, pp. 421–22.

147.
Ibid., p. 422.

148.
Leffler, “Expansionist Impulses and Domestic Constraints,” in Becker and Wells (eds.),
Economics and World Power
, p. 258.

149.
For a good, succinct survey of American defense policy between the wars, see Millett and Maslowski,
For the Common Defense, ch
. 12.

150.
H. Yardley,
The American Black Chamber
(New York, 1931), pp. 262–63.

151.
See above, pp. 281–82.

152.
R. M. Hathaway, “Economic Diplomacy in a Time of Crisis,” in Becker and Wells (eds.),
Economics and World Power
, pp. 277–78.

153.
L. Silk, “Protectionist Mood: Mounting Pressure,”
New York Times
, Sept. 17, 1985, p. Dl; Robertson,
History of the American Economy
, pp. 516ff.