The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (116 page)

75.
Quoted in D.C.B. Lieven,
Russia and the Origins of the First World War
(London, 1983), p. 21. See also D. Beyrau,
Militär und Gesellschaft im vorrevolutionären Russland
(Göttingen, 1984).

76.
W. E. Mosse,
Alexander 11 and the Modernization of Russia
(New York, 1962 edn.), passim; Kochan and Abraham,
Making of Modern Russia
, ch. 10; Seton-Watson,
Russian Empire
, pt. 4; Falkus,
Industrialization of Russia 1700–1914
, ch. 5; Blackwell,
Industrialization of Russia
, ch. 2.

77.
See again Dukes,
Emergence of the Super-Powers
, chs. 3–4; Gollwitzer,
Geschichte des weltpolitischen Denkens
, vol. 1, chs. 3–4.

78.
Covered in K. Bourne,
Britain and the Balance of Power in North America 1815–1908
(London, 1967).

79.
“Correlates of War” print-out data; for the railway mileages, see W. W. Rostow,
The World Economy, History and Prospect
(Austin, Texas, 1978), p. 152. See also W. H. Becker and S. F. Wells, Jr. (eds.),
Economics and World Power: An Assessment of American Diplomacy Since 1789
(New York, 1984), pp. 56ff.

80.
The literature upon the American Civil War is staggeringly large. I found most useful H. Hattaway and A. Jones,
How the North Won: A Military History of the Civil War
(Urbana, 111., 1983); P. J. Parish,
The American Civil War
(New York, 1975); A. R. Millett and P. Maslowski,
For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America
(New York, 1984), chs. 6–7; R. F. Weigley,
History of the United States Army
(Bloomington, Ind., 1984 edn.), chs. 10–11; Ropp,
War in the Modern World
, pp. 175–194; Addington,
Patterns of War
, pp. 62–82.

81.
Millett and Maslowski,
For the Common Defense
, p. 155.

82.
R. F. Weigley,
The American Way of War: A History of the United States Military Strategy and Policy
(Bloomington, Ind., 1977 edn.); Millett and Maslowski,
For the Common Defense
, passim.

83.
For brief details of that position, see K. Bourne,
Victorian Foreign Policy 1830–1902
(Oxford, 1970), pp. 90–96; and, in much more detail, E. D. Adams,
Great Britain and the American Civil War, 2
vols. (London, 1925).

84.
J. Luvaas,
The Military Legacy of the Civil War: The European Inheritance
(Chicago, 1959), passim.

85.
For post-Crimean War diplomacy in Europe, see Bridge and Bullen,
Great Powers and the European State System
, pp. 88ff; Albrecht-Carrié,
Diplomatic History
, pp. 94ff; W. E. Mosse,
The Rise and Fall of the Crimean System 1855–71
(London, 1963);
NCMH
, vol. 10, ch. 10, pp. 268ff; A. J. P. Taylor,
The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848–1918
(Oxford, 1954), pp. 83ff.

86.
Rothenberg,
Army of Francis Joseph
, pp. 52ff.

87.
McNeill,
Pursuit of Power
, ch. 7; C. Harvie,
War and Society in the 19th Century
, block 4, unit 10 of
War and Society
(The Open University, Bletchley, 1973); Strachan,
European Armies
, ch. 8; Ropp,
War in the Modern World
, ch. 6; Showalter,
Railroads and Rifles
, passim;
NCMH
, vol. 10, ch. 12; M. Glover,
Warfare from Waterloo to M0Ons
(London, 1980), pts. 2–3.

88.
For Prussian military developments, see again Dupuy,
Genius for War
, pp. 75ff; Showalter,
Railroads and Rifles
, passim; Strachan,
European Armies
, pp. 98ff. For the mistakes made in 1866, see M. van Creveld,
Command in War
(Cambridge, Mass., 1985), ch. 4; G. A. Craig,
The Battle of Koeniggratz
(London, 1965), passim. The Austrian side is summarized in Rothenberg,
Army of Francis Joseph
, pp. 66ff.

89.
See again van Creveld,
Command in War
, pp. 140ff; M. Howard,
The Franco-Prussian War
(London, 1981 edn.), passim.

90.
For military details, see Craig,
Koeniggratz
, passim; for the diplomatic and political background, O. Pflanze,
Bismarck and the Development of Germany: The Period of Unification 1815–1871
(Princeton, N.J., 1963), chs. 13–15.

91.
Howard,
Franco-Prussian War
, offers outstanding coverage of these events. For French military weaknesses, see also R. Holmes,
The Road to Sedan: The French Army, 1866–70
(London, 1984).

92.
Howard,
Franco-Prussian War
, p. 1; and Holmes,
Road to Sedan
, passim, for the French side.

93.
The raw figures are available in Flora,
State, Economy and Society in Western Europe 1815–1975
, vol. 1; and in B. R. Mitchell,
European Historical Statistics 1750–1975
(2nd edn., New York, 1981), e.g., coal figures on p. 381, etc. For comparative analyses of the two nations’ economies, see again Trebilcock,
Industrialization of the Continental Powers
, chs. 2–3; Kemp,
Industrialization in Nineteenth-Century Europe
, chs. 3–4; Landes,
Unbound Prometheus
, ch. 4.

94.
The diplomacy of the Franco-Prussian War is covered in Taylor,
Struggle for Mastery in Europe
, pp. 201–17; W. E. Mosse,
The European Powers and the German Question 1848–1870
(Cambridge, 1958); E. Kolb (ed.),
Europa und die Reichsgründung (Historische Zeitschrift
, Beiheft 6, Munich, 1980), passim; Bridge and Bullen,
Great Powers and the European States System
, pp. 108ff.

95.
On which see A. Mitchell,
The German Influence in France After 1870: The Formation of the French Republic
(Chapel Hill, N.C., 1979); and idem,
Victors and Vanquished: The German Influence on Army and Church in France after 1870
(Chapel Hill, N.C., 1984).

96.
See the revealing figures in Taylor,
Struggle for Mastery in Europe
, pp. xxiv-xxvi (and the remark on p. xxiii, fn. 4); also D. Mack Smith,
Italy: A Modern History
(Ann Arbor, Mich., 1959); and C. J. Lowe and F. Marzari,
Italian Foreign Policy 1870–1940
(London, 1975).

97.
To use the terms employed by P. W. Schroeder, “The Lost Intermediaries: The Impact of 1870 on the European System,”
International History Review
, vol. 6 (1984), p. 14.

98.
On the implications of which, see ibid., passim.

99.
Taylor,
Struggle for Mastery in Europe
, pp. 218ff; Bridge and Bullen,
Great Powers and the European State System
, pp. 112ff; W. L. Langer,
European Alliances and Alignments 1871–1890
(New York, 1950 edn.), passim; Grenville,
Europe Reshaped 1848–1878
, ch. 18. British policy is well covered in K. Hildebrand, “Grossbritannien und die deutsche Reichsgründung,” in Kolb (ed.),
Europa und die Reichsgründung
, pp. 37ff.

100.
For a good discussion, see A. Hillgruber,
Bismarcks Aussenpolitik
(Freiburg, 1972), briefly summarized in idem,
Die gescheiterte Grossmacht: Eine Skizze des Deutschen Reiches 1871–1945
(Düsseldorf, 1980), pp. 17–30.

101.
A. Hillgruber, “Die ‘Krieg-in-Sicht’-Krise 1875,” in E. Schulin (ed.),
Gedenkschrift Martin Göhring, Studien zur europäischen Geschichte
(Wiesbaden, 1968), pp. 239–53; P. Kennedy,
The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860–1914
(London/Boston, 1980), pp. 29–31.

102.
Hillgruber,
Die gescheiterte Grossmacht
, pp. 30ff.; and for stimulating discuszation
sions of the longer-term issues, see D. Calleo,
The German Problem Reconsidered: Germany and the World Order, 1870 to the Present
(New York/Cambridge, 1978), espec. chs. 2–4; W. D. Gruner,
Die deutsche Frage: Ein Problem der europäischen Geschichte seit 1800
(Munich, 1985), passim; K. Hildebrand, “Staatskunst oder Systemzwang? Die ‘Deutsche Frage’ als Problem der Weltpolitik,”
Historische Zeitschrift
, no. 228 (1979).

103.
Taylor,
Struggle for Mastery in Europe
, pp. 228ff; Langer,
European Alliances and Alignments
, chs. 3–5; B. Jelavich,
The Great Powers, the Ottoman Empire, and the Straits Question 1870–1887
(Bloomington, Ind., 1973).

104.
Quoted in Seton-Watson,
Russian Empire
, p. 455. For the naval side, see Mitchell,
A History of Russian and Soviet Sea Power
, pp. 184–90. More generally, see B. H. Sumner,
Russia and the Balkans 1870–1880
(London, 1937).

105.
See the essays by Beyrau (on Russia) and Rumpler (on Austria-Hungary) in Kolb (ed.),
Europa und die Reichsgründung;
Taylor,
Struggle for Mastery in Europe, ch
. 12; Langer,
European Alliances and Alignments
, chs. 6–7; W. Windelband,
Bismarck und die europäischen Grossmächte 1878–85
(Essen, 1940); B. Waller,
Bismarck at the Crossroads
(London, 1974).

106.
Taylor,
Struggle for Mastery in Europe, ch
. 13; Langer,
European Alliances and Alignments
, chs. 7–9;
NCMH
, vol. 11, chs. 20–22.

107.
Kennedy,
Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery
, pp. 189–90.