The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (119 page)

112.
Quoted in N. Mansergh,
The Commonwealth Experience
(London, 1969), p. 134.

113.
Kennedy,
Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism
, p. 307, and passim, for similar quotations.

114.
Quotation in G. R. Searle,
The Quest for National Efficiency 1899–1914
(Oxford, 1971), p. 5, with a wealth of further detail on this mood.

115.
Porter,
Lion’s Share
, pp. 353–54.

116.
Taylor,
Struggle for Mastery in Europe
, p. xxix; Peacock and Wiseman,
Growth of Public Expenditure in the United Kingdom
, p. 166; Kennedy,
Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, ch
. 17.

117.
Figures from W. Woodruff, “The Emergence of an Industrial Economy 1700–1914,” in Cipolla (ed.),
Fontana Economic History of Europe
, vol. 4, pt. 2,
The Emergence of Industrial Societies
, p. 707.

118.
On which theme see Porter’s excellent
Britian, Europe and the World
, passim.

119.
Kennedy,
Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery
, pp. 195ff.

120.
Mansergh,
Commonwealth Experience, ch
. 5; D. C. Gordon,
The Dominion Partnership in Imperial Defense 1870–1914
(Baltimore, Md., 1965).

121.
On which see J. Ehrman,
Cabinet Government and War 1890–1940
(Cambridge, 1958); F. A. Johnson,
Defense by Committee
(London, 1960).

122.
See note 102 above.

123.
Superbly analyzed in M. Howard,
The Continental Commitment
(London, 1972), passim.

124.
French,
British Economic and Strategic Planning
, passim; Kennedy, “Strategy versus Finance in Twentieth-Century Britain,” in
Strategy and Diplomacy
, pp. 89–106; and the stimulating treatment in Porter,
Britain, Europe and the World, ch
. 3.

125.
Cited in Fischer,
War of Illusions
, p. 402.

126.
The words are those of Buchanan, British ambassador to Russia, as quoted in K. Wilson, “British Power in the European Balance, 1906–1914,” in D. Dilks (ed.),
Retreat from Power: Studies in Britain’s Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century, 2
vols. (London, 1981), vol. 1, p. 39.

127.
Which are, respectively, the rough subtitle and the main title of R. Ropponen,
Die Kraft Russlands: Wie beurteilte die politische und militarische Führung der europäischen Grossmächte in der Zeit von 1905 bis 1914 die Kraft Russlands?
(Helsinki, 1968), an extraordinarily rich compilation.

128.
The following section on the Russian economy prior to 1914 is. based upon G. Grossman, “The Industrialization of Russia and the Soviet Union,” in Cipolla (ed.),
Fontana Economic History of Europe
, vol. 4, pt. 2, pp. 486ff; R. Munting,
The Economic Development of the USSR
(London, 1982), ch. 1; O. Crisp,
Studies in the Russian Economy Before 1914
(London, 1976), espec. ch. 1, “The Pattern of Industrialization in Russia, 1700–1914”; Seton-Watson,
Russian Empire
, pp. 506ff, 647ff; Blackwell,
Industrialization of Russia, ch
. 2; M. E. Falkus,
Industrialization of Russia 1700–1914
, chs. 7–9; Milward and Saul,
Development of the Economies of Continental Europe
, pp. 365–423; the comparisons in Black (ed.),
Modernization of Japan and Russia
, passim; and the many statistics in the older work of M. S. Miller,
The Economic Development of Russia, 1905–1914
(London, 1926).

129.
Crisp, “Pattern of Industrialization,” pp. 40–41.

130.
Munting,
Economic Development
, p. 34; Girault,
Emprunts russes et Investisements français en Russie
, passim; and J. P. Machay,
Pioneer for Profit: Foreign Entrepreneurs and Russian Industrialization
(Chicago/London, 1970), passim. For indigenous entrepreneurs, see R. Portal, “Muscovite Industrialists: The
Cotton Sector 1861–1914,” in W. L. Blackwell (ed.),
Russian Economic Development from Peter the Great to Stalin
(New York, 1974), pp. 161–96.

131.
Munting,
Economic Development
, p. 31. More generally, A. Gershrenkon,
Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective
(Cambridge, Mass., 1962); M. Falkus, “Aspects of Foreign Investment in Tsarist Russia,”
Journal of European Economic History
, vol. 8, no. 1 (Spring 1979), pp. 14–16. For the latest, very sophisticated (but therefore very complex) diagnosis, see P. Gatrell,
The Tsarist Economy, 1850–1917
(London, 1986), passim.

132.
See Tables 14–18 above; and A. Nove’s excellent comparative statistics in
An Economic History of the USSR
(Harmondsworth, Mddsx., 1969), pp. 14–15.

133.
Munting,
Economic Development
, pp. 27; Trebilcock,
Industrialization of the Continental Power
, pp. 216ff, 247ff.

134.
Grossman, “Industrialization of Russia and the Soviet Union,” p. 489.

135.
Ibid., p. 486.

136.
Lieven,
Russia and the Origins of the First World War
, p. 4. Chs. 1 and 5 of Lieven’s book are compelling in this respect, as is T. H. von Laue,
Sergei Witte and the Industrialization of Russia
(New York, 1963).

137.
Lieven,
Russia and the Origins of the First World War
, p. 13; H. Rogge,
Russia in the Age of Modernization and Revolution 1881–1917
(London, 1983), pp. 77ff; Falkus, “Aspects of Foreign Investment,” p. 10.

138.
Stone,
Europe Transformed
, pp. 257ff, is especially good here. See also Seton-Watson,
Russian Empire
, pp. 541ff; Milward and Saul,
Development of the Economies of Continental Europe
, pp. 397ff; J.H.L. Keep, “Russia,” in
NCMH
, vol. 9, p. 369.

139.
Stone,
Europe Transformed
, pp. 212–13. See also Blackwell,
Industrialization of Russia
, pp. 32ff.

140.
Stone,
Europe Transformed
, p. 244.

141.
Seton-Watson,
Russian Empire
, pp. 485ff, 607ff, 643ff; Rogge,
Russia in the Age of Modernization and Revolution, ch
. 9. For the army’s dislike of internal-police roles, see J. Bushnell,
Mutiny and Repression: Russian Soldiers in the Revolution of 1905–1906
(Bloomington, Ind., 1985), pp. 32ff.

142.
Lieven,
Russia and the Origins of the First World War, ch
. 5; Joll,
Origins of the First World War
, pp. 102ff.

143.
See Tables 14–18 above.

144.
K. Neilson, “Watching the ‘Steamroller’: British Observers and the Russian Army before
1914,” Journal of Strategic Studies
, vol. 8, no. 2 (June 1985), p. 213.

145.
And not surprising, since the War Office’s “Military Reports” on foreign countries covered “geography, topography, ethnography, defences, trade, resources, communications, political condition, etc.”—see T. G. Ferguson,
British Military Intelligence, 1870–1914
(Frederick, Md., 1984), p. 223.

146.
O. Crisp, quoted in Lieven,
Russia and the Origins of the First World War
, p. 9; and see the details in J. Bushnell, “Peasants in Uniform: The Tsarist Army as a Peasant Society,”
Journal of Social History
, vol. 13 (1980), pp. 565–76. See also A. K. Wildman,
The End of the Russian Imperial Army
(Princeton, 1980), chs. 1–2.

147.
The quotation is from Fuller, “The Russian Empire,” in May (ed.),
Knowing One’s Enemies
, p. 114, and passim. Also important here is J. Bushnell, “The Tsarist Officer Corps, 1881–1914: Customs, Duties, Inefficiencies,”
American Historical Review
, vol. 86 (1981), pp. 753–80; P. Kenez, “Russian Officer Corps Before the Revolution: The Military Mind,”
Russian Review
, vol. 31 (1972), pp. 226–36. Bushnell’s study
Mutiny and Repression
contains further eye-opening details, as does W. C. Fuller,
Civil-Military Conflict in Imperial Russia 18810–1914
(Princeton, N.J., 1985).

148.
Fuller, “Russian Empire,” passim; A. K. Wildman,
End of the Russian Imperial Army
, chs. 1–2; W. B. Lincoln,
Passage Through Armageddon: The Russians in the War and Revolution 1914–1918
(New York, 1986), pp. 52ff.

149.
Lieven,
Russia and the Origins of the First World War
, pp. 149–50; Stone,
Eastern Front
, p. 134 (from where the quotation comes).

150.
The confusions of prewar Russian planning are covered in Stone,
Eastern Front
, pp. 30ff; Lieven,
Russia and the Origins of the First World War, ch
. 5; L.C.F. Turner, “The Russian Mobilization in 1914,” rev. version, in Kennedy,
War Plans of the Great Powers
, pp. 252–62; Fuller, “Russian Empire,” pp. 111ff.

151.
Mitchell,
History of Russian and Soviet Sea Power
, p. 279.

152.
Doran and Parsons, “War and the Cycle of Relative Power,” p. 956.

153.
D. M. Pletcher, “1861–1898: Economic Growth and Diplomatic Adjustments,” in W. H. Becker and S. F. Wells (eds.),
Economics and World Power: An Assessment of American Diplomacy Since 1789
(New York, 1984), p. 120. For other surveys of this growth, see M. L. Eysenbach,
American Manufactured Exports 1897–1914: A Study of Growth and Comparative Advantage
(New York, 1976); H. G. Vatter,
The Drive to Industrial Maturity: The U
. S.
Economy, 1860–1914
(Westport, Conn., 1975 edn.).

154.
Stone,
Europe Transformed
, pp. 211ff; cf. R. M. Robertson,
History of American Economy
(New York, 1975 edn.), ch. 13.

155.
Barraclough,
Introduction to Contemporary History
, p. 51.

156.
Taken from Q. Wright,
Study of War
, pp. 670–71, with my calculations on per capita income.

157.
See Tables 15–16 above—but cf. Taylor,
Struggle for Mastery in Europe
, p. xxx.

158.
Farrar,
Arrogance and Anxiety
, p. 39, fn. 168.

159.
Ibid.; D. H. Aldcroft,
From Versailles to Wall Street: The International Economy in the 1920s
(Berkeley/Los Angeles, 1977), p. 98, Table 4.

160.
Keylor,
Twentieth-Century World
, p. 39; cf. Crouzet,
Victorian Economy
, p. 342, fn. 153.

161.
Woodruff,
America’s Impact on the World
, p. 161.

162.
W. LaFeber,
The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion 1860–1898
(Ithaca, N.Y., 1963); W. A. Williams,
The Roots of the Modern American Empire
(New York, 1969). For more general surveys of American foreign policy, see T. A. Bailey,
A Diplomatic History of the American People
(New York, 1974, edn.); R. D. Schulzinger,
American Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century
(New York/Oxford, 1984), chs. 2–3.

163.
Pletcher, “1861–1898,” pp. 124ff; T. McCormick,
China Market: America’s Quest for Informal Empire
(Chicago, 1967); D. G. Munro,
Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean 1900–1921
(Princeton, N.J., 1964); E. R. May,
Imperial Democracy: The Emergence of America as a Great Power
(New York, 1961), pp. 5–6; Perkins,
Great Rapprochement
, pp. 122ff.

164.
For a critical analysis, see M. de Cecco,
Money and Empire: The International Gold Standard 1890–1914
(Oxford, 1974), pp. 110–126; for the 1907 crisis, see J. H. Clapham,
The Economic History of Modern Britain
, 3 vols. (Cambridge, 1938), vol. 3, pp. 55ff.

165.
The literature upon the motives and actions of American imperialism between 1895 and 1914 is colossal. Apart from the references in notes 162 and 163. above, see also R. Dallek,
The American Style of Foreign Policy
(New York, 1983), chs. 1–3; E. R. May,
American Imperialism: A Speculative Essay
(New York, 1968); G. F. Linderman,
The Mirror of War: American Society and the Spanish-American War
(Ann Arbor, Mich., 1974); Howard K. Beale,
Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power
(New York, 1962 edn.).